A political economy approach to the impact of the WTO’s accession process on Vietnam’s economic reform: a case of compliance? by Pham, Gia Son
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
A Political Economy Approach to the Impact of 
the WTO’s Accession Process on Vietnam’s 
Economic Reform: A Case of Compliance? 
 
 
 
 
 
Gia Son Pham 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
London, February 2013 
 
 i 
DECLARATION 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work 
other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the 
extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in 
it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party. 
 
  
  
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
This research examines the impact of the WTO accession process on the 
economic reform process of Vietnam. The WTO accession provided a decisive external 
force to accelerate and lock-in domestic reforms. Accession acted as a template to 
inform and structure the reform process. The process was utilised by reformers help 
rescue Vietnam from economic crisis. With the extensive reform of economic 
institutions, the opening up to the market economy and the input of foreign capital, the 
Vietnamese economy showed rapid growth, moving from being the poorest country in 
the world to a middle ranking economy by 2013. 
 
In the first and second chapters the objectives of the thesis are explained and the 
contextual framework and research design are presented, with the focus being on the 
economic reform of Vietnam. A literature review is followed by a comparative analysis 
of China’s accession to the WTO. 
 
In the third and fourth chapters, both the Vietnam political and economic 
systems and processes are presented in the context of Vietnam’s transition from a 
centrally commanded economy to a market economy. A full examination is made done 
of the Communist Party and its governance mechanisms. Chapters five, six and seven 
concentrate on three case studies that evaluate the impact of the WTO on three Vietnam 
economic sectors; Agriculture, Banking and Textiles. 
 
The conclusion demonstrates that the thesis research provides a unique new 
contribution to the literature as it revealed limits to the reach of WTO accession in 
accelerating domestic reforms. It identified the structural impediments to the full-
fledged transformation of what was an insulated command economy into a globally 
integrated market economy. Endemic corruption, a growing debt burden and the 
influence of a powerful and wealthy elite interest group now threaten the Vietnam 
economy with a severe financial crisis. The reforms have failed to provide the necessary 
tools to avert the impending crisis. How and why this is the case is explained in the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to the research 
 
This thesis exams the impact and role of WTO accession and membership upon 
Vietnam, and the subsequent affect it has had upon the reform process, with the 
economy converting from a centrally controlled system to a free market economy. 
However, its findings have drawn the thesis away from a constructive examination of 
the impact upon reforms of compliance to the WTO commitments and turned it towards 
an examination of a case of non-compliance, in which WTO accession and membership 
has illustrated how a developing country can, and has, resisted the reforms necessary for 
a true movement towards a market economy. Subsequently, the case studies and 
research focuses on domestic reforms in the context of commitments to the WTO and 
the reason why the credibility of even the most observable changes, such as in 
regulatory reform and establishment of new institutions, has to be questioned. The 
primary findings become not the type, degree and application of WTO commitments 
and the negotiations in formulating them, but rather the shape and form of internal, 
domestic resistance that negates many of the changes appearing to take place in the 
Vietnam economy. So deep is the resistance that the WTO becomes merely another 
player in a political and economic strategy of survival of the Vietnam Communist Party. 
Domestic reform is predicated on the grounds of political survival and not on economic 
growth or sustainable development, resulting in a thesis that has no choice but to assign 
the Vietnam case as a clear demonstration of the levels of non-compliance possible in a 
process formulated on supposed ‘commitments’ to an international organisation. The 
outcomes of such a strategy are now just becoming clear, and although the ‘eye’ of this 
hurricane of economic disaster is still to appear, the signs all point to an impending 
crisis of the gravest nature. The thesis examines the evidence for this hypothesis and 
presents the impact of the WTO as a force to bring transparency to an otherwise opaque 
economic situation, uncovering a variety of domestic issues where faults are far more 
apparent in the light of WTO commitments to reform. The actual reform process began 
in earnest with the advent of Doi Moi. 
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Doi Moi1, in 1986, began a movement from the centrally controlled system to a 
free market based upon ‘openness’ and ‘renovation’. This was a gradual process as the 
country retained many of the supports, relationships and politics of communism. Doi 
Moi was the country’s first major domestic reform in transformation of the economy 
and eventually progressed towards WTO accession. That accession was only made 
possible by the initial changes that occurred through Doi Moi and its subsequent 
packages of reforms, and when the global market judged reform to have sufficiently 
moved towards free market principles. That reform process, although successful, saw 
many difficulties remain and the challenges presented required a new acceleration of 
reforms that arrived with the onset of WTO accession. 
 
WTO accession provided another means to reform the economy and in the 
process facilitated resistance against the conservatives and anti-reformist in the 
government and business world. WTO accession in Vietnam is not only an economic 
tool for reform, but in Vietnam, has played a part in promoting liberal democracy, 
challenging the sustainability of a communist regime and bringing into question the 
viability of the communist’s leadership role in a market economy. The political impacts 
upon reform have often resulted in serious flaws in the Vietnam economy remaining, 
such as the continued power and dominance of State Owned Enterprises and central 
control through them of the economy by the Communist Party. Reform through 
conversion to a market economy and the strengthening of that through WTO 
membership, are powerful influences upon political transformation, first being used by 
Vietnamese reformists to counter the resistance against economic and political reform 
of Vietnam, but also by the major actors in the global markets to impact upon Vietnam 
and bring about social, economic and political change. The main actors in the WTO (ex. 
USA), also see it as a way to promote liberal democracy. On the one hand it opens up 
new markets, and access to resources- such as cheap labour, while also providing 
political gateways for change. 
 
                                                
1 Doi Moi is the economic reforms process initiated in Vietnam in 1986 with the goal of creating a 
"socialist-oriented market economy”. 
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Vietnam is a similar case to China, where economic reform is also taking place 
against the background of continued dominance of the Communist ideology. But, China 
is much larger than Vietnam and very different in many ways, such as the size of 
population, types of economic activity, etc. The two systems are very different types of 
communism. Added to this is the particular aspects of Vietnam that make it a unique 
study- coming out of many years of war and the subsequent destruction of those wars, 
being culturally very different, etc. 
 
The thesis presents a comparison with China, but focuses chiefly on how reform, 
Communist political dominance and the impact of the WTO affected three main areas of 
the Vietnamese economy: The Textile and Garment industry, Banking and the 
Agriculture industry. Originally envisaged as a study of the positive reforms from WTO 
accession and the changing nature of the economy, the hypothesis of this thesis was 
dramatically changed by the research itself, with clear evidence uncovered that, rather 
than eventually leading to economic success, the WTO accession is beginning to reveal 
the structural problems that threaten economic collapse and crisis. It also showed that 
rather than reasoned and planned strategies for reform brought about by choices made 
through economic logic, the Vietnamese political and economic system is more often 
only changed by impending and disastrous crisis that threatens total collapse if 
adjustments are not made. When faced with virtually no choices but disaster or reform, 
the Vietnam Communist Party has only then welcomed the onset of reform on any 
effective level. WTO accession was originally seen by the author as primary evidence of 
an open arms welcome to the impacts and demands of free markets economics, but 
instead, the research showed that WTO accession forced changes only where the Party 
believed it could control the effects and the Party changing many ‘appearances’ of the 
economic system but retaining the basic elements of a centrally controlled system that 
ensured political dominance over all major areas of the economy. Equally disturbing has 
been the realisation that rather than providing access to global markets and the 
subsequent necessity for transparency, efficiency and competitiveness, WTO accession 
and membership has not prevented an increase in corruption in business and 
Government and left the economy on the verge of collapse, brought about by a refusal 
to actually change the basic underlying structures of the economy. To clarify such a 
statement, it should be made clear that the WTO accession process has not been the 
cause of such a situation, but rather the victim of an embedded Vietnam political and 
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business culture that continues to avoid embracing the competitive forces of the market 
economy, and instead remains in the control of ‘relationships’, cronyism and political 
and economic corruption on a scale that the forces of the market and the domestic 
‘systems’ developed for WTO membership have failed to alter or deter.  
 
The WTO accession and membership has been successful in providing the right 
impetus for reforms and in structuring those reforms in a more knowledgeable and 
professional way, such as the wholesale reform of the law and the introduction of new 
processes and systems for government administration and management of the business 
world. This success has provided the major challenge and in many ways the Vietnam 
economy has failed to meet those challenges. For example, the law on foreign direct 
investment has been aligned with WTO principles and for the first years, FDI improved 
at dramatic rates, but is now in the worst decline in South East Asia. The reasons for 
this include the Government failure to fully open up the economy to foreign businesses, 
the lack of any significant overspill of capital, technology and efficient management 
skills into the domestic Vietnam businesses, the numerous cases of corruption on a scale 
involving billions of USD and the unwillingness of Vietnam companies to actually 
change the way they do business in order to ‘fit’ into the international model. In 
Banking, the WTO accession brought international capital, skills and knowledge into 
the Banking sector, with economic growth providing ideal conditions for profitable and 
long-standing improvement of the Vietnamese Banks. Yet, in less than a decade, the 
benefits of WTO developments of the banking sector have been virtually wiped away as 
Banks find themselves billions in debt from the Government directed forced lending to 
State Owned Enterprises. Vietnamnet News (2012) recently reported that: 
 
 “In other countries, the ratio of outstanding loans on the capital mobilized from 
businesses and individuals is less than 100 percent, while the safety line is 80 percent. 
Indonesia and the Philippines, which are considered as having similar conditions with 
Vietnam, have the very low ratios, while Vietnam’s is 104.2 percent. The bad debt ratio 
of the banking system, according to the State Bank, is about 3 percent. However, 
international credit rating firms believe that the actual figure is higher. Fitch Ratings 
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believes that Vietnam’s bad debt is 3-4 times higher than the official figure released by 
the State Bank, if calculating bad debts in accordance with the international standards”.2 
 
This aversion to actually carrying out reforms that totally move away from 
central control of the economy has brought the whole question of WTO benefits and 
costs to the forefront of the economy, not only showing the failures to significantly 
change the way the economy is run, but also a continuous process of trying to hide the 
fact with false reporting of statistics and the creation of dual systems where companies 
continue a covert pattern of business through ‘relationships’ and cronyism, while the 
‘face’ is presented as abiding by the changes required to meet the demands of the free 
market. 
 
Throughout the thesis the research revealed alarming facts and was presented 
with two ways to view accession and membership of the WTO. The first was in line 
with the original hypothesis: namely that WTO accession was a vital step in carrying 
forward reforms, accelerating and deepening their impact while also acting as a 
template to inform and re-structure the reform process. With the extensive reform of 
economic institutions, the opening up to the free market and the input of foreign capital, 
the Vietnamese economy showed rapid growth, the control of inflation and a 
transformation from a controlled economy to a free market. However, research into the 
three case studies and the Vietnam economy in general, revealed a second face that 
required careful navigation through the propaganda and suspicious data of the 
Government. This revealed the flaws in the model presented, and could not avoid the 
conclusion that the movement from a central control to a free market system was not 
actually taken on in a thorough and deep way, but instead has involved a refusal to fully 
reform the system and now clearly shows that Central Government control covertly 
remains the dominant form of managing the economy. In addition it has shown that the 
chief flaw in the present system is the increase, and almost critical impact, of 
corruption, with the now almost totally embedded systems of corruption threatening the 
Banks and many of the major State Owned Enterprises with collapse under the growing 
burdens of debt. For example, the real estate market is in crisis as the value of land and 
                                                
2 Vietnamnet News, 14th June 2012, “Bank sneezes, the national economy catches a chill” 
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property slumps and numerous investors find themselves searching for liquidity. Yet the 
depth of crisis and the true assessment of the situation is impossible to calculate, while 
investor are also unable to reveal the true debts, because almost all deals involve on-
going hidden charges, such as ‘bribes’ to officials to gain possession of land or rights to 
actually build on it. Much of these ‘hidden charges’ are linked to the investors 
‘borrowing’ money to pay them. Because of the ‘unofficial’ means that the finances are 
often sourced from, the debtor is often left with loans from ‘unconventional’ providers 
that involves incurring excessive interest rates and even dangerous terms for non-
repayment. These practical problems are aggravated by systemic faults in the Vietnam 
governance model. 
 
The Party and the Government have retained a central control of the economy 
through the SOEs and continue to use the system of administration as a means to 
provide vast fortunes to individuals who have used the Political and economic systems 
for personal gain only. In a recent meeting of the Politburo, the Communist Party Chief, 
Nguyen Phu Trong, declared that the ‘immoral lifestyles of some Party members’ and 
their families was the main cause of Vietnam’s present economic problems (An Diem, 
2012). 
 
The thesis fully examines this hybrid system of WTO accession providing 
support for market economy reform, while also secretly retaining the old system of 
central control. Its path shows that in less than a decade of reform through openness and 
an often covert conservative refusal to reform, the Vietnam economy has reached a 
cross-roads, where there are signs that Vietnam’s growth is on a reverse track and 
economic crisis is one of the strongest possibilities for the future. 
 
The WTO and its impact on the Vietnamese economy are the central targets of 
this study. The WTO administers trade agreements negotiated among its members and 
is the international institution that deals with international trade, ensuring smooth, fair 
and predictable global trade flows. The main contingent of those seeking membership 
are developing and transitional economies. WTO membership provides countries with: 
1. Opportunities for access to new markets,  
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2. Protection for transitional economies against the trade blocking measures of 
the more dominant ones,  
3. The strengthening of the domestic institution-policy establishment,  
4. Helps prevent an erosion of past reforms and guards against pressures from 
interest groups by locking-in such reforms through binding international 
commitments (Michalopoulos, 2002; Drabek and Laird, 1998).3 
 
WTO membership is essential in reform of developing countries, as they require 
greater market access and protection against any arbitrary actions by bigger players. The 
reform success often generates the need for further reform, such as further liberalisation 
in trade and investment4, the development of a new regulatory regime for SOEs and the 
private sector in order to encourage competitiveness and integration into the world 
economy. Further reform is often technically and administratively more difficult than 
the initial stages and often encounters political resistance (Krueger, 2000). Under such 
circumstances, developing countries are rushing to become WTO members with the 
hope that the WTO will help support and accelerate reform processes. 
 
Despite the success of the WTO, there remain a number of contentious issues, 
such as claims from developing countries about the lack of fairness and asymmetrical 
gains. After the Uruguay Round, international trade practices on the part of developed 
countries focused on the benefits they could gain from membership, although many 
developed countries continued to provide protection and subsidies and engage in 
‘dumping’. WTO members have negotiated several agreements covering both border 
and non-border issues. The trade-related issues often burden developing countries with 
administrative and economic costs (Katrak and Strange, 2004; Finger, 2001).  
 
                                                
3 Krueger, 1998; Sally, 1999; Langhammer and Lucke,1998 
4 Further trade liberalisation often entails greater reduction of tariffs in goods, service sector market 
access, and trade related processes or behind the border issues such as custom valuation, trade facilitation, 
etc.  
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Under the principle of ‘single undertaking’, all WTO members have to sign and 
implement all WTO agreements. Apart from Special and Differential Treatment 
provisions, developing countries are obliged to make trade related policies fully 
compatible with their WTO commitments (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). However, 
efforts to liberalise global trade through the WTO have achieved limited progress since 
the Doha Round in 2001. The large and unwieldy agenda, coupled with a chaotic UN-
style decision-making process and a vastly expanded membership, has raised concerns 
about the organisations future. The failure of the Doha Round (Geneva 2008) was a 
vivid illustration of these controversies and concerns. Negotiations resulted in a 
disappointing stalemate and major differences remain between members over trade 
policy priorities. Mr.Lamy5 said “members have simply not been able to bridge their 
differences”, while an US Trade Representative declared “it may be that this grand-
scale agreements format that we have been operating under since 1947 needs to be 
reviewed” (Beattie, 2008, pp.1-2). 
 
WTO membership still plays an important role in the economic development of 
developing countries, as its rules help to strengthen domestic institutions and policy 
systems and prevent the retreat of previous reforms by a lock-in through binding 
international commitments. WTO rules can become guidelines for determining which 
trade restrictions to impose or retain and which to avoid, providing a basis for 
government resistance to domestic pressures for protection, and allowing use of WTO 
rules as a mould for unilateral policy choices. Accession is a powerful and effective 
measure to counteract protectionists groups and to mobilise support for the reform 
stages, where political resistance against further reform is growing and entrenched. 
Countries seeking WTO membership use the accession process to overhaul their 
economic management institutions. WTO membership requires the policies of acceding 
countries to be in line with the provisions of the main international agreements. The 
policies help adapt laws and redesign institutions to make the market operate free from 
government controls (Drabek and Laird, 1998). WTO membership is regarded as a 
means to accelerate domestic reform and prevent the retreat in reforms, while also 
gaining credibility from the international business community. It indicates a willingness 
                                                
5 Mr. Pascal Lamy is the General Secretary of the WTO 
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on the part of acceding countries to implement far-reaching changes in domestic 
policies and institutions. 
 
Economic liberalisation sees developing countries liberalise their economies via 
three major tracks (Sally, 2006). They can undertake unilateral reform, reciprocal 
liberalisation such as bilateral, regional or multilateral liberalisation and finally, via 
agreements with donors (reform under conditions set by IMF or World Bank in order to 
receive financial and technical aids). Literature also points out that unilateral economic 
liberalisation should be given first priority and that multilateral tracks can serve as a 
helpful auxiliary to unilateral liberalisation. Multilateralism provides a springboard for 
further and deeper unilateral reforms (Sally, 1999). Accession is a multilateral process 
for liberalising the economies of developing countries and is an auxiliary to unilateral 
liberalisation. 
 
1.2 The political economy of reform 
 
The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented effort on the part of 
developing countries to reform their economies. Integration of developing countries into 
the world economy is an enabler for their economic successes (Winter and Finger, 
1998). In the second half of the last century there were many success stories where 
developing countries opened their economies and became new economic powers. These 
have acted as examples for other countries that are struggling to find appropriate 
development policies. Reform is not always smooth and there are internal and external 
factors that discourage, retard and even reverse the process. Countries intent on a 
successful economic liberalisation have to utilise different methods to overcome these 
difficulties. 
 
Most developing countries adopted a very similar set of ‘import substitution 
industrialisation’ policies, with the aim of catching up to the level of development of 
industrialised countries. This strategy for achieving fast economic growth often relied 
on state intervention in international trade and investment, especially through trade 
barriers, government planning and investment policy. Since the 1970s these policies 
often failed to achieve their purpose, and the economic imbalance of the trade and 
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budget deficits was the result, accompanied by inefficient government investment 
practices and the adverse control of international trade that forced countries into debt. 
The situation worsened with the impacts of the oil price crisis and the world recession in 
the 1970s.  
 
Facing threats from the internal and external environments, developing countries 
had few options but to adjust their policies in a market friendly direction. Many 
recognised the problem and started unilateral reform, while others liberalised their 
economies with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank under 
Structural Adjustment Loan Schemes. The 1980s witnessed the demise of ‘import 
substitution industrialisation’ policies in developing countries, and this was accelerated 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the late 1990s, most developing countries had 
attempted liberal and market oriented policy reform (Krueger, 2000).  
 
The economic reforms aim to limit the role of government and encourage a 
stable macroeconomic environment, liberalise trade, privatise State Owned Enterprises 
and promote the private sector. Reform focuses on macroeconomic stabilisation and 
structural adjustment, with programmes varying in scope, content, commitments, 
political support and results. Such variation in reform effort and its results suggest that 
the economic reform process is not an easy and natural process, but is complex and 
influenced by many natural, economic and political factors. The pace at which 
governments adopt economic reform is determined by domestic political factors. 
Economic reform imposes short-term economic and political costs on decision-makers 
and on many powerful groups with vested interests in the status quo (Krueger, 1993). 
Changes in income distribution generate conflict between interest groups affecting the 
balance between support and opposition during the policymaking process. The interest 
groups that gained most from import substitution stand to lose the most from 
stabilisation and structural adjustment. Import competing firms benefiting from credit 
subsidies are hardest hit as government payments are substitutions for operating 
inefficiencies. Vietnam workers in the urbanised non-traded goods sector who had 
benefited from subsidies for basic service such as utilities, transportation, and essential 
food items are also hit hard by budget cuts. Public sector employment suffers as budget 
cuts bring an end to wage increases and forces large reductions in government 
employees.  
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Structural adjustment programmes brings more political tension between groups 
as it is aimed at budget reductions and the efficient allocation of resources. Adjustment 
redistributes income from industry and urban non-traded goods sectors to agriculture 
and other export-oriented industries. This increases conflict between entrenched interest 
groups. Structural adjustment benefits, and negatively affects, the reform process. 
Interest groups that lose in the reform process exert strong influences on the government 
and their incentives to block reform often outweigh the benefits to groups in favour of 
reform, making forward movement difficult. 
 
The enthusiasm for greater liberalisation and associated structural reform in 
developing countries has been low compared with the climax of the Washington 
Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s (Sally, 2008). Governments are more sceptical and 
defensive about further liberalisation and complex reform. After two decades of reform, 
reform-minded countries encountered more complex tasks and political resistance to 
pushing forward the reform agenda. Second generation reform involves complex 
domestic regulation and competition. These reforms are technically and administratively 
difficult, requiring time to be implemented and challenge the legislature (Krueger, 
2000). These reforms often face severe political pressure and resistance. The hesitation 
in implementing further reform involves globalisation and a change in attitude towards 
liberalisation and structural adjustment. Increasingly there has been a trend to link any 
mishap in the world, be it from economic crisis or natural disaster, to rapid 
globalisation. Macroeconomic crises often provided windows of opportunity for 
economic reform in the 1980s and 1990s. But, the Asian Financial Crisis created doubts 
about economic reform under the ‘Washington Consensus’ model (Sally, 2008).  
 
The promising economic reform model prescribed by the IMF and World Bank 
was not seen as delivering sufficient economic growth, employment generation, and 
poverty reduction in the developing world. Many governments slowed the process of 
reform as conditions constantly challenged them (Biersteker, 1995; Thomas, 2005; 
Sally, 2006; Stiglitz, 1998). This was the case in Africa and leading developing 
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and India. 
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China was still able to pursue its own liberalisation and reform before and after 
WTO accession, and is the most significant case of a developing country carrying out 
wholesale reforms (Sally, 2008). Vietnam has appeared to follow the Chinese path for 
liberalising its economy; ensuring the continued benefits of reform is a top priority in 
the Government’s economic agenda, making decisive use of unilateral reforms, while 
also combining other tracks of reform to facilitate and lock-in current reforms. Vietnam 
has used multilateral liberalisation to assist domestic unilateral reform.  
 
1.3 Vietnam as a case study 
 
Vietnam is currently undertaking market-friendly economic reforms with an 
impressive record of economic liberalisation. The reform process in Vietnam has not 
been a smooth and even process. There were periods when reform was slow or even at a 
standstill with periods of strong political resistance. Reform has slowed down when 
interest groups organised against the reform. Economic reform was slow from 1995 to 
2002, and was only overcome when the Government publicly announced its accelerated 
efforts to become a WTO member. The Government appeared to leverage the 
advantages of WTO accession to push for an overhauling of the economic system and to 
overcome political resistance toward market reform.  
 
This thesis shows that the appearance belies the truth and to a great extent the 
Government has used the process to maintain a central control over the economy. 
During this difficult time of economic reform, Vietnam’s WTO accession process offers 
an interesting opportunity to examine the link between this process and domestic 
reform, and this reflects contemporary debate on the role of multilateral pressures as an 
auxiliary to unilateral reform. The most serious problem in analysing Vietnam’s 
economic reform is the actual lack of real reform. In the case of WTO impacts upon the 
process, there is far more evidence of resistance to reform than real incidences of 
positive changes 
 
A further problem for the thesis is that it has attempted to situate the assessment 
of the WTO reforms in the context of a ‘communist’ regime. But closer examination of 
Vietnam’s political system would find that communism in Vietnam has strayed far from 
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its ideological roots and display very little evidence of what could be called 
‘communist’ besides a complete commitment to centralised single Party rule. Party 
‘rule’ is itself questionable, as the thesis uncovered strong evidence that Vietnam is 
strongly influenced by an elite interest group, consisting of individuals who hold 
omnipotent levels of power through positions in both the Party and the business 
economy, but actually operate almost entirely on individualistic reasons, rather than the 
‘Party’ or ‘National’ ideals. Increasing evidence is appearing to justify this view as 
Communist Party chief, Nguyen Phu Trong recently observed “Some Party members 
have gotten richer so quickly leading a lavish lifestyle that is miles away from that of 
the workers” and that their actions are firmly embedded in a selfish exploitation of their 
own power and wealth (Dien, 2013, p.4). Leading economist, Le Dang Doanh identifies 
the influence as a ‘group interest’, which has diverted billions in government finances 
into their own pockets, and concentrated this mainly through the system of financing 
State Owned Enterprises (Hang, 2013, p.15). Anh (2013, p.10) finds that this involves 
such examples as US$28.4 million being diverted by EVN (Vietnam Electricity 
Economic Groups) into buying ‘houses, villas, tennis courts, swimming pools, etc’ for 
staff and disguising it under ‘creative accounting methods’. The present outcomes are 
far different from those originally envisaged when the dramatic reforms of Doi Moi 
began twenty-seven year ago. 
 
Vietnam began its domestic economic reform programme in 1986 after the sixth 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) National Congress. Against a background of 
critical economic imbalances, shortages produced by the command economy, the drying 
up of foreign aid and the loss of its traditional export market to the Soviet Union, 
economic reform initially aimed at reducing macroeconomic instability in order to 
provide accelerated economic growth (Harvie and Tran, 1997). Partial reforms began 
and were accelerated in 1988 when economic instability reached a critical level due to 
hyper-inflation and severe state budget deficits. Reforms included a series of market-
oriented shock therapies to stabilise the economy - ‘IMF style structural adjustment’ 
(Masina, 2006). Major reform measures included internal trade and price liberalisation, 
exchange rate adjustment, interest rate reform, fiscal and monetary reform, gradual trade 
liberalisation, and restructuring of the SOEs sector (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Masina, 
2006).  
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Encouraging results of the reform included controlling inflation, macroeconomic 
stabilisation and the creation of the pre-requisite conditions for economic growth. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation and fast economic growth were achieved (Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003). Hyperinflation was contained and gradually reduced to single digits after 
1993 (Masina, 2006).6 Macroeconomic stabilisation and growth were achieved through 
liberalisation of international trade through flexible exchange rates pegged close to 
market prices, substantial reductions in the average tariff rates and reductions in 
quantitative restriction on imports and export (Masina, 2006). This transformation 
achieved early success, which made the external sector the engine of growth.7 Imports 
for investment in export production grew significantly. Openness to trade was 
accompanied by openness to foreign investment. The new foreign investment law 
(1988) triggered a strong inflow of foreign investment. FDI became an important 
stimulus to growth, accounting for 28% of the total investment expenditure in the 
country in 1996 (Masina, 2006). By 1994, the first stage of economic reform was 
completed with success and had achieved the dual goals of macroeconomic stabilisation 
and high economic growth. Reform appeared to transform the closed economy into an 
economy with a significant degree of openness and gradually integrated it into the 
regional and world economy. 
 
From 1996 to 2000, the Vietnamese economy slowed down with a lower GDP 
growth rate, deflation and a sharp reduction in both domestic and foreign investments 
(Pham, 1999). This was partly due to the regional financial crisis, which hit most 
economies in Asia. As the Vietnamese economy depended on exports and FDI, the 
economic crises in most FDI providing countries and the major export markets of 
Vietnam significantly affected the growth rate of Vietnam. Sharp currency devaluations 
from neighbouring countries exposed Vietnam to the increased competition in domestic 
and export markets, which led to a surge in its trade deficit.  This crisis was also a result 
of its own internal weaknesses (WB, 1997; Pham and Le, 2003). Vietnam entered a 
period of slower economic growth and was losing the confidence of foreign investors 
                                                
6 In the decade from 1987-1996, GDP growth was on average 7.3%, increasing to 9.5% in 1995 and 1996 
7 Exports grew far more rapidly than GDP (23% in 6 years to 1994), and as a result the proportion of total 
output exported went from 46% of GDP in 1989 to 97% in 1996 (Masina, 2006). 
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before the Asian Financial Crisis and this was a result of the internal resistance to 
reform and its lack of real intention to actually re-shape the economy. 
 
The slowdown in the economy and the shrinkage of FDI commitments and 
disbursements was the result of inappropriate Government policies (WB, 1997; Arkadie 
and Mallon, 2003; Masina, 2006; Pham and Tran, 2002). The Government had been 
actively implementing an inward-oriented development strategy since 1995 with biased 
trade protection and government investments (Athukorala, 2006). Reforms in trade 
liberalisation and support of export industries were used to promote rapid 
industrialisation (Martin, 2001). Trade policy was focused on the import–substitution 
manufacturing sector and embedded in a long–standing protectionist state–led model 
(Pham, 1999; Pham and Tran, 2002; Auffret, 2003; Athukorala, 2006).  
 
Government investment in SOEs was significant, indicating their important role 
in the economy and in the government’s development ideology. The SOEs, through 
their continued relationships at the high levels of Government and the Party retained a 
monopoly on the economy with explicit forms of state support and unofficial protection 
that was channelled through connections with political and administrative officers 
(Masina, 2006). Improvements in FDI helped accelerate the industrialisation process 
and to enable the country to enter into new strategic sectors. SOEs prioritised foreign 
investment in areas that were capital intensive and labour saving. The Vietnamese 
government was attempting to use industrial and trade policy to replicate the lessons of 
‘developmental states’ and promote selected strategic industries in order to diversify its 
export composition (Masina, 2006).  
 
The privatisation of small and medium SOEs was not successful and fell well 
behind the targets of the national authorities (WB, 2000; 2002). Large SOEs still 
remained intact and the government protected this sector, causing severe financial 
restraints on the banking system and restricted opportunities for the development of the 
private sector.  The private sector was focused on high priced goods of low quality, 
which were less competitive in both domestic and international markets. 
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Banking sector reform made little actual progress and was kept afloat by strong 
government patronage and dominated by the largest SOE banks. An inconsequential 
supervisory framework, with unclear regulatory standards and imprudent lending forced 
the banks to function under severe stress, especially in regards to the high rate of Non-
Performing Loans. Negative political and administrative pressures, corruption in the 
business community and weak management skills aggravated problems, with lending 
mainly due to political pressure forcing Banks to loan to inefficient, unproductive and 
failing SOEs. Lending to the private sector was subject to stringent procedures and high 
collaterals, which discouraged them from using the system and stifled their 
development.  
 
The private sector was neglected and not promoted adequately as a key to 
employment generation and economic growth. Although economic reform changed the 
attitudes toward the private sector, the regulations and restrictions inherited from the 
previous era made growth of the private sector difficult. They suffered from an unfair 
competition with SOEs in regards to credit lending and government support. The CPV 
greatly fears any independent development of the private sector, identifying this as 
direct threat to their continued control of the economy, and forcing them to divert 
resources away from their own privileged SOEs. 
 
Vietnam development was severely handicapped by inefficient and outdated 
economic management institutions. The whole economic system retained the old-
fashioned central command economy style, with Government intervention still the 
dominant form of control in all economic activities. This was coupled with inadequate 
laws and regulations in almost every sector. Enforcement was also weak as a result of 
political interventions, lack of adequate laws and corruption. A major problem was the 
lack of capacities in the whole government system and especially in the enforcement of 
law and regulations. Many highly placed leaders and their middle management lacked 
even adequate levels of skills in their areas of responsibilities. Coupled with the very 
low level of salaries (thus enticing very few highly educated and capable candidates and 
depriving the system of any incentive to improve), the lack of capacities made reform 
and development difficult, if not impossible, in almost every area of administration and 
governance. Moreover, the administrative organisations and their procedures were often 
overlapping, cumbersome, bureaucratic and distorted by corruption. The real underlying 
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concern for the Vietnam economy post WTO accession is that the same faults beset the 
economy today and although the superficial appearance is one of dramatic change, the 
reality is the same problems not only exist but are in many cases worse.  
 
The uneven pace of reform decreased enthusiasm for more change, and instead 
of being encouraged by increased FDI flows and development assistance funds from 
donors the leadership’s sense of urgency in implementing sensitive reform measures 
was reduced. It is difficult for foreigners to understand this particular psyche of Vietnam 
leaders and people, where a cultural dominance for caution in decision-making, 
accompanied by very short term thinking in regards to the consequences, lead to 
irrational outcomes, such as meeting the success of reform with an aversion to more 
reform. While the official declarations encouraged a rapid liberalisation of trade, the 
resistance to reform in the political leadership remained strong (Masina, 2006).  
 
   Implementation of the reforms was slow, especially in trade liberalisation, 
SOE privatisation and legal and administration reform. This was reflected in the last 
minute postponing of the signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US, an 
agreement to set a course toward great openness, receding government control over the 
economy, and ultimately greater freedoms for individuals in Vietnam to find jobs and 
determine their own future (Irvine, 1999; Masina, 2006). The second stage of reform 
often involves difficult and complex domestic issues such as tax reform, privatisation 
and trade liberalisation. Implementation and the realisation of benefits take more time 
than in the first stage of reform (Haggard and Webb, 1994). As reform progressed it 
also generated resistance as the reforms are politically sensitive and affect entrenched 
interests that are extremely difficult to dislodge (Sally, 2006). Many were ideologically 
bound to communism and viewed the reforms as politically generated and feared more 
the overthrow of their oligarchic control, than they worried about economic decline. 
 
The pace of reform was not quickened until the government actively engaged in 
the US-BTA (2001), which set the framework and momentum for further trade and 
trade–related liberalisation. This agreement was regarded as a WTO agreement mimic, 
which regulated almost all areas covered by a normal WTO agreement. In 2002 the 
government publicly announced its desire to join the WTO and intentionally accelerated 
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the negotiation process. Comprehensive reform now proceeded progressively and 
institutional reform accelerated with legal and regulatory revisions and more attention 
paid to law enforcement. Yet, all reform in Vietnam has to be assessed against what 
appears to have happened and the reality behind it. There is often little evidence of 
resistance to many reforms, and the introduction of new laws, regulations, and 
institutions regularly takes place without effective opposition. Its opponents are aware 
that Vietnam’s greatest challenge is actually enforcing the reforms/changes and they are 
quite rightly correct in thinking that the practice will be as before. Lacks in capacities, 
low incentives such as low salaries and little chance of promotion without relationships, 
fear of change and the generally very conservative nature found at all levels means 
numerous reforms are often merely cosmetic changes.  
 
Vietnam completed negotiations to join the WTO in 2006 and became the 150th 
WTO member state in 2007. Vietnam’s accession to the WTO was very lengthy and 
demanding as reformers constantly met opposition from conservatives, communist 
dogmatic and interest groups affected negatively by reforms. What is clear now is that 
elements within these ‘anti-WTO’ groups have been far more successful at undermining 
the WTO reforms, and disguising that successful resistance under a blanket of 
commitment to the market economy. The WTO accession involved multilateral 
negotiations with member nations to help adjust Vietnam’s trade regime to conform to 
WTO rules, while bilateral negotiations related to market access concessions in goods 
and commitments in the services sector (Michalopoulos, 1998). The process is lengthy 
as the acceding country enacts the laws, develops the institutions, and applies the 
policies that enable it to conform to fundamental rules and disciplines of the WTO 
(Drabek and Laird, 1998). Greater stability in commercial policy is required, and must 
adhere to WTO rules and legally binding agreements. The accession process is complete 
when all members are satisfied with the progress and assurance of policy and 
institutional reform from the acceding country (Michalopoulos, 2002). 
 
WTO rules consist of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
twelve issue-specific agreements (e.g. on agriculture), the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). A multilateral working party is established to review each 
accession case. In these working parties, WTO members investigate whether any part of 
 19 
the acceding country's trade regime is inconsistent with WTO rules. Two main areas of 
scrutiny are the economic policies affecting imports and exports, and the institutional 
framework (legal and judicial factors) that exists to formulate and enforce such policies. 
Therefore, the process encouraged Vietnam to overhaul its economic institutions and 
policies in order to be in conformity with the market economy. 
 
WTO accession was undertaken in parallel with the difficult process of 
structural adjustment and played an important role in pushing ahead reform progress. 
The process was an impetus for domestic reform and served as a lock-in. Success in 
WTO accession is the result of the dynamic interaction between the state and other 
actors in the economy, leading to a broad-based consensus on the need to open up and 
further integrate into the world economy. All these deductive conclusions lead us to 
many insightful questions about this event, such as the mechanism, development and 
interaction between multilateral agreements and domestic economic reforms. 
 
However, the evidence gathered here in this study shows that much of these 
reforms are countered by a systemic aversion to ‘real’ change, and that for every reform 
there is disturbing levels of ‘resistance’ that continues to negate many of the benefits 
accrued from strategies such as entering the WTO. The outcome is that WTO accession, 
entry and reform remains secondary to a domestic determination to ‘carry on business 
as usual’. Subsequently, this has appeared in previous studies as a commitment of the 
Communist Party’ to survive’ such global changes as the end of Communism in the 
Soviet Union and the turn to market economics by the Chinese Communist Party. Such 
studies would entail deeper analysis of the WTO negotiations and the substance of the 
impacts of the commitments made and their enactment. But, so deep is the actual levels 
of non-compliance to WTO commitments and the ‘conservative’ practices that continue 
to be the systemic formats of ‘doing business’ and ‘ruling’ the country, the thesis 
instead concentrates more on how the WTO impacts are merely a public screen for what 
one could more accurately call an elite dictatorship, rather than communist rule.  
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1.4 Research question 
 
This thesis will examine how the WTO accession process contributed to the 
economic reform of Vietnam and concentrate the case studies on Agriculture, the 
Textile and Garment industry (T&G) and the Banking sector.  
 
The main rationale for choosing these industries is because these industries are 
the most representative of the Vietnamese economy and have been directly affected by 
the WTO accession process. WTO accession process began during a stagnant period of 
economic reform and suddenly accelerated after five years of almost no progress.   
 
The success of the first wave of reform had reduced the government’s sense of 
urgency toward the economic crisis, which consequently left room for interest groups to 
revive and influence government policy. The dynamics of interaction between interest 
groups for and against economic liberalisation was further amplified by the politically 
sensitive and difficult nature of structural adjustment. The political regime inherited the 
ideology of a communist central command economy where elements in the Party and 
Government provided a favourable environment for the interest groups against reform. 
This led to delays in reform, but some degree of lock-in of reforms protected the 
achievements of past reform and prevented the Government from succumbing to the 
pressures of interest groups opposing reform. The efforts made by the Government to 
join the WTO were understood as a signal, which acted to push forward sluggish policy 
reform efforts. 
 
In political terms, the accession process was an externally enforced multilateral 
agreement, making any domestic policy reversal costly. The added value of the WTO 
accession process, apart from the lock-in effects for domestic reform, is that in the 
absence of a pre-determined model of a social market economy, the economic and 
institutional framework of the WTO facilitates the acceding country’s efforts at building 
full-fledged market institutions. The WTO accession process of Vietnam was presented 
as a conscious effort made by the Government to accelerate economic and institutional 
reform. The clear lack of enforcement of those reforms or even the establishment of 
mechanisms to truly apply the commitments made, show that WTO accession and 
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membership has failed to overcome the domestic business structures that are dominated 
by a relationship culture and the unbreakable hold of cronyism and corruption as a ‘way 
to do business’ in Vietnam. 
 
1.5 Research methodology 
 
1.5.1 Research design 
 
This research will adopt a qualitative case study approach involving an analysis 
of a sequence of events and processes in order to identify the historical events. It will 
build an account of the WTO accession process in Vietnam and how it influenced the 
progress of domestic economic reform. Accession was undertaken in tandem with the 
implementation of the second generation reforms in Vietnam and was one of the levers 
that helped to accelerate current reforms. This approach enables us to explain in detail 
how and why the WTO accession process supported and accelerated reform. 
 
1.5.2 Case study approach 
 
A multiple case study approach is taken here and in order to narrow the scope of 
the research, three traditional industries (textile and garment, agricultural, and banking 
industries) are selected for the purpose of examining the proposed research hypotheses 
and questions. These industries have different characteristics and roles in the economy 
and the reform process. They were selected based on four criteria: (1) representation for 
important industries in the economy, (2) representation for different levels of 
government protection and intervention, (3) representation for different actors in the 
economy, (4) representation for different levels of reform references. 
 
Textile and garment industry: 
 
The textile and garment industry is key in the Vietnamese economy and its 
export-led growth policy. The impressive performance of Vietnam's T&G industries 
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over the past fifteen years was mainly attributed to the liberalisation of domestic and 
foreign polices initiated in 1986 and to the changes in WTO regulation on textiles and 
garments industry in 1995. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing succeeded the 
Multi-Fibre Agreement under the umbrella of the WTO Establishment Agreement in 
1995, whereby it was agreed that all quota restrictions would be eliminated by January 
1, 2005. The elimination of quotas was expected to unleash the potential of developing 
countries and to provide tremendous opportunities for export expansion. Joining the 
WTO helped the industry to gain more access to export markets and it benefited from 
trade liberalisation and deregulation. 
 
However, as the case study chapter shows, the industry should be judged more 
by the progress it should have made, rather than the impressive data it presents. 
Investment has been dominated by a Government’s support of the T&G SOEs, which 
has retarded their levels of improvements in efficiency and denied much of the domestic 
private textile companies the funds they need for development; and a private sector 
reliant on FDI investors and private companies for any real economic progress. In 
addition, SOE power means many FDI companies can only optimise their profits by 
building relationships with SOEs and the officials that are closely linked to them. For 
example, one major foreign textile owner declared that bribes for acquiring land, good 
relationships with customs (nearly all FDI companies rely on importation of raw 
materials and overseas customers) and almost every aspect of production and 
management adds a cost that is increasingly being seen as an ‘unsustainable’ overhead 
in the present global market conditions (Confidential interview8, 2012). 
 
Agricultural sector 
 
Agriculture is a vital industry in the Vietnamese economy and in its export-led 
growth policy.9 It is the dominant employer in rural areas, accounting for more than 
                                                
8Director of a European textile company focused solely on supplying its 85 different European customers. 
9 Agriculture accounts for 22% of GDP with an average growth rate of 4.3% and employs more than 60% 
of the Vietnamese population (WB, 2006). 
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30% of the country’s total exports and rice, coffee, cashew nuts, pepper, etc. have 
occupied an important role in world markets (Nguyen and Grote, 2004). Before 
economic reform, Vietnam imported rice and other food products. Presently, Vietnam is 
the worlds’ largest rice exporter and the country’s exports of agricultural, forestry and 
fishery products reached 4.19 billion USD in 2000, and soared to more than 12 billion 
USD in 2007 (UNDP, 2004). The export growth rate of agricultural commodities has 
been 20% on average during the last 10 years. Agricultural success is due to 
government reforms in this sector and the process of international economic integration. 
The agricultural sector was the first target of structural adjustment reform, with 
measures directly promoting agricultural production such as land-use rights and tax 
reforms, investment, credit provisions and market liberalisation (UNDP, 2004). The 
WTO provided market access through MFN and new protections against powerful 
trading nations. Nonetheless, there was a declining contribution of this sector relative to 
the contribution of the industrial and services sectors. The proportion of agriculture to 
total GDP fell from 42.1% in 1989 to 22% in 2007 (Nguyen and Grote, 2004). 
Agriculture highlights the impact of the WTO accession process on economic reform 
and will allow us to see how the WTO accession process affects the formation of pro-
trade interest groups and its interaction with other actors in the economy. 
 
Again, the progress and development of agriculture in Vietnam disguises an 
inherent fault in the sectors business. Almost all producers (the farmers, etc) are 
dependent on the SOEs, which act more as ‘middle managers’ than producers. The 
SOEs dominate the agricultural sector by acting as the only connection between the 
global economy and the industry. They deny the producers direct access and carry out 
both overt and covert means to control the prices that producers receive. The outcome is 
that much of the benefits of WTO entry, including larger and new markets, improved 
profits, etc are channelled almost entirely to the SOEs and many producers remain on 
only subsistence levels, denied credit, limited to only small land holdings and barred 
from any real opportunities to modernise and mechanise. Subsequently, farmers still 
remain one of the poorest sectors in the economy, and are the main source of protest 
against the Government and the WTO ‘reforms’. However, their poverty, social 
conditions and lack of coordinated and powerful representation means much of their 
protests are ineffective. 
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Banking and finance industry 
 
Vietnam’s banking and finance industry can be traced back to 1988 when four 
state-owned banks were separated from the State Bank of Vietnam (Le, 2000). The 
banking sector has been at the forefront of the economic transition and liberalisation in 
Vietnam and is dominated by four State-Owned Commercial Banks, which together 
account for 72% of total banking assets.10 During the reform, the banking industry was 
criticised for its inefficiency and loss-making operation since the banks operated as 
covert government agencies, with restricted access given to foreign investors (Masina, 
2006; WB, 2007). 
 
Yet, the role of banking as merely the gateway through which the Party 
subsidised the SOEs is now undeniable. Banks remain solvent and defended themselves 
from foreign competition by concentrating their profitable business on transferring 
government money to the SOEs. The profits from this sustained all the major banks, and 
this ‘false’ economy was further embedded into the system by allowing ‘owners’ of the 
main SOEs purchase controlling shares in the banks and using this to ensure on-going 
preference in loans and debt. This ‘cross-shareholding’ scandal is discussed further in 
the case study chapter. 
 
In the next section we examine the Chinese case and its relationship to Vietnam.  
 
1.5.3 China as a shadow case study 
 
In this research, a parallel is drawn between Vietnam and China’s WTO-related 
economic reform, providing theoretical and empirical support for the study. China made 
the same transition from central command to a free market while retaining its 
communist political system. 
                                                
10 There are 36 joint-stock commercial banks (10.5%), 4 joint venture banks, 25 foreign bank branches 
(16%), and some 40 foreign bank representative offices as well as a network of credit cooperatives (Le, 
2000). 
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Economic reform in China is a textbook case of strong unilateral economic 
liberalisation (Sally, 2006). Chinese economic reforms can be traced back to 1978, but 
reform accelerated after 1994, transforming the Chinese economy into a market-
oriented economy. A series of structural adjustment measures11 were undertaken 
unilaterally in order to restructure the economy. GDP growth rates exceeded 9.5% 
during the 1991-2005 reform period (Naughton, 2007). Inflation was controlled in 1996, 
producing a stable macroeconomic situation in the following years, and domestic 
market prices gradually converged toward international levels (Lardy, 2002). The most 
impressive economic reforms have been in the trade and foreign investment sector. 
China unilaterally moved from extremely protectionist trade policies to relatively liberal 
ones (Sally, 2004).12 The liberalisation of the Chinese economy led to a surge of 
imports and exports, rapid expansion of international trade and the liberalisation of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), with FDI inflows surpassing 40 billion dollars since 
1996 (Naughton, 2007). 
 
By 1999, China faced an urgent need for further reform (Qian and Wu, 2000). 
China’s economic growth slowed down in 1998 and 1999. Although this deceleration of 
the economy can be partially accounted for by the pervasive impact of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the sluggishness of the reform in key areas also negatively affected 
Chinese economic performance (Qian and Wu, 2000; Lardy, 2002). Several issues were 
still left unaddressed by the previous reform thrust: the weak financial system, which 
was dominated by SOEs, was subject to government and well-connected insider group 
intervention; weak legal accountability; an absence of regulatory agencies independent 
from governmental influence; and the limited progress in developing a transparent and 
publicly accountable regulatory apparatus (Qian and Wu, 2000). The standards of 
                                                
11 They included the unification and convertibility of the exchange rate, SOEs privatisation, formal 
recognition of private property rights, tax and fiscal system reform, banking restructuring and a host of 
other market-based reforms. 
12 Extensive trade reforms were undertaken unilaterally during this period, which resulted in a significant 
drop of tariff rates and non-trade barriers. Simple statutory tariffs were reduced to only 16.5% in 2001 
from 17.5% in 1998 and 43% in 1992.  
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corporate governance were still low (Naughton, 2007). WTO accession made it urgent 
for China to push through its domestic reform more rapidly (Qian and Wu, 2000). 
 
Reforms were initiated in 1999 with a whirlwind of economic liberalisation 
(Naughton, 2007; Kynge and Jonquieres, 1999; Lardy, 2002). Premier Zhu Rongji made 
clear during his visit to the United States, that reform was highly dependent on the 
possibility of using WTO accession as a lever to overcome domestic opposition (Lardy, 
2002). 
 
In 2001, China was officially admitted to the WTO as its 143rd member after 15 
years of negotiation. China’s WTO commitments are very strong and they exceed those 
of other developing countries by a wide margin (Sally, 2004). These comparisons hold 
not only for tariff ceilings on goods but also for border and behind-the-border non-tariff 
barriers in goods and services. Although a few implementation shortcomings still 
remain, notably in the creation of independent regulatory schemes and judiciary, 
research shows that China complied in a satisfactory manner with the large majority of 
WTO commitments that it undertook (Zhang 2005). Zhang (2005, p.332) commented 
that “there is no ground to allege China’s compliance with the WTO agreements as 
‘uneven and incomplete’ in a wide range of areas”. 
 
The reform-oriented Chinese government intentionally used the WTO accession 
process and commitments as a lever to accelerate and complete the transition to a 
market oriented economy. Vietnam and China share similar starting conditions and 
characteristics at the outset of the reform process. Both countries are ruled by 
communist parties that have adopted a similar reform model favouring economic reform 
without political reform. The two countries have also demonstrated the same enthusiasm 
for unilateral reform and the use of international commitments as lock-in devices for 
internal reform. The pattern and ideology of reform in Vietnam are very much based on 
China’s experiences. 
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1.5.4 Horizontal policy areas 
 
This research focuses on how Vietnam’s WTO accession process influenced the 
course of domestic economic reform. Four major horizontal policy-areas have been 
chosen: (1) trade and investment liberalisation; (2) SOE restructuring and (3) private 
sector promotion; and (4) institutional reform. 
 
Trade and investment policies are present in all economic activities. They are a 
central aspect of economic reform, especially in structural adjustment programmes. 
Economists define trade and investment liberalisation as the transition from an 
interventionist government towards ‘neutrality’ between tradable and non-tradable 
sectors of the economy (Sally, 2008). This process often involves the reduction of 
quotas (import and export) and tariffs, and the dismantling of licensing agreements, 
state trading policies, and other non-tariff barriers. Foreign currency exchange control 
and currency convertibility is reformed as FDI liberalisation entails fair and non-
discriminatory conditions for foreign companies investing in the host economy. This 
involves removing market entry and ownership restrictions, and opening up protected 
markets such as the service and agricultural sectors. The changes are to ensure efficient 
resource allocation and development of a comparative advantage through international 
competition (Biersterker, 1995). 
 
The second and third policy areas placed under the microscope are the process 
of SOE privatisation and restructuring, and of private sector promotion. In many 
developing countries, a large set of economic activities is undertaken by the State. SOEs 
have become monopolies in almost all of the important industries. These inefficient 
state investments divert resources from other competitive industries leading to a sub-
optimal economic equilibrium. The privatisation of SOEs is an efficient way of 
reducing government intervention in the economy and fostering greater competition, 
bringing a more efficient private sector to lead in economic development (Oatley, 
2006). 
 
The fourth policy area to be scrutinised in this research is the development of 
efficient economic management institutions. Since the market operating mechanism 
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shifted sharply from government planning and intervention to free market forces, the 
role, functions and competence of economic management institutions has to be adjusted 
to match the development of a market-based economy. Government institutions 
abdicate their powers of direct intervention and adopt the role of market monitors and 
guides. This process entails redefining the mandates and competencies of economic 
management institutions as well as providing them with technical support in the early 
stages of their mission. This institutional reform also involves the provision of adequate 
laws and regulations, not only to manage the economy on a fair and intervention-free 
basis, but also to guide economic activities and prevent conflicts between interested 
parties. This often involves the revision or enactment of laws and regulations as well as 
their fair and unbiased enforcement. 
 
1.5.5 Delimitation and time period 
 
Vietnam accession took twelve years (1995-2007) and the rate of reform 
implementation was markedly uneven: a relative standstill from 1995-2000, slow 
progress from 2000-2003, and a very rapid pace from 2003-2006 when the reform 
process ran in parallel to Vietnam’s final efforts to accede to the WTO. From 2007 to 
2012, Vietnam membership of WTO has revealed a number of political and economic 
challenges, which are examined in the later parts of the thesis chapters.  
 
1.5.6 Research conceptual framework 
 
The process of adjustment of Vietnam’s domestic trade and investment policies 
to comply with WTO rules and regulations and the effects of these changes on the 
progress of economic reform is examined in the thesis. Two important blocks of 
literature are reviewed. 
 
First is the literature on the WTO accession process, which provides an 
understanding of the rules, regulations, and mechanisms through which the WTO 
accession process affects a country’s policy reform. The WTO accession process 
requires an adjustment of the applicant’s trade regime and economic policies in order to 
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conform to WTO rules. Adjustments are reviewed by a multilateral working party in 
each accession case to investigate whether any part of the acceding country's trade 
regime is inconsistent with WTO rules. Two of the main areas that often have strong 
impacts on economic reform are (1) the economic policy measures affecting imports 
and exports, and (2) the institutional framework (of legal and judicial factors) that exists 
to formulate and enforce such policies. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The analytical framework 
 
Second is on the politics of economic reform. This highlights the components, 
processes, difficulties and politics of economic reform, especially of a structural 
adjustment programme and the determinants through which external factors can 
influence the economic process. The five determinants used as points of analysis, are 
economic crisis, interest groups, ideology, institutions and factor endowments. These 
determinants help to explain how changes in economic policy meet the requirements of 
accession and influence the reform process. 
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The reform process consisted of structural reform, with four major components: 
trade liberalisation, SOE privatisation, private sector promotion and the building of 
institutions for a market-oriented economy. The WTO accession process requires an 
applicant country to adjust its domestic policies to conform to WTO rules and 
regulations. The impact on determinants is assessed as to whether they are positive and 
helpful to the reform. 
 
1.5.7 Data collection 
 
Data for this thesis was collected by documentary research and in-depth elite 
interviews. The sources for documentary research were mainly from domestic 
governmental agencies, with both English and Vietnamese versions accessed. WTO, 
international and Vietnamese economic policies were extensively reviewed. Reports on 
economic reform, multilateral trade agreements and economic integration were 
consulted for conceptual frameworks, empirical information, and additional insight into 
the economic reform of Vietnam. Newspapers and magazines were cross-referenced 
with media material from different international sources to minimise the possibilities of 
biased information. 
 
In-depth elite interviews were conducted between November 2008 and January 
2013. There were in total 36 interviews with 16 elite individuals and 3 other anonymous 
persons. Interviewees were selected from different policy-making influencing groups, 
who were decision-makers; famous research intellectuals and policy consultants; 
businessmen and foreign experts on economic reforms and WTO accession. Many of 
them were engaged in two or three interviews during the research to gather or clarify 
more details on the researching subjects. Instead of a rigid questionnaire, an aide-
memoire was used and referred to during the interviews. Further clarifications from 
interviews were obtained through e-mail or telephone and personal communications. 
 
Most interviewees were senior policy makers, such as ministers and their 
deputies, heads of departments, trade negotiators and key members in trade delegations. 
Interviews with middle-level officials, general directors and managers of SOEs and in 
the private sector were taken to access feedback about government policies. Interviews 
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with researchers and consultant from government and independent think-tanks provided 
more truthful and balanced views on the process of economic reforms and impacts of 
the WTO accession on reforms, as well as clarifying the information provided by the 
government officials. Foreign experts were approached to see the standard views from 
an outsider’s position on WTO led reforms in Vietnam.  
 
1.6 Thesis outline 
 
Chapter 2 begins with an examination of the literature used in building the 
research framework and briefly explores the parallel case of China. China’s reforms is 
explored to generate some understanding and lessons about the relationship between the 
WTO accession and the progress of domestic reform in the similar condition countries, 
and helps further understand and explain Vietnam’s economic reform process. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the background information on Vietnam’s economy and 
politics. It provides a summary on Vietnam’s international economic integration 
process, including the WTO negotiation process and its commitments, while also 
identifying the interest groups in the process of economic reform. 
 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the process of economic reform in Vietnam since 1986 
and the impacts of the WTO on the reform process. It describes the process of domestic 
policy reform and summarises all the difficult areas and unfinished reforms of the 
previous era. An analysis of how the WTO’s accession of Vietnam helped to accelerate 
structural reform is given and examines the political economic impacts. 
 
Chapters 5-7 analyse the impact of the WTO accession process on three sectors 
and each assesses the adjustment of domestic policy to WTO rules. The development 
and interactions of different interest groups over time are compared across specific 
industries and different periods of reform in order to understand the evolution of 
economic reform. 
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The last chapter draws conclusions about the impact of WTO accession on 
domestic economic reform in Vietnam and provides some lessons for other developing 
countries that undertake similar tracks of reform and liberalisation. However, the final 
chapter will conclusively show that a new understanding of how WTO accessions 
affects a developing countries reform process needs to be re-evaluated by economists, 
as the Vietnam case shows an alarming level of misappropriation and 
misunderstandings of its impacts and the very process itself. The continued levels of 
involvement by the Party and Government in the economy remains a problem, as it 
means the basic aims and processes of reform through the WTO membership are limited 
by the lack of real separation between the political system and the 
economy. The acceptance as a fully market economy may only come if their is dramatic 
political reform that clearly shows less control of the economy by the Party and 
Government and less active participation by the Government in many major economic 
sectors. 
 
The conclusion compares the appearances of reform with the actual reality, 
where to all and intents and purposes the Vietnam economy remains almost solely under 
central command control, and where those with political power are able to subvert the 
reform process for individual gain on a scale that now threatens the very core of the 
economy’s sustainability. Whilst the market economy membership is the basic tenet and 
flagship achievement of the WTO, the continuation of central control of the Vietnam 
economy by the Government and SOEs, alongside unsustainable levels of corruption, 
belies the WTO’s very purpose as a progressive tool of reform. 
 
The case studies show different levels of negative outcomes to reform of the 
economic system. This is in some cases due to powerful (financially and politically) 
individuals misusing the process and benefits of reform, such as diverting governmental 
financial support into their own 'pockets' or to an ideological bounded resistance that 
makes it difficult for them to agree to reducing political control and Party involvement 
in the economy. WTO membership requires valid separation of political power from 
active participation in the monopoly control of the economy, and a development of 
greater separation between the government and the economic institutions that govern 
the economy. In the case of Vietnam, the failure to fully move to a WTO market system 
has resulted in crippling levels of corruption, a failure to achieve economic 
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competitiveness and efficiency, a banking system on the brink of total collapse due to 
unsustainable burdens of debt and the possible beginning of a financial crisis that could 
overflow into the whole Asian economy. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW: ECONOMIC REFORM 
AND THE WTO ACCESSION PROCESS 
 
 
Unilateral economic reform in developing countries is often a difficult and 
challenging undertaking. Impediments to unilateral reform arise from both internal and 
external factors. The internal factors reflect the political resistance of vested interests 
and the technical problems inherent in the reform process. External factors stem from 
the overall scepticism towards globalisation and economic liberalisation after the Asian 
Financial Crisis (Bates and Krueger 1993; Stallings, 1995; Sally, 2006; Rajapatirana, 
2001). The World Trade Organisation has a role in facilitating difficult unilateral 
domestic reforms, providing governments with both the mechanism to overhaul policies 
and institutions and a lock-in device for market-friendly reforms (Rajapatirana, 2001). 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical literature and discussions on the economic 
reform process and WTO accession of a developing country. It establishes the 
conceptual framework and gives an understanding of the political economic reforms in 
developing countries. It focuses on: 
1. The concepts and process of economic reform, and 
2. The determinants of a successful reform.  
 
The functions and procedures of the WTO accession process are analysed and 
the thesis explores how the accession process influences a developing country’s 
economic reform. The final section examines China’s WTO accession and its relativity 
to the Vietnam case. 
 
2.1 Political economy of reforms 
 
After WWII, many developing countries gained their independence and started 
to reconstruct their economy. Developing countries adopted similar economic policies, 
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in which rapid industrialisation through state intervention in trade and investment was 
put at a higher priority in their development programmes (Bates and Krueger, 1993; 
Oatley, 2006; Krueger, 1993). Developing countries strongly believed that 
industrialisation though government controls and leadership of the economy would 
bring about greater economy growth (Bates and Kruger, 1993). State-led development 
policy relied heavily on three policies instruments: trade barriers, government planning 
and investment policies (Oatley, 2006; Krueger, 1993). The strategy is dubbed as the 
‘import substitution industrialisation’ (Krueger, 1993; Bates and Krueger, 1994; Nelson, 
1990). They adopted highly restrictive trade regimes to protect domestic manufacturing 
industries with the aim of producing their own goods in substitution for imported goods. 
In any relatively closed economy, the government exert strict control of foreign trade to 
ensure that the foreign exchange is allocated correctly in line with the governments’ 
development objectives (Bhagwati, 1978; Oatley, 2006, p.126). Tariffs and quotas are 
used extensively to protect the domestic industries from foreign competition. Import 
licensing is applied extensively and granted for small numbers of monopoly agencies to 
control imports (Krueger, 1993). The exchange rate is undervalued to ensure cheaper 
import inputs for the industrialisation process (Krueger, 1993). Governments also 
strictly control investment in the industry sectors via development plans. These plans 
serve as the coordination device for investment to promote targeted industries for 
development rather than according to their role in the market (Little, 1982; Oatley, 
2006). In order to assist these plans, the state controls the financial sector to enable 
easier management of capital and direct it to targeted sectors. Government investments 
are channelled through the State Owned Enterprises to support implementation of 
growth in the industrialisation process. 
 
A general consensus is that these policies fail to achieve their purpose 
(Williamson, 1994; Krueger, 1993; Bates and Krueger, 1993). The strategy first brought 
economic growth to the applied economies in 60s and 70s, but increasing economic 
imbalances created by persistent deficits in trade and budgets proved this state control 
and centralisation of economic power impeded, rather than supported, economic growth 
(Krueger, 1993; Nelson, 1990). Heavy government intervention in the economy in the 
forms of SOEs and state investments tended to generate budget deficits for governments 
(Bates and Krueger, 1993). Many SOEs never became profitable and were kept solvent 
through funds from the governments’ budgets (Waterbury, 1992). Current accounts 
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suffered persistent deficits due to trade deficits and the industrialisation process 
generated considerable demand for imported capital and inputs. The restricted trade 
regime for domestic market protection increasingly undermined the export capacity of 
the countries. Overvalued exchange rates helped to support cheaper intermediate 
imported goods and inputs, but equally made the export goods more expensive in the 
world market. Restrictive trade regimes in new industries prevented economies of scale 
needed in order to compete in the world market (Little et al, 1970). 
 
Industrialisation shifted resources out of agricultural sectors, weakening the 
capacity of this sector at domestic and international levels. Problems with budget and 
trade deficits created macroeconomic instability and increases in money supply were 
used to cover deficits, resulting in aggravation of difficulties with inflation (Krueger, 
1993). Many countries, especially in Latin America, borrowed heavily through external 
loans to finance their deficits and industrialisation processes (Oatley, 2006).  
 
In the 1980s, the imbalances in these economies were increased by a number of 
external shocks (Nelson, 1990; Krueger, 1993; Easterly, 2001; Rajapatirana, 2001; 
Stallings, 1992). Dramatic increases in oil prices in 1979 posed significant challenges to 
global growth and developing countries in particular, widening their current account 
deficit and forcing them into debt (Nelson, 1990). The US government changed its 
monetary policy, focusing it on controlling inflation and believing that interest rates 
were too high. Many developing economies were brought to the brink of insolvency 
(Harvey, 2005). The global economic recession saw demand for developing countries 
export goods reduced and debt-servicing was tightened and widened (Cline, 1984; 
Oatley, 2006; Stalling, 1992). These negative international shocks increased the 
domestic problems of the majority of developing countries, except for those that were 
oil exporters (Rajapatirana, 2001). Latin American countries defaulted in their debts and 
showed that the domestic policies used by these countries were not compatible with 
continuing economic growth plans and were a major contribution to crises (Bate and 
Krueger, 1993; Krueger, 1993; Rajapatirana, 2001; Nelson 1990; Stalling 1995). The 
debt crisis forced these countries to revise their development policies, with many forced 
to make policy changes by their international creditors and a sea change in policies in 
developing countries (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992).  
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Some developing countries in East Asia adopted a different set of development 
strategies. Although sharing the same background with other developing countries, 
these countries were able to develop rapidly in a short time. The rate of average income 
growth was twice as fast as the rate in Latin America and 26 times the rate in Africa. As 
a result, the average income in East Asia countries soared and manufacturing output 
demonstrated sustained growth rates (Oatley, 2006). Exports grew rapidly with an 
annual rate of 8.5% from 1965 to 1990, which completely contrasted with little or no 
growth in other developing countries (WB, 1991). A common agreement was reached 
on the development of the East Asia with them pursuing market friendly and outward 
development strategies. These countries focused on producing manufacturing goods for 
export rather than producing them for domestic markets, as in the import substitution 
industrialisation model (Krueger, 1993; Rodrik, 1994; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; 
Nelson, 1990; Haggard, 1990). 
 
The debt crisis in Latin America and other developing countries indicated that 
their policies were not appropriate for economic development and there was a need for 
policy changes. Most debtor countries turned to the International Financial Institutions 
for financial assistance to rescue their economies. IFIs were explicitly linked to policy 
reform packages, aimed at medium term structural adjustment programmes (Nelson, 
1990). Countries were encouraged to maintain macroeconomic stability, trade 
liberalisation with export promotions, rationalisation of public sector investment, and 
reduction in the role of the state with SOE privatisation programmes (Kahler, 1990; 
Nelson, 1990; Williamson, 1990; 1994; Oatley, 2006). These measures were inspired by 
a neo-orthodoxy approach under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. There 
were pressures from international lenders to take adaptive measures (Nelson, 1990). 
Developing countries accepted that an economic reform agenda was unavoidable. 
 
There was no standard reform programme, with reform packages often entailing 
some common adjustment measures to alter previous policies including the rate of 
government spending; the financing of the government expenditures; the foreign trade 
and payment regime; policies affecting conditions of operation of private firms and the 
SOEs (Bate and Kruger, 1993; Williamson, 1990; Beirsteker, 1995). These reforms 
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were considered as a process rather than instant measures, thus often taking time and 
commitment (Bate and Kruger, 1993). Reform packages aimed to reduce the 
macroeconomic instability of the early 1980s (Stalling, 1992). ‘Structural adjustment’ 
reforms encouraged movement away from inward oriented development and focused on 
medium and long-term economic development (Stalling, 1992). Structural adjustment 
reforms became increasing popular and were adopted in developing countries around 
the world in the late 1980s (Stalling, 1992). Economic reform was composed of two 
major groups of policies: (1) macroeconomic stabilisation and (2) the so-called 
‘structural adjustment’ (Bates and Krueger, 1993; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Nelson, 
1990). 
 
Stalling (1992) argued that the changes in the development policies of the 
developing countries were the result of not only the economic situation but also of the 
political and ideological changes made in the international environment. The UK and 
US governments were headed by liberalist leaders (Reagan and Thatcher), who strongly 
supported the ‘magic of the market’ (Biersteker, 2005). These governments supported 
the IFIs in terms of financial and political resources for researching and advancing the 
idea of neo-liberalisation (Biersteker, 2005; Stalling, 1992). IMF and the World Bank 
were centres for propagation and enforcement of ‘free market fundamentalism’ and 
‘neo-liberal orthodoxy’ (Harvey, 2005). Creditors were increasingly united with the 
IMF and World Banks in facilitating the idea of neo-orthodox reform packages offered 
by the IFIs (Stalling, 1992; Biersteker, 2005; Nelson, 1990). They acted as the external 
pressure for the reforms in debtor’s countries. 
 
The IMF and the World Bank offered debt re-scheduling on condition of 
structural adjustment for economic reforms in debtor countries (Stalling, 1992; Nelson, 
1990; Kahler, 1990). Policy reforms were also the result of the ideological changes that 
moved economic policies based on Keynesian to neo-orthodox, then neo-liberalisation 
influences (Nelson, 1990; Kahler, 1990; Harvey, 2005). In a decade of slow growth and 
economic instability, the Keynesian approach was believed to have failed and was 
responsible for the failures in development (Harvey, 2005; Bierkester, 1995). This gave 
rise to the search for an alternative policy approach, in which correction of the previous 
policies were taking into account. 
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Support for the neo-orthodox approach stemmed largely from the success of 
East Asian countries when compared to the struggling Latin American, African and 
South Asian economies (Stallings, 1995). In contrast to structuralism and neo-
Keynesianism’s distrust of market mechanisms and faith in the state, neo-liberalism is 
highly sceptical of the state’s ability to efficiently allocate resources and as such, places 
greater faith in the market’s ability to do so. Neo-liberalism advocates limits to 
government intervention in the economy and the phasing out of protectionist measures 
(Harvey, 2005; Biersteker, 1995; Stalling, 1992; Nelson, 1990; Krueger, 1993). 
 
The new ideology was shared by the leaders of developing countries, as many of 
them were classified as technocrats who had been trained as economists in neo-
liberalisation. The convergence of beliefs in neo-liberalisation among the economists 
and many countries’ leaders had created a general consensus on ‘a recommended policy 
for developing country development’, known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Stalling, 
1992; Biertersker, 1995). Structural and trade reforms were further supported by the 
creation of new endogenous growth models that analysed the link between policy 
reforms and economic growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). Empirical works were also 
conducted to support the new ideology.13 These strengthened the belief in the new 
ideology of development policy (Rajapatirana, 2001). The 1980s and 1990s were 
considered as the decades of major policy changes, with developing countries turning 
away, partly or fully, from previous policies. 
 
Policy reform under the neo-liberalisation ideology was not free of challenges, 
and was criticised on theoretical and empirical grounds. Researchers believed that East 
Asia development was wrongly interpreted as evidence of the superiority of the market-
oriented mechanism and for the potential to turn away from the import substitution 
policies.14 They argued for the active role of government in guiding and promoting 
some selective sectors, in order to have better industrial performance and economic 
                                                
13 Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; Edward 1997 
14 Bierkester, 1995; Amsden, 1989; Haggard, 1990; Wade, 1992; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; and Lal, 
1996 
 40 
success, rather than leave them to free market influences. Taiwan and Korea advocated 
the role of government in designing policies and organisation to promote the transition 
from one level of industrialisation to another (Wade, 1994; Amsden, 1989). Wade 
(1990; 2003) promoted Governed Market theories in which the developmental state 
model combined with an international market orientation as the main contribution of the 
success of the East Asian model. Rodrik (1992) was sceptical about the across-the-
board trade liberalisations, although he did support the selective promotion of a specific 
industry. World Bank adjusted their criticism on the roles of state and government 
policy failures, with more importance given to other factors for structural reforms. In 
the study ‘The East Asian Miracle’, the World Bank suggested that effective 
institutional development, human capital investment and some types of sector policies 
were needed to accompany the reforms (WB, 1993; Bierkester, 1995). The tone for 
reforms had shifted from a total laissez faire approach towards more ‘market-friendly’ 
policies (Berger and Beeson, 1998; Masina, 2006). 
 
The theoretical challenges to the traditional argument of free trade came from 
the direct relationship between trade liberalisation, welfare and growth. Stiglitz and 
Charlon (2005) suggest that the benefits of trade liberalisation may not be taken for 
granted. The traditional arguments for free trade are often built in perfect conditions, but 
developing countries operate in less than perfect conditions. A perfect market entails 
full employment, full resource utilisation and perfect risk management (Stiglitz and 
Charlon, 2005; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1977). Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) showed that 
under certain conditions free trade is Pareto-inferior to autarky, in which welfare is 
reduced and leads to increased unemployment. Anand and Johsi (1979) suggested that 
there was a trade-off between efficiency and inequality in trade liberalisation. Rodrik 
and Rodriguez (2001) found that there is a gap between the results that economists have 
actually achieved and the policy conclusions they have typically drawn. Rodrik and 
others suggests that in order to achieve the effect of trade liberalisation on long-term 
growth, the market may not be sufficient for encouraging restructuring, diversification, 
and technological dynamism. Thus, developing countries need to develop ‘a framework 
of public action’ for private initiatives to change the competitive advantages. Countries 
with poor institutions suffered a strong negative impact in terms of trade losses, and 
trade liberalisation diverts the needed resources away from development priorities such 
as education, public health, industrial capacity and social cohesion (Rodrik, 2001). 
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Rodrik (2001) declared that global integration rested on shaky empirical grounds 
and negative results have fuelled increasing criticism and challenges to the economic 
reforms advocated under the neo-liberalisation banner in the last two decades. The IMF 
and World Bank frequently expressed their pessimism on the extent to which policy 
agreements would eventually be implemented accordingly (Haggard, 1985). Reform 
implementation is often politically constrained (Nelson, 1990).  These reform failures 
are not the only reason for the poor performance of many African and Latin American 
countries in implementing economic stabilisation and structural adjustment (Bierkester, 
1995; Nelson, 1990). The implementation of trade liberalisation has often come at a 
high cost. Finger (2001) estimated that developing countries must spend 150 billion 
USD to implement requirements under just three WTO agreements, which may exceed 
the capability of many low-income nations. The evidence on the benefits of liberalising 
capital flows is even weaker after the Asian Financial Crisis, as financial markets are 
inherently unstable, subject to ‘bubbles’, panic and short-sightedness (Rodrik, 2001). 
 
Although the mood for reform was lowered since the Asian Financial Crisis, 
intellectuals and policy makers still believe the harshest elements of each development 
policy should be avoided (Stiglitz and Charlon, 2005). Instead the worries for the roles 
of market or of the state in efficient allocation of resources, has caused many 
researchers to have serious reservations about the ability of the officials in developing 
countries to manage the development policies (Krueger, 1997; Stiglitz and Charlon, 
2005). Winter (2003) clearly expressed his sceptical view on the ability of officials to 
implement the state intervention policies effectively, thus rejecting the possibility to use 
these interventions against the market failure. Krueger (1997) doubted the ‘degree of 
sophistication of officials’ to interpret policy reform research results correctly. In 
addition, the simple orthodoxy policy is more transparent and less prone to corruption 
and rent seeking activities (Stiglitz and Charlon, 2005). 
 
2.1.1 Components of Reforms 
 
The failure of the Keynesian model, combined with serious macro-economic 
instability with high inflation and budget and current account deficits, resulted in the 
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need for policy reform in the 1980s. Orthodox measures often required the re-
establishment of a healthy economy by immediately controlling inflation; reducing the 
growth rate of government spending; reforming the tax structure, rationalising 
expenditures, reducing government subsidies, and improving the efficiency of public 
investments by scaling down and shifting their focus from production and towards 
infrastructure and the social sector (Biertesker 1995).15 
 
The existing inefficient economic structures made sustainable growth difficult 
for the success of the first stages of reform, and in the second stages there was a need to 
improve incentives and efficiency for sustainable growth (Nelson, 1990). The new 
policies required the rationalisation of the allocation of resources and the strengthening 
of the export sector (Bates and Krueger, 1993). The specific measures may vary with 
individual country’s circumstances (Nelson, 1990). Reform programmes often 
reallocated resources for more efficiency through promoting a greater reliance on 
market mechanisms, further reducing the roles of government, and bringing integration 
into the international economy (Bates and Krueger, 1993). Typical structural adjustment 
programmes often involved four main issues: 
1. Trade and foreign direct investment liberalisation; 
2. SOE privatisation and restructuring; 
3. Promotion of economic competition and of private sector; 
4. Efficient economic management institutions (Bates and Krueger, 1993).16 
 
Trade and investment policies are often at the core of the structural adjustment 
processes. Welfare enhancement through free trade has been the one of the most 
fundamental doctrines in modern economics (Stiglitz and Charlon, 2005). Countries are 
required to liberalise their trade regime with several degrees of liberalisation. Free trade 
is “generally regarded as an incentive structure which does not discriminate between 
exportable and importable goods or between production for domestic market and export 
                                                
15 Nelson 1990; Haggard and Webb 1994; Biertesker 1995; Stalling 1992; 1995; Harvey 2005; Krueger 
1994 
16 Williamson, 1990; 1994; Haggard and Kaufman, 1993 
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sales” (Oyejide, 1998, p.343).17 Liberalisation aimed to create a trade regime with 
minimum barriers for trade and investment, ensuring that countries establish and exploit 
their comparative advantages, therefore enhancing the efficiency of the domestic 
resource allocation.18 From this process, technology and knowledge also flow and 
transfer between countries, which increase innovation development (Srinivasan and 
Bhagwati, 2001). Trade liberalisation is the process of balancing domestic and 
international prices (Masina, 2006; Nelson, 1990; Kruger, 1992; 1994). This involves 
the reduction of quotas and tariffs, dismantling of licensing agreements, state trading 
policies, and other non-tariff barriers (Oatley, 2006). Foreign exchange controls are also 
relaxed to create unifying exchange rates and greater currency convertibility. FDI 
liberalisation focuses on creating fair and non-discriminatory conditions for foreign 
companies investing in the host economy, and removing market entry and ownership 
restrictions (Stiglitz and Charlon, 2005). In Vietnam, the free trade approach thus 
entailed both internal and external reforms to liberalise the economy; but domestic 
reforms based upon opening up the economy to global competition lacked enforcement 
mechanisms and were open to distortion through opaque methods of non-compliance. 
 
An essential challenge is SOE reform and private sector promotion, as 
developing countries governments tend to prefer state control of economic activities. 
The existence of the large SOEs is considered a major burden preventing a country from 
realising its economic potential (Masina, 2006). This sector benefits from the 
government policies and supports such as subsidies, trade protection and cheap credit. 
SOEs become monopolies in major industrial sectors and usually operate inefficiently. 
State investments and interventions are believed to draw resources from more 
competitive industries and to weaken the banking system through the state’s policy of 
lending. These supports and protections actually make the SOEs compete directly with 
the private sector for the country’s limited resources and limit the capacity of the private 
sector to compete and develop in the market. Regulations increase operating costs of the 
private sector and reduce output growth rates (Oatley, 2006). SOEs restructuring and 
privatisation process reduces this inefficiency. It fosters greater competition in the 
                                                
17 Helleiner, 1995: Iqbal and Khan, 1998 
18 Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 2001; Nelson, 1990; Stiglitz and Charlon, 2005; Biersterker, 1995 
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private sector, which in turn helps to create a more efficient private sector and better 
resource allocation. In general, structural adjustment encourages scaling back of the role 
of state in the economy, while enhancing the role of the ‘market’ (Oatley, 2006; 
Biertesker, 1995). 
 
Essential to reform is economic institutions. Since the market operating 
mechanism shifts sharply from government’s planning and intervention to market 
forces, the role, functions and competence of economic management institutions has to 
be adjusted to match the development of a market-based economy. The advocates of the 
New Institutional Economics (Coase, 1992; North, 1997; Williamson, 1994; Rodrik, 
2004) recognised that a good market economy requires not only ‘getting prices right’, 
but also ‘getting property rights right’ and ‘getting institutions right’ (Rodrik, 2004). 
Property rights and institutions in general, set the rules to affect the behaviour of 
economic agents in a fundamental way (Qian, 2002). 
 
Institutional reforms are critical for growth including improving secured private 
property rights protected by the rule of law, impartial enforcement of contracts through 
an independent judiciary; appropriate government regulations to foster market 
competition effectiveness; public administration; corporate governance and a 
transparent financial system. They are needed for sustainable development because they 
determine the efficiency and existence of both markets and organisations, public and 
private (Rodrik, 2004). Institutions determine the level of investment in physical and 
human capital and the dynamics of innovation, determining the perceived risks by 
individuals and other economic agents of conducting investments and undertaking risks 
(Burki and Perry, 1998).  
 
There is a strong consensus on the absence of a ‘typical’ or one fits-all reform 
package since the characteristics and circumstances of each economy, such as economic 
structures, reform priorities, initial conditions, and types of governments, differ widely 
(Nelson 1990; Haggard and Web, 1994; Bates and Krueger, 1993). The task of selecting 
a suitable reform package is often daunting and the implementation of the reform in a 
quantum leap is not easy, since reform is usually a lengthy process (Krueger 1993; 
Krueger and Bate, 1993; Haggard and Webb, 1994). There are numerous strategies for 
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economic reforms and the results vary greatly between countries (Krueger, 2000). Since 
the mid-1980s, there have been an increasing number of the developing countries 
altering their economic policies, as the previous policies had failed to serve their 
purpose in providing growth and rapid development (Krueger, 2000). This trend was 
further strengthened by the wave of Eastern-European countries undertaking reforms 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
The trend of economic reform in developing countries was still continuing and 
holding its general trend in the 1990s. However, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 had 
negative effects on the reforms process in developing countries. Due to the global 
economic instability, many countries, including both advanced and developing countries 
de-escalated their will to liberalise their economies. This dramatically slowed the 
process of the reforms in many countries in the next decades (Sally, 2008). Economic 
reform processes varied vastly from country to country. It was not an easy and natural 
process, but rather a complex process influenced by many factors. 
 
2.1.2 Determinants of the policy reforms 
 
In the last three decades, enormous efforts and resources have been used to 
achieve appropriate reform programmes and the necessary conditions for the 
development of the developing countries. They were often concerned about the factors 
influencing nature, programme, speed, and results of the reform process. These factors 
are concentrated in five determinants:  
1. Crisis/Pressure,  
2. Interest,  
3. Ideas,  
4. Institutions, and  
5. Factor endowments (Sally, 2008).19 
 
                                                
19 Bates and Kruger, 1993, Krueger 1993; 2000; Haggard and Web, 1994; Nelson ,1990; Sally, 2008 
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(1). Crisis/Pressure: 
 
Crisis often means that the policies in place have problems created by internal 
and external influences. Bates and Krueger (1993) found that crisis was the more 
frequent stimulus to reform. The reforms are often triggered by three major types of 
crisis: (1) balance of payments difficulties; (2) accelerating inflation and (3) the loss of 
economic control. The first two problems often leads to shortages of imported goods, 
services, debt-servicing difficulties or capital flight, which worsens the living conditions 
of the ordinary citizens (Bates and Kruger, 1993). The deterioration of public services, 
increased corruption, and the increased size of the informal sector, such as in frequent 
evasion of regulation, smuggling, etc. are often the symptoms of the loss of State 
control. When faced with these problems, governments often strive to restore their 
control and stabilise the situation (Bates and Krueger, 1993). 
 
However, in the case of Vietnam a more sophisticated examination of the causes 
and impact of crisis needs to be taken. The Communist Party fixation on survival at all 
costs means that re-occurring crisis became an almost systemic inevitability, as the 
Party consistently decided strategy on the basis of political survival and the subsequent 
policies created economic crisis. An example is the SOE debt crisis, brought about by 
the enormous amounts of financial support loaned without risk controls, and predicated 
purely on a need to retain a government control of the economy and using SOEs as the 
Party’s means to that end. The unforeseen ends was that large amounts of the financial 
support were illegally diverted into individuals hands, the SOEs failed to invest in re-
structuring and improving their competitiveness and the distortions in the economy, 
such as less investment for the private sector and distortions in the market sectors, 
meant that the governance ability of the Party was publically seen to be failing, The 
very strategies for avoiding crisis became the actual source of re-occurring economic 
and political crisis. A vicious circle of crisis became inevitable, as the ‘creative’ 
economic statistics, (constructed to ‘hide’ the consequences of Party decision-making) 
mean future policies were based on fictional economic realities and old problems 
deepened, while new challenges, such as debt, aggravated already critical faults in the 
economic system.  
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Crisis does have a positive ‘side’ as it helps to break the patterns of ‘normal 
politics’ and can lean towards an accumulation of power for reformers in government to 
implement positive reforms (Williamson, 1994; Bates and Kruger, 1993; Nelson, 1990). 
It not only re-shapes societal interests, but also shifts the domestic balance of power by 
“weakening some groups and strengthening others” (Haggard and Webb 1994, p.153). 
Crisis often worsens living standards, so it tends to increase the public’s intolerance in 
the short-term costs accompanying the reform process.  
 
The role of crisis in initiating reforms has not yet been satisfactorily supported 
by empirical studies (Haggard and Webb, 1994, Sally, 2006). Nelson (1990, p.325-26) 
has argued that “the nature of the crisis itself – its sudden or gradual emergence, its 
largely exogenous or substantially internal causes, even its severity – has little clear 
relation to the timing of policy response in many of our cases”. Governments may 
respond differently to crises, and their response may even vary in the most common and 
circumscribed balance of payments difficulties. 
 
There is still no consensus among researchers about the right timing with which 
to respond to a crisis (Haggard and Webb, 1994). While in countries such as Thailand, 
Colombia and Indonesia, governments have usually responded quickly to warning 
signals at the outset of an economic crisis, the average African government has waited 
until the worst has materialised (Haggard and Webb, 1994). Moreover, a crisis is not a 
sufficient condition to guarantee the sustainability and institutionalisation of a reform. 
Even though it can stimulate government willingness and tolerance of both the political 
opposition and public opinion, it does not eliminate the vested interests opposing 
reform. But, again, Vietnam has a particular problem here in reacting to crisis and the 
right-timing for decisions. Decision-making can often be instinctive and rushed, or 
conversely, extremely slow and cumbersome. An example here is the Minister of 
Transport’s decision to extend school hours to 7pm (from 5pm) in 2012, in order to 
lessen the traffic on roads in rush hour. The decision was taken without recourse to the 
Ministry of Education and chaos resulted in schools and on the road network. The pilot 
project was cancelled within a week. Traffic control has become a major problem to the 
economy, with severe impacts on transport logistics, but the strategy for dealing with it 
was poorly constructed, enacted without planning or forethought and created a bigger 
crisis than the one it was designed to deal with (VNS, 2012). 
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(2) Interests: 
 
Interest groups act together to promote and protect their interests by attempting 
to influence government decisions (Salisbury, 1975). These groups use various 
methods, such as the diffusion of information, expertise, publicity, campaigning or 
electoral assistance to influence the policy decisions of government (Olson, 1965). The 
effective influence of an interest group stems not only from their decisive role in 
mobilising electoral support, but also from their capability in spearheading collective 
action outside of the routine channels of politics, such as labour strikes, capital flight, 
demonstrations, riots and even insurrection. Thus, interest groups often play a central 
role in the decision-making process, especially in democratic societies. 
 
Extensive literature on the political economy of policy reform during the 1980s 
supports the view that the politics of economic reform are driven by income-distribution 
dynamics between interest groups. Economic reform tends to redistribute income across 
groups in the short run, and achieve better resource allocation, faster growth and higher 
average income only in the long run. Consequently, reform-related income re-
distribution leads to a complicated political scenario, where groups losing from the 
reform attempt to block it, while groups benefiting from it promote it (Frieden and 
Rogowski, 1996; Nelson, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). As the government 
needs the support of interest groups to be successful, it often has to serve as a mediator 
between them. This mediation process then influences the government’s pace and 
attitude toward the reform process (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996).  
 
The structural adjustment accentuates political tensions between interest groups 
through budget reductions and enhanced efficiency in resource allocation. In, agrarian, 
labour abundant countries like China and Vietnam, reforms often redistribute income 
from industry and urban non-tradable sectors to agriculture and export-oriented 
industries. Given that the benefits from structural adjustment are often only felt in the 
medium or long run, reaching the necessary political balance for reform implementation 
becomes an arduous task. Since the groups losing from the reform often have strong 
influence on the government, their motivation to block the reform is greater than the 
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‘winners’’ motivation to press for the reform. Losers are the groups benefiting from the 
previous policies, the losses acting as incentives to carry out collective action against 
reform (Olson, 1971; Krueger, 1974; Sally, 2008). Meanwhile, the benefits of the 
reform are often diffused over the whole society. Yet the winners have a vague 
understanding of what benefits the reforms may bring to them. Thus, these two factors 
may limit the motivation for collective action of the winners in a reform process 
(Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). Reforms subsequently become harder to implement due 
to the overwhelming collective action of the losers in the reform process.  
 
The groups that gain the most from protection stand to lose the most from 
stabilisation and structural reform (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). Import competing 
firms that had benefited from government credit subsidies and protection would be hit 
the hardest by the government’s budget cutback. SOEs would be particularly hard hit as 
they would lose the government support that had sheltered their operational 
inefficiencies. Workers in urban non-tradable sectors who had benefited from 
government subsidies to basic services, such as utilities, transportation and essential 
food items would also be hit by government budget cuts. Public sector employment 
would suffer as well, as budget cuts bring an end to wage increases and force a large 
reduction in the number of government employees (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). Since 
reform-related losses are very concentrated in a few groups of society and the gains are 
widespread and uncertain, these groups often dominate the politics of reform (Bates and 
Krueger, 1993). 
 
Olson (1982) also argued that strong institutionalised interest groups are likely 
to become highly rigid and cause deadlocks in individual groups and in the interactions 
of the groups with the state. The government must have sufficient power to break the 
deadlock to initiate the reform as well as to avoid the risk of becoming semi-paralysed. 
A single party rule may thus be seen as a highly positive influence on reform as the 
government has the power and freedom to over-ride many of the opposition groups to 
reform, unless the strongest anti reformers are actually in the govt. Policy reform 
implementation involves encouraging the reorganisation of interest groups by 
expanding the representation and weight of those benefiting from the reform and either 
marginalising or compensating the losers. Forming a new pattern of interest groups and 
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building the capacity of political elites are ways to secure the adjustments to economic 
policy.  
 
In the case of Vietnam, the most relevant group in concern to the thesis claim of 
non-compliance to WTO commitments is a politically and financially powerful 
contingent of elites, who have used positions in the political structure and wealth 
accrued mostly from improper practices, to dominant control of the system of 
governance. Their power as an interest group is mostly based on serving the interests of 
the members as individuals, but their common interests are increasingly consolidating 
the interest group into a direct challenge to the power of the Party. Yet, nearly all their 
power is directed through the Party structure and separating them as an ‘interest group’ 
either in support or opposed to the Party is extremely difficult. Throughout the thesis, 
this interest group will be referred to and its ability to ‘capture’ control in its own 
personal ‘interests’ in both the economic and political framework cannot be under-
estimated. 
 
(3) Ideology:  
 
The literature on policy reform often shows that ideology can be a critical 
determinant of policy change (Bates and Krueger, 1993). Although the influence of 
ideas (or ideology) in policy is not easy to measure, past experience shows us that the 
prevailing climate of ideas and their interaction with interests and events can influence 
the set of policies (Goldstein, 1994; Sally, 2008). Indeed, ideology is a mental model 
that provides a coherent set of beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships (Goldstein, 
1999). In the context of economic policy, these mental models typically focus on the 
relationship between government policies and economic outcomes. Ideas/ideology often 
stem from economic theories, where they frequently establish clear statements about 
economic relationships (Biersteker, 1995). 
 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993) have suggested three causal pathways through 
which ideas can influence policy choices, arguing that ideas serve as ‘road maps’, or 
understandings of the causal connections between a given set of objectives and different 
political strategies. Ideas can influence the choice of policy and once they become 
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embedded in political institutions, they influence the policy choice long after the 
founding interests of those institutions have changed (Biersteker, 1995). Ideology also 
guides the beliefs of interest groups (Bates and Krueger, 1993). 
 
In the context of comprehensive economic reform, it is difficult for particular 
groups to calculate where their interests are: “people subject to economic policy reform 
would themselves remain uncertain as to how their interests would be affected by policy 
change” (Bates and Krueger 1993, p.129). It is difficult for agents to estimate 
macroeconomic contingencies, as ideology and economic theories play an important 
role in assisting agents to ‘discover’ where their interests lie. What matters, therefore, is 
not whether a particular idea is true or false, but whether interest groups and people in 
power believe the idea to be true. As such, ideas can be the source of interest group 
preferences for or against a set of economic policies, helping to overcome collective 
action problems during the run-up of economic reform (Bates and Krueger, 1993). 
 
Changes in ideology have often led to policy reform in many developing 
countries. Since the end of World War II, the ideology of development has been 
oscillating between the policies of intervention and those of free markets (Sally, 2006). 
A consensus on import-substitution, state planning and foreign aid was strongly 
embedded in developing country governments up to the 1970s. This consensus was 
reinforced by the post-colonial political ideology of mercantilist state-building and 
state-led economic development. Policy preferences were gradually replaced, however, 
by the neo-liberal economic ideas enshrined by the ‘Washington Consensus’ package. 
This package stressed the efficiency of market forces and outward economic orientation 
in promoting economic development, and led to massive policy reform in developing 
countries in the early 1980s (Biersteker, 1995; Sally, 2006; Ravenhill, 2006). 
 
Now, the prevailing ‘post-Washington Consensus’ ideology has re-legitimised 
government intervention in the economy in order to tackle market failures. This does 
not represent a full return to the pre-Washington Consensus ideology, for the spirit of 
the latter has been considerably eroded (Sally, 2006).  
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(4) Institutions:  
 
Institutions have a significant bearing on the development and political process 
(Garrett and Lange, 1996). According to North (2004), institutions comprise both sets of 
formal rules and informal norms of behaviour structuring human interaction. Formal 
rules constitute the ‘rules of the game’ such as the constitution, statutes and laws 
governing and enforcing contracts and property rights, which are the legal framework 
within which agents produce, consume and interact. Informal norms of behaviour are 
codes of conduct, taboos, and standards of behaviour that constrain the choice of agents 
and organisations in their activities and operations (North, 2004; Burki and Perry, 
1998). Institutions mitigate market failures, stemming from the informational needs, 
commitment and enforcement problems, and prisoners’ dilemmas (Krehbiel, 1991; 
Milgrom et al, 1990). They determine the efficiency and existence of both markets and 
organisations, public and private. Institutions determine the level of investment in both 
physical and human capital and the dynamics of innovation, determining the perceived 
risks by individuals and other economic agents of conducting investments and 
undertaking risks (Burki and Perry, 1998). Countries that have liberalised and accepted 
globalisation often have stronger institutions. With lower trade and FDI barriers and 
higher trade to GDP and FDI to GDP ratios, they tend to have better property rights and 
contract enforcement, better regulated financial markets, a stronger competitive culture, 
and more transparency in business. These countries also present a higher capacity in 
terms of resources, human capital, and in formulating and implementing unilateral and 
multilateral trade policy. 
 
According to Sally (2008), institutions set the scene for government actions, 
interest group lobbying and the influence of ideas. They are the arena for policy choices 
and their implementation. These rules influence how people organise and thus 
determine whether interests organise around factors of production or industry lines 
(Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). They also influence how interest groups exert pressure 
on the political process, whether they lobby the legislature or exert influence through 
political parties. Rules influence which interests politicians, must respond to and thus 
determine which interests gain representation and which do not. 
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Garrett and Lange (1996) explain the role of institutions in inducing policy 
reforms by classifying institutions into two major groups. ‘Socioeconomic institutions’ 
organise interests in the private sector, affecting the types of distributional demands of 
societal actors place on government and influence the macroeconomic constraints under 
which governments operate. They can affect the political power of private sector actors 
and can play an important role in facilitating collective action. ‘Formal institutions’ 
aggregate societal interests in the public arena and determine the responsiveness of 
governments to them, affecting the responses of government to distributional demands 
and macroeconomic constraints in the public sphere. They also influence the willingness 
of governments to undertake reform, determine governments’ power to initiate the 
reform, and affect their capability to sustain the reform process once set in motion 
(Garret and Langer, 1996; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Haggard and Webb, 1993; 
Nelson 1990; Rius and Walle, 2003). 
 
(5) Factor endowments:  
 
Ranis and Mahmood (1992) argue that resource endowments are important 
factors in influencing the policy reform process in developing countries. Reform in 
countries with relatively rich endowments of natural resources, such as land and 
minerals, tends to be more complicated than in countries without such endowments. The 
conclusions from the economic development of East Asian countries show that the 
relative labour abundance at certain development stages has allowed them to embark on 
labour-intensive manufactured exports. This industrial specialisation is an engine for 
growth and, in turn, helped poverty reduction and human-welfare improvements, while 
many African and Latin American countries were struggling with their economic 
reforms and low growth rates (Sally, 2008). 
 
By using FDI to develop their labour-intensive export capacity, the East-Asian 
countries have been able to bring about poverty reduction, employment, better 
infrastructure and institutions. This specialisation creates and strengthens a constellation 
of interests supporting further economic reform (Sally, 2006). Land and resource-
abundant countries, given their relatively high labour cost, are crowded out of the global 
manufacturing markets by East-Asian (especially Chinese) competition. This position in 
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the world economy leaves these countries dependent on cyclical and volatile 
commodities markets. FDI in resource-abundant countries tends to be capital-intensive. 
The result is a FDI enclave, with high levels of unemployment, no technology and 
wealth spill-over into the rest of the economy, and with profits mainly distributed 
among the corrupt local business and political elites (Sally, 2006).  
 
In conclusion, developing countries have made an unprecedented effort to shift 
their economic policies away from import-substitution towards more market-oriented 
ones. Most reforms undertaken in these countries include economic stabilisation and 
structural adjustment, which in turn consists of three major policies: trade liberalisation 
and FDI, SOEs deregulation, and construction of market-oriented institutions. Even 
though the reform packages were very similar, the results were often quite different. 
The reform process is influenced by five main determinants: crises, interest groups 
activity, ideology, institutions, and factor endowments. In most strong-liberalising 
countries, political or macroeconomic crises have contributed to opening-up the 
economy (Krueger, 1993; Nelson, 1990). This has paved the way to the consolidation of 
market-oriented interest groups and a challenge to traditional protectionist interests. 
Gradually, open-market ideas have become entrenched and the resulting stronger 
institutions turned out to be more capable to support and manage open-market policies. 
However, this has not been sufficiently studied in Vietnam. 
 
2.2 World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its accession process 
 
2.2.1 WTO and its functions 
 
The WTO administers a trade agreement negotiated by its members and is an 
organisational structure developed under the auspices of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since the completion of the Uruguay Round the structure 
has expanded to incorporate agreements on tariffs and trade (GATT), on trade in 
services (GATS), on intellectual property (TRIPS), the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
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The WTO inherits many features of GATT, but has also evolved to become a 
wider and deeper institution. The WTO has numerous functions, including facilitating 
the implementation and operation of multilateral trade agreements, to provide a forum 
for negotiations, to administer the dispute settlement mechanism, to furnish the 
multilateral surveillance of trade policies, and to cooperate with other international 
institutions such as the World Bank and IMF in order to achieve greater coherence in 
global economic policy-making (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). The WTO is an inter-
governmental organisation with its own secretariat, and the agreements it administers 
are mandatory and permanent. WTO agreements are multilateral and it has a wider 
scope than the GATT had, covering trade in services, trade related aspects of 
intellectual property and continues dealing with trade in goods through ‘GATT 1994’ 
(an updated version of ‘GATT 1947’).20 The WTO system is faster and more automatic 
than the old GATT system. The existence of WTO is essential as it provides codes of 
conduct for international trade and reduces the arduousness of negotiation processes 
(Hoekman, 2002b). 
 
The WTO is headed by the Ministerial Conference, where members meet at least 
once every two years. Between the meetings of the Ministerial Conference, the 
organisation is managed by the General Council, which meets about 12 times a year to 
carry out day-to-day functions of WTO. The General Council adjudicates on trade 
disputes or reviews member countries’ trade policies (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). 
The two highest profile activities of the WTO are: initiatives to launch multilateral trade 
negotiations and the settlement of disputes. These activities are the responsibility of 
WTO members and not the Secretariat (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). 
 
2.2.2 Roles of the WTO in economic reform 
 
The WTO agreements facilitate the free and fair flow of goods and services 
between countries, but are not specifically designed for direct promotion and assistance 
of economic development and reform. In an increasingly globalised world, it is difficult 
                                                
20 GATT 1947 largely concerned which commodities would be covered by the agreement tariffs 
reduction. GATT 1994, extended the agreement fully to new areas such as intellectual property, services, 
capital, and agriculture and created the WTO. 
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to find an economic activity that is not related to international trade. Trade and 
investment play an important economic role in any country and as a consequence of this 
importance, many countries liberalised their trade and investment regime as a part of the 
structural adjustment process. 
 
The WTO provides several advantages for developing countries: 
1. It provides less developed countries with opportunities for market access 
and expansion.  
2. Developing countries are small in terms of demand and supply compared to 
the large trading entities from the developed world.  
3. It binds reciprocal commitments made in previously undertaken 
liberalisation programmes and helps to prevent a return to protectionism 
when faced with adverse economic conditions  
4. WTO membership and negotiations can strengthen the domestic policies 
and institutions created for the conduct of international trade policymaking. 
5. WTO accession is a means to accelerate and lock-in domestic reforms. The 
changes in economic policies and institutions that often accompany WTO 
accession also increase the credibility of governments in the eyes of the 
international business community (Michalopouslos, 1998).21 
 
In joining the WTO, acceding members accept a number of commitments, which 
also carry the risk of adverse affects upon their economy. The acceding member risks an 
increase in the pressures where ‘products, enterprises and industries’ are faced with a 
new level of competition that forces them to accelerate and extend their market driven 
reforms. The reduction in domestic protections such as tariff barriers opens up the 
market to ‘foreign products, services and investments’ and there is a new demand for 
enterprises to restructure and become more profit driven and competitive as foreign 
inputs challenge the past preferences and protections that domestic businesses often 
became reliant on for economic survival (Yan, 2000, p.1). The necessary incorporation 
of WTO rules into domestic legislation places a heavy burden on the acceding nation, 
                                                
21Krueger, 1998; Sally, 1999; and Langammer and Lucke, 1999; Drabek and Laird, 1998 
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with quick and efficient reforms needed in both the content and the subsequent 
enforcement of the new regulations and laws.  An increasing number of ‘losers’ in the 
process becomes a source of interest group resistance to the reforms and this can often 
spread into the government bureaucracy as administrative elements reveal the levels of 
inadaptability in the system (Yan, 2000, p.2). 
 
The new competitive and globalised economic environment means that a far 
higher calibre of human resources eventually becomes a necessity. The whole system of 
providing the necessary skills for economic survival creates demands that affect 
everything from the education system to the boardroom. The quality of human 
resources, in skills and talents becomes the key to making the transition from a 
developing country (with its advantages such as low labour costs), to a middle income 
country now providing better quality products and services and relying on its 
competitive advantages in a global economy. The WTO acts as a tool for development, 
but places a number of inevitable demands on an acceding Member to reform, and the 
subsequent changes are costly and require a number of economic reforms that needs to 
be seen as a short-term burden for a long-term benefit.  
 
In Vietnam the disadvantages are increased by the actual structure of the 
economy which is predicated on an obsolete production structure that is also impaired 
by a lack of resources and knowledge required to develop the economy into an energy-
saving and environmentally-friendly structure. The Vietnam economy has concentrated 
on growth in quantity and very little improvements in quality, and the subsequent 
scenario is one that deepens the extent and impact of the disadvantages in joining the 
WTO (Bui, 2010, p.1). 
 
2.2.3 WTO Accession Process 
 
Accession to the WTO is an increasingly demanding and lengthy process due to 
the institution’s growing membership and expanded mandate. Accession can be divided 
into an introductory phase and three substantive phases: 
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1. The applicant’s preparation of a memorandum on its foreign trade regime 
describing in detail the country’s policies and institution involved in the 
conduct of international trade; 
2. The members’ examination phase; and  
3. The negotiation phase (Michalopoulos, 1998). 
 
In the accession process, the applicant country is required to meet the WTO 
requirements and provisions, as well as the demands of existing members without the 
full knowledge about the benefits it will gain from the accession process. These 
negotiations are often one-sided. 
 
Introductory phase: The applicant country begins the accession process by 
sending a formal letter to the Director General of the WTO expressing its desire to 
become a member of the organisation. The request is then considered by the WTO 
General Council who set up a Working Party to consider the accession application.   
 
The memorandum: This is the fact-finding phase designed to give WTO 
members a deeper understanding of the applicant country’s economy and trade related 
regimes. The applicant country submits a memorandum describing in detail its foreign 
trade regime and providing relevant statistical data for circulation to all WTO members. 
(Michalopoulos, 1998).  
 
Questions and answers: Once the memorandum has been circulated to WTO 
members, they can ask questions and obtain clarification on the applicant’s policies and 
institutions. The applicant is requested to submit relevant legislation and information on 
a variety of issues covered by the WTO for the consideration of the Working Party’s 
members. The purpose of the detailed review and negotiations are to ensure that the 
applicant’s legislation and institutions are in conformity with WTO provisions and the 
applicant will make specific commitments on areas relevant to WTO rules. The results 
of this phase are then recorded in: Draft Report of Working Party and the Draft Protocol 
of Accession. 
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Bilateral negotiation on terms of accession: Once offers are settled, the 
accession process enters its final phase, which involves specific bilateral negotiations 
between the applicant and each WTO member who wishes to hold such talks. These 
negotiations concern tariff levels and the degree of openness of the services sector 
proposed by the prospective member. 
 
When the Working Party agrees on the completion of its mandate, it adopts the 
Draft Report on Accession, the Draft Protocol of Accession, and the Schedule of 
Concessions and Commitments. All these documents then are submitted to the General 
Council for approval. Following a favourable decision by the General Council, the 
country is invited to sign a protocol of accession under Article XII of the WTO 
agreement (Guohua and Jin, 2001).  
 
The accession process often takes a long time because members try to make sure 
that the acceding country enact laws, develop the institutions, and apply policies that 
conform to the fundamental rules and disciplines of the WTO (Drabek and Laird, 1998). 
The applicant country has also to guarantee greater stability in commercial policy, 
which is in itself a consequence of adherence to WTO agreements (Michalopoulos, 
2002). Therefore, the accession process encourages acceding countries to overhaul their 
economic institutions and policies to be in conformity with the market. 
 
Unilateral liberalisers can lock-in their reforms through binding WTO 
agreements; countries choosing the multilateral track can use the accession process as a 
springboard for further and deeper unilateral reforms (Sally, 1999). WTO accession 
affects policy reform through its member’s requirements that the applicant country's 
trade regime and economic policies conform to WTO rules. WTO members investigate 
whether any part of the applicant's trade regime is inconsistent with WTO rules.  
 
2.3 China’s WTO Accession 
 
China was officially admitted as the 143rd member of the WTO in 2001 after 15 
years of negotiations. Commitments in meeting the WTO requirements resulted in 
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highly successful economic reform and integration into the world economy 
(Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002; Lardy, 2002; Sally, 2004). 
 
China’s reform is seen as the textbook case for strong unilateral economic 
liberalisation (Sally, 2006). Reforms began in 1978, and accelerated after 1994. 
Economic liberalisation saved China from the economic and social ruin of the Cultural 
Revolution but also provided it new economic and political strengths in the world arena, 
with GDP growth rates often exceeding 9.5%, and significant economic growth 
throughout the 1991-2005 reform period (Naughton, 2007). Reform was not 
implemented without difficulties. Technical problems of the reform agenda created 
difficulties for policy makers in planning, implementing and controlling the process of 
reform. Disadvantaged groups during the reform applied political pressure to slow down 
the reforms or force a compromised agenda. Nevertheless, the Chinese government has 
wisely used its strong determination in acceding to the WTO to cope with these 
difficulties (Naughton, 2007).  
 
The China economic reform involved unilateral and multilateral economic 
liberalisation driven by WTO accession. Its experience is highly relevant to the 
Vietnam’s case with China’s economic reform processes sharing many similarities. 
Compared to transitional economies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Vietnam 
and China stand apart, as both countries remain under the leadership of the Communist 
Party and adopted reform models favouring gradual economic reform before political 
reform. Both countries paths to reform focused on high economic growth, while the 
governments persisted on continuing single party leadership under the Communist 
Party. They demonstrated the same enthusiasm for unilateral reform and the use of 
international commitments as lock-in devices for internal reform. The pattern and 
ideology of reform in Vietnam is based on China’s experiences. In the initial years of 
reform, Vietnam was faced with a choice of two directions, epitomised by the 
contrasting strategies carried out by the Soviet Union and China. In the next sections we 
first, examine the two options that the Vietnam Communist Party faced and then 
provide the outline of the subsequent preferred option - China. Studying China’s 
economic reform during the WTO accession process is a valuable template from which 
to evaluate Vietnam’s own accession. 
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2.3.1 Soviet and Chinese Influence on Vietnam reform 
 
A major influence on the Party in deciding the structure and format of reform 
was the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and the turn of China towards a 
market economy model. Interviewees for the thesis remembered the Soviet experience 
as a dominant cause of fear within the Communist Party of Vietnam. However, the 
dominant fear was not for collapse of the economy, or loss of foreign support. The 
almost totally encompassing fear was for the collapse of the Vietnam Party and a 
determination to avoid this at all costs. Party survival was already steering towards a 
route that depended entirely on saving itself and accepting whatever means that would 
entail (Chi Lan, interview, 2012; Nghia, interview, 2011; Thai, interview, 2012; Thanh, 
interview, 2011). 
 
In the early years of the Soviet Union’s steady decline, the Communist Party 
chose an uneasy mix of radical and orthodox reforms. Yet, privatisation of the economy 
became the central focus, with centralisation of fiscal policy, strict monetary policies 
and free trade becoming the main reforms (Chen, 2010). In contrast, China chose a 
gradualist approach, with the Communist Party maintaining a strict control and reform 
focusing on foreign trade and agriculture (Chen, 2010). Chen (2010) argues, that the 
lessons of the Soviet and Chinese reform experiences were a choice between gradualism 
or radicalism. Thesis interviewees were almost universal in declaring that, from the 
outset, the Vietnam policies were determined by an obsessional fear of the Party 
collapsing in a style and speed commiserate with the Soviet Party example. In addition, 
the Chinese approach appeared to be working and even strengthening the power of the 
Party, while the Soviet Party example promised only economic failure and Party 
destruction.  
 
However, both experiences showed that whether gradualist or radical paths, both 
needed strong government governance to ensure control of corruption, regulation of 
monopolies, strong market institutions and efficient financial and regulatory controls, 
such as with efficient tax collection (Kizilyalli, 1998, p.6). Russia was seen to have 
undermined this by choosing both political and economic reforms. To add to this 
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challenge, Vietnam’s political system already contained quite powerful elites who were 
determined how reform and its pace of application would be carried out. Much has been 
written on the Soviet collapse and China’s success in reform (Aslund, 2000; Chen, 
2010; Poznanski, 1995). The debate on whether gradualist or radical reform works best 
is challenged effectively by new research, which points to initial conditions as the 
primary factor in the success of either pathway (Chen, 2010). Chen (2010) points out 
that, China’s advantages of having a powerful central control that limited rent-seeking 
by political elites and administered reform efficiently, is two of the major pre-reform 
conditions that determined the success or not of reform. There were limited entrenched 
interests in the economy, whereas, in Russia, enterprise managers were in a solid 
position to take immediate and rich advantage of the reforms. Corruption and rent-
seeking were already taking hold and reform did little more than providing new impetus 
for its growth. China avoided many problems by, for instance, controlling the supply of 
raw materials to industries through strong economic coordination and control, while 
Russia suffered rampant diversion of raw materials and illegal speculation on an 
economy wide basis (Chen, 2010). 
 
Foreign investment levels in China were good, with heavy inputs from the 
overseas Chinese Diasporas, especially in Macao, Taiwan and Hong Kong and 
significant contributions from Japan and the USA (Chen, 2010). In contrast, Russia and 
the Former Soviet Union attracted little foreign investment. These limited initial 
economic and fiscal conditions, which now can be seen as essential factors in the reform 
process, rather than specific political and economic policies. However, it would be a 
mistake to believe that Vietnam political elites were so rationally directed and 
calculating. Interviewees clearly showed a far more simplistic approach, driven almost 
entirely by the fear engendered by the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party. As 
McGough (interview, 2012) noted22, “In a decade of conversations with Vietnam 
political elites, the common factors were a fear of change- any and all change- a 
desperate level of distrust of anti-Communist elements in Vietnam and the belief that 
the Soviet collapse was not brought about by economic failure, but by ‘external forces’ 
                                                
22 Dr Sean McGough is a consultant to Provincial Central Committees, advised Party and Government 
officials at all levels for over 10 years and served on the Board of Directors in a number of major SOEs, 
including in the Banking, Agriculture and Textile sectors. 
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that ‘manufactured’ that failure. Reform was seen as essential, but one that could, and 
must, be focused entirely on economic reform and avoid political reform at all costs. 
The Party needed to change, not transform, while economic reform needed to be 
controlled, not liberated”. Privatisation would be allowed, but only through careful State 
control. While Fiscal freedom would be channelled through Party dominated institutions 
and agencies, and economic reforms would always focus on strengthening the Party, 
while weakening political adversaries. The ‘hidden hand’ of economic liberalism would 
be replaced by the Party’s own covert control of all things economic, as well as 
political. To this date, the Party still fails to see economic independence as an essential 
ingredient for efficient reform of the economy and remains dominated by the need for 
political survival through central and absolute control of both the economic and political 
environment.  
 
Throughout the reform process (before, during and after WTO accession), the 
dominant theme has been a desire by the political elite for survival. The Communist 
Party’s ideology has been continuously adapted to maintain power, with mainstays of 
ideology opened to the ‘free’ market, but Party control maintaining its conservative and 
unbending focus on continuing its absolute authority over all decision-making. This 
constraining political environment means that economic rationale is rarely the logical 
basis for decision-making in the economy, and political survival dominants all strategies 
for development. 
 
Yet, the thesis shows that the Party may have lost even this battle, and its mis-
directed control over external forces and its dominance of domestic economic factors 
allowed a power base to be built and consolidated by an interest group of individualistic 
driven elites who hold positions of both political and economic supremacy and 
challenge even the Party’s ability to govern. Corruption and rent-seeking dominates 
every sector, while political and economic institutions either bend and serve this interest 
group, or are rendered ineffective by the lack of establishment of mechanisms to enforce 
regulations or controls. In the quest to covertly maintain the Party’s dictatorial control 
of all economic and political factors, the Party established the means for this system to 
provide unbridled opportunities for particular individuals to first direct all political 
decision-making to their own personal favour, and then use the resulting growth in their 
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wealth to combine both power and money towards cementing their overall control of the 
Government, Party and Nation. 
 
The case of China leant towards a more palatable model than that of the Soviet 
experience. The Chinese Party appeared stronger due to economic liberalisation and, the 
Vietnam leaders felt that the combination of strong Party control in an Asian cultural 
context offered a working model of how to combine market economy reforms alongside 
a continued maintenance of single Party control of the overall political and economic 
systems (a common view amongst nearly all of the thesis interviewees). 
 
2.3.2 China’s WTO accession and commitments 
 
China withdrew from GATT in 1950 due to the Communist takeover in 1949. 
China resumed relations with the GATT in 1972 and became an observer of GATT in 
1982. In 1986, China formally applied to ‘resume its status’ as a Contracting Party to 
GATT. After submitting the application, it put forward the ‘Memorandum on China’s 
Foreign Trade System’ on February 13th, 1987 and followed the standard accession 
procedure of GATT/WTO (Lardy, 2002). 
 
Negotiations concerned tariff concessions, as well as market access on trade in 
services, and were dominated by the United States and the EU. The negotiations also 
considered additional commitments in investment measures, protective measures, anti-
dumping, subsidies and state-run enterprises, textiles and trade in services (Gertler, 
2004). The General Council approved the Decision on Accession and the Protocol on 
the terms of China accession on November 2001. 
 
Negotiations were far from smooth for China. The rapid pace of China’s 
opening to the outside world, together with limited members’ interest in the scope of 
market access of goods, brought it closer to other major contracting parties, such as the 
US and EU countries, in reaching an understanding on many key issues (Guohua and 
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Jin, 2001). However, the Tiananmen Square incidence led to economic sanctions being 
imposed by the Western countries.23 Social unrest led to stagnation in reforms with a 
series of administrative measures to strictly control economic affairs. WTO membership 
was halted and only resumed in 1992, when the new wave of the economic reforms led 
by Deng Xiaoping was initiated (Naughton, 2007; Lardy, 2002). However, GATT’s 
negotiations process changed completely with the establishment of WTO at the end of 
the Uruguay Round. The ‘GATT a la carte’ approach was replaced with the uniformity 
of WTO rules of conduct. The New policy ‘one single package of understanding’ 
provided a uniform application process for all new Members. Acceding countries 
accepted additional obligations (WTO-plus). China’s rapid expansion of international 
trade worried WTO member countries and demands from WTO members increased to a 
point where China negotiations were burdened by the higher level of accession 
requirements24. 
 
2.3.3 China economic reforms 
 
In late 1970s the poor economic performance led Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) leaders to reject the old standard planning system (Naughton, 2007). The 
government started dramatic economic reforms in 1978, rejecting Maoist central 
planning and reducing the role of communist ideology in economic policymaking, and 
moving towards a market oriented one (Naughton, 2007). The second phase of reform 
resumed in 1992 when the CCP adopted the historic decision to implement further 
reforms to transform to a market economy. The second reform was conducted alongside 
negotiations for WTO accession. 
 
2.3.3.1 First stage of reform (1978 – 1993) 
 
After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese economy and society had been 
severely affected because the foundations for economic and social growth had been 
                                                
23 In June 1989 
24 See more detail summary of China commitments in WTO accession in Appendix A. 
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destroyed (Qian and Wu, 2002). China suffered high levels of unemployment, low 
productivity and food shortages (Shirk, 2008). Under the strategies of ‘Leap forwards’ 
and ‘Leap Outward’, the resources of the whole nation were mobilised for 
‘industrialisation’ and concentrated in the heavy industries. Economic returns of these 
capital-intensive investments were often low because capital was tied up on long-term 
outputs (Naughton, 2007). This bias towards heavy industries meant investments in 
light industries and agricultural sectors were neglected, which resulted in a shortage of 
consumption goods and foods for the industrialisation process (Naughton, 2007; Shirk, 
2008). After the death of Mao, the CCP decided to undertake reforms to the central 
command economy and encourage production and productivity. Initial reforms did not 
aim to eliminate and replace the central command economy, but instead, aimed to adjust 
the mechanism for better economic performance (Qian and Wu, 2002). 
 
Reforms started with the rural economy, which employed more than 80% of the 
population. Collectives were given greater autonomy in their production. The 
government’s procurement prices for agricultural products were sharply increased. 
These relaxations helped to introduce profit incentives and to encourage production 
flexibility (Naughton, 2007). Later, collective farm land was contracted directly to 
households under the ‘Household Responsibility System’ (Qian and Wu, 2000). 
 
In non-agricultural activities, new forms of business, Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVE), were developed in parallel with the planned sector, while joint 
ventures with foreign firms and sole foreign invested firms were established in four 
special economic zones (Qian and Wu, 2000; Naughton, 2007). The outputs of these 
new business entities were not incorporated in the planned economy and were subject to 
the market’s principles (Naughton, 2007). The SOEs were allowed to produce and sell 
the output above the plan to the market. A dual track economy was established with the 
co-existence of two co-ordination mechanisms (market and plan), with one subject to 
market prices and the other subject to state plan prices and resource allocation (Qian, 
2002; Roland, 2000; Wu and Zhao, 1987). 
 
External trade was gradually liberalised from the system of strict planning to a 
less restrictive system with import licensing and quotas in the early 1980s. This system 
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was gradually replaced by a high tariff system (Lardy, 2002). Incentives for export were 
introduced and trading rights were partially reformed by increasing the number of 
companies authorised to trade. The Government devalued the highly overvalued 
domestic currency and relaxed exchange controls by allowing exporters and individuals 
to use foreign currencies (Qian and Wu, 2000). 
 
The central command economy still remained dominant in the economic system 
and retained a tight grip on its command of economic sectors. Large non-performing 
loans created a burden on the state budget and the banking system (Qian and Wu, 2002; 
Naughton, 2007). No market-based institutions were established, resulting in 
unregulated competition at all levels (Qian and Wu, 2002). Inconsistency and 
distortions in the market mechanism amplified economic instability (Naughton, 2007). 
Macroeconomic cycles in 1989 contributed to a serious economic imbalance with 
soaring inflation and declining living standards. The economic crisis fuelled people’s 
disillusionment with the Government due to its corruption and arbitrary privileges 
during the reforms. These led to a political crisis in China when Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations occurred. The brutal crackdown on the demonstration by the Chinese 
government halted reforms and encouraged conservative ascendancy from 1989 to 1991 
(Naughton, 2007). 
 
2.3.3.2 Second generation of reform (1993-1996) 
 
Since Tiananmen Square, Chinese leaders became convinced that only through 
economic development could they gain popular support and retain the legitimacy of the 
CCP (Qian and Wu, 2002). The collapse of the Soviet Union further strengthened the 
CCP’s view: fearing the greater risk to the Party would come from economic stagnation 
rather than further deregulation and reforms (Zweig, 2002). Economic reforms had 
shown an undeniable success in terms of growth, which convinced people that reform 
might be an alternative to the planned economy (Perry, 1993; Lardy, 2001; Sprayregen 
et al, 2004). In 1992, economic reforms were revived with endorsements from Deng 
Xiaoping. This approach rested on its ability to deliver economic prosperity without 
forfeiting political security (Perry, 1993). Reform covered three major issues: market 
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reunification, fiscal recentralisation, macroeconomic austerity (Bachman, 1994; 
Naughton, 2007, Qian and Wu, 2002). 
 
The Dual-track economy was replaced by market reunification, with planned 
economy elements abolished in 1993 (Naughton, 2007). Re-centralisation of the central 
and local authorities created clearer responsibilities and strengthened regulatory and 
macroeconomic management (Naughton, 2007). A new tax system with a broader tax 
base was introduced, and as a result, budgetary collection was improved. The 
macroeconomic policy was also regulated to follow an austerity based fiscal policy. The 
SOEs underwent restructuring but not privatisation (Yang and Zang, 2003). In 1994, the 
Company Law was issued to strengthen the legal basis for further SOE reform 
(Naughton, 2007; Li and Putterman, 2008). The central government endorsed it with the 
slogan of ‘grasping the large and releasing the small’ (Qian and Wu, 2002). Devaluation 
of the currency and current account convertibility was established. Quotas and high 
tariffs were introduced to gradually replace the monopoly planning activities. Trading 
rights were relaxed with more companies allowed to operate in international trade 
(Naughton, 2007; Qian and Wu, 2002; Lardy, 2002). 
 
Reform in early 1990s changed its nature from ‘reform without losers’ to 
‘reforms with losers’. Competition and less protection from Government put a real 
stress on the SOEs and their millions of employees, as well as a more equal distribution 
of income than in the planned economy (Shirk, 1996; Naughton, 2007). 
 
2.3.3.3 Problems before WTO accession (1995-1998) 
 
Many reforms were diluted down in order to avoid social unrest and pressure 
from interest groups, particularly in the reform of SOEs (Naughton, 2007; Shirk, 2008, 
Qian and Wu, 2002). Slow reforms of SOEs and trade institutions negatively affected 
the economic development of China. Qian and Wu (2002) identified that the core issues 
of many challenges of reforms were mainly from the SOEs. SOEs still accounted for 
one-third of the industrial output in 1998, compared to 77% of industrial output in 1978 
(Lardy, 2002; Naughton, 2007). Enterprises were often laden with excess labour and 
‘social burdens’ (Lal, 2006; Lin 2004). Most of them were operating at a loss (Starr, 
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1996; Lin, 2004). Many managers benefited personally, while the companies suffered 
losses (Wang, 2000). 
 
The Government was forced to finance them through State loans and trade 
protection (Riedel et al, 2007; Qian and Wu, 2002). Non-performing loans of SOEs 
banks increased dramatically to over 20% of total outstanding loans (Qian and Wu, 
2002; Lal, 2006). This diverted resources from other efficient sectors (Qian and Wu, 
2002; Naughton, 2007). 
 
Problems with reforms were caused by SOEs, as they were embedded in the 
political system of China as components of CCP ideology and a part of the bureaucracy 
(Qian and Wu, 2002). SOEs were still considered as the major tool to lead and to 
monitor the reform (Qian, 1996; Qian and Wu, 2002). Reforms would force mass lay-
offs of SOEs’ employees (Oi, 2005). Before the reforms, SOEs were the main source of 
urban employment and considered as the ‘iron bow’ of the Chinese workers 
(Nakagame, 2000). Thus reform needed effective social safety nets to avoid social 
instability (Naughton, 2007; Cheng, 2000; Goldstein, 1998). 
 
The legal system of China had ill defined laws, poor law making institutions, 
contradictory and overlapping laws at all levels, vague terms and a wide variety of 
interpretations of laws. This led to tendency for discretionary law application and 
arbitrary interventions on domestic businesses that were not favourable to government’s 
interests (Sally, 2004).  Some of its consequences were corruption and rent seeking in 
the economic system, which created unpredictable and unfavourable conditions for 
business development (Qian, 1999; Sally, 2004). 
 
2.3.3.4 Economic reform with WTO accession process 
 
Reforms were compromised due to the threats of the social instability and 
political pressure from interest groups. Further reforms needed decisive political forces 
to push them forward (Krueger, 2000; Haggard and Web, 1993). By the late 1990s 
China was ready for a new phase of reform (Qian and Wu, 2000). The Asian Financial 
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Crisis had serious negative impacts on the China’s economic growth (Qian and Wu, 
2000; Lardy, 2002). A period of economic stagnation began, with slow economic 
growth and blame falling clearly on the failure of the policies of a conservative faction. 
This helped form a political base for a shift in policy and movement of power from 
conservatives to new leaders willing to accelerate economic reforms (Zweig, 2001). 
After the 17th National Congress (1997) there was a new generation of members in the 
Central Committee and Politburo, with a better understanding of economics and 
experience of the market economy (Cheng, 2000; Fewsmith, 1999; 2008). They 
unanimously recognised the vital role of economic growth in retaining political power 
(Lardy, 2002; Naughton, 2007). 
 
The decision to join the WTO was not an easy and smooth process because 
many viewed it as a threat to China’s sovereignty and its domestic industries (Zweig, 
2001). The top leadership of China was divided on accession and the decision to join 
was only narrowly passed (Zweig, 2001). The debate for the WTO accession was made 
public in order to allay popular fears and undermine the resistance from government 
bureaucrats and the business community (Pearson, 2001; Zweig, 2001). China was 
preparing to extend “its most credible offer yet to entry the WTO” and was considered a 
lever for promoting domestic reform (Kynge and Jonquieres, 1999). 
 
International trade reform 
 
China maintained a complex and highly restrictive system of import controls, 
and WTO entry provided the necessary impetus to accelerate reform and oppose 
resistance to China’s domestic reform process (Lardy, 2002). The reforms on trade 
policy during the WTO accession were unilateral, determined and swift (Lardy, 2002).25 
The most important non-tariff barrier measures maintained by the Chinese government 
were the trading rights.  
                                                
25 The average nominal tariff was reduced from 23% in 1996 to 17% in 1999 (Naughton, 2007). In 2001, 
the average statutory tariff rate stood at only 15%, which was two thirds less than the peak level in 1980s 
(Lardy, 2002). This tariff was superior to that of India and equivalent to that of Mexico and Brazil (Lardy, 
2002; Sally, 2008). 
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Changes in the international trade regime demonstrated that China made serious 
efforts in reducing the trade barriers in order to meet the expectations of the WTO 
working party (Lardy, 2002). This WTO accession created a sense of urgency for 
economic reforms in all economic sectors. Upon the accession to the WTO, China 
opened the domestic market to foreign companies and domestic companies had to face 
competition with well financed, savvy, and technologically sophisticated foreign 
companies (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002). 
 
SOEs reforms 
 
A threat to the continued economic reforms and development was the intention 
of many interest groups to protect the home-grown industries. Local businesses 
provided tax revenue and jobs. There was strong domestic pressure to protect them from 
more advanced foreign companies (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002). SOEs 
restructuring resulted in massive lay-offs and workers protests (Lardy, 2002; Naughton, 
2007; Qian and Wu, 2002; Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002). SOEs still enjoyed close 
relationships with state agencies and officials. This was partly due to important roles 
SOEs played in the socialist ideology (Zhang and Yang, 2003). They also served as a 
channel for bureaucrats and state agencies to receive direct benefits and rent seeking, 
which compensated them for the low state budget and salary, especially in the 
provinces. 
 
Benefits of the WTO accession included increasing economic efficiency through 
trade liberalisation and institutional reforms which would lead to a more competitive 
economy, bring new technology and management skills to the country, attract new 
flows of FDI, and improve productivity. Pearson (2006) had commented on the decision 
for WTO accession that “opposition within China was not won over... but rather was 
run over”. It was a decision to use WTO accession to be a flagpole to balance the 
demands of the interest groups for protection while creating incentives for reformers 
and other groups to support reforms (Panithchpakdi and Clifford, 2002;Hai, 2000; 
Bajona and Chu, 2004).  
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WTO accession put more pressure on the SOEs via the reduction of trade 
barriers from WTO commitments, which would increase the competition for the 
domestic market. SOEs had to restructure themselves to adapt to the new environment 
(Lardy, 2002). Accession acted as an umbrella for reform’s supporters and a shield for 
policy makers to avoid pressures for protection from the SOEs (Rieden et al, 2007; Qian 
and Wu, 2002).26 
 
Institutional reform 
 
China had a weak and inadequate institutional framework for the market 
economy. The decision to build strong institutions faced technical, political and social 
challenges (Wolfensohn, 2001; Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002; Lubman, 2001). Swift 
and decisive reform after 1992 had transformed the economy. Reform involved a 
decentralisation process and rapid growth of the private sector, but institutions were 
finding it harder to play ‘catch-up’. As a result, the gaps between the development of 
the market and the legal framework led to problems and tensions, with corruption, 
smuggling and social injustice prevalent in China (Fewsmith, 1998; Starr, 1996). 
Inadequate legal and institutional frameworks supporting economic development were 
inhibiting the attraction of FDI (Qian and Wu, 2002; Lubman, 2001). With ambiguous 
laws, vague property rights, local protection, corruption and the limited power of courts, 
development of the modern market economy was severely undermined. 
 
China promised to apply and administer its laws in a ‘uniform, impartial and 
reasonable’ manner and to make sure of transparency in making and implementing laws 
and regulations (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002).27 The capacity of China’s courts was 
enhanced to render fair judgements, free of corruption, and of the pressure from the 
government, as well as to execute those judgements once rendered. 
                                                
26Zweig, 20020; Panithchpakdi and Clifford, 2002; Lardy, 2002; Cheng, 2000; Bajona and Chu, 2004; 
Yang, 2002 
27Over 1400 laws, regulations and similar documents were reviewed by the end of 2000. In the first two 
months of 2001, the various ministries and commissions of the State Council reviewed some 2,300 laws 
and regulations (Clarke, 2002). 
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2.4 China’s implementation of the WTO’s commitments and economic reform 
post- WTO accession 
 
Reforms were swift and strong under the accelerated negotiations for WTO 
accession in late 1990s (Sally, 2008). The process helped to strengthen the political will 
for further domestic economic reform (Yang, 2002; Farah, 2006; Zhang, 2005; Sally, 
2010). However reforms slowed down during the implementation period and stalled 
again at the end of the implementation process. In addition, the global financial crisis 
and later the economic recession created strong demands for slowing down reform 
(Sally, 2011). 
 
In the first five years of WTO membership, China worked hard to uphold its 
commitments, especially in tariff and quota reduction commitments (USTR, 2007; 
2008). China was ahead of schedule in significantly reducing its tariff rates, decreasing 
the number of goods subject to import quotas, expanding trading rights for Chinese 
enterprises and increasing the transparency of its licensing procedures. China undertook 
a huge programme of aligning national technical standards with international standards 
(Erixon et al, 2008; Sally, 2011; Clarke, 2008). They also revised its FDI law in 2004 to 
allow both domestic and foreign enterprises to have automatic trading rights through a 
registration process (Sally, 2011). 
 
The SOEs reforms were deepened by restructuring large and medium SOEs. 
Reforms involved the separation between the policy-making functions and SOEs’ 
ownership function. It established an arms-length relationship between the regulator and 
the regulated companies. It also separated ownership and SOEs management functions 
(Yang, 2003). A new State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) was formed in 2003 to act as the central agency for supervising and 
exercising the restructuring process of the largest SOEs (Gallagher, 2005).28 
 
                                                
28 The number of SOEs decreased from nearly 50,000 units to just over 20,000 units from 2001 to 2007. 
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China was serious in implementing WTO commitments right after the accession 
process (USTR, 2009; Zhang, 2005). However, since the implementation period has 
ended the motivation for further reforms has been slowing down (Saich, 2007). 
Although the economic growth had been maintained at a good rate, the Chinese 
economy had been criticised for creating greater inequality and endemic corruptions 
(Saich, 2007). 
 
China increasingly used opaque trade measures to promote industrial policies. 
Export quotas, export license fees, minimum export prices, export duties and other 
export restrictions have been used to restrict exports of a growing number of goods in 
which it has advantages, such as raw materials and agricultural commodities (USTR, 
2008; Sally, 2011). These provided substantial artificial advantages to a wide range of 
downstream producers in China (USTR, 2008; Erixon et al, 2008). There are also signs 
of a slow reduction in services barriers. Foreign services providers have experienced 
high and discriminatory capital requirements for market entry in several service 
industries such as telecommunications, insurance and construction. Foreign enterprises 
complain of a lack of transparency in Chinese standard-setting bodies and conformity 
assessment bodies due to restricted membership, voting rights and information 
dissemination (Erixon et al, 2008; Sally, 2011). This is exacerbated by standards set by 
different agencies at national and provincial levels. 
 
A number of increasingly restrictive investment rules were used to protect many 
domestic industries (USTR, 2008). In November 2006, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) stated in its Five-year Plan that it would tighten the 
foreign acquisition of leading domestic enterprises (Erixon et al, 2008; Sally, 2011). 
New rules governing mergers and acquisitions contained vague language on ‘national 
economic security’ and ‘critical industries’. The new Anti-Monopoly Law limited the 
merger and acquisition process (Sally, 2011). In addition, the Government also 
expressed their interests in the development of ‘pillar’ and ‘backbone’ sectors, which 
might limit the foreign investment in these sectors (Saich, 2007; Erixon et al, 2008). 
 
Government procurement continues to explicitly discriminate in favour of 
domestic enterprises (Erixon et al, 2008). China has applied to join the WTO's 
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Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), in line with its WTO-accession 
commitments, but negotiations have been predictably slow (Sally, 2011). This was 
further aggravated by the pronounced ‘Buy China’ programme operating at national, 
provincial and municipal levels under the fiscal stimulus package in 2009 (Sally, 2011). 
 
Signs of slowing down in SOEs reform have been observed since 2006. Trade, 
investment and regulatory barriers have become more restrictive and sophisticated to 
protect SOEs and assorted ‘national champions’, which mainly dominate in ‘upstream’ 
resource and capital intensive industries, such as coal, gas, crude oil, old processing, 
electricity, iron and steel, communication, and mining (Zhao, 2009; Sally, 2011). Other 
industries are protected by national standards, investment policies and tax incentives. 
The privatisation process was also facing increasing criticisms from Chinese society 
(Saich, 2006). People have seen this process as a way of stripping the State assets for 
personal benefits. China remained a guiding example to the Vietnamese and their 
actions and strategies in the accession process offered Vietnam decision-makers an 
experience to learn from and a framework to copy. 
 
China was serious in implementing WTO commitments right after the accession 
process (USTR, 2008; Zhang, 2005). However, since the implementation period has 
ended the motivation for further reforms has been slowing down (Saich, 2007). 
Although the economic growth had been maintained at a good rate, the Chinese 
economy had been criticised for creating greater inequality and endemic corruptions 
(Saich, 2007; Saich, 2006). Conservatives claimed that the market-based reform process 
was to blame for many of these problems. These problems also created high demands 
for market intervention in many areas due to the market failures caused by reforms 
(Saich, 2007). On the other hand, the reform process also created interest groups29 that 
were resistant to further liberalisation.  In addition, the recent global economic crisis has 
also affected China’s economy, which has fuelled doubt on further economic 
liberalisation (Sally, 2011). As a result, debate on the future of reform has been more 
                                                
29National regulatory agencies, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other “national champions” in the 
private sector (or with hybrid forms of ownership), state-sponsored trade associations, as well as 
provincial and municipal governments. 
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intense and virulent (Saich, 2007). Facing these pressures, the willingness of the 
government for further unilateral reforms has been greatly influenced, especially 
decision-making in Hu-Wen’s government has become more collegiate, cautious and 
incremental (Saich, 2007; Erixon et al, 2008). Reform is not reversed, but is much 
slower (Sally, 2011; Erixon et al, 2008; Saich, 2007). Such turns towards a more 
incremental approach encouraged Vietnam leaders to adopt a more cautious approach. 
However, McGough (interview, 2012) said “the fascination with the Chinese example 
was taken in a too simplistic fashion. Vietnam did not understand that many of the 
differences, size, capital reserves, a better and more practical approach to reforms, etc 
made following the Chinese example a mistake”. In concluding this chapter it is 
pertinent to repeat that this thesis study is predicated on a hypothesis that finds Vietnam 
accession to the WTO as a failure, and that is mainly due to a consistent strategy of non-
compliance. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In late 1980s, many developing countries had undertaken economic reform to 
save their unbalanced economies suffering from ‘import substitution industrialisation’ 
policies. The reform often involves measures to reduce the roles of Government and 
replace them with market principles. Reforms involve stabilising the macroeconomic 
situation then restructuring the economy for better resource allocation. Although 
roadmaps for reform are quite clear, the implementation of this reform is not easy and 
can fail due to both internal and external factors. Internal factors mainly reflect the 
political resistance of vested interests and the technical problems inherent to the reform 
process. Reform tasks often encounter political resistance due to the redistribution of 
income (Krueger, 1994; 2000; Haggard and Web, 1993; Nelson, 1990). External factors 
stem from the overall scepticism towards globalisation and economic liberalisation 
(Sally, 2008). In such circumstance, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) emerges to 
play an important role in facilitating difficult unilateral domestic reforms. Many 
researchers have shared the view that the WTO provides developing countries market 
access and expansion for export, protection against the selective protectionism and 
predatory behaviour of more powerful players from the developed world, prevention of 
the return to protectionism, and strengthening the domestic policies and institution 
 77 
capacity for the conduct of international trade policymaking (Krueger, 1998; 
Michalopouslos, 1998; and Langammer and Lucke, 1999; Drabek and Laird, 1998). 
 
China’s WTO accession process was a typical example of the successful use of 
multilateral liberalisation as a lever to unilateral liberalisation. The Chinese government 
consciously and strategically used the WTO accession process as a pillar to bolster 
domestic reforms (Sally, 2008). A series of structural adjustment measures were 
undertaken unilaterally and gradually in order to restructure the economy from a central 
planning model to a socialist market economy. However, reform was not implemented 
without difficulties as economic and political pressures not only slowed down the 
reforms but also created a compromised reform agenda. The next wave of further 
reform was initiated with a whirlwind of economic liberalisation in 1999 when the 
Government publicly declared its intention to accelerate the progress of the WTO 
accession in 1998 (Naughton, 2007; Sally, 2008). Self adjustments to meet WTO rules 
and regulations alongside its own commitments set much of the momentum for the 
Government and economy to accelerate their internal and external liberalisation. WTO 
accession has acted as a channel for levering the economic and legal reforms by locking 
in the reforms and making it irrevocable, thus maintaining the pace and speed of the 
reforms. 
 
However, the reforms have been slowing down since the end of the 
implementation period of the WTO. Side effects of the market economy such as 
inequality and corruptions have been the main reasons to slow down the reforms. The 
sentiment against the reforms was further increased by the down turn in the economic 
situation resulting from the global economic crisis. It showed that the WTO had 
provided a motivation and political protection for reformers to push further reforms. 
However, the WTO accession cannot sustain and guarantee enough motivation beyond 
the end of its implementation period.  
 
Vietnam and China have shared many similarities in culture, reform conditions, 
and the reforms agenda and implementation. In the next chapter, the Vietnamese 
economic reform will be investigated to comprehend the progress of the reform and to 
see challenges encountered by the reform process. 
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Chapter 3 examines how the processes of economic reform are structured by the 
Vietnamese economic and political systems. Central to this is how the political 
decision-making proceeds through the Vietnam authorities, as this reflects the constant 
divide between conservative elements in the Party and system and the economic and 
political reformers. Each interest group defends its position based on their own self-
interests. WTO entry has become the ‘battle-ground’ for this conflict of interests and 
interests groups and also reflects the tension and opposition found in the political reform 
of the system. Essential here is to also define and explain the interest groups involved in 
managing the accession of Vietnam to the WTO 
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CHAPTER 3 VIETNAM’S POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTEGRATION PROCESS 
 
 
3.1 Overview of the Vietnam Economy 
 
After the war for unification in 1975, the Vietnamese economy faced paramount 
difficulties (Le and Liu, 2006). Desperate shortages of food led to famine and economic 
collapse, with the only solution being the shift from a centrally controlled communist 
economic system to free market economics, but still under a communist political 
system. Two decades of reforms brought the country out of economic crisis and 
collapse. 
 
The Government faced many difficulties in restructuring the war-torn 
economy.30 During French colonisation some industries did develop, but only on a 
small scale and for exploitation rather than development. During the war, economies of 
both South and North Vietnam were left with severe problems in their economic 
structures. In the South, the market economy was established, but fully dependant on 
US aid. While in the North, the central command was fully applied to mobilise the 
resources for the war. As a result, the economy was severely damaged and distorted by 
the war. 
 
After 1975, the difficulties of the economy were exacerbated by the full 
application of the central command economy in both parts of Vietnam. Central to this 
was the supreme role of State in the economy. The Government owned all means of 
production; made decisions on resources allocation, and the production and distribution 
                                                
30 War, it was devastated by 7.8 million tons of US-dropped bombs dropped upon its major cities. It 
destroyed 70-80% of industrial capacities and infrastructure, while also leaving 400,000 hectares of 
cultivation fields fallow (Le and Liu, 2006). 
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process via physical plans; distributing the income by labour contributions (Fforde and 
Vylder, 1996). The Government nationalised the private sector and applied 
collectivisation to agriculture. 
 
The command economy was characterised by serious sector and investment 
imbalances due to the decision-making on resources allocation. Resources were 
invested heavily into the SOEs, and production had long lead times and little practical 
use for society (Beresford, 1989). The SOEs had low capacities combined with 
shortages of inputs, which resulted in the failure to meet arbitrary government targets. 
Farmers were grouped into collectives with specific targets and resource allocations and 
paid for their labour regardless of their productivity. Economic distribution was not 
appropriate for creating incentives for individuals to increase productivity. This led to 
‘shared poverty’ rather than rising overall living standards (Beresford, 1997; Phong, 
2009). SOEs and collectives stagnated through a lack of incentives and efficiency, 
which generally created the chronic disequilibrium between supply and demand. A side 
affect was the development of the black market, where market prices were much higher 
than official prices in order to meet the demands of the citizens (Fforde and Paine, 1987; 
Phong, 2009). Capital was badly used and led to large unfinished constructions. 
Shortages in every facet of the production process (fuel, coal, spare parts, etc) occurred 
in the whole economy (Phong, 2009). In agricultural the volume of output was just half 
of the target set by the Government. Declines in production output and Government 
purchases led to famine in many areas. Imported foods jumped to the highest record of 
1,570,000 tons in 1980 (Phong, 2009). The central command economy blocked all the 
other distribution channels. 
 
The inappropriate economic mechanism was pushing Vietnam into deeper 
recession (Chi Lan, interview, 2012). There was acute shortage of foods, basic 
consumer goods, and inputs to agriculture and industry, and a growing external debt 
(Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The Government imported foods to meet the domestic 
demand (Le and Liu, 2006). The incompetence of the economy was reflected in the low 
GDP per capita (Le and Liu, 2006). The underdevelopment of the economy led to low 
levels of foreign trade and constant trade deficits (Le and Liu, 2006; Phong, 2009). Chi 
Lan (interview, 2012) and Thai (interview, 2012) both confirmed that the Vietnamese 
economy was entirely dependent on foreign aid at that time. 
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By mid-1980s, the economic situation became worse. Foreign aid was 
insufficient and was mainly in the form of consumer goods such as rice, sugar, milk, 
and medicine etc. Foreign aid from China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe dried 
out due to their own economic difficulties and economic reforms. The government 
passed measures to loosen the rigidity of the central command economy, such as 
increasing the price-salary-money to meet the market price. The reforms could not save 
the economy from shortages because they did not tackle directly the problem of 
ownership, freedom of doing business and motivation to work in the central command 
mechanism (Phong, 2009). The average budget deficit of the 1981-1985 increased 64 
times compared to that of 1976-1980 period (Le and Liu, 2003). The Government was 
forced into printing more money. Inflation became a chronic disease of the economy. 
The consumer index of Vietnam in 1986 reached 587.2% compared to 1985 (Phong, 
2009). The Communist Party in 1986, agreed to abandon the system of bureaucratic 
centralised management in favour of a policy package aiming for a market-oriented 
economy. 
 
Chi Lan (interview, 2012) said “the reforms not only lifted the country out of 
systemic crisis but also transformed it into a new dynamic developing country”. 
Vietnam’s economy showed a growth rate of 7.8% per year during 2002-2007.31 Vo Tri 
Thanh, Vice Director of CIEM, (interview, 2012) stressed that “the economic reform 
has had a significant impact on the performance of the economy, turning it from a 
backward, aid-dependent, slow economy to a very dynamic one”. 
 
Economic transformation helped control inflation, contributing to a stable 
macroeconomic performance (Arkadie and Malton, 2003). Vietnam curbed hyper-
inflation of 774% in 1985 to a healthy average rate under 10% annually (GSO, 2011). 
                                                
31 Despite being hit by financial crisis, the growth rate still remained positive at 6.31%, 5.32%, and 6.78% 
in the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively (GSO, 2011). A GDP per capita of US 1244 dollars in 
2010 compared to merely US 239 dollars in 1985 (WB, 2011). By 2009, agriculture dropped to 16.14% 
from 40.8% in 1990, while industry increased from 22.8% in 1990 to 40.24% over the same period. The 
service industry expanded from 36.4 to 39.1% during the same period (GSO, 2010). 
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The rate was kept low until inflation suddenly jumped to 28% in 2008, caused by the 
expansionary macroeconomic policies and massive unprecedented capital inflows as 
results of the WTO accession (Khanh, interview, 2012). Vietnam concentrated on 
maintaining a relatively prudent fiscal position, despite the tendency to rely on public 
investment to boost growth. The annual budget deficit increased from an average of 
3.5% of GDP in the 1990s to an average of 4.9% after 2000 (Goldman Sachs, 2008). In 
2009, the total public debt was 52.3% GDP due to a fiscal stimulus package. 
Accumulated foreign debt remained below 30% of GDP, while the ratio of debt service 
was no more than 4%. Most of them were medium and long-term loans. Vietnam 
foreign reserves rose dramatically from US$ 11.5 billion in 2006 to 23 billion in 2008. 
 
The reforms helped Vietnam integrate rapidly into the world economy, moving 
from state monopolies on foreign trade toward a freer trade regime.32 Tran Quoc Khanh, 
(interview, 2012) said, “tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have been reduced and 
gradually eliminated. They have been further pursued and secured by joining various 
multilateral trade agreements”.33 Vietnam became a member of ASEAN in 1995 and 
agreed to implement the AFTA. It joined APEC in 1998. In 2001, Vietnam signed the 
BTA with US, paving the way for Vietnam to become the 150th member of the WTO in 
2007 (Thai, interview, 2012). 
 
Open trade promoted foreign investment, with accumulative implemented FDI 
in 2009 at US$ 66.9 billion compared to US$ 328.8 million in 1991 (GSO, 2009). FDI 
flows to Vietnam amounted to US$ 11.5 billion in 2008, increasing from US$8 billion 
in 2007 and merely US$328 million in 1991. FDI declined dramatically due to the 
                                                
32 The total value of exports and imports reached USD 126 billion in 2009 from a mere USD 2.9 billion in 
1986, equal to 130% of the real GDP. Export to GDP ratio, the standard indicator of export orientation, 
increased from around 5% in later half of the 1980s to 47.8% in 2000 and then to 86.6% in 2006 (GSO, 
2010). 
33 Tran Quoc Khanh is the Vietnam Chief Negotiator and also the Vice Minister of the Industry and 
Trade. 
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global crisis in 2009, but still amounted to 10 billion USD (WB, 2010; GSO, 2011).34 
There was an increasing awareness of commitments of the Vietnamese government in 
economic reform and the improvement of the investment environment (WB, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of projects and volumes of FDI to Vietnam 
Source: OECD (2009). 
Table 3.1: Distribution of FDI in different sectors in Vietnam 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2008. 
                                                
34 FDI enterprises play an important role in the economy, contributing 18.33% of GDP in 2010; 10.52% 
of national budget; accounting for 53.2% of export value and 44.4% of total industrial output (GSO, 
2011). 
 84 
Manufacturing rapidly became the primary driver of FDI and of the economic 
diversification and structural transformation from the agricultural base towards an 
industrial base. Since 2001, the manufacturing sector accounted for almost 60% of the 
FDI projects registered in Vietnam. During the early reform stages, the standard 
intensive goods such as T&G and footwear dominated the export composition of 
foreign invested enterprises. Foreign investors began to enter into assembly activities in 
electrical and electronics industries (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
Success had positive effects on social indicators. Income per capital reached 
US$1,160 in 2010 compared with a US$170 in 1993 (WB, 2010). In purchasing power 
parity (PPP), per capital GDP was estimated at US$3100 in 2010, up from US$941 in 
1990. The poverty rate declined from 58% in 1993 to 37.4% in 1998 and 14.5% in 2008 
(WB, 2009). All targets for Millennium Development Goals were achieved, together 
with improvements in living standards, life expectancy, adult literacy and infant 
mortality. 
 
Nevertheless, great caution has to be made in assessing Vietnam’s reform 
success. Closer examination of the result points to endemic corruption and 
misrepresentation of the ‘real’ picture. Government statistics are extremely unreliable 
and often false, designed to avert pressure for political responsibility or even reform, 
and the general strategy has usually been to protect the interests of a political/business 
elite interest group, rather than create national holistic economic development for the 
society and economy. The statistics and national data hide a growing poverty gap, 
serious deficiencies in the economic infrastructure, an embedded aversion to 
privatisation and genuine equitisation. Failures to comply with WTO commitments and 
carry out the necessary structural reforms that would transform the economy are leading 
to an economic crisis of critical levels. Central to these failures has been a Party 
predicated on surviving at all costs and limiting reforms to an extent where their face is 
genuine, but their actual impact has been negligible and often restricted to benefiting 
only a small group of politically and economically dominant individuals. With the lack 
of accountability and transparency, a growing crisis manifested in internal power 
struggles that have set the very senior levels ‘at war’ with each other. The lacks of 
capacities to cope with the demands of a modern economy mean that the very 
legitimacy of the political system has been brought into question. Vietnam faces not 
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only an economic crisis, but also, its political system is fighting for survival with 
growing public unrest, increasing numbers of arrests for public dissent (especially 
internet ‘bloggers’) and a steadily declining economic performance mired by Bank debt, 
bankruptcy, declining foreign investment, inflation and corruption. Such a dramatic and 
critical situation has been caused by faults within the political system. The next section 
examines how that political system actually makes and enforces decisions. 
 
3.2 Political System of Vietnam 
 
The reform process in Vietnam is a political process, where fast market-oriented 
economic reform has occurred, while Vietnam is still a socialist country under the sole 
leadership of the Communist Party. Vietnam has chosen to conduct economic reform 
gradually while maintaining the status quo of the political system. The market economy 
requires a different set of ideological and institutional frameworks, where the market 
principles prevail over the administrative commands from the ruling authority 
(McCarty, 2002). 
 
Central to the political structure is the Communist Party. They intended creating 
the right conditions for the market economy to gain economic growth, while also 
needing to maintain the regimes stability and its vision of communism. In both cases, 
they would appear to have failed. Economic growth has been achieved, but without 
sustainable development, while the Party is being challenged for power both from 
within and without. 
 
3.2.1 The Communist Party of Vietnam 
 
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is the only political Party and was 
established in 1930. The CPV is the leading force of the State and the society and 
“represents the vanguard of working people and the whole nation with the aim to make 
Vietnam a strong, independent, prosperous and democratic country with an equitable 
and civilised society to realise socialism and ultimately communism” (CPV, 2012b). 
Thai (interview, 2012) suggested that “with only three million members, the Party is 
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able to have its representatives in all important positions across the State administrative 
apparatus, from Central level to provincial, city, district and communal levels, as well as 
in administrative bodies, schools, enterprises, social organisations, army and police 
force, etc”. 
 
The CPV’s National Congress is held every five years, with over 1,000 
representatives reviewing the Party’s work and discussing guidelines and policy of the 
Party in the next five years. The National Congress elects the Central Committee for a 
five-year term and it is the leading organ of the CPV. The Committee has currently 160 
members representing CPV members countrywide. They meet once every six months to 
decide and review the implementation of important guidelines and policies of internal, 
external and public affairs, and organisation of the Party (CPV, 2011). Chi Lan 
(interview, 2001) suggested that “the guidelines serve as the policy for almost all 
activities in any political and government organisations”. The Central Committee is 
responsible for the Personnel management of the CPV, elects the Politburo, the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee and establishes the Secretariat, other Commissions 
and the Head of Central Inspection Commission. 
 
CPV power is concentrated in the Politburo and the Secretariats and is 
considered as the ‘brain centre’ of the CPV (Phong, 2009). They meet monthly to 
decide major guidelines, policies, organisation and personnel issues, as well as to 
organise and prepare for meetings of the Central Committee. They also do the planning 
and appointment of high level ranking officers in the political and government apparatus 
(Phong, 2009).  
 
The CPV exerts absolute power in the Party’s policies and personnel in all 
government branches and political organisation. Resolutions are issued by the Central 
Committee to define major policies and directions for all aspects of the political, social 
and economic life. The priority and content of these policies and directions for the 
Central Committees Meetings are prepared by the Politburo. Resolutions are 
compulsory and the magnetic needle for all activities of the Government and political 
apparatus (Thanh, interview, 2011). 
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The CPV has consensus governance, with power shared through collective 
decisions. The resolutions show the solidarity in the Party and the unity and consensus 
in political ideology on major issues. But, documents are often vague and ambiguous, 
making them difficult to implement effectively (Phong, 2009; McCarty, 2001). 
 
The Central Committee manages the senior personnel appointments in the 
political system and government apparatus. An (interview, 2012) suggested that 
“personnel from the Vice Minister level in the government system; the vice- chairman 
of provinces or cities, heads of large SOEs, heads of Vietnam television and major 
newspapers are under the management and appointment of the Central Committees. The 
Politburo is responsible to make appointments and personnel decisions on government 
officers from the minister level upward including the Provincial Secretary of CPV and 
its Chairman. The Secretariats are in charge of making appointments and personnel 
decisions for officers from Vice Minister level to Minister level including the Vice 
Chairman and CPV’s Vice Secretary of any province”. Thai (interview, 2012) said 
“there is a Personnel Commission, which is the advisory agency for main guidelines and 
policies on personnel for the whole political system. They act as the gatekeepers for the 
Central Committee on human resources matters”. 
 
The appointments and transfer of a post is based on certain rules and criteria. 
However, the process is often seen as undemocratic one by the Western standards. 
There is often only one candidate and no option to nominate any others. A candidate is 
often suggested by the Personnel Commission based on the position’s demands and 
suggestion from the employing organisation. However, this process is an internal 
political process, in which final decision rests in the hands of the Politburos or 
Secretariat. As a result, the appointments, transfers or dismissals are subject to the 
influence and will of a very small group of leaders (Thai, interview, 2012). 
 
The power structure is shared between the General Secretary, President, Prime 
Minister and the Chairman of the NA. The formula for power distribution is based on 
the regions, which are North, Middle and South of Vietnam. This formula helps to 
encourage unity and solidarity among regions (Stern, 1998). The Northern leader often 
holds the General Secretary position. The Southern leader often fulfils the Prime 
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Minister positions, because the South always is the economic engine for the economy. 
The Central region often fills the Presidential post. The other pillar of the top leadership 
of Vietnam is the Chairman of the National Assembly. This formula builds blocs that 
have client relationships at each region powerful enough to represent their interests at 
local government and central government levels. These blocs may be formed by 
political interests, business interests or regionalism (Koh, 2004).  
 
Each province or city has its own Communist Party Committee, in which the 
Secretary of the Province or city's Committee is the member of the Central Committee. 
The Provincial Committee controls the local government policies and personnel. It 
directly guides the implementation of the Central Committee Resolutions and issues its 
own resolutions for the provincial matters based on the Central-Committee’s 
Resolutions. It also manages and makes decision on the personnel appointments in 
almost all management posts in the provincial political and government apparatus (Thai, 
interview, 2012; An, interview, 2010). 
 
Intra-party relationships are dominated by reformists and conservatives. 
Conservatives worry that reforms lead to a danger where the CPV cannot control the 
economic and political situation. They are often the people from the veteran and founder 
groups of Vietnam, the Army, or the CPV’s advising and research organisations. They 
put a high priority on the stability of the CPV and worry on the consequences of rapid 
reforms on the Vietnam society and CPV role. The leaders from the North are more 
cautious about the reform process and its negative impacts on the society and the CPV 
than the leaders from the South (Koh, 2001a; Phong, 2009). They prefer to build an 
economy with internal strength and less dependent on the external forces (Phong, 2009). 
Reformists are often people who understand the local reality and the difficulties of local 
business communities, the younger generation, have good education, and have more 
opportunity to come into contact with the international environment, are more open-
minded and believe that a good international economic environment will bring 
improvement of the national economy, giving more credibility and strength for the 
CPV. 
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Intra-party fractions consist of a series of reformers, conservatives and the 
balancers (in the middle), opportunists and independents in the Central Committee 
(Dixon, 2004). They are not fixed groups but entangled with each other representing 
different interests such as socio-economic sectors, regional divisions, ideologists and 
various ministries and departments (Dixon, 2004; McCargo, 2004). Groups are 
reinforced, cut across and divided by the interests groups outside of the Party such as 
the SOEs, private business, foreign businesses, and local businesses. As a result of the 
complicated matrix of representation of the CPV members, many individuals and 
groups have been assembled to represent a position based on a particular measure and 
circumstances, rather than a process of a general representation (Dixon, 2004). 
 
The levels of participation, scope, and pace of international integration depend 
on the decisions of the Central Committee and the Politburo. Khanh (interview, 2010) 
suggested that “negotiations and concessions on international integration must be 
consulted upon within the Politburo and the Secretary. Negotiations are not allowed to 
stray from the approved lines and policy”. 
 
3.2.2 Formal structure of the Vietnam Government 
 
The President is the ceremonial Head of State and represents the State of 
Vietnam in domestic and foreign affairs. The President is elected by the National 
Assembly for a five year term, and he appoints the Prime Minister from among 
members of the NA; the Prime Minister then appoints the Deputy Minister. The Prime 
Minister proposes a Cabinet, which then is appointed by the President, subject to the 
ratification of the NA. These personnel appointments have been pre-decided internally 
by the CPV (Koh, 2004; Stern, 1998). 
 
The Government is the executive body of the National Assembly and the highest 
administrative agency in Vietnam. The central government is chaired by the Prime 
Minister and currently comprises 18 ministries and several other agencies (GOV, 2011). 
Each minister follows the instructions issued by the Prime Minister, is accountable later, 
and receives from the Prime Minister’s instructions in connection with any subject 
deemed to be on the borderline of or beyond the formers power (McCarty, 2002). 
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The Prime Minister appoints the Chairman of Provinces or Cities. Each province 
and city has their own executive organisation, in which they have the same functional 
department as in the central government. These departments take care of the central 
policy at local level. 
 
3.2.3 Vietnam’s National Assembly 
 
 
The National Assembly (NA) is the highest representative body of the people, 
endowed with the highest State power of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It governs 
the constitutional and legislative rights, decides fundamental domestic and foreign 
policies, socio-economic tasks, and national defence and security issues (McCarty, 
2002). It exercises the right to supreme supervision of all activities of the State. The 
National Assembly elects, dismisses, and removes Prime Minister at the request of the 
Figure 3.2: Summary of the policy making process in Vietnam 
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President. The NA is organised into the Standing Committee, the Ethnic Council and 
several specialised Committees, and it convenes twice a year (VNA, 2011). 
 
3.2.4 Policy making process 
 
In figure 3.2, the CPV holds the central role in policy-making and all economic 
policy starts from its headquarters. The National Congress issues policies and lines for a 
long-term plan of the country (Phong, 2009). In Politburos, the General Secretary holds 
the highest and most influential position for making policy of the CPV. The Politburos 
receives information on important issues needed to be addressed from day by day and 
decide the importance and priority of the problems. If there is a need for issuing new 
policies or revising them, the Politburos will ask a member of the Politburos in charge 
of the matters to prepare a programme on the matter with the related ministries. It is 
then discussed and voted upon in the Politburos, and later in the Central Committee for 
forming new resolutions or instructions. In some matters, the Politburos can make the 
immediate decision without discussion and vote at the Central Committee. The 
Politburo is the central player of this process because they are in-charge of preparing the 
agenda and problem solving options. The General Secretary has the decisive role in the 
decision process and this role has been empowered by the formal power in CPV. It is 
strengthened by the Vietnamese culture in which the authoritarian leader was honoured 
throughout its history (Phong, 2009). Phong (2009) notes that the personality and 
beliefs of the General Secretary and leaders have been important factors in the policy 
making process. As the highest leader, he has the power to lead all the meetings and 
agendas of the Politburo meetings. 
 
A group of advisors assists the General Secretary and Politburos in making 
decisions and play a key role in the process. It is comprised of the advisors of General 
Secretary, CPV’s think-tanks such as the CPV’s Commissions, and its research centres. 
They draft the documents on issues and influence the process by their writing and views 
(Phong, 2009). 
 
During the drafting process for law the business community and socio-economic 
organisations are consulted for suggestions and feedbacks (McCarty, 2002). When the 
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final draft bill is completed, the Committee will prepare the Official Bill to submit to 
the Standing Committee of National Assembly for adoption in a NA session. Before 
submittal, however, the Bill is required to pass the examination of the NA’s evaluating 
agency and receive comments from people and members of National Assembly 
(McCarty, 2002). 
 
The CPV and the government review policy implementation through their 
feedback channels. First, is the Government’s reviewing report to the Politburos and the 
Central Committee, conducted once every six months. Second, is the research and 
reports from the research centre and think tanks, which are often State run centres. The 
CPV also has its own think-tank for the development of the CPV, which is the Ho Chi 
Minh National Academy of Politics and Administration. Third, is the media and public 
opinion on the policies and lines. This channel is under strict control of the CPV, but 
left considerable room for criticising and evaluating the policy. International donors 
play an important role in forming policy and provide assistance and guidance for the 
development of the country (Phong, 2009; Thai, interview, 2012). For the ODA funders 
there are at least two Consultation Group meetings every year for them to express their 
views on policies of Vietnam. 
 
Vietnam governance is ‘democratic centralism’, as prescribed in Article 6 of the 
Constitution 1992. The ‘democratic‘ aspect of this organizational method describes the 
freedom of members of the political party to discuss and debate matters of policy and 
direction, but once the decision of the Party is made by majority vote, all members are 
expected to uphold that decision. This latter aspect represents the centralism. As Lenin 
(1965) described it, democratic centralism consisted of ‘freedom of discussion, unity of 
action’. 
 
The CPV is seen as ‘soft governance’ (Koh, 2004, Dixon, 2002; McCarty, 
2001). The implementation of policies is often carried out gradually to see the reactions 
of people to policies. Local governments’ often try to evade implementation of the 
central policies. Although high homogeneity in culture and linguistics, there is always 
differences in natural resources, social characteristics and interests between regions in 
Vietnam (Dixon, 2004; Pike, 2000). Division was increased by the autonomy of the 
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local administrative during the wartime and the process of resource allocation during the 
central command economy (Dixon, 2004; Beresford and McFarlane, 1995; Mallon, 
1993; Thrift and Forbes, 1985). As a result of the division in the CPV, they need to 
reach a consensus between different interests. 
 
The central government has been often blamed for slow and rigid policies in 
contrast to the reality of the economy. The economic development strategy and major 
policies are often set at the beginning of the new term of the National Congress for the 
next 5 or 10 years. Problems are identified and discussed by the Politburos, then the 
Central Committee. A slow and out-dated process of discussing problems in closed 
political sessions, containing only a few leaders and advisors, leads to decisions that do 
not reflect the reality of the times. Feedback channels are limited or not truthful, which 
leads to the wrong perceptions and subjective decision-making in the policy 
implementation process (Phong, 2009). Decision making at all levels is developing new 
strategies for solutions, which includes consensus-seeking as the strong guiding 
principle, engaging a wide range of actors before decisions are finalised. This helps in 
sharing responsibilities and reducing the political risks involved in making difficult 
decisions. The emphasis on collective leadership and consensus has the merit of 
maintaining stability and involving many elements of society in decisions, but it is also 
the root cause of many problems in relation to the slow government response to critical 
issues. 
 
3.2.5 Relationship between the Party and the State 
 
The CPV shares its authority with other organs of the state structure. CPV 
focuses on the making major policies for the development of Vietnam, while the 
National Assembly implements laws and policies. Since independence the relationship 
between the Party and the State has changed (McCarty, 2002). From 1945-1954, when 
the country had just gained independence and the need for reconciliation of the whole 
nation and support of international community, the Party accepted the participation of 
non-Party members in Government and a greater role of the National Assembly. From 
1954-1986, the Party moved into a domination role and imposed central planning and 
state ownership of the means of production. The CPV took the lead in drafting policies, 
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replacing the roles of Government and the National Assembly. From 1986 to the 
present, the political process changed in line with economic reforms. The Party retreated 
from direct control over the state affairs and gave increasing autonomy to the 
Government and the National Assembly (Phong, 2009; McCarty, 2002). McCarty 
(2002) has described the new form of the governance of CPV as ‘state corporatism’, 
with a less authoritarian mode of policy-making and taking more into account the 
feedback from the society. This adapted it to the new demands of development and 
produced more careful analysis and specification, and reflected a move to a more 
democratic power (Heng, 2001; Dixon, 2004). State corporatism in this thesis is 
perceived as involving ‘outside’ interests to the Party governance structure, but 
traditionally retaining authority and decision-making mechanisms of control.  The State 
corporatist model did result in reform of how ‘interest groups’ in business and society 
interacted with the State, and how their interests were better reflected in decision-
making, but the Party intended retaining their central control. 
 
The command management system was no longer appropriate as State 
management capacities and efficiencies were inappropriate for the economic 
development. The improvement of the living standards meant the growth of the middle 
class and the enhancement of the society’s intellectuality. This new middle class with 
higher income and a good education demand better governance of the society. So faced 
with these challenges, the CPV adopted a softer role in leading the country, letting other 
groups participate in the process of decision-making for meeting the demands of the 
society and ensuring the long-term legitimacy of the regime (Dixon, 2004). 
 
The CPV still retains close patronage over its personnel and major policy 
making tools. It still provides guidance on all major issues of the Vietnam society, from 
education, economic policy, foreign policy and government control of the military and 
the bureaucracy (Thai, interview, 2012; Chi Lan, interview, 2012). It is an unofficial 
rule of thumb that being a member of the Communist Party is a pre-requisite for any 
appointment and promotion at management level in all State and Local bureaucracy 
units (Thai, interview, 2012). The CPV has the power to nominate only one candidate 
for the posts of the Chairman of National Assembly, President and the Prime Minister to 
the National Assembly. All Government ministers are members of the Party Central 
Committee. At local level, each unit of the government is shadowed by a unit of the 
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Communist Party, who are involved in implementing the Central Committee 
resolutions, defining lines and goals as well as personnel management. 
 
The influence of the CPV also reaches into the business community. All the 
SOEs chairman of the boards and general directors are personnel under the management 
of the CPV. They must be approved by the Personnel Department and the Secretariats 
of the CPV. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested “the Party has become increasingly 
opaque because it can issue orders that cut across all levels of the government”. 
 
3.2.6 Relationship between Central and Local Governments 
 
Sub-national government is administered through 63 provinces and municipals 
with three levels of local administration: provinces, districts, and communes. Each level 
of local administration has an executive arm (People’s Committee) and a legislative arm 
(People’s Council). The People’s Council represents the citizens at their local level, 
which decides matters concerning the legislative matters of the local government. They 
have to report and obey the decision of the higher levels (Kerkvliet et al, 2004). The 
People’s Committee is the executive arm of this local council. Administrative 
responsibilities of the People Committee include maintaining law, order and security 
within their jurisdictions; forwarding budget requests to higher levels; reviewing and 
approving plans for socio-economic development within their delegated authority; 
executing the budget; and undertaking duties as assigned by higher levels of 
administrations, etc. (Wescott, 2003; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003).  The Prime Minister 
has authority to suspend or cancel decisions of the local government as well as to 
dismiss the Chairs and deputy chairs of local People’s Committee (Kerkvliet, 2004). 
 
Local government and central government relations are complex. Provincial 
governments enjoy significant levels of decentralisation and autonomy (Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003). This has been common practice in Vietnam as an old Vietnamese maxim 
states that ‘the emperor’s rule has to stop at the village’s gate’ (Painter, 2008). Central 
policies and regulations are often ambiguous and over bureaucratic for the local 
government. They have a wide degree of interpretation of these policies for the local 
application, but the central government is often considered as bureaucratic and lacking 
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control mechanisms and enforcement measures due to the low levels of capacities in 
staff and a lack of local information. As a result, the local government must act to meet 
the demands of the local development rather than obeying the central policies and 
regulations. Local government acted as the initiator for reform before 1986, as they 
overruled the central government regulations simply for the survival of their local 
community. This act is often dubbed as ‘fence-breaking’ activities or reforms from 
below. The local government has their own responsibility for budgets, collecting taxes 
and fees and receiving percentages of this collection from the central government. 
Although the system appears to be centralised, the local government still also have their 
own source of income from various sources such as their properties, their SOEs and 
other fees and charges. The system is not very transparent and strict, so the local 
government may own some funds separate from the national budget and not disclose 
these to the national authorities (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Ffordes, 2004; Wescott, 
2003). 
 
Coordination problems between central and local government often occurs, both 
due to unclear laws and a continuation of the tradition of local autonomy (Wescott, 
2003). Many central government decisions are defined inadequately, with very little 
supporting documentation and little explanation of the ruling, making it difficult for 
local government to implement. Local governments often issue regulations 
contradicting those of central government, and they regularly increase fees and charges 
outside the formal and legal channels, and often in such a way that there is little 
opportunity for central government oversight (Painter, 2008). Local governments 
launched and expanded SOEs, managed natural resources and undertook imports and 
exports often contrary to central policy (Westcot, 2003).  Wescott (2006, p.217) 
suggested that “The unclear demarcation of the mandates of various agencies continues 
to leave room for discretion in interpretation of responsibility and accountability where 
there are overlapping functions and duties”. 
 
This autonomy and decentralisation has attracted much criticism (Vo and Do, 
2005). There is concern over lax control and allocation of fiscal resources at local level, 
which affects the government’ capability to invest in the national level. Currently, only 
44% of national budget is allocated to local government. Secondly, autonomy and 
decentralisation in a weak institutional framework often leads to localism. Vietnam 
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local governments insist on wanting to develop their own local economy, regardless of 
the Central governments master plan and in consequence create an inefficient use of 
limited resources. The local governments are granted rights to draw up a master plan for 
local socio-economic development with central government approval, to grant licenses 
to Foreign Direct Investment to a certain scale, to issue local bonds, etc (Thanh, 2005). 
Each province or city has their own, but similar, master plan for economic development 
depending on their own structure of industry, agriculture, and services, and their own 
airport and seaports. Thai (interview, 2012) agreed that “local governments try to build 
a self sufficient local economy but this is leading to the insufficient uses of resources 
and creates extra burdens due to bureaucracy and duplication”. 
 
3.2.7 Relationship between state and society 
 
There are three broad models of party-state-society relations in contemporary 
Vietnam. The ‘dominating state’ model claims that although state affairs are discussed 
within the state and influenced by the external events, the society is effectively in 
compliance to the bureaucratic polity in which decisions are made entirely within the 
bureaucracy (Womack, 1992, Thayer, 1992). The second model asserts that the state 
uses other mass organisations to control the society and to mobilise various social and 
economic groups in support for their policies. This is often called ‘state corporatism’, in 
which there are channels for society to influence state, but only within strictly 
prescribed limits (Kerkvliet, 2001). The third model emphasises that the state has to 
decentralise its powers and needs to maintain its popular legitimacy, so it has to respond 
to the social pressure for modification of policies, which undermine this legitimacy 
(Woodside, 1979; Thrift and Forbes, 1986; Fforde, 1989; Lam, 1992; Kerkvliet, 1995). 
 
Before the economic reform, Vietnam was a ‘dominating state’, where power 
was highly centralised and discretionary within the Party. While during the economic 
transition, the authoritarianism was ‘softened’ by the efforts of promoting closer 
relationships between the people and the Party-state. Signs of this change were the 
increasing independence and voice of the National Assembly in debating and approving 
the Government and Party plans and policies. They supervise the government activities; 
ratify the government budgets and major projects, but also create open debates about the 
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government policies. This is seen as a channel for the government to negotiate their 
policies with the society (Kerkvliet, 2001). The CPV increasingly use a ‘soft’ approach 
to test and implement their policies. Many policies have been implemented and re-
adjusted following the expression of public opinions. The media has played an 
important role in receiving feedback from the society, although the government is still 
strictly controlling the media and does not tolerate any ‘undesirable’ media coverage. 
To Huy Rua (2007), a politburo member – Chief of Ideology and Culture Committee 
has publicly stressed the importance of the media and its effectiveness as a channel of 
communication between the ‘people’ and the Party and Government. 
 
The Party-State is gradually adjusting itself to be more a ‘dialogue’ regime with 
a softer power approach and the appearance of benevolent rule (Kerkvliet, 2001; Dixon, 
2003). The marketisation process is diversifying the current social structure with the 
introduction of new social forces such as new economic entities with new interests, new 
economic and social relations, etc. As a result, the CPV must adjust itself towards a less 
authoritarian role in the society. Secondly, the Party-State is facing the problems of a 
shortage of resources and capacities in planning, implementing, coordinating and 
enforcing its programmes (Woodside, 1979; Thrift and Forbes, 1986; Kervliet, 2001). 
This, together with the marketisation process, has created wide discrepancies between 
what the State claims and what actually occurs (Thrift and Forbes, 1986). The Party-
State has often been blamed for rigidity in decision-making, excessive bureaucracy and 
for being slow and insensitive in the face of demands for change from the market and 
society (Fforde, 1989; Lam, 1992; Kerkvliet, 1995; White, 1985). The Party-State must 
incorporate other components of the society in their decision making process, in which 
its political organisations such as the Fatherland Front have been used for gaining 
support and channelling citizen’s concern and criticisms to its leaders (Kerkvliet, 2001). 
The transition from a command economy to the market economy left a vacuum in 
economic institutions and the Vietnam market. The economic institutions were not 
ready for the market economy, leaving many gaps in laws and regulations and 
inappropriate structures for a market economy. Officials from local and central 
government have utilised their positions to fill these gaps through their own discreet 
ways. Market forces were little understood and the strategy for coping became one of 
‘on the spot’ decision-making. Informal arrangements were made between officials and 
citizens based on providing private benefits. Personal connections such as family’s ties, 
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friendship or relationships became the primary means to ‘do business’ (Kerkvliet, 2001; 
Gainsborough, 2010; Dixon, 2004; Fforde, 2012; Koh, 2001). These expanded into 
exchange and bargaining arrangements, which were even more susceptible to corruption 
and bribery. 
 
Corruption has become increasingly widespread in terms of money and material 
exchange, and its prevalence has gradually rooted itself in the business culture of 
Vietnam (Kerkvliet, 2001; Gainsborough, 2010; Thayer, 1992). This problem is also 
increasingly undermining the legitimacy of the CPV. These widespread activities have 
lead to social instability and encouraged increasing numbers of citizen’s protests or the 
formation of dissident groups protesting against the corruption and bad practices found 
at many levels in government authorities (Kerkvliet, 2001; Nhi Le, 1994). 
 
A turning point that totally changed the behaviour of the CPV towards the 
corruption issue was the violent outburst of peasants in Thai Binh in 1998. The local 
government had used their authority and power to mis-allocate land for their own 
benefits; to confiscate land for private sale or exchange it for other material needs; to 
use local tax revenue for their own private purposes; extract the public budget for 
private usage by claiming higher public expenditure, etc. These officials used public 
money for their own private means with the building of new houses, buying private cars 
and luxury goods, while ordinary people and peasants were losing their lands and jobs 
as well as living in desperately poor conditions. However, their complaints through 
official channels, at all level of the government, were ignored. This led to large-scale 
protests in the Province, and at their height, there was 10000 demonstrators gathering 
together to take over and damage the local government headquarters. The scale and 
nature of this unrest alarmed the CPV and government about issues of the corruption, 
abuse of power and the relationship between State and society. After the investigation, 
nearly 2000 officials in the province were removed from office, which included the 
Secretary of the provincial CPV and the Chair of the People’s Committee (Kerkvliet, 
2001). This also rang an alarm for the CPV legitimacy if they did not take into account 
the pervasive corruption and continue the bureaucratic and authoritarian approach to 
citizen’s complaints and demands (Thayer, 2009). As a result, the CPV developed new 
approaches including popular propaganda, democratic political reform, and ‘grassroots 
democracy’. The CPV encouraged the strengthening of the participation of communities 
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and people at the local government level. Later, the government issued Decree 
29/1998/ND-CP, with the slogan “the people know, people discuss, people execute, and 
people supervise”, to improve transparency and accountability of local government and 
stipulate that local officials must disseminate information on policies, law, long-term 
and annual socio-economic development plans, land-use policy, and on the annual draft 
budget. Decree 79/2007/ND-CP on ‘Grassroots Democracy’, was issued to approve the 
participation of community-based organisations in development activities at the 
commune level (Thayer, 2009). The relationship between the State and the society 
involves linkages with professional associations, the business community, and the 
public media.  
 
Associations 
 
The CPV uses various mass organisations to support government programmes 
and policies. These also serve as channels for communication between authorities and 
important sectors of the society and helped to maintain social order (Kerkvliet, 2001). 
As a result, the Party-state strictly controls these organisations and sets up a system of 
dependent relationships between these organisations and the Party. These official social 
and professional associations are strictly managed by the CPV under the umbrella of 
Vietnam’s Fatherland Front (VFF). They are considered as extended arms of the CPV in 
the decision-making process and policies implementations, serving as the bridge 
between CPV, the State and citizens (Thong, 2007).  
 
The VFF is “a voluntary union of political organisations, social organizations 
and individuals representing their class, social class, ethnicity, religion and overseas 
Vietnamese” (VFF, 2011, p.1). It expresses the will and aspirations of the ‘People’; 
setting the template for national unity and promoting people's rights, through 
consultation, coordination and unity of action of its members, contributing to 
maintaining national independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
successfully implementing the industrialization and modernization of the country (VFF, 
2011). However, the head of the organisation is currently a member of Central 
Committee, so its activities are greatly dependent on the CPV and State’s policies. 
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Social and professional organisations have been revived since economic reform. 
The government has recognised the need to strengthen relationships with these 
organisations and actively engages with them (Thayer, 2008). There are 140,000 
community-based organisations, 540 international NGOs, 1000 locally registered NGOs 
and 200 charities (Dang et al, 2006; Thayer, 2008). Most of them are involved in social 
or humanitarian causes and aim to improve social welfare (Dang et al, 2006). However, 
these organisations have limited influenced on the policy-makers (Dang et al, 2006; 
Koh, 2004; Shanks et al, 2004; Norlund et al, 2003). 
 
Business 
 
The State business sector was the sole owner of the means of production and 
distributor of the outputs of the economy (Le and Liu, 2006). The private sector was not 
officially allowed to operate in the economy, and gradually eliminated from any active 
participation (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The relationship between SOEs and the State 
was based on a ‘give and take mechanism’, in which the state enterprises asked for 
output targets to receive the inputs for production (Le and Liu, 2006)  
 
Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested that “The economic reforms brought a 
substantial change to the business community and the relationship between the State and 
the business sector”. At the 6th National Congress, the CPV decided to reform the 
ownership rights to create a multi-sector economy. Ownership was divided into three 
groups: State ownership, Cooperative ownership and Private ownerships. Six main 
economic sectors were allowed to form including the State-run economic sector, the 
Collective-run sector, the Private sector, an Individual and small holder-run sector and 
the State capitalist sector (Quy, 2008).35 For the first time, the private sector was 
recognised and allowed to participate officially in the market. In the 7th Party National 
Congress (1990), the concept of a multi-sector economy was defined more precisely, 
with specific identities given to owners and users of the means of production (Quy, 
2008). Foreign investors were officially recognised with the introduction of joint 
                                                
35 Political Report at 6th National Congress (CPV, 1986) 
 102 
ventures with state companies. All economic establishments regardless of their 
ownership relations operated according to the mechanisms of business autonomy, equal 
cooperation and competition. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested “business had greater 
freedom and were guaranteed rights of legal possession and earnings”. In the 9th 
National Congress (2001), the CPV reaffirmed that “other ownership forms may be 
established based on the three basic ownership forms of public, collective and private 
ownership (Quy, 2008). A new economic sector in foreign investment was officially 
recognised. The 10th Congress continued to reaffirm the development of the market 
economy with multi sectors. It stated “all economic sectors operating according to the 
law are a component of the socialist oriented economy, being equal before the law, in 
long term development together and healthy cooperation and competition” (CPV, 2009, 
p.83).  
 
The Foreign Investment Law was introduced in 1987 and created more 
favourable conditions for doing business in Vietnam. Private companies were regulated 
by the Company and Private Law’s (1990). Liberalisation of trading rights in the private 
sector came with the Enterprise Law in 1999 (Le and Liu, 2006; Arkadie and Mallon, 
2003). The United Corporate Law (2005) combined all previous laws on different types 
of enterprises and created a level playing ground for all types of business (Chi Lan, 
interview, 2012) 
 
The reforms created a rapid emergence of new economic elites. Following the 
approval of the Company Law in 1990 the number of non-state sector businesses 
expanded remarkably.36 The Enterprise Law (2000), saw 14,444 new enterprises 
registered in the first year, an increase of 2.5 times on 1999 (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; 
Hakkala and Kokko, 2007). By 2005, there were more than 200,000 registered 
enterprises in Vietnam (Tuoi Tre News, 2010).37 
 
                                                
36 With 190 joint-stock companies, 8,900 limited liability companies, and 21,000 private enterprises 
registered by 1996 (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
37 In 2010, enterprises would increase to 248,847 enterprises (Vneconomy News, 2009). 
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The State sector stilled played an important and distinct role in the Vietnam 
economy. The GDP share of SOEs decreased rapidly over the years, but still continues 
to hover around 35% of GDP during the last five years (GSO, 2010). Despite the rapid 
shrinking of the SOEs, they are still large in number. They enjoy a near-monopoly 
status in many important industries of the economy.38 
 
SOEs tend to be involved in capital-intensive industries, and their capital 
increased from 130 billion VND in 2000 to 768 billion VND in 2008.39 Although there 
is heavy investment in the SOEs, these enterprises are often blamed for inefficient use 
of resources (Kokko, 2004; Riedel and Turley, 1999; Sjoholm, 2006). Productivity 
compared to capital investment in the SOEs has decreased. This has been reflected in 
the average ratio of turnover to capital of the SOEs, which decreased to 1.1 compared to 
21.0 for the whole business sector in year 2009. In 2000, this gap is only 1.6 in SOEs 
compared to 8.8 in the entire sector (WB, 2011). The growth of labour productivity in 
SOEs has also not been sustained in comparison with the rest of industry. Between the 
2000 and 2008, the turnover to employee ratio in the SOEs was up from 0.6 to 1.7. 
Meanwhile, this ratio in the overall enterprise sector increased from 2.7 to 16.3. The 
increase of the productivity of the rest of the enterprise sector was much faster than that 
in the SOEs. The productivity for using fixed assets such as land and machinery, which 
is measured by turnover-to-fixed assets ratio, also diminished between 2000 and 2008 
(WB, 2011). 
 
Throughout the economic reforms, SOEs were central to the process of change. 
The focus was on transforming SOEs into market-oriented entities. However, SOEs 
remain government led actors operating in the market rather than important independent 
elements in the market economy. The role of the SOEs remains rooted in its past 
                                                
38 For examples, SOEs account for 99% of fertiliser, 97% of the coal industry, 94% of electricity and gas, 
91% of telecommunication and 88% of insurance. They have also taken a large market share in many 
consumer goods market such as 51% in cement, 41% in beer; 73% in refined sugar, 21% in textiles and 
21% in the chemical industry (WB, 2011). 
39 During the same period, an average SOE also invested 677 billion VND in fixed assets and investment, 
which increased six fold from 110 billion VND. The capital to employee of SOEs increased to 1.5 in 
2008 compared to 0.4 in 2000, which was nearly double the figure of the private sector (WB, 2011) 
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heritage of being part of the command economy and vanguards for the economic face of 
the CPV’s ideology. The CPV has developed its own model of development often 
dubbed as a ‘market economy with socialist orientation’, but would more accurately be 
named a central command economy with free market elements. The market economy 
with socialist orientation was clearly stipulated as “the multi-sector commodity 
economy operating under a market mechanism with the state management under the 
leadership of the Communist Party. The economy is “based on, led, and governed by the 
principles and essence of socialism”, and, “all forms of market participation are 
respected, together with long-term development, cooperation, fair competition, healthy 
and civilized conditions, of which the State holds the leading role” (CPV, 2011, p.34-
36). The existence and influence of SOEs in the market is rooted deep in the philosophy 
of development of the CPV. SOEs are considered as a tool of the government to 
coordinate and to govern the market (Nguyen Thao, 2012). The reality has been far 
from this with SOEs staying unproductive and inefficient, while also holding a 
monopoly over the economy. 
 
It is difficult to see the SOEs as separate entities from the political ideology, and 
a true conversion to a market economy is likely to be challenged by this refusal to open 
these ‘government arms’ to real market forces based on productivity, profitability and 
competitive market pressures. Although implementing economic reform, the Party-State 
has no intention of major political reforms in the near future. Through Marxist ideology, 
the Party-State still keeps close vigilance on political competition from the private 
sector, especially the bourgeois class (Reidel and Turley 1999; Thang, 1995; 
Gainsborough, 2010). SOEs are central to CPV strategy of marketisation as a process of 
socialism, with the economy actually remaining under state control via the SOEs 
(Masina, 2006). The strategy is seen as reasonable and understandable, as they identify 
it with the models of Japan, Taiwan and Korea, which relied upon large state 
conglomerates for their post war industrialisation. They see large scale conglomerates as 
little more than identical reflections of their own SOEs, believing that the enterprises in 
these countries were strategically developed to be the main forces for guiding the 
industrialisation process (Wade, 1990). The Party see it merely an exercise in semantics 
to argue whether ultimate ownership is a politically connected rich bourgeoisie or the 
Government. 
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In this ideology there is a strong belief that private ownership within a 
government framework is a ‘sensible’ way to reform the 1000 year old culture of 
Confucian rule of mandarins, combined with Leninist rule of the ‘Communist elite’ and 
in the transition period to full socialism makes it psychologically understandable that 
the Party rejects carte blanche release of its power to the ‘masses’ (or business in 
particular- which is seen as pursuing wealth alone, while the Party represents the health, 
safety and social welfare of the people, as well as the interests of business and national 
security). The Vietnam culture is overtly seen as trusting and friendly, but its deeper 
roots, nurtured by centuries of war and internal conflicts, famine, poverty and continual 
problems with corruption in politics and business, is a culture more reflected by distrust, 
secrecy and power ‘games’. The importance of relationship factors in business, and the 
tendency to ‘do business’ through complicated and often secretive means, is a culturally 
embedded practice pre-dating Communism and central control, and chiefly based on a 
certain belief that ‘strong leaders’ are needed to control and direct a mass of people 
often seen as greedy, emotional and impractical. They are seen as needing the ‘guiding’ 
hand of good leaders and actually welcome and embrace a ‘paternal and 
knowledgeable’ authoritarianism. This culture has developed through centuries of 
colonisation where there has been a hatred and resistance to ‘foreign’ control and a 
following of strong and powerful domestic leaders resisting the foreigner. Such a 
history means that the ‘masses’ want a ‘voice’, but only where ‘great’ individuals are 
trusted with total autonomy in power, and are expected to make all the important 
decisions. To suddenly expect a ‘hidden’ hand of the free market to operate in this 
environment is unrealistic, and Party, Government and the ‘People’ expect that the 
economy can only improve if strongly led by ‘on hands’ governance of the leaders. The 
Party fulfils this role and both government and society often expect the SOEs to be the 
practical mechanisms for actually applying the reforms and ‘managing’ the economy. 
 
SOEs are seen as having a social responsibility for under the central command 
economy, these companies are the major sources for employment, especially in urban 
areas. The perception of ‘durable stability’ in public sector employment has been 
developed and become rooted in the minds of Vietnamese of all ages. SOEs have a duty 
to employ large numbers of the population and put ‘productivity’ second to this 
requirement. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested that “The SOEs received more than 
45% of total investment from 2000-2006” and “are believed to be too large to fail”. 
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SOEs are managed by the government line ministries and local government 
officials and they are part of the system where benefits and duty are entangled in 
complicated political matters. Through these SOEs the ministry and also its officials 
may accumulate material benefits for their own institutions or individuals. The budgets 
for these ministry’s and local government offices are often limited or strictly monitored, 
so using their own SOEs to finance their personal needs is a popular solution for the 
limited resources of the state agencies (Thanh, interview, 2011). The Ministry or local 
government office is also the state management authority in charge of planning and 
issuing policy and mechanisms for the operations of all companies in particular areas of 
business- thus, having its own company is inevitably a conflict of interests, but also a 
lucrative way to do business. This suspect level of inter-dependence brings unfair 
benefits to both SOEs and regulators. 
 
 SOEs transformed into State-Owned Economic Groups (SOEG) in 2005 that 
enjoy privileged access to factor inputs and a higher level of operational autonomy, 
which helps them to attract large investments. SOEGs are state-owned business 
conglomerates in strategically important sectors, formed by consolidating independent 
SOEs into a holding company structure. Companies that have relations in terms of 
capital or corporation were grouped together to create larger corporations that could 
theoretically dominate the entire domestic industry and compete on the global market. 
The core element for the establishment of each SOEG is the General Corporations 
operating in the industry and focused on restructuring. The SOEGs play the role of 
leaders in Vietnam’s key industries, including rubber, shipbuilding, coal-mineral 
mining, oil and gas, electricity, textile and garment, insurance, chemistry, construction 
and housing and urban development (Amcham, 2012). However, many of them 
diversify outside their core competency and this has allowed them to compete unfairly 
with private sectors in many other areas of the economy (WB, 2011). The advantages of 
government support, privileged access to decision-makers and an ability to control 
regulators means that private sector companies are faced with various forms of unfair 
competition from SOEs. 
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SOEs are a market distortion force and an obstacle for promoting further 
economic growth and development of the country (Masina, 2006). Although they have a 
number of advantages, the reality is that they often waste resources, especially finances. 
The quality of their work and standards of service are often worse than those in the 
private companies, but they remain dominant in many industries because they enjoy a 
‘privileged’ status, with direct access into areas such as licensing, connections to 
suppliers, and the ability to use other ‘regulators’ such as the police as barriers to their 
competitors. 
 
The influences of the SOEs on the policy making process can be through several 
channels. SOEs are the strongholds of the CPV in advancing its ideology of control and 
distribution and they enjoy a close political link with the Party and State. Most of the 
SOEs ‘saved’ from the privatisation process are large enterprises at central level and 
‘fully’ privatised ones are actually still ‘ruled’ by high-level politicians who balance 
their State role with a private business identity (Clarke, 2004; Masina, 2006; Painter, 
2003). SOE appointments are carefully monitored and approved by the Party Personnel 
Department before the final appointment by the Prime Minister. Similar to the SOEs 
belonging to ministries, they also enjoy close relationships with ministry’s highest-
ranking officials and Party-State officials. This relationship is viewed as reciprocal. The 
SOEs ‘payments’ to the Ministries and the Government to do business such as land 
allocations; cheap credit, market domination guarantee, etc are in exchange for 
‘advantages’ being given to the SOEs. Chi Lan and Thai (interviews, 2012) agrees that 
“They provide the material benefits for these ministries to compensate for shortage of 
budgets and these relationships become dubious with opportunities for corruption or 
benefit exchange and strong bargaining positions due to being able to take advantage of 
weak institutions and poor oversight in checks and controls”. 
 
As SOEs have been granted more and more autonomy, the opportunity for them 
to abuse the system has grown, with SOEs able to lobby for special treatments or 
protection. The situation is so serious that it is almost impossible to see where politics 
ends and business begins. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested “In Vietnam, politics is 
focused on providing ‘material’ benefits to individuals and profits guaranteed to those 
individuals through the dual avenues of political influence and business advantages. The 
consequence is that even the education and health systems are based purely on a 
 108 
‘business’ status and ruled by a pure capitalist theme of ‘profit’ alone”. McGough 
(interview, 2012) commented “such a situation makes WTO membership extremely 
difficult to manage, or understand, with most of the business relationships hidden under 
a veil of political impartiality, but actually working in a situation where business is 
government and government is business.” 
 
The Private sector is a young sector and has developed rapidly and made a 
significant contribution to growth, employment and poverty reduction. The relaxation 
on Laws for the private sector, as well as the conditions for opening business, has meant 
the private sector has expanded rapidly (WB, 2006).40 
 
The private sector is still considered as being neglected and having much room 
for further development. Most of the private enterprises are Small and Medium 
Enterprises. They often employ less than 300 employees or are registered with capital 
under US 500,000 dollars. The bulk of them were upgraded from household enterprises, 
which operated on a very small scale and with simple technological capacities (Kokko, 
2004). 
 
The hesitation of the leaders to develop further the private sector comes from 
three sources. First source is the political aspect. The Party-State was reluctant to 
increase support for the private sector precisely because the emergence of autonomous 
business elites might be a force to challenge to its power (Forsyth, 1997; Dixon, 2004; 
Masina, 2006). Secondly, the private sector had the ability and conditions to accelerate 
industrialisation, although only on a limited basis as they lacked capital and technology 
(Masina, 2006). Lastly, the private sector was considered weak and young, and this was 
feared would open the door to transnational and international corporations to dominate 
and intervene into the domestic market, faced as they would be very little effective 
competition. SOEs dominated the profitable areas of the economy, strengthened and 
                                                
40 There are 238,932 private enterprises (excluding the FDI sector) operating in Vietnam in 2010, a 
significant expansion from merely 35,004 enterprises in 2000 (GSO, 2010). They account for 38.4% of 
industrial production in 2010, which is up from 24.5% in 2000. In 2007, the private sector employed 
nearly 4.7 million workers and each year, they can absorb more than 1.5 million workers (WB, 2006). 
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supported by unfair political advantage and protected from market forces by 
‘relationships’ (Masina, 2006). The WTO entry was seen as a way to further develop the 
economy, but most decision-makers believed the existing economic system could 
remain intact and actually be strengthened by the opening up of the economy to the 
global markets. The strength of the economy was seen as being the ability of the 
government to (behind closed doors and covertly) remain in overall control of business 
and the main recipients of its ‘profits’. Although ‘free’ market and ‘privatised’, the 
words ‘free’ and ‘private’ have to be understood in this system where ‘relationships’ 
and ‘influence’ are based on a synergy of the political and the economic. 
 
Tuat (interview, 2010) suggested “the private sector was still regarded with 
apprehension and often discriminated against in relation to competing with SOEs. 
Before reform they were seen as ‘enemies’ of the ideology, but after the reforms they 
were seen as necessary, but only when tightly controlled”. 
 
Truong (interview, 2012) suggested that “the private sector had very limited 
capability to influence the policy makers for more favourable conditions. As the SOEs 
have better resources, access and protection, many private enterprises have to become 
‘affiliated’ to the SOE”. Private companies need to use or develop strong relationships 
with officials or the ministries, and many of these relationships are established only 
through bribery and corruption (Fforde, 2005). This further distorts the business 
environment and actually weakens the overall position of the private sector to influence 
policy makers, with ‘favoured’ private entities relying on their support of the status quo 
as their main means of survival. 
 
The third major sector in the business community is the Foreign Invested Sector. 
Despite its late establishment, this sector has become an important component of the 
economy.41 It is mostly focused in industries such as oil and gas, manufacturing and 
                                                
41 In 2009 there were 6,546 FDI’s enterprises, employing 1,919,600 employees (21.5%), they had 55.1 % 
of total export, 43.1% of total industrial inputs, and represents 18.43% of GDP (GSO, 2009; 2010). In 
2010, Vietnam attracted USD11 billions in FDI in 969 projects, which makes the total inflow FDI of 
USD77.9 billions from 1988-2010 (GSO, 2010). 
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processing industries and services such as banking, insurance, hotels, restaurants and 
transportation. They bring in new technology, management skills, capital and market 
access for economic development (Doanh, 2002). 
 
The official view is that FDI has constructively and positively contributed to the 
development of Vietnam. Since 2000, the CPV has officially accepted foreign investors 
as an integral part of the national economy with equal market footing with other sectors 
(Doanh, 2002). The regulation framework has been constantly revised in order to make 
better conditions for investing in Vietnam (Kokko, 2004). 
 
FDI plays a vital role in the economy and its ‘voice’ has become an important 
element in the decision making process. Before 2000, the FDI sector was confined to 
joint ventures with the SOEs. This requirement was aimed at preventing direct 
competition to the SOEs while also providing the means to reform and renovate them 
(Hakkala and Kokko, 2005; Leproux and Brooks, 2004). However, this format not only 
served the purpose of building state led industrialisation of the Party-State, but was also 
a way to closely control the operation of the FDI enterprises (Masina, 2006). It was 
designed to prevent the possibility of building up a strong independent private sector led 
by FDIs and be a vehicle for capitalists to weaken the role of the Communist Party. It 
was referred to as the ‘sugar coated bullet’ for implementing ‘peaceful revolution’, 
underpinned by the CPV propaganda for vigilance against the economic power of the 
capitalist (Masina, 2006). Instead, The FDI became a life buoy for inefficient SOEs with 
budget constraints, backward technology and management skills. The FDI influence 
rescued many SOEs from almost certain collapse and became a vital element in 
reforming the economy. 
 
However, it should be noted that in 2012 FDI has dramatically declined, and 
while neighbours continue to see investment growth, the levels of corruption, increasing 
anti-foreigner attitudes on the part of officials such as the Police, a lack of trained 
human resources and the growing debts of banks and the government is eroding the 
former confidence investors had in Vietnam (WB, 2011). 
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Mass media 
 
The Party has kept close relationships and control over the mass media. Before 
the economic reforms, the mass media was limited to a role of spreading propaganda 
and educating people, and was less focused on reporting news on the reality of the 
situation in Vietnamese society (Mandy, 2001). With the expansion of the market 
economy and the opening up of Vietnam into the world, the mass media has been given 
far more freedom, but again this to some extent is just appearances as major constraints 
still exist on the ‘free’ press. 
 
The Party and State needs candid information and feedback from society for 
their fine-tuning of the decision making process (Phong, 2009). The operation of the 
market economy has led to more free and democratic channels of information. But, the 
CPV still uses media extensively as a tool for spreading their policies and propaganda. 
The CPV allow more freedom of the press to utilise its contribution in providing 
constructive criticisms and a reflection of society on the government policies and 
performance (Kerkvliet, 2001; VNA, 2012). The CPV believe that relaxation of press 
control is one of the channels for providing a ‘release valve’ for deflating some of the 
most pressing issues.42 
 
Relaxing controls of media should not be directly equated to freedom of the 
media. The rights of reporters and media companies are respected but they must obey 
the Press Law and many other vague and stringent laws and regulations. The 
Government does not tolerate any breaches of these laws and regulations. Journalists 
face grave consequences, such as fines or jail if they do not abide by these broad and 
vague provisions on media freedom (Kerkvliet 2001; Human Right Watch, 2011). 
                                                
42 There are now nearly 850 press agencies, including 786 printed press agencies, 1 national news agency, 
61 internet online newspapers and magazines, 191 social networking webpages and thousands of websites 
of the CPV, governments, NGOs, and business. There are also 67 television broadcasting services 
including 3 national services, and 64 local services; and 500 radio broadcasting services (VNA, 2012). 
More than 17,000 press cards have been issued (VNA, 2012). Nowadays, the Internet is also booming in 
Vietnam with 23 million users (27.18% of the population) (GSO, 2010). 
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3.3 VIETNAM’S ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND WTO ACCESSION 
 
3.3.1 Vietnam’s economic integration process 
 
Vietnamese leaders have changed their approach in international relations, 
shifting from ideology to pragmatic interests, deepening and broadening the levels of 
integration, and now participating in various regional and global economic integration 
institutions (Chuc, 2009). 
 
The 6th National Congress (1986) identified the ‘open economy’ as one of key 
tasks of the economic reforms in Vietnam. The CPV’s Political Reports (1986, p.20) 
affirmed “Nowadays the development of the technology and science revolution is the 
trend of expanded labour division, cooperation between countries including countries 
having different socio-economic regimes, is also an important condition... We have to 
make good uses of all opportunities for expanding trade relations, economic cooperation 
and science and technology with outside countries”. In 1988, the Politburo issued 
Resolution 13-NQ/TW on foreign relations to define a breakthrough view on foreign 
affairs and initiate an open door policy, which abolished the Cold War’s hostile stance 
and set up the foundations for the integration process (Chuc, 2009). The view changed 
from prioritising security to concentrating on economic development and expansion of 
foreign relations as “our country must participate in the international system of labour 
division in order to combine the strength of the nation and the power of the era. We 
need to grab the chance to expand economic and technological relations with the third 
world, industrialised countries, international organisations and individuals on the 
principle of equality and mutual benefit” (Le and Liu, 2006). The changing view on the 
open economy led to the passing of the Law on Foreign Investment in 1988 with 
attractive terms to open the economy for investments (Phong, 2009). The ideological 
view of FDI, that identified it as a mean of exploiting developing countries by the more 
powerful developed counties was gradually reviewed and changed to accept FDI as a 
necessary transition step to economic growth (Phong, 2009). 
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At the 7th National Congress of CPV (1991), the open economic policy was 
further clarified as “Vietnam wishes to be friend of all nations in the world, striving for 
peace, independence and development, and advocates the equal and mutual beneficial 
cooperation with all nations regardless of their different socio political systems on the 
basis of peaceful co-existence principles” (CPV, 1991, p.35). Vietnam actively 
promoted the normalisation of relationship with many countries and international 
organisations such as IMF, ADB and the World Bank as well as with the United States 
(Masina, 2006). 
 
Admission to ASEAN reflected the fundamental changes in the foreign policy 
orientation, showing that Vietnam was taking into consideration the relationship 
between its external environment and the development of Vietnam (Amer, 2001; Nien, 
1996; Binh and Duong, 2001). The reason for this turning point was the pressure of the 
unilateral economic reforms of Vietnam in the last 10 years. The newly reformed 
economy needed markets, supplies and capital for its restructuring. Before the reforms, 
Vietnam had foreign relations and trading with only 26 fellow communist countries 
(Goodman, 1996). Vietnam depended on these countries for its export markets and the 
imports of production and consumptions resources, as well as capital for the economy. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union narrowed down the traditional export markets and 
dried out the capital and import material sources for Vietnam (Le and Liu, 2006). Under 
the US embargos and blockade, Vietnam fell further into isolation, while the move to 
reform needed new markets, capital and technology for the development of the 
economy (Chuc, 2009). Regional integration was considered a strategic step for 
Vietnam to break the isolation with its neighbouring countries and to take advantage of 
the recent economic emergence of South East Asia (Thayer, 2004). 
 
The accession to the ASEAN also meant joining the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) (Thayer, 2004). AFTA is the centrepiece of ASEAN economic cooperation, 
and was the first time Vietnam had participated in an international free trade agreement 
with commitments to trade liberalisation, with a concrete time schedule and a need to 
abide by international law and regulation standards (Thayer, 2007). AFTA established a 
free trade area in the region removing all trade barriers among the ASEAN members to 
create a single production base and regional market (Bowles, 1997). The main 
instrument for the AFTA is the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, 
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in which a member is required to classify all manufactured goods into 4 categories: 
Inclusion List, Temporary Inclusion List, Sensitive List and General Exclusion List. 
AFTA members agreed to reduce scheduled tariffs in the first two lists to no more than 
5%. All other trade restrictions on virtually all commodities were eliminated by 2003 
(Nguyen, 2004; Phuong, 2002). AFTA facilitated trade through harmonisation and 
simplification of custom procedures, streamlining custom administration, and the 
elimination of technical barriers through mutual recognition of technical regulations and 
conformity assessments (Lao-Araya, 2003). Vietnam committed to remove all barriers 
in 2015 in the AFTA framework and selected 12 priority areas to eliminate trade 
barriers before 2012 (Nguyen, 2004). 
 
Table 3.2: Average tariff reduction under CEPT implementation of 
Vietnam 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total 12.7 12.6 12.1 11.9 11.4 10.9 10.7 9.3 7.4 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total 5.3 3.0 2.33 2.77 2.72 2.68 2.6 2.53 2.45 
Source: Ministry of Finance, personal communication, 2012 
 
The tariff reductions under AFTA were not very effective for trade 
liberalisation, because it was typically small and occurring over long and delayed 
implementation periods. Thayer (2004) believed that these limitations of AFTA were 
indeed an appropriate level of trade liberalisation for a low-level development country 
like Vietnam. It provided reasonable times for adjustments and helped Vietnam to gain 
experience in participating in international economic institutions and to cope with 
competition in the regional market. It also has room for Vietnam to protect its industry 
through the General Inclusion List (Loc, 2001). Vietnam submitted its schedule for 
tariff reductions up to 2006. Implementation of AFTA’s commitments was a real test 
for the international economic integration of Vietnam. Tariff reductions led to fiercer 
competition in the domestic market, putting enormous pressure on the Vietnam 
economy. This fuelled domestic reforms in many areas, which included reform of the 
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tax system, protection of property rights, SOE equitisation, and promoting the private 
sector (Loc, 2001). 
 
The success of ASEAN accession and pressure from AFTA integration 
prompted the CPV to issue Resolution 4-NQ/TW in 1996 on expanding and enhancing 
the effectiveness of the international trade relations in between 1996-2000 (Thuong and 
Hung, 2010). CPV’s declared it “should be active and proactive to penetrate and expand 
the international market” as well as “take prompt and solid preparation for the 
negotiation of the US Bilateral Trade Agreement, accession for APEC and the WTO” 
(CPV, 1996, p.36). 
 
In 2001, Vietnam concluded the negotiations for the US-Bilateral Trade 
Agreement. This agreement was a milestone in Vietnam’s international economic 
integration process (Wiemann et al, 2006; Thai, 2005; Nguyen, 2004). The BTA 
required Vietnam to review and revise its trading and legal system for meeting 
international standards (Parker, 2005). It had a deep impact on reforms of the trade and 
institutions in Vietnam, and provided a benchmark and focus on modernising Vietnam’s 
economic and legal institution to support the market economy and economic integration 
(Parker, 2005, Weimann et al, 2006; Bao, 2004; WB, 2006). Implementing these 
commitments meant anticipating most of the WTO requirements and facilitating WTO 
accession (Weimann et al, 2006).  
 
After 2 years of the US-BTA coming into effect, the BTA led to sharp rises in 
US –Vietnam trade.43 Many believed that after the BTA, the weak Vietnamese economy 
would not be able to compete with the US and it would create more harm than good 
(Masina, 2006). However, the reality showed that the Vietnamese economy adjusted 
quickly to take advantages of larger markets and actually benefited from the challenges 
of new competition. This further strengthened the determination of the government to 
engage further in the integration process (Chuc, 2009). 
                                                
43 Volumes of trade reached US 6.2 billion in 2004 compared to US 1.158 billion in 2000. Vietnam’s 
trade surplus with the US accounted for US 5.1 billion in 2004 (Masina, 2006). 
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The 9th National Congress in 2001 was increasingly aware of the globalisation 
process and the necessity to participate further in this process (Thuong and Hung, 2010; 
Le and Liu, 2006). In its Political Report and National Plan for Socio Economic 
Development 2001-2005, the CPV identified that “globalisation takes a new 
development, becomes an objective tendency, attracting participation of many countries, 
having both positive and negative aspects as well as cooperation and struggle with each 
other. It is necessary to proactively integrate Vietnam’s economy into the world and 
region in the spirit of making full use of internal strength, increasing the effectiveness of 
international cooperation to ensure national independence, sovereignty and socialist 
orientation, protect national interests, national security, preserve national identities and 
protect the environment” (CPV, 2001, p.35-38). Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested that 
“the Politburo issued Resolution 07-NQ/TW in 11/2001 on international economic 
integration, which specified clearly the targets, as well as specific tasks during the 
integration process and delegated tasks for ministries to actively prepare and negotiate 
for WTO accession”. 
 
At the 10th Congress (2006-2011), the CPV re-confirmed the commitment to 
continue the market economy reforms, and focusing on perfecting the market economy 
institution with socialist orientation, while accelerating the industrialisation and 
modernisation process. Restructuring institutions started by enhancing the roles and 
effectiveness of the government’s management through proper strategic planning and 
using market friendly measures to manage the economy. The Congress also declared to 
develop more markets for the economy and reduce the roles of the SOEs and 
accelerated the development of new market such as the property market, the financial 
market; the labour market and the technology market, while removing the government 
monopoly for the private sector in many industries. In line with it, the Party aimed to 
promote heavily the other economic sectors and organisations as well as committing to 
restructuring the SOEs towards a more level playing field, transparency, efficiency and 
more independence from the government, mainly through an accelerated equitisation 
process (CPV, 2006). The Party also reconfirmed that “Vietnam should actively 
integrate into the world economy and expand its cooperation in other fields. Vietnam is 
a trusted friend and partner of other countries in the world, participating in the 
cooperation process in the region and the world” (CPV, 2006, p.39). The attitude and 
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level of commitment of Vietnam for the international integration was also upgraded in 
this Congress. It was enhanced from ‘participating’ level in the 9th Congress (2000) and 
by ‘actively integrating to the world economy’ level in the 10thCongress (2006). The 
economic integration of Vietnam progressed from the regional level (ASEAN) to the 
inter-regional level (APEC) and then to the global level (WTO) and brought 
encouraging results (Le and Liu, 2006). It created favourable conditions for Vietnam to 
enhance its political, diplomatic and economic position in the world, and support the 
development of Vietnam’s international trade (Chuc, 2010). 
 
At the 11th Congress in 2011, the policy for development was refined for quality 
rather quantity. The Party shifted their focus on sustainable growth, balanced 
development between economic and social cultural development and balanced 
development between rural and urban areas. This change resulted from the Party 
awareness of the challenges and distortions that happened during the last fast phase of 
reform. The tone for promoting the leading role of the SOEs was also at a minimum, 
while the Congress focused more on creating the level playing field between different 
economics sectors and controlling and restructuring the SOEs for more efficiency and 
transparency (CPV, 2011). Another significant change in the 11th Congress was the 
commitment for deeper international integration. The Party wanted to promote 
international integration on all fronts such as politics, military, technology, etc rather 
than only economics. This has been a totally new advance step in the international 
policy that may help Vietnam fully integrate into the global economy. 
 
3.3.2 WTO’s accession process and the commitments of Vietnam 
 
The WTO accession process  
 
Vietnam WTO accession took 11 years of negotiations, with over 200 
negotiation rounds, 14 multilateral negotiation rounds and 28 bilateral partner 
negotiations (NCIEC, 2007). Vietnam’s WTO accession process consisted of three 
major components: multilateral negotiations on the rules in goods, services and TRIPS; 
bilateral negotiations related to market access concession in goods and commitments in 
the services sector with individual Working Parties’ members interested in access to the 
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applicant’s market; and lastly drafting the legal documents for the WTO accession 
(NCIEC, 2007) 
 
The ‘Memorandum on Vietnam’s Foreign Trade System’ (1996), explained the 
country’s trade and legal regime (NCIEC, 2007).44 Vietnam offered detailed replies and 
explanations to these questions. In the 6th meeting round (2003), Chairman of the 
Working Panel concluded that Vietnam completed this session and could prepare for the 
second phases of bilateral negotiations (Hiep, 2005). 
 
The reasons for the delay in this phase were that members’ country wanted to 
understand and see whether Vietnam trade policy and legal regime complied with the 
WTO regulations. Khanh (interview, 2012) said “many trade policies and the legal 
regime of Vietnam were complicated and a contradiction with the standards of the 
WTO, which made the process take a long time to complete”. This phase of negotiation 
was in parallel with the period of the accelerated industrialisation process of Vietnam. 
For a small economy like Vietnam, the number of interested countries seeking bilateral 
agreement seemed to be excessive for Vietnam. Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested that 
the “reasons for huge interests in Vietnam accession to the WTO might rest in the 
potential of this country in world trade”. Foreign investors see Vietnam as a promising 
market for trade and investment (Bank of Tokyo, 2010). Vietnam is a favourable 
location in the terms of regional trade routes for land, sea, and air transportation. The 
second reason was derived from the competition of some WTO’s members who share 
the same export structure as Vietnam (NCIEC, 2007). Their involvement in the 
negotiations was in order to protect their own trading advantages. 
 
In the bilateral negotiations, the United States and the EU were the main 
representatives and the most important members. These members were negotiating not 
only on their own interests but also on behalf of WTO’s interests as a whole (NCIEC, 
2007). Vietnam concluded bilateral negotiations with the United States in November 
2001, which paved the way for the market-access deal with the EU and other members 
                                                
44 From 1998 to 2003, WTO’s members raised 3,516 questions about the trade and legal regime in 
Vietnam’s memorandum (Hiep, 2005). 
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in Working Parties. Another tough case was the negotiations with China. Both countries 
already had a free trade agreement under the ASEAN Framework and did not need 
another bilateral agreement. However, China still expressed its interest in having 
bilateral negotiations with Vietnam in the WTO framework (NCIEC, 2007). Vietnam’s 
bilateral negotiations with 28 members were concluded in July 2006 (WTO, 2008). 
 
Vietnam’s Commitments for WTO’s accession 
 
Vietnam accepted all WTO’s agreements and committed to have a ceiling rate 
for the whole goods tariff table of 10,600 lines and 11 services with 110 categories out 
of 155 categories specified by the WTO (NCIEC, 2007). Khanh (interview, 2012) said 
“the commitments were rather strong for a country with low levels of development, 
including a tariff ceiling on goods and ‘second generation’ institutional reforms such as 
transparency procedures, judicial and administrative review and other domestic 
regulation such as intellectual property and product standards”. 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012) commented that “Vietnam achieved good acceding 
commitments compared with other countries. Although the commitments are detailed 
and concise, but secured for Vietnam, they put a lot of pressure on the domestic 
economy but, also allow enough room for the domestic economy to adjust under these 
pressures”. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of the WTO’s commitments of Vietnam and China 
COUNTRY	   VIETNAM 	   CHINA	  
Policy Area	   Commitments	  
	   TRADE IN GOODS	  
Tariff reductions	   Average tariff reduction to a final 
bound of 13.4% from 17.4%  
Agricultural tariff declined to 21% 
from 23.5 
Non agriculture tariff declined from 
to 12.6% from 16.6% 
Tariff reductions implemented over 
5-7 years.	  
Average tariff reduction to a final 
bound of 9.8%. 
Agricultural tariff declined to 15%  
Manufacturing products tariff 
reduced to 9.5% 
Tariff reduction implemented over 3 
year transition period	  
	   TRADE IN SERVICE	  
	   Committed in 11 service categories, 
including 110 sub-categories (out of 
150 sub-categories). They are 
business, communication, 
construction, distribution, education, 
environmental, financial, health care, 
tourism, recreation, and transport 
services. 	  
Committed in 9 categories, including 
88 sub-categories. They are business, 
communication, construction, 
distribution, education, 
environmental, financial, and social, 
tourism and travel related and 
transport services. 	  
	   MULTILATERAL ISSUES	  
Trade framework 	   Complied WTO requirements on Non 
discrimination, transparency, uniform 
administration, judicial review, 
special economic areas...	  
Complied WTO requirements on Non 
discrimination, transparency, uniform 
administration, judicial review, 
special economic areas...	  
Trading Rights	   -All firms and individuals are 
allowed to engage in import and 
export activities, except items 
subjects to state trading. Importer can 
choose their domestic distributors 
- No minimum capital requirements 
for firms engaging in trading 
- All firms and individuals allowed to 
engage in import and export activities 
except items subjects to state trading 
(within the transition period -3 years). 
- No minimum capital requirements 
for firms engaging in trading 
activities after 3 year transition 
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activities	   period	  
State Trading 
Enterprises	  
Natural monopolies included 
manufactured tobacco products; 
cultural sensitive products such as 
newspapers, journals and audio-
visual material, petroleum and 
aircraft...	  
Including tea, rice, corn, soy bean, 
tungsten ore, ammonium 
paratungstates, tungstate products, 
coal, crude oil, processed oil, silk, 
unbleached silk, cotton, cotton yarn, 
antimony ores, antimony oxide, 
antimony products, silver...	  
Price Control	   Committed fully the WTO 
requirements and ensured the 
transparency in price control by 
publishing the list and related 
regulation on the Government 
bulletins. 	  
Committed fully the WTO 
requirements and ensured the 
transparency in price control by 
publishing the list and related 
regulation on the Government 
bulletins. But reserved 10 
commodities groups and some utility. 
Some other essential services are 
subject to government pricing or 
guiding	  
Tariff Rate Quotas	   Egg, un-manufactured tobacco, sugar 
and salt. Quota volume increases at 
5% annually	  
Wheat, Corn, Rice, Sugar, Wool, 
Cotton, Vegetable oil. The quota will 
be averaged of import in the last three 
years or 3-5% of domestic 
consumption. 	  
Quantitative 
Restrictions	  
Import bans on cigarettes, cigars, 
large motorcycles, and used cars to 
be abolished. Cigarettes and 
manufactured tobacco products to 
have production quota (including 
imports).	  
To be removed from 2002 to 2005. 
Quota applied for 15 products: 
processed oil sodium cyanide, 
chemical fertiliser, Natural rubber, 
Tires of rubber used on car, 
motorcycles and key part, car and key 
parts, Air conditioner and 
compressor, Recording apparatus, 
Magnetic sound and video recording 
apparatus, Recorders and transport 
mechanism, Colour TV, Crane 
Lorries and chassis, cameras and 
Wrist Watches. 	  
Export Restrictions	   Export controls on rice for food 
security reasons. Control on wood 
Raw material	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products and materials for 
environmental reasons and to prevent 
illegal exploitation. 	  
Standards	   Comply with TBT and SPS upon 
accession	  
Comply with TBT and SPS upon 
accession. Fully implemented by 
June 2003. 	  
Agriculture Subsidies	   ‘Amber box’ or supports that have 
direct impact on prices or quantities 
of 3.96 trillion dong in addition to the 
de minimus allowance to developing 
countries of up to 10% of the value of 
domestic agricultural production	  
Agreed to limit subsidies to 8.5% of 
the value of production and to 
eliminate all agricultural export 
subsidies upon the WTO entry.	  
Agreement on 
Subsidies and 
Countervailing 
Measures	  
Comply upon accession. Subsidies in 
the form of investment incentives 
contingent upon exports to be phased 
out over 5 years for existing 
beneficiaries.  	  
Comply upon accession. Subsidies in 
the form of investment incentives 
contingent upon exports to be phased 
out upon accession. 	  
TRIMS	   Comply upon accession. Preferential 
state credit and import tariffs 
contingent upon localisation ratios to 
be abolished	  
Comply upon accession. Removing 
the trade and foreign exchange 
balancing requirement, local content 
requirements, joint venture 
requirements etc.	  
TRIPS	   Comply upon accession	   Comply upon accession	  
Safeguard and Trade 
remedies	  
12 years for transition to be market 
economy. During this time, member 
countries can use price comparability 
to determine dumping or subsidies 
case of Vietnam imported goods. 	  
12 years for  
• product specific safeguard, 
allowing other members to 
limit imports if import of 
Chinese products cause market 
disruption 
• Textile is specifically added 
for this term of safeguard 
• Non-market economy by 
examining the price 
comparability in determining 
subsidies and dumping 
8 years for transitional review 
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mechanism to review China’s 
implementation of its WTO 
commitments.	  
Sources: Adapted from NCIEC, 2007 and Zhang, 2005 
 
i. Multilateral Commitments: 
 
Vietnam agreed to abide fully on the Article X of GATT 1994, Article III of 
GATS and other requirements on WTO’s policy transparency, including requirements 
for notice, comments and publicity. Upon the accession, Vietnam fully committed to 
leave 60 days for public comments on proposed laws and regulations under the WTO’s 
requirements. It also disclosed publicly all legal documents in Ministry and industry’s 
newspapers and websites. Laws and regulations relating to WTO obligations had to be 
applied uniformly throughout Vietnam's customs territory and other territories under its 
control. Independent and impartial tribunals review administrative acts including 
implementation of WTO commitments. Individuals, agencies and organisations have the 
right to lodge a complaint against administrative decisions issued by, or administrative 
actions taken by, a State administrative agency or a competent person of the State 
administrative agency (NCEIC, 2007). All these have been fundamental innovations in 
the legal system in Vietnam, which were major steps in the direction of the ‘rule of law’ 
(MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
Commitments on non-tariff barriers of Vietnam were equally bold in liberalising 
the trade regime. Vietnam reserved import bans on very few goods, basing these on the 
concern for social security, environment and health protection such as arms and 
ammunitions, explosive materials, toxic chemicals, used electronics, etc (MOIT, 2007; 
NCIEC, 2007). These bans fully complied with WTO regulations, and were based on 
scientific research. Under the WTO commitments there were several import bans. 
Import and export quotas have been eliminated upon accession, except in the case of 
four goods; sugar, eggs, tobacco leaf and salt, which are reserved for tariff-quotas 
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(MOIT, 2007).45 These industries are very important for a large rural population of 
Vietnam, which provides jobs and earning for them for many generations. Vietnam 
agreed to bring its customs valuation, non-preferential rules of origin, custom procedure 
and pre-shipment-inspection procedures into line with relevant WTO agreements from 
the date of accession. Vietnam adopted the WTO’s agreements on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) and on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS), also without transition 
periods as the current legal system and SPS measures do not contradict the SPS and 
TBT Agreements (MOIT, 2007). Vietnam also committed to apply fees and charges for 
public services under the WTO regulations, which reflected the right value of these 
services, such as custom fees and charges. 
 
Vietnam agreed to apply fully WTO’s regulation on SOEs operations upon the 
accession. SOEs would operate based purely on the market criteria. The State would not 
intervene directly or indirectly in SOEs operations, except when allowed by the WTO or 
by their role as shareowners in these SOEs. Vietnam agreed to submit its annual report 
on its equitisation progress to the WTO. Upon the accession, Vietnam allowed foreign 
enterprises and individuals to enjoy the same import and export rights as the 
Vietnamese enterprises and individuals, except several products under the State-trading 
list such as Petroleum, cigarettes, cigars, video, newspapers and magazines. Some other 
sensitive products such as rice and medicines were opened up to foreign enterprises and 
individuals after a transition period (NCIEC, 2007). 
 
Vietnam agreed to abolish all subsidies prohibited by the WTO’s regulations and 
committed to eliminate trade-distorted subsidies for agricultural products from the date 
of accession. Subsidies for poverty reduction, infrastructure building and agricultural 
encouragement under the green box are allowed (MOIT, 2007). 
 
                                                
45 The in-quota tariff rates for these 4 products are equal to the current MFN tariff (i.e. 40% for eggs, 25% 
for raw sugar, 40-50% for refined sugar, 30% for tobacco, 30% for cooking salt). Out-quota tariff rates 
are much higher. It committed to apply, allocate and manage tariff quotas in the manner of transparency, 
non-discrimination and in conformity with WTO rules (NCIEC, 2007). 
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As Vietnam’s domestic legal system on intellectual property right conforms to 
the corresponding regulations of TRIPS Agreement Vietnam adopted WTO’s TRIPS 
agreement in full without a transition period. Vietnam also issued several legal 
regulations to comply with the Berne Convention. Vietnam committed to applying 
WTO’s relevant agreements on antidumping, subsidy and countervailing measures, 
safeguard measures, and to inform the WTO on its countervailing and safeguard 
measures. (NCIEC, 2007) 
 
ii. Commitments on Opening the Market: 
 
Vietnam is committed to reducing the average tariff rate to 13.4%, which was a 
significant reduction from 23.32% in 1997(MOIT, 2007; WB, 2006). The most drastic 
tariff reductions were in garments and textiles, fish and fish products, wood and paper, 
other manufactured goods, electric and electronic machines and equipment (NCIEC 
2007). 
 
Vietnam participated fully in three sectoral liberalisation agreements (IT, textiles 
and garments, and medical equipment). It partially committed in agreements for aircraft 
equipment, chemicals, and building materials (MOIT, 2007).  
 
iii. Commitment in Services: 
 
The level of WTO commitments in services is the same as the level committed 
in the US BTA. These commitments are considered as strong with some breakthrough 
commitments in banking, telecommunication and stock exchange services. As a result, 
the service industries encountering heavy pressures for change. Vietnam allowed 
foreign companies to operate in service sectors and buy shares in Vietnamese 
companies (NCIEC, 2007). 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
During the last 25 years, the economic reforms of the Vietnam have achieved 
some admirable results. From being an exhausted and exceptionally aid-dependent 
country, Vietnam’s economy has maintained a high growth since 1990s. The structure 
of the economy has advanced with more macroeconomic stability over the last two 
decades. One of the features of the success was the quick integration of the Vietnam 
economy into the world. 
 
Although economists and investors consider Vietnam as an emerging market and 
a good example for economic transition, Vietnam has maintained a very different 
political regime to that found in most Western developed countries. It is still maintained 
the leading role of the CPV, exerting absolute power over political economic life.  
 
The CPV has adopted a ‘corporatist’ model and switched from giving direct 
commands to trying to form a consensus on strategic issues. It is also trying to include a 
wider representation of society in its decision making process. The reform in ownership 
has led to the rapid emergence of the new economic elite, the business community, 
although the CPV continues to perceive the SOEs sector as the leading sector for the 
Vietnam economy. The private sector and foreign sector have proved themselves more 
efficient and dynamic than the SOEs. 
 
The economic reform in Vietnam has owed much to the new policies of the 
Vietnam government. The leadership’s view on international relations was changed 
radically from the basis of ideology towards pragmatic interests, which has led to new 
views on the role of international economic cooperation. This change was clearly seen 
in the parallel development between the process of domestic reform and the process of 
economic integration of Vietnam. 
 
It is clear that the political system is itself in a period of crisis. A major power 
battle exists between the President, the Prime Minister and the General Secretary of the 
Party. Sections of the elite interest group are chiefly behind high ranking politicians. 
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SOE reform, development of the infrastructure and tackling the problems of debt, 
inflation and economic decline are chiefly secondary to the internal battle for political 
power. Even more concerning is that the true nature of the State is now seen as one of 
“the ethos of a rent-seeking state” creating barriers and “extract rents from society” 
(Vuving, 2013. p.325). As Vuving (2013, p.325) declares “Rent-seeking finds fertile 
ground in Vietnam, where the state owns all the land, controls the press, and is 
accountable to none but itself”. Vuving (2013) openly lays the blames Vietnam leaders, 
who he calls ‘the leading rent-seekers’ heading an interest group of elite politicians with 
large-scale business interests and growing wealth. Vuving (2013, p.326) reflects the 
thesis findings as he warns of a growing likelihood of a “severe political, economic and 
national security crisis”. The connection between the corruption of the banking sector, 
the Party and the SOEs is clearly pointed to as “the lion’s share of the bad debts”, and is 
a result of “corruption in the state-owned conglomerates, which received preferential 
treatment because of ideological bias and personal ties” (Vuving, 2013, p.328). An 
example is the hostile takeover of Sacombank (Vietnam’s largest private bank) by 
investors with vast business connections and even greater political power, who were 
able to perform what has officially been declared, “was not just hostile; it bordered on 
the criminal” (Vuving, 2013, p.329). This pattern of cross-shareholding, debts and 
corruption is discussed further in the case study on banking. Investigations revealed that 
the group behind the takeover was relatives of high-ranking political figures together 
with “ACB Bank owner Nguyen Duc Kien and millionaire businessman Tram Be, 
backed by an elite interest group who were attempting to control the entire financial-
economic system of the country” (Vuving, 2013, p.330). Both President Sang and 
Secretary Trong have warned that corruption is a ‘powerful trend’ threatening the 
‘demise of the party’ (Vuving, 2013, p.336). This thesis provides supporting evidence 
of the depth of corruption and rent-seeking within the Vietnam economy and illustrates 
how this has subverted much of the positive impacts of WTO accession and 
membership and created a system of non-compliance with both the word and the spirit 
of the commitments involved in entry to the WTO. 
 
In understanding the relationship between the commitments made by Vietnam 
and the WTO the important factor is to realise that the majority of Vietnamese official 
participants had a very simplistic understanding of the Agreements and its 
consequences. At present, recent interviews by the thesis author with active participants 
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in the forthcoming Tran-Pacific Partnership Agreement showed that there remains a 
problem with the capacity of Vietnam negotiators to fully understand the sophisticated 
and high level factors involved in an international agreement. The level of influence of 
this a decade ago was far higher and more influential. The WTO accession process was 
undertaken in an atmosphere of confusion and lack of knowledge that all interviewees 
for this thesis all reflected on (Chi Lan, interview, 2012; McGough, interview, 2012 
Thanh, interview, 2012, Thai, interview, 2012). Commitments were often made on the 
basis of hoping to later realise what they actually meant and knowledge of the 
consequences was often superficial at best. Few negotiators were actually of a capacity 
necessary for such a high level and complicated negotiation process, while this was 
further aggravated by some officials believing that commitments made internationally 
could soon be ‘got around’ domestically. Interviewees made numerous requests for ‘off 
the record’ comments and these usually focused on the internal lacks of capacities and 
understandings of elements in the Vietnam WTO negotiating team and the main 
decision-makers. Even more sensitive conversations were on comments that related to 
the very real influence of decision-makers who were clearly aware that some 
commitments would have to be ‘altered’ in actual domestic application. This was 
reflected in the growing strategy in the domestic regulatory environment for ‘making 
laws’ but not enforcing them. The WTO was to be no different, and the combination of 
not understanding and actually believing that accession commitments ‘application’ 
would be easily the same process of regulation without enforcement provided a leeway 
for ‘signing up’ in an atmosphere of back room confusion, lack of knowledge and a firm 
belief of many that ‘commitments’ was a fluid and non-biding concept.    
 
This overview of the political system and WTO accession of Vietnam helps set a 
background for the analysis of the impacts of WTO accession on the domestic economic 
reform of Vietnam in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 IMPACT OF THE WTO ACCESSION PROCESS 
ON VIETNAM’S ECONOMIC REFORM PROCESS 
 
Twenty years of economic reform have brought remarkable changes to the 
Vietnamese economy and socio-economic life in Vietnam. Reforms have gradually 
transformed it into a dynamic market economy with high levels of international 
economic integration. The CPV is leading the economic reforms but fears the loss of 
their monopoly on political power. The reform process is similar to China’s, where 
economic reform has not meant political reform. Vietnam has pursued “economic 
reforms with a socialist orientation’ and sought to establish an economic model with 
market economy principles but, retain the role of the Communist Party and the State 
sector. 
 
Reform has been cautious and gradual. Reform helped economic development 
but also created unhealthy competition and social problems, with corruption severely 
harming economic growth and the business environment. Despite economic growth, the 
sustainability of this development is threatened by the rampant corruption and the lack 
of long-term thinking and planning. This chapter will look at the evidence of this and 
provide a clear indication of the need for alternative policies, before the collapse of all 
the benefits of the WTO process of entry and membership, and the possible return of 
Vietnam to poverty and economic disaster. 
 
Reforms were undertaken in parallel with the accelerated efforts for WTO 
accession. WTO accession and Vietnam reforms provided economic opportunities 
through international market access, helped in adopting international rules and standards 
on trade and investment and improved FDI. Accession was essential to the growth of 
the Vietnam economy, boosting economic growth and accelerating reforms using WTO 
rules and regulations to resist conservative opposition to reforms (Painter, 2003). 
 
The basis was the movement from a controlled economy to a free market model 
while retaining a communist political system and one Party rule, but was beset by 
problems and barriers to reform created by conservative elements and those such as 
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SOE managers who feared that change would bring only negative results for their own 
situation. The basic fear was that economic liberalism would eventually mean the end of 
the communist rule and ideology in Vietnam, while many supporters of this resistance 
to political change found significant support from various interest groups facing new 
demands in an inevitably far more competitive economy under a free market system. 
The WTO provided the means to accelerate and re-enforce change, while also 
presenting a central focal point upon which both conservatives and reformers could 
contest the battle for control of the economy and the ideology under which it would be 
managed. 
 
Reformers were not driven by any desire for ending communist rule, as both 
conservatives and reformers generally believed that a free market economy in a one-
Party communist system was both feasible and necessary. Many reformers were 
committed to a strengthening of Communist rule through economic prosperity brought 
about by closer inclusion into the global economy and adoption of economic 
liberalisation, and were convinced that the two different political and economic 
ideologies would become interdependent and complementary, with the Communist 
Party rule growing more secure under the clear benefits of increased trade, profits and 
opportunities brought about by economic transition. 
 
The chapter describes the reasons for ending the centrally planned economy, 
focuses on the reforms implemented by the Party and examines how the WTO accession 
provided incentives and tools for reformers to conduct further reforms.  
 
4.1 Pre-reform period (before 1986) 
 
In the 1940s, Vietnam was a poor, agriculturally based and under-developed 
economy, built for exploitation rather than development by the French after a century of 
colonisation (Le and Liu, 2006). After defeating the French, the country was divided 
into two parts, the North and the South. In the North, the Soviet-style centrally planned 
economy was adopted since the 1950s, with the State having the supreme role in the 
economy, strictly controlling output targets, allocating resources to production units, 
and taking care of the distribution of products to consumers and other production units 
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(Fforde and Vylder, 1996; Le and Liu, 2006). In the South, the economy was built on 
the market economy model but dependent on massive US aid (Le and Liu, 2006). 
 
From 1975, the command economy was extended over the entire country (Riedel 
and Turley, 1999; Pike, 1977). It soon suffered with increasingly serious sectoral and 
investment imbalances due to its inefficient resources allocation planning. Beresford 
(1989, p.185) suggested that “resources were chiefly allocated to SOEs with heavy 
industrial capacity, long lead times and little practical use for the society”. New SOEs 
saw low productivity combined with shortages of inputs. As a result, the industrial 
sector never met the arbitrary government targets (Beresford, 1989; Phong, 2009). 
Farmers were grouped in collectives with specific targets and resource allocations and 
the workers were paid for their labour regardless of their productivity. Rationing and the 
distribution mechanism led to a ‘shared poverty’ problem, with a failure to create 
adequate incentives for individuals to increase productivity (Beresford, 1997; Phong, 
2009). Production SOEs and collectives stagnated through a lack of incentives and 
efficiency. This led to the chronic disequilibrium between supply and demand (Phong, 
2009). 
 
By the end of 1970s, Vietnam was facing a ‘major economic crisis’ with acute 
shortages of both foods and basic consumer goods for consumption and inputs to 
productions (Le and Liu, 2006).46 The government imported hundreds of thousands of 
tons of foods to meet the domestic demand (Le and Liu, 2006). The economy was 
entirely dependent on foreign aid and built up large foreign debts as the foreign grant 
loan averaged 63.2% of the non-military state budget. All demand depended on the 
government supply mechanisms (Phong, 2009; McWilliams, 1983). 
 
Hardship induced the local governments to secretly undertake spontaneous 
production activities outside the central government plans (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Local governments made contracts with farmer’s households for rice production, in 
                                                
46 Annual economic growth of Vietnam averaged only 0.4% in late 1970s, while population increased by 
about 2.3% annually (Phong, 2009). Agricultural production showed low growth rates (0.6%) due to the 
bias in investment to heavy industries. The Yearly agricultural output was below subsistence levels. 
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which they were provided certain inputs for the production process in exchange for 
fixed levels of output. The excess output was free for farmers to use at their own 
discretion (Le and Liu, 2006). These contracts were prohibited under the central 
government. However, the practices expanded rapidly over the country due to its ability 
to produce some extra food for households (Le and Liu, 2006). 
 
Economic shortages convinced the CPV to issue Directive 100, approving 
experiments in the contract mechanism in some regions (Phong, 2009). Although not 
publicly announced, many local governments immediately applied it (Phong, 2009; Le 
and Liu, 2006). Each farmer was required to provide the State a quota of grain in the 
form of rent, but any grain produced on the land beyond the established quota could be 
consumed or sold on the free market (Duiker, 1995). This concept was also then applied 
to the industrial sectors in urban areas (Phong, 2009; Le and Liu, 2006). The ‘Three-
Plan System’ confirmed that enterprises could perform additional activities after 
completing planned targets. The priority of SOEs was State planned targets. Second was 
the production and free disposal of the SOEs main products after completing the First 
Plan. The ‘Third Plan’ was the production of products that resulted from the factory’s 
own attempts at diversification (Fforde and Vylder, 1996; Le and Liu, 2006). The 
command economy gradually decentralised to cope with its own shortage of production 
and became known as ‘reform from below’ (Fforde and Vylder, 1996; Webster and 
Taussig, 1999; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Phong, 2009).  
 
Increasing problems in the centrally planned mechanism diverted even more 
scarce resources out of the main economy production units, the SOEs. Increased input 
prices due to the differences between official and free-market prices were further 
putting inefficient SOEs operation into more difficult situations (Phong, 2009). The 
government had to finance them more heavily and imported more inputs for production, 
but had no other choice than printing more money and inflation increased (Ninh, 2003). 
Conservatives called for tough actions on the economic relaxation (Beresford, 1997). 
From 1985, the Government attempted to restore stability by increasing wages, 
adjusting official prices and introduced a new dong. These measures were to retain 
operation of the central command economy, but only worsened the situation, causing 
hyper-inflation and economic decline (Fforde and Vylder, 1996; Le, 1996; Phong, 
2009). 
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The leaders had no intention of turning away from a socialist path and feared 
that the growth of the private sector threatened the socialist system (Chanda, 1984; 
Duiker, 1986). A struggle continued between economic reform and ideological purity. 
This led to several campaigns against illegal economic activities and corrupt cadre 
(Chanda, 1984). Policy reform continued to only progress slowly and sufficient only for 
food self-sufficiency (Phong, 2009; Duiker, 1986). Reforms were blamed for the 
negative economic situation and were criticised for deviation from socialism (Phong, 
2009). The fear was it was a ‘Trojan Horse’ to sabotage and defeat socialism in 
Vietnam. 
 
Mounting economic problems with hyperinflation, low levels of development, 
and large budget deficits and foreign debts were the prominent features of the economic 
situation in the first half of the 1980s.47 The economic difficulties let to range of social 
maladies, which created a sense of pessimism and cynicism about the Party and the 
Government (Duiker, 1986). The centrally command economy was failing and negative 
economic planning caused the spread of fence breaking activities in the Provinces 
(Phong, 2009). There was little choice but to turn to new ways to avoid the collapse of 
the economy. 
 
4.2 Economic reform process in Vietnam since 1986 to 2006 
 
The failure of the partial reforms to save the collapsing central economy left 
bold imprints on the CPV leadership and shaped their experience and awareness of the 
potential of the market economy and the limitations of the central economy. Chi Lan 
(interview, 2012) said “economic crisis threatened the collapse of the system, and the 
CPV had little choice in making decisions on economic policy development, pushing 
ahead a more comprehensive economic reform. They abandoned the command 
                                                
47 The annual rate of inflation reached 500% in 1985. The GDP was at very low rate and the value of 
exports was considerably less than half the total value of imports, which led to the huge budget deficit. 
The total foreign debts were already equivalent to the annual GDP (Mallon, 1999). 
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economy system after many attempts to save it”. The reform process accelerated, but 
was now portrayed as a delicate compromise between hardliners and pragmatic 
elements within the Party leadership (Duiker, 1986). Beresford (1997) argued that 
Vietnamese leaders have behaved much like politicians elsewhere and that their power 
is contingent upon building coalitions of interest which provide support for particular 
sets of policies. Reforms were in a stop and start manner. 
 
A broad thrust of the economic reform was officially adopted by the 6th Party 
Congress in December 1986. The CPV agreed to abolish the system of bureaucratic 
centralised management based on State subsidies and moved to a market oriented 
economy (Le and Liu, 2006). Like the Chinese approach, the CPV had undertaken the 
economic reforms while averting from political reforms. The Party were still holding 
the sole power to run the country while leading the economic reform process. The Doi 
Moi policy was predicated on the change of the thoughts on the way and route to the 
socialism, which accepted a transition period for building market forces and a market 
economy to accelerate industrialisation and modernisation (Le and Lui, 2006). As a 
result, a controlled market economy, later called a market economy with socialist 
orientation, was promoted by the Party. “It is an economy with various ownership types 
and multi economic sectors, in which the state economic sector plays a leading role. The 
state sector together with the cooperative sector set the firm foundation for the national 
economy” (CPV, 2006, p.26). Reforms have taken place in a gradual mode, and 
concentrated on social and political stability. Although, reforms first started in 1986, 
they were still considered by many international economists as shock therapy, as the 
reform programs were quickly applied to transform the central command economy to 
the market economy. The economic reform process has focused on major issues as 
follows (Le and Liu, 2006): 
• Reforms on multi ownership types and economic sectors 
• Reforms on market economy institution and management 
• Openness and international integration 
• Industrialisation and Modernisation 
• Rural reforms 
• SOEs reforms 
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The reforms process from 1986 was divided into 2 major stages. The first stage 
of reform was generally from 1986 to 2002, when Vietnam gradually achieved macro-
economic stabilisation and set up the basic foundations for the market economy. The 
second stage of reform started since 2002, when Vietnam actively participated in 
international economic agreements to assist its structural reforms.  
 
4.2.1 First stage of reform (1986-1995) 
 
In the 6th Party Congress (1986) the CPV agreed to abolish the system of 
bureaucratic centralised management based on State subsidies and moved to a market 
oriented economy, with the Party focused on reducing macroeconomic instability and 
accelerating economic growth (Le and Liu, 2006; Chi Lan, interview, 2012). 
 
The reasons for decisive reforms were the pressure of the economic crisis and 
changes in the external environment. Economic crisis, with low growth, low 
productivity, and huge budget deficits, exhausted the economy, and failed to provide 
enough consumption goods and foods. The Vietnamese economy was totally dependent 
on foreign aid from the Soviet Union (Phong, 2009; Le and Liu, 2006).48 Thai 
(interview, 2012) said “the changing international environment critically impacted on 
Vietnamese leaders in this difficult time”. 
                                                
48 Soviet’s aid not only provided the full military support for Vietnam’s operations in Cambodia, but was 
also the largest donor of economic aid and biggest trading partners. In 1979, the figure for military aid 
was almost US$1.4 billion and increased to US$1.7 billion annually in the 1982-1985 period (Cima, 
1987). Soviet non-military economic aid in 1978, estimated at between US$0.7 and US$1.0 billion, was 
already higher than Western assistance. By 1982 it had increased to more than 1 billion annually, close to 
US$3 million per day (Cima, 1987). During the 1981-85, the Soviets provided some US$5.4 billion in 
balance-of-payments aid, project assistance, and oil price subsidies (Cima, 1989). By 1983 they were 
supplying 90 percent of Vietnam's petroleum, iron and steel, fertilizer, and cotton imports and 70 percent 
of its grain imports. The Soviets was also the major supplier of food and commodity aid on a mostly 
grant-aid or soft currency basis (Cima, 1989). Total economic aid for 1986 was an estimated US$1.8 
billion. Since 1982, the foreign grant loan averaged more than 63.2% of the non-military state budget of 
Vietnam’s government (McWilliam, 1983). 
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Phong (2009) suggests an important factor was the changes to Communist 
ideology and the political balance toward reforms. Before the 6th Congress, the General 
Secretary Le Duan died, and had been most influential leader of the Party (since 1953) 
and the main architect of the collective economic model for the North before 1975 
(Phong, 2009). His ideological arguments for building socialism in Vietnam was 
imprinted on every economic vision and policy of the Vietnam economy from 1960 to 
1986, and resistance to economic reform and the market concept was at its height 
(Phong, 2009). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) noted “the market economy concept raised 
increasing attention and debate in the meetings of the CPV since 1984 and gained 
supported from many local leaders and the SOEs from the South”. Le Duan’s death 
opened the way to technocrats and economic specialists to challenge orthodox 
ideologues (Esterline, 1988). 
 
Truong Chinh, (The President) was appointed to be the transitional General 
Secretary. Chinh was considered a conservative (Phong, 2009). He voiced doubts about 
the command economy and problems at the central level and appointed personnel and 
an agenda for discussion on the market economy (Phong, 2009). He replaced the 
previous think-tank for analysing the economic situation and travelled widely to regions 
to find out the truth of the socio-economic situation in Vietnam. His prestige and respect 
as the General Secretary encouraged progressive CPV members to speak up and discuss 
the real situation. New ideas to overcome the old-fashioned and obsolete ways found 
Chinh as their advocate (Phong, 2009). 
 
The Congress declared policies based on principles of the market economy, such 
as recognition of the multi-sector economy and the appropriate use of money-goods 
relationships, The Party declared “look at the truth, respect the truth and speak the truth, 
on the path to the socialism” (Phong, 2009). Many Party members still had concerns 
about these new ideas and saw them as dramatic deviations from the old ideology. 
However, Truong Chinh was able to protect and explain the ideas in the Politburo and 
the Central Committee (Phong, 2009). 
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The Congress adopted the policy for economic development of Vietnam and the 
direction and target for socio-economic development prepared by Truong Chinh was 
adopted unanimously (Phong, 2009). Reports focused on three major issues: 
1. Accelerate agricultural production, putting a high priority on consumer 
goods production;  
2. Recognise the multi-sector economy; and 
3. Increase exports and open up foreign policies (Phong, 2009). 
 
There were substantial changes in the structures of the Party Membership and it 
reverted to a younger generation, with less experience of revolutionary activity and less 
investment in the ideology (Beresford, 1997). The revolutionary generation, such as 
Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Le Duc Tho, all retired from their offices, but still 
played important roles as mentors (Esterline, 1988). But the leadership selection process 
still showed a struggle between the pragmatist and the conservatives (Phong, 2009; 
Cima, 1989; Esterline, 1988). 
 
The National Election and the Assembly Congress were both organised late and 
indicated that there was a struggle between the pragmatists and the conservatives for the 
positions in the Party and the Government (Esterliner, 1988). This was further supported 
by the Foreign Minister Thach’s remark that much debate occurred prior to the 
convening of these two events due to the ‘different opinions’ (Esterliner, 1988). A 
reformer, Nguyen Van Linh was appointed to head the CPV. The previous leaderships, 
with strong views of socialism and the central command economy, still retained their 
positions and played roles in smoothening the period of transition. These included Pham 
Hung as Chairman of Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) at the age of 75 and Vo Chi 
Cong as President of the State Council at age 74. Although part of the ‘old guard’ 
pragmatism prevailed and they supported the movement towards a free market 
economy. Most were reformers and the younger generation, including the chief 
economic planner, Vo Van Kiet and the Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach 
(Esterliner, 1988). 
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The reform programme was launched with concrete policies in 1986. General 
Secretary, Nguyen Van Linh, introduced market pricing and abolition of the command 
economy. He initiated and supported open debates on development paths and solutions, 
a move that demonstrated a firm break with the traditional CPV methods (Phong, 2009). 
The first reform was the liberalisation of the ownership in economy practices. Decree 
27-HDBT, on the private sector, and Decree 29-HDBT on the household sector in 1988, 
were issued to restore the concept of private ownership in the economy (Phong, 2009). 
Following the recognition of the private sector, the CPV also issued a resolution on 
measures to reform the circulation of goods and their distribution. The dual track price 
and circulation blockages were abolished completely. Subsidies in the price system 
were abolished and new administrative measures in economic management introduced 
(Phong, 2009; Masina, 2006; Le and Liu, 2006). 
 
The government implemented a series of price reform measures, which were 
considered as a strong ‘orthodox’ to end the central command economy (Phong, 2009). 
The rationing system was abolished for almost all commodities, which raised the 
official prices of non-essential goods to a level close to free market prices. Consumer 
goods sold at state outlets were sold at prices very close to the free market level and 
were frequently adjusted to keep pace with free market prices (Arkadie and Mallon, 
2003; Phong, 2009; Esterline, 1988). Price reforms ended the dual-track economy 
(Phong, 2009). By 1990, commodity prices were largely market determined and direct 
subsidies in pricing of commodities had been eliminated (Le and Liu, 2006).  
 
Parallel with the price reform, the government paid attention to macroeconomic 
stability by strict control of the budget and tax reform (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Le 
and Liu, 2006). Strict fiscal policies involved expenditure cuts, while direct subsidies to 
the SOEs and the government’s expenditure in defence and food subsidy programs were 
reduced (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Masina, 2006). The fiscal base was strengthened 
by tax and fiscal institutional reform. By late 1980s, the National Tax Collection Office 
and the National Treasury system were established (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The 
Tax base was broadened and included the introduction of new profit and turnover taxes 
and income tax. 
 
 139 
The banking system was reformed to support the tight monetary policy and to 
build a healthy market economy (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). Under central planning, 
resources were allocated directly through the plan, so the bank role was minimised to 
being a component of the state accounting system. The banking system was reformed to 
create a two-tier banking system with a clear division between the central bank and 
commercial banks (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Le and Liu, 2006). 
 
The price reforms and tight monetary policies consequently affected those 
segments ill adapted to respond to the new system, especially the SOEs (Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003). In 1987, the Government introduced Decision 217-HDBT, setting SOEs 
free to manage their own business (Phong, 2009). Enterprises gained the freedom to 
recruit workers and to acquire and dispose of resources that were outside the constraints 
imposed by the Government Plan (Fforde and Vylder, 1996). SOEs had only two 
Government targets, volume and budget contributions. Later, commercial banks started 
to lend money to SOEs on a market basis, thereby reducing state subsidies to SOEs. 
High interest rates placed strong financial pressure on the SOEs, which forced them to 
liquidate their inventories and reform (Masina, 2006; Phong, 2009). From 1990 to 1994, 
many SOEs pursued rapid liquidation and sought to merge, especially non-viable 
enterprises.49 
 
There was the creation of new market institutions, including the legal framework 
for business that defined the accepted forms of ownership and business organisation (Le 
and Liu, 2006; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). Several regulations on ownership and 
business organisation were ratified in 1998, and recognised the freedom of citizens to 
engage in private economic activities. Together with the recognition of the private 
sector, the legal system for administration was also developed, and led to the 
introduction of a range of new important laws for the market economy. 
                                                
49 The number of SOEs reduced from 12,000 in 1988 to 6,000 in 1992 (IMF, 1995). The total 
employment in State enterprises fell from 2.7 million in 1988 to 1.7 million in 1993 (Schwarz, 1995). Net 
transfers from SOEs to the budget increased from zero in 1988 to 12 per cent of GDP in 1994; net credit 
flows from Commercial Banks to SOEs fell from 9 per cent of GDP in 1998 to about 2 per cent in 1993-
1994 (IMF, 1995; 1998).
 140 
 
The first reform was in the adjustment of the exchange rate towards the market 
price. The exchange rate for imports was kept at a very low rate compared to the market 
rate, in order to provide low price machines and inputs for domestic production 
processes (Phong, 2009). The Government subsidised the exchange rate with one billion 
USD and the Vietnam Dong was gradually devalued to match its real market price. The 
trade policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas, and licenses were introduced (Auffret, 
2003). The Law on Import and Export Duties (1988) introduced the present trade tax 
system based on the Harmonised System of tariff nomenclature. Along with tariff 
reform, the government gradually removed the quotas and administrative barriers, 
which were left by the central planning system (Auffret, 2003; Athukorala, 2005). 
Custom reform commenced with the Ordinance on Customs (1998) and aimed at 
reduction of the number of required supporting documents for custom clearance. 
Procedural simplification reduced customs clearance times (Le and Liu, 2006). Reform 
in this area started with increasing trading entities outside the state’s system. Private 
companies newly established under the New Privates Enterprises Law and Law on 
Companies in 1990 were allowed to engage in export-import activities. These 
companies basically broke the monopolies of SOEs in international trade (Athukorala, 
2005; Thai, 2005; Riedel and Comer, 1997).50 
 
Foreign investment was encouraged with the enactment of the Foreign 
Investment Law (1987). Investment laws were very liberal compared with South East 
Asia standards (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). It allowed foreign ownership, tax holidays, 
and concessions to invest in priority areas. It was subsequently amended in 1990 and 
1992 to adapt better to the development of the issues, and went further than most other 
developing countries (Le and Liu, 2006). 
 
The first years of reform were challenging for the reformers because of the 
negative response of the economy to the ‘shock’ therapy of the reforms (Phong, 2009; 
Masina, 2006). Price escalation across the board and competition due to the 
                                                
50The number of enterprise allowed to engage in direct foreign trade increased from around 300 in 1991 
to nearly 500 in 1992, including six private firms (Hiebert, 1992). 
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marketisation process not only put 60% of SOEs onto the edge of bankruptcy, 500,000 
into unemployment, and piles of unsold inventory, but also the life of ordinary people 
became difficult. As a result, the pressure and criticism to roll back reforms heightened 
(Phong, 2009). However, the economic crisis still left the Vietnamese leaders with little 
choice but reform (Chi Lan, interview, 2012; Pike, 1992). The international 
environment also pointed to a need to accelerate the economic reform. The collapse of 
Eastern European Communist countries in 1989, and later the Soviet Union, 
strengthened the determination of the leadership to reform (Phong, 2009).  
 
Since 1990, hyper-inflation was reduced to single digits and macroeconomic 
stabilisation was achieved together with the fast economic growth (Arkadie and Mallon, 
2003). From 1987-1996, the GDP growth was an average 7.3%, increasing to over 9% 
in 1995 and 1996 (Masina, 2006). The macroeconomic stabilisation and growth 
gradually brought the Vietnam economy into the world economy.51 Openness to trade 
was accompanied by openness to foreign investment. FDI became an important stimulus 
to growth, accounting for up to 28% of the total investment expenditure in the country 
in 1996 (Masina, 2006). By 1994, the first stage of economic reform was over and 
successfully achieved the goals of macroeconomic stabilisation and high economic 
growth. The reforms were not without pain and the negative consequences, such as 
higher unemployment, which strengthened the conservative’s resistance to change and 
brought about a period of relative stagnation. 
 
4.2.2 Slow reform (1996-2001) 
 
From 1996 to 2000 the Vietnamese economy slowed down with a lower GDP 
growth rate, deflation, and a sharp reduction in domestic and foreign investments 
(Pham, 1999). The economic slowdown was due to the regional financial crisis that hit 
most of the economies in Southeast Asia and to the standstill in further economic 
reform and the inward-oriented development strategy since 1995 (Athukorala, 2005; 
                                                
51 Exports growth went on an explosive path of 23% in 6 years to 1994, far more rapidly than GDP, and 
as a result the proportion of total output exported has increased dramatically from 46% of GDP in 1989 to 
97% in 1996 (Masina, 2006). 
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Masina, 2006; Kokko, 1998). Economists and investors called attention to several 
problems in the economic policies of Vietnam, and focused on the import-substitution 
policies and the Government reliance on the SOEs as the main vehicle for realising 
reform and economic development, as well as a lack of business transparency and 
stability in the economic management institutions (Masina, 2006). Vietnam targeted the 
development of capital-intensive industries and using trade and investment policies and 
SOEs to promote these industries with the aim of rapid industrialisation (Martin, 2001). 
 
Table 4.1: Nominal rate and effective rate of protection in 1997 and 2001. 
 1997 2001 
Vietnam Nominal 
Rate of 
Protection 
Effective 
Rate of 
Protection 
Nominal 
Rate of 
Protection 
Effective 
Rate of 
Protection 
Agriculture 8.12 7.74 6.28 7.43 
Mining 9.42 6.05 8.91 16.39 
Manufacturing 30.63 121.47 25.28 95.97 
Total traded-goods 20.95 72.22 17.92 58.46 
Overall Simple 
Average 
23.32 59.54 20.14 54.1 
Source: Athukorala (2005) 
 
Foreign observers sensed that the reform process was losing momentum and 
direction was becoming uncertain; a common phenomenon in the reform process of 
many countries after a crisis ends (Krueger, 1993; Bates and Kruger, 1993; Haggard and 
Webb 1994). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) said “serious economic crisis pressed the 
leaders into converging the will and sharing the common need for an alternative way or 
solution to overcome the difficulties”. As a result, when the economy overcame the 
difficulties, the motivation for further reforms declined. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) noted 
“the motivation for the reform was started from the pragmatic thinking of finding a 
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solution for the crisis rather than from absolute change in their economic and political 
ideology”. Thai (interview, 2012) commented on this period with “high growth rates 
and large flows of FDI and ODA deflated the sense of urgency for implementing 
sensitive reform measures”. The Vietnamese economy showed rapid economic progress 
growth since 1992.52 
 
‘Shock therapy’ for the economic reform also created losers, who then 
collectively organised to pressurise the government into slower reforms. Since 1992, the 
Government restructured SOEs by allowing more autonomy and cutting subsidies. 
SOEs faced new challenging operating conditions, where they were now responsible for 
capital management and outputs and faced increasing competition from the private 
sector (Tuan, 2006). A legal framework for protecting private investment was 
established and the private sector expanded from a mere 414 firms in 1991 to 39,180 in 
1998 (Tai, 2006). The open policy provided a better environment for the flow of 
imported goods into the market (Le and Liu, 2006). This placed further competitive 
forces upon the old-fashioned and inefficient SOEs. The market was flooded with cheap 
and smuggled goods from across the Chinese border following normalisation of the 
relationship between China and Vietnam in 1991. All these pressures became too much 
for inefficient and obsolete SOEs, and resistance against reform declined. 
 
Opposition also came from the newly unemployed as SOEs were restructured 
and employment in them was significantly downsized in the early 1990s (Le and Liu, 
2006; Mekong Economics, 2002).  Nearly one million workers were laid off from 1988 
to 1994 (Riedel and Turley, 1999; Mekong Economics, 2002). Reforms led to rapid 
industrialisation of agriculture and lands were easily confiscated to convert into 
industrial sites, without any master plan and adequate compensation. Farmers lost their 
main possession, land, and left rural areas to find work in the cities, putting even greater 
pressure on jobs and social stability (Son, 2008). 
                                                
52 GDP grew by an average of 8.2% since 1991, and reached 9.5% in 1995 (Womack, 1996). Total 
cumulative total of approved licenses for foreign investment rose to 16 billion USD in July 1995, while 
Aid increased steadily since 1993 with an average of 2 billion USD every year (Womack, 1996). Inflation 
was kept under 10% since 1993 after years of hyper-inflation (Bui, 2008, Womack, 1996). 
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The reforms also increased the tensions between the central and local 
government. Most of the SOEs liquidated and privatised were in the provinces. The 
central government further centralised the economic resources allocation process, and 
thus, limited the power of the provincial governments. Uneven distribution of the 
resources and development aid remained a problem. The new ‘losers’ in the reform 
process were populous provinces facing unfair distribution of resources and their 
protests caused the Party to question its own ability to remain in control (Womack, 
1996). 
 
The newly established multi-sector economy was expanding rapidly with more 
complicated economic relations, which also exposed some negatives aspects of the 
market economy. Due to the inadequate legal and economic institutions, the 
Government feared losing control of Vietnam’s economic and political development, 
Weak and inadequate development of institutions was opening the door to rampant 
levels of corruption (Sidel, 1998; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). In the face of unbridled 
corruption, social unrest peaked with mass protests (Sidel, 1999; Masina, 2006). 
 
The bureaucratic and authoritarian way of thinking, as well as the continued 
belief in the communist ideology was still deeply imprinted into the minds of 
government officials and the leaders. The development of a private sector and SOEs 
privatisation was still of extreme concern to many conservatives, and perceived as a 
direct threat to communism (Phong 2009, Le and Liu, 2006; Masina, 2006; Pike, 1992). 
The concerns of the conservatives were aggravated by the negative attitudes towards the 
free market economy resulting from the catastrophic impact of the Asian financial 
crisis. Thai (interview, 2012) revealed that “the Party was really concerned by failures 
of these countries [Other Asian countries affected by the Crisis] and influenced that this 
model could lead to the wrong direction and the collapse of the economy”. 
Conservatives were worried about the deviation from socialism and the growing 
instability of the society and the economy. These negative effects of the market 
economy reforms provided the ideal environment for strengthening the voice of the 
conservatives. They were particularly concerned for the maintenance of the leading role 
of the CPV (Masina, 2006). The CPV and the Government reformers were forced to 
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cede power to the conservatives and the scope and pace of reform suffered. Policies 
were introduced that demonstrated this negative approach to reform. 
 
The trade regime still accommodated many distorted incentives provided by the 
complex, non-transparent, and high restrictive practices. Government employed many 
instruments to impede imports, including formal tariffs, the use of reference prices in 
customs administration, excise taxes and surcharges levied only on imports, formal 
quotas, other quantitative restrictions, import licenses, and foreign exchange controls, 
which greatly reduced the transparency of the regime (Kokko, 1997). 
 
Apart from the biased tariffs against the export sector, a full set of NTBs could 
be found in Vietnam: specialised licensing for certain goods, certain customs 
surcharges, special sales taxes, minimum pricing at customs, anti-dumping and counter-
veiling duties, foreign exchange allocation restrictions, export bans and controls and tax 
stamps of cleared goods. These restrictions cover around 40 per cent of imports, but, if 
the effect of other less transparent NTBs were considered, the overall impact would be 
much higher (CIE, 1999). The quotas were introduced in 1994, and played an important 
role in the trade barriers of the Vietnam’s trade policy (Thanh, 2005). Formal licensing 
procedures, administrative rigidities and delays in the Customs administration also 
played important non-tariff barriers. Delayed and strict requirements on clearing 
Custom procedures often increased costs and time, which clearly discouraged the 
international trade activities. 
 
A number of key problems and constraints in SOE reform remained. Most SOEs 
were operating inefficiently and with weak and poor performances due to obsolete 
technology, weak incentive structures and poor management practices. Many were 
forced to borrow capital, creating a significant financial burden. Most of this capital was 
provided under the preferential scheme through SOE Bank or financial services.53 SOEs 
and its foreign joint venture partners were not the economically important, but closely 
connected with various levels of political decision-making. Empowered by their 
                                                
53 The IMF (2002) estimated that 45% of total credit in 2000, which was down from 54% in 1996, was 
still channelled to SOEs under State Owned Banks schemes. 
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economic and social importance, they were in a position to use their political influence 
to oppose trade liberalisation and other reforms that would reduce their privileges. In 
addition, they could influence future policy decisions through their own investment 
behaviour. There was limited progress in the liquidation of non-viable SOEs, due to a 
cumbersome legal framework and procedures for liquidation that made it difficult to 
enforce creditor rights and for the authorities to declare bankruptcies. The pace of 
equitisation was slowly constrained by factors including: a cumbersome administrative 
process; non-suitability of some SOEs to equitisation given that they were not 
commercially viable enterprises; too small sizes of some SOEs to operate under a joint 
stock management structure; difficulties in the valuation process and resolution of 
enterprise debts and resistance of vested interests, including controlling agencies, SOE 
managers, and the SOE workers who feared loss of control, revenues, and jobs.54 Poor 
accounting and auditing standards made the scrutiny of many enterprises’ financial 
performance difficult, further discouraging potential investors (Arkadie and Mallon, 
2003; IMF, 2005). 
 
In 1998 the Government issued a new decree further instructing the process and 
requirements, which helped to accelerate the process (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The 
fundamental factor in the limited scope and slow pace of SOE reforms related to the 
continued commitments of government to the role of the state in the economy, and their 
consistent aim of maintaining a significant role for SOEs (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; 
IMF, 2005). 
 
 The financial sector was largely dominated by the SOEs Commercial Banks 
(SOCBs). The four biggest SOCBs accounted for 82% of total bank assets and 80% of 
loans and deposits (IMF, 1999). The Central Bank made public estimations in which 
non-performing loans (NPLs) were 14.5% in 2000 of the total lending, while other state 
publications reported an estimate that it could be as high as 28% (WB, 2000; Masina, 
2006). This high level of NPLs was the result of political interference, as the 
Government continued commitments to support the SOEs and the four large SOCBs 
were forced to comply (Masina, 2006). The loans often lacked sufficient collateral or 
                                                
54 A more politically correct expression for privatisation, with equities sold to employees and employers. 
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credible evidence that the debtor could service the loan. This problem with the lending 
to SOEs, together with the lack of investment evaluation tools, caused banks to have 
little room for lending to the private sector and the collateral requirements were 
extremely restrictive. SOEs were assured that the Government would not default on its 
obligation, and felt immune from the forces of the economy, particularly in long term 
investment and planning, financing human resource training or any other area of 
development that required capitalisation in the short-term. These loans were little more 
than back door subsidies to inefficient and unproductive SOEs, while denying that 
investment to the growing and mostly productive private sector companies (Hakkala et 
al, 2001). 
 
The development of the private sector was disappointing and stunted by the 
complex regulatory environment and the competition from SOEs benefiting from 
political contacts and privileged access to capital, land and other resources. The GDP 
share of the domestic private sector, excluding farmers and informal household 
enterprises, reached only 7.5% in 1995, while the modern private sector consisting of 
limited liability companies and shareholding companies, accounted for at most 1% of 
GDP (Webster, 1999. Hakkala et al, 2001). 
 
 Public administration reforms were needed in order to manage reforms in other 
sectors. Vietnam undertook a number of changes of its legal system and legislation but, 
the institutional reforms undertaken were still far from sufficient. The business 
environment suffered from excessive regulation, red tape, widespread corruption and 
non-transparency. A number of problems were obstacles to building the concept of rule 
of law in the Vietnam economy. A lack of clear boundaries between the substantive 
areas of different government agencies as well as legislative or quasi-legislative powers 
of local executives and jurisdictional bodies, allowed different agencies to make 
regulations pertaining to the same substantive areas. This resulted in overlaps and 
inconsistencies, non-uniform application of legal provisions, and fragmentation of 
administrative powers (Rose, 1998;Dinh, 2000; Hoang et al, 2000). Excessive 
regulations and cumbersome administrative procedures lead to opportunities for abuse 
of power and corruption of state officials. Faulty and opaque implementation of 
legislation and inefficient supervision and investigation of violations of law negatively 
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affected the respect for individuals’ lawful rights and their effective exercise of rights to 
complain and obtain judicial reviews. 
 
The lack of an efficient and well supported legal framework meant that many 
government officials were finding the lucrative offer of ‘back-hander’s’ and corrupt 
payments to by-pass the system more attractive than enforcing the law. The legal system 
itself moved to being a facilitator of the corruption, with the business systems efficiency 
often relying on the corruption to provide an efficient way to carry out business. 
 
4.2.3 Accelerated reforms under the WTO accession process (2002-2006) 
 
After years of reforms, the negative sides of the market economy, such as 
income distribution discrepancy, corruption and negative impacts upon private domestic 
industry led to fears that CPV’s socialist leadership and ideology was under attack 
(Sidel, 1999, Hung, 2000). The external political situation supplied even more 
problems, with the collapse of the communist countries in Eastern Europe still fresh in 
peoples minds and creating insecurity in the CPV and the fear that the free market was 
nothing more than the first ‘seeds’ of a coup d’état (Sidel, 1999; Thayer, 2002). Chi Lan 
and Thai (interviews, 2012) revealed that “the pessimism and anxiousness of the leaders 
resulted from the lessons of Southeast Asia and East Asia countries wrestling with the 
Asian Financial Crisis. All these countries once served as models for Vietnam, but were 
now victims of their own market economy reforms”. This reality was utilised by the 
conservatives to reject further reforms (Chi Lan, interview, 2012). Prime Minister 
Khai’s said the government would move cautiously in adopting economic reforms in 
1999(Hung, 2000). 
 
The peak of the conservative opposition came with postponement of the signing 
of BTA in 1999. The Agreement was intensively negotiated over three years, with 
Vietnam gaining little penetration into the American market, but committing to 
widespread reforms (Thayer, 2001; Masina, 2006). The original signing of BTA was 
delayed at the very last minute with Conservatives convincing decision-makers that it 
did not serve Vietnam’s ‘best interests’ (Hung, 2000; Masina, 2006). According to Chi 
Lan (interview, 2012) “there was much distrust of US intentions”. She also mentioned 
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that the delayed decision was influenced by China top leader’s advice to Vietnam that 
“do not sign the agreement until China joins the WTO as Vietnam may enjoy more 
favourable conditions after China enters the WTO”. Not only were Vietnam concerned 
about the US intentions, reform itself was seen as a ‘problem’, with the view that 
Vietnam was being expected to reform too much, and too soon (Masina, 2006; Thayer, 
2001). Thayer (2001) notes that the decision to delay was also greatly influenced by the 
vested interest groups asking for protection, including SOEs and military owned 
enterprises. Hung (2000, p.99) mentioned “Vietnam’s leadership chose political stability 
and Party supremacy even at the risk of the country falling behind”. The leadership 
decided to back away from economic reform and concentrate instead on maintaining 
socio-political stability from 1998 (Hung, 2000). The CPV focused on the issues of 
Party building, and building itself politically, ideologically, and organisationally 
stronger in order to cope with the new political and economic environment (Thayer, 
2000). Changes indicated a power struggle between reformers and conservatives 
(Thayer, 2002; Hung, 2000). Party conservatives used the fight against corruption to 
purge the reformers, successfully laying the blame on reformist policies and ridding the 
Party of their influence (Hung, 2000). 
 
The conservatives found themselves facing low economic performance and their 
anti-reform policies were found to be economically as bad, if not worse, than the 
reformist strategies (Sidel, 1998; 1999; Hung, 2000; Masina, 2006). A large part of the 
GDP was unsold inventory, especially in the State sector (Pham and Le, 2002). The 
disbursement of FDI also significantly reduced (IMF, 1998; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Many foreign companies withdrew their business.55 This mass exodus was extremely 
damaging to the Vietnam economy, as it depended largely on FDI (Hung, 2000).56 Anti-
reformist policies aligned with the impact of the Asian financial crisis created an 
atmosphere of crisis, even impending doom as total economic collapse seemed possible 
(Masina, 2006; IMF, 1999; Pham and Le, 2002; Dang, 2002; Vu and Tran, 2002; 
Painter, 2005). Vietnam often only accepts true change when faced with a catastrophic 
crisis and the choice is ‘change or die’. This is much to do with the Vietnam culture and 
                                                
55 Such as Cables and Wireless, three top Japanese banks and Chrysler. 
56 Asian Wall Street Journal 1999 7 Sept. 
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its self-defence mechanism of usually choosing conservatism when faced with the 
challenge of change and often only turning to reform when there seems no other choice. 
 
The poor economic performance eroded the credibility of the conservatives and 
put pressure on the CPV (Thayer, 2002). The Party could not afford to undermine their 
authority given the increasing calls for economic reforms and increasing social 
instability, with large scale and violent protests in many provinces and cities (Thayer, 
2001). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested that “the CPV could not risk damaging their 
prestige and power by avoiding the calls of the society. The CPV had compromised to 
reach a practical solution for the pressing economic demands, which allowed the private 
sector a complete freedom of doing business”. The new Enterprise Law was issued in 
1999, with breakthrough reforms favouring private business (Tai, 2006). The Law on 
Foreign Investment was revised to create a better environment for attracting more FDI. 
Chi Lan (interview, 2012) commented “this period of reforms had been characterised as 
two steps backward and one step forwards. This practical solution was not signs of the 
demise of the conservatives in this time, but rather the compromise of the conservatives 
for ensuring the leadership of the CPV”. 
 
The 9th National Congress (2001) chose a new leadership. Conservatives focused 
on anti-corruption strategies and strengthened their positions by proposing some 
organisational changes to centralise power. The Central Committee rejected the changes 
as they feared a return of the command economy (Thayer, 2001). Chi Lan (interview, 
2012) said “with no sign of improvement and a change in the policies, these 
conservative policies for a difficult period had diminished the trust of many other 
politicians and people, who expected the Party to make reforms to cope with the poor 
economic performance and to accelerate the development”. Thai (interview, 2012) 
commented that “the need and expectation for economic policy change was also 
influenced by the rapid recovery of other Asian countries after the Asian Financial 
Crisis. This trend had left Vietnam only limited choices for future economic policies”. 
Domestic economic difficulties and increasing international competition led to the 
demise of the conservatives. Their policies were criticised for not reviving the economic 
stagnation in Vietnam, while many leaders of the conservatives were blamed for 
ineffective leadership (Thayer, 2002). Their hard policies caused disappointment 
(Thayer, 2002). The General Secretary and seven senior members of the Politburo were 
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retired. The new members were proactive and younger reformers under the command of 
the General Secretary, Nong Duc Manh. The Politburo Standing Board was replaced by 
the Secretarial, and the Members of Secretarial were elected by the Central Committee 
rather than the Politburo (Thayer, 2002). The CPV called for high economic growth 
through domestic mobilisation of capital for self-reliance, finding its own competitive 
advantages and creating a better environment for attracting external sources of capital, 
technology and expertise (Thayer, 2002; CPV, 2002).  
 
Reform was resumed in 2001 and tied up closely with the negotiation and 
implementation of the BTA (Thayer, 2001). It aimed to tackle the unfinished reform 
agenda including liberalising trade and investment policies, restructuring the SOEs 
sector, promoting the private sector, restructuring the financial sector, and building 
transparent and efficient economic management institutions. Implementation of the 
reform was slow and cautious, but with a Party intention to develop a multi-sector 
commodity economy operating under the market mechanism-with a socialist orientation 
(Thayer, 2002).  The pace of the reform picked up when the Government actively 
engaged in bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements, especially the accelerated 
efforts in negotiation for WTO membership (Abrami, 2003).  
 
However, we must begin to question whether the WTO process was the actual 
initiator of reforms; or rather the tool to carry reforms through, and the actual trigger for 
reform was the threat of catastrophic crisis. Vietnam only changes at the very point of 
disastrous crisis, and this is the only real cause of reform, while international treaties, 
WTO entry, etc are the methodologies referred to for change and reform, mostly 
because the Governments own intent for reform can be hidden beneath a cloak of 
pressure forced upon the Government and country to reform by the conditions of, for 
instance, entry into the WTO. The thesis research revealed that change and reform has 
only come at the very pinnacle of crisis (whether the collapse of the command economy 
in the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s or the conservatives mishandling of 
the economy in 1996-2001). It is crisis that is the only answer to the embedded culture 
of Vietnam to prefer conservatism and tradition before change, and that only the forces 
of crisis actually overcome this traditionalist approach. 
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Trade and investment reform 
 
Trade reform accelerated in 2003 to meet requirements in various international 
agreements (Arbami, 2003; Masina, 2006; Hoang and Le, 2010).57 As a result of the 
implementation of AFTA and US-BTA agreements, the trade policy of Vietnam was 
adjusted significantly to reduce distortions remaining in the economy. On 1st September 
2003, a new tariff system took effect that was based on the eight-digit Harmonized 
System and conformed to ASEAN’s Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature.58 
 
The most impressive changes in tariff reduction were seen in the period from 
2003 to 2006, when Vietnam accelerated its process of WTO accession.59 Tariff rates 
were reduced most significantly for products at higher rates, leading to a compacting of 
the frequency of tariffs rates from a bi- modal distribution with a substantial frequency 
of tariff rates from 35% to 50% in 2003, to a more uni-modal distribution with almost 
80% of all tariff rates at 20% or lower (WB, 2006). The high tariff rates were often 
concentrated in the transport sector; some agricultural products; beverages; tobacco, fish 
processing; minerals and metals; chemicals; leather goods, and electrical machinery.60 
 
Under the BTA and WTO negotiations, non-tariff barriers were progressively 
eliminated. Goods subject to Quantitative Restriction greatly reduced from 17 products 
                                                
57 such as the ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement (AFTA), the BTA and WTO negotiations 
58 The simple average tariff rate increased slightly from 16.8 % to 18.2 % in 2003, and the maximum 
tariff came down from 200% in 1997 to 120% in 2001 and then to 113% in 2003 (Athukorala, 2005). The 
simple average Effective Rate of Protection reduced dramatically from 59.54% in 1997 to 54.1 in 2001, 
and then to 26.23% in 2003 (Athukorala, 2005). The ERP for import competing production in all traded 
goods sectors was down considerably from 58% in 2001 to just 25% in 2003 (Athukorala, 2005). 
59 The simple average tariff rate decreased from 18.4% in 2003 to 13.7% with the WTO’s commitment in 
2006 (CIEM and US STAR Project, 2008). In the December 2006, the tariff reductions were extensive 
and deeper, reducing tariffs in 1,986 lines, while increasing tariffs in only 6 lines (5 of which were for 
tobacco). 
60 The most significant reduction was recorded in tariff rates for textiles and clothing, which went from 
48.7% to 19.6% for clothing and from 30.6% to 10.5% for textiles (NCIEC, 2007). 
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in 1999, to 7 products in 2000 and 2 products in 2003. Under the WTO commitments, 
all these quotas were eventually removed and replaced by TRQ, which applied for only 
eggs, sugar, tobacco leaf and salt (Mutrap 2007). This was a strong commitment to 
liberalisation of agriculture.61 
 
Under the Enterprise Law (2005), domestic firms were free to export non-
prohibited commodities while free to import commodities registered in their business 
license (Thai, 2005). The WTO process eliminated all discrimination in the field of 
trading rights and import licensing, thus allowing foreigners to import and export 
commodities (Mutrap 2007).62 
 
Custom reforms gained momentum in 2001 and export and import activities 
were clarified and simplified, reducing customs clearance time. The results were 
remarkable – the average time for customs clearance was reduced from 1-3 days to a 
half day (Thai, 2005). Custom valuation for calculating import duties was based on the 
transaction price in accordance with the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (Thai, 
2005; MUTRAP, 2007). The Harmonised System of Tariff Nomenclature was also 
introduced in order to classify imports (MUTRAP, 2007). As of 2004, instead of using 
two registered codes (one for paying tax and one for customs clearance) each enterprise 
now used a single code for both tax payment and custom clearance. Since 2004, e-
custom procedures were experimentally introduced into major ports around Vietnam. In 
2005, a governmental decree was issued to create a legal framework for e-customs 
                                                
61 Under the BTA, Vietnam reserved the right to use quotas on many products such as maize, cotton, 
animal products and soybean.  In 2003, it introduced the WTO’s compliance system of tariff rate quotas 
in 2003 for cotton, tobacco leaf, dairy products, maize, soybean, eggs and salt (Athukorala 2005; Mutrap 
2007; Thai, 2005). 
62 The Government demonstrated its commitments on the trading rights for foreign companies in a series 
of laws and regulations (example: Decree 23/2007/ND-CP for regulation on purchase and sale of goods 
and related activities by foreign owned enterprises; Decree 90/2007/ND-CP for providing import and 
export rights of foreign business entities without presence in Vietnam; Decision 10/2007/QD-BTM for a 
detailed roadmap for implementing regulations and policies; Circular 09/2007/TT-BTM for instruction of 
implementing these regulations and policies) (Mutrap, 2007).  
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(MUTRAP, 2007). The WTO accession process completely overhauled the trading 
regime. 
 
SOEs reforms 
 
At the 9th Congress the General Secretary acknowledged that SOEs reform was 
“a sensitive political issue, closely related to social and economic stability” (Thayer 
2002, p.85). SOEs should “serve as a tool in the hands of the State to regulate the 
economy, ensure adherence to the socialist path, and maintain political, economic and 
social stability” (Thayer 2002, p.85). The conflict was between the need for economic 
growth and maintaining CPV control of the economy. Pressure to reform SOEs coupled 
with the need to strengthen them to meet the competition from economic integration 
forced the CPV to bring about changes (Abrami, 2003).  
 
 In 2002 the SOEs reform aimed to create a “level playing field for non-state 
actors” (Abrami, 2003). The Prime Minister, Phan Van Khai, organised and chaired 
meetings to discuss the need and solutions for accelerating the reforms. A range of 
policies and measures were introduced to facilitate the SOE restructuring process, 
including mergers, conversions to limited liability companies, outright sales and 
liquidation (WB, 2006). In 2004, Government’s Decision 155/2004/QĐ-TTg was issued 
by Prime Minister to establish the criteria for classification and listing of SOEs’ 
operations.63 Firms who did not meet the criteria were forced into equitisation to be 
Joint Stock Company’s operating under the Enterprise Law (same as private companies) 
(WB, 2006b). Equitisation is a process of restructuring SOEs, rather than simply 
privatising, but can include elements of privatisation of SOEs subsidiaries. Decree 
187/2004/ND-CP64 on converting SOEs to joint-stock companies was issued in2004 to 
facilitate the equitisation process. It guided the process and emphasised that auctions 
should be the main mechanism for divestiture with appraisals being conducted by 
outside evaluators and the sale of shares taking place through auctions at securities 
                                                
63 Regulating which fields and activities were allowed to 100% SOEs operations and reducing the 
numbers of SOEs 
64 Issued on 16 November 2004 about equitising SOEs into the joint-stock companies 
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centres for market prices. The stock markets were upgraded, invested and promoted to 
facilitate the process of SOE’s equitisation and restructuring 
 
Table 4.2: Process of equitised SOEs in Vietnam from 1999 to 2005 
Year Number of 
equitised 
SOEs 
Total 
number of 
equitised  
Year Number of 
equitised 
SOEs 
Total 
number of 
equitised 
1992 Started 0 2000 212 577 
1992 – 1995 3 3 2001 149 726 
1996 5 8 2002 164 890 
1997 7 15 2003 532 1422 
1998 100 115 2004 753 2175 
1999 250 365 2005 754 2929 
Sources: PWC, 2008. 
 
As a result of the Government’s drastic measures, the number of SOEs was 
reduced from more than 5600 in 2001 to below 3,200 in September 2005 and to around 
2100 in 2006.Since 2004, the average size of the SOEs being equitised increased, 
including medium SOEs (WB, 2006). 
 
The rest of SOEs were reformed by two other mechanisms:  
1. Increasing competitions in the market and  
2. Gradual hardening of the budget constraint to the SOEs (WB, 2006).  
 
A new single Enterprise Law was issued in 2005 to merge different laws for 
different economic sectors. The Government also stipulated that all SOEs would be 
operated under the Enterprise Law 2005 by 2010. The new law with clearer articles and 
easier regulations for establishing private companies provided a more level playing field 
between sectors and has increased the number of new registered companies 
significantly, which served as a means to place more market competition on the SOEs. 
Increasing trade liberalisation increased competitiveness in the market economy, and 
the Government’s efforts to accelerate the WTO accession process helped liberalise the 
trade and investment regime, further undermining the SOE’s monopolies (WB, 2006). 
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The New Investment Law (2005) had policies for allowing foreign owners up to 49% 
ownership of equitised SOEs. 
 
Institutional reform 
 
Rapid development created demands for institutional reforms. Effective 
institutions were required to reduce transaction costs, condition the market environment 
and regulate the player’s behaviour and operation (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Inadequate legal and market institutions for investment in Vietnam greatly inhibited 
economic development, and the institutions in Vietnam only slowly adjusted to the 
needs of the market, causing a mismatch between changes in market actor’s behaviour 
and adjustments in the formal institutional framework (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Further decentralisation increased the pressures for institutional reform (WB, 2006). 
 
Institutional reforms were essential to the process of accelerated international 
economic integration (Luong, 2006; 2007; Fforde, 2004). The motivation for 
accelerated reform was the need for an improved market oriented economic 
management system in order for the country’s deeper integration into the World 
Economy (Masina, 2006; Fforde, 2004). International commitments, such as, the US-
BTA and the WTO, resulted in the urgent need for the Government to accelerate reform 
in almost all aspects of the legal and administrative framework (WB, 2006b). The 
national chief negotiator, Khanh (interview, 2012), agreed that “The WTO and BTA 
agreements had a deep impact; not only on trade policy, but also on many fundamental 
rules of law and governance, providing a critical benchmark and focus for modernising 
Vietnam’s economic and legal institutions to support the market economy and 
international integration”. The essential impact here was on the granting of Vietnam 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, which gave open access to US markets. In one 
year (2002) the exports to the US increased by 128%, while exports of manufactures 
increased by ‘an impressive rate of over 500 percent on an annual basis’. There was an 
18 fold increase in clothing exports, a 250 percent increase in electrical appliances and 
499 percent increase in furniture (Reidel and Parker, 2003, p.4). A number of major 
regulations were changed and details of some of the main new laws are given below. 
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In 2003, the Government proposed an Action Plan for Legislation Reform, 
which planned to change 31 laws and ordinances by 2007 (Hiep, 2005). The law-
making agenda from 2001 reflected the legislative harmonisation required for BTA and 
WTO accession (Gillespie, 2007).65 Law making was intensified in 2004 and 2005 in 
the bid for the WTO accession (WB, 2006).66 Vietnam revised and modernised almost 
every law affecting commercial activities in Vietnam in line with the need for 
supporting a domestic market economy with a growing private sector and for 
conforming to international standards. These reforms made the business environment 
more transparent and equal to all economic players (Anh, 2007). The law restrained the 
Governments’ intervention in the market, including intervention on resource allocation, 
firm’s planning and operational processes (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2009). 
 
Judicial reform was accelerated and the National Assembly adopted the Law on 
the Organisation of the People Courts and the Ordinance on Judges and People’s 
Assessors in 2002, specifying the formal tasks and functions of the Court. The Court 
system changed its roles toward fostering strict compliance with law and became 
independent from the political system (WB, 2006; Phuc, 2006). The Supreme Court has 
also undertaken reform programmes for its management of the courts, and gained 
independence from the Ministry of Justice (Nghia, 2008; Phuc, 2006; WB, 2006; 
Nicholson, 2007). With the exception of the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme 
People Court, all judicial appointments, removals and dismissals in provincial and 
district courts are made by the Chief Justice on the advice of the Judicial Selection 
Councils. Court budgets are determined by the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly on advices of the Chief Justice. Thus, the court system does not need to be 
dependent on the Ministry of Justice for funds (Phuc, 2006). New laws specified that 
judges must hold a bachelor of laws degree, have legal experience, and have attended 
adjudication training for enhancing the profession of the judges. These all contributed to 
                                                
65 For implementation of the USBTA, the Ministry of Justice reviewed 148 legal documents relating 
directly to the agreement, and it suggested amendments to 24 legal documents, including 8 laws and 3 
ordinances, and issued 39 new legal documents including 8 laws and 11 Ordinances (Hiep, 2005). For the 
WTO accession, 263 legal documents directly related to regulations of the WTO and 52 legal documents 
including 14 laws and 9 Ordinance, needed amending. 
66 The National Assembly passed 8 laws in 2004 and 22 laws in 2005 
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the process of making judges and courts at all levels gain more independence from 
political influence (Nicholson, 2007). 
 
Licenses were abolished for all firms and individuals who had registered import 
and export functions in their licenses. The new Enterprise Law (2005) and the 
Investment Law (2005) prohibited discrimination in ownership types and nationality 
such as state and non-state firms, domestic and foreign firms (WB, 2006). The 
Competition Law (2005) restrained monopolies to enhance competitive advantages, and 
the Department of Competition and Council of Competition was established to monitor, 
investigate and handle all cases relating to competition (Anh, 2007; Nguyen and 
Nguyen, 2009). 
 
Public administration reform was guided by the need to decrease unnecessary 
bureaucracy, to combat corruption, and to increase the transparency and effectiveness of 
the administrative system (ADB, 2003; WB, 2004; Ministry of Home Affair, 2006). 
Three major components of the public administrative were: 
1. Legal reforms including simplification of administrative procedures, 
increased legal basis for state activities,  
2. Organisational reform including restructuring of central and local 
governments and some degree of decentralisation of administration, and 
3. Reform of human resource management. Functions, responsibilities and 
mandates of agencies and institutions were defined more clearly (Phuc, 
2006; Anh, 2007; Buhmann, 2007). 
 
The Government’s decision 136/2001/QD-TTg (2001) adopted the 
Comprehensive Public Administration Reform Agenda for 2001-2010, with it 
‘responsive to the needs of the people’ (Phuc, 2006). Administrative procedures were 
simplified, more transparent and open, with streamlining of public administrative 
procedures into the ‘One Stop Shop’ (OSS) (WB, 2006). This mechanism helped reduce 
difficulties for citizens, combat red tape and reduce corruption. E-government was 
actively promoted to increase efficiency, boost transparency and reduce corruption and 
inconvenience (WB, 2007). 
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The number of Government agencies was reduced from 70 in 1986 to 39 in 2006 
and then 22 in 2011, of which 18 are ministries and equivalents, and 4 Government 
affiliated agencies (Office of Government, 2012). The number of provincial 
departments and equivalents was reduced from 30 to 20-22; at district level, from 16-17 
to 12-14 (Phuc, 2006). This helped overcome the problems of overlaps and duplications 
in terms of functions, tasks, responsibilities, scopes and objects of management among 
ministries and agencies (Phuc, 2006).  
 
4.3 Impacts of WTO accession on the accelerated reform process of Vietnam 
 
Accession is often considered as a catalyst and guideline for economic reforms 
towards an accepted level of a market economy (Michalopoulos, 1998; Basu, 2008). 
WTO accession supported domestic reform of Vietnam by:  
1. Creating pressure for reform;  
2. Creating a new balance of influences from interest groups on the policy 
making process;  
3. Forcing adjustment of institutions;  
4. Influencing the leader’s ideology on economic reform (Sally, 2008). 
 
4.3.1 WTO accession process has provided pressure for reforms 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012), said that “one of the tangible challenges of the WTO 
accession is the increasing pressure of external competition on domestic production 
triggered by the opening of the market”. In the negotiation process for accession, 
Vietnam bilaterally and multilaterally negotiated the levels of its WTO commitments 
(NCIEC, 2007). Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested “although Vietnam trade accounted 
for a very small share at the global level, it has been considered as a potential market by 
its scale of population ranked 13th in the world and a young workforce of nearly 40 
million. Thus, Vietnam received considerable attention from WTO members during its 
bid to accede to the WTO”. 
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Table 4.3: Nominal and Effective Rate of Protection under the WTO 
commitments (%) 
 
Year 
Agriculture and 
seafoods 
Mineral, oil and gas Manufacturing Whole economy 
ERP Tariff ERP Tariff ERP Tariff ERP Tariff 
2005 7,40 6,10 4,39 3,85 40,38 19,45 21,43 11,12 
2006 6,42 5,37 4,33 3,84 38,93 18,69 20,43 10,53 
2007 6,20 5,17 4,38 3,84 31,21 15,25 16,93 9,04 
2008 5,50 4,72 4,41 3,84 29,58 14,45 15,97 8,54 
2009 5,00 4,39 4,43 3,83 28,00 13,71 15,10 8,11 
2010 4,59 4,13 4,45 3,83 26,78 13,14 14,41 7,78 
2011 4,20 3,88 4,46 3,83 25,53 12,53 13,72 7,43 
2012 3,92 3,72 4,48 3,83 24,57 12,05 13,20 7,18 
2013 3,85 3,67 4,49 3,83 24,08 11,80 12,96 7,05 
2014 3,85 3,67 4,49 3,83 24,05 11,77 12,95 7,04 
2015 3,51 3,25 -0,29 0,17 21,14 10,65 10,57 5,64 
2016 3,51 3,25 -0,29 0,17 21,13 10,64 10,56 5,63 
2017 3,50 3,25 -0,28 0,17 21,12 10,64 10,56 5,63 
2018 3,35 3,11 -0,33 0,13 21,01 10,51 10,44 5,52 
2019 3,35 3,11 -0,33 0,13 21,00 10,51 10,44 5,52 
2020 3,36 3,11 -0,32 0,13 20,76 10,30 10,34 5,43 
Sources: CIEM, 2009 
 
Vietnam’s commitments were strong and comprehensive (Mutrap, 2007; 
NCIEC, 2007). The average simple tariffs were cut down to just 13.4% and all tariffs 
lines would have only seven years to adjust (Mutrap, 2007; NCIEC, 2007). NIEIC 
(2007) believed that Vietnam’s commitments exceeded China’s, even though Vietnam 
is a much smaller country to China. The average agricultural bound tariff was below the 
same tariff of neighbouring WTO members such as Thailand and Philippines (WB, 
2006b; Mutrap, 2007). Table 4.3 shows that the WTO accession process put direct 
pressure on many industries that Vietnam had protected for years (NCIEC, 2007). 
 
The pressures for increasing competition and limiting government intervention 
and protection were high. According to Thanh (interview, 2011), “this expectation of 
increasing competition was a real motivation for both government and the business 
communities to think of improving and renovating their business efficiency and 
competence to cope with future environment. The motivation was actually tense 
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because many businesses, citizens and even the government agencies had not had a 
clear idea about the WTO accession”. 
 
All these changes and expectations had significant impact upon the Party-State. 
Accession meant managing a more diverse and complicated economy. The State’s 
agencies came under pressure to be more transparent and provide regulatory equity in 
economic management according to the WTO framework. Accession forced the Party-
State to rethink their ideology and economic management (Anh, 2007). 
 
The Government were forced to renovate their public financial management 
system, improve the business and investment environment and develop the tax 
collecting system. The shrinking budget prompted the Government to re-consider its 
levels of subsidy to SOEs (Luong, 2006; Fforde, 2005). 
 
Vietnamese enterprises came under pressure to become more competitive. Chi 
Lan (interview, 2012) said “many businesses would face challenges in the short-term as 
they adjusted their business and production operations to the new business 
environment”. Accession was a real threat to the SOEs, with a wider market opening 
undermining their monopolies and weakening their financial position through reduced 
government protection and subsidies (Luong, 2006; 2007; Fforde, 2005).67 SOEs were 
using more capital but the factor accumulation did not produce a proportionate increase 
in output or productivity (WB, 2011). SOEs used several times more capital to produce 
one unit of output than the industry average (WB, 2011).68 SOEs were less efficient in 
their use of fixed assets than the industry average (WB, 2011). Labour productivity 
growth in SOEs was lower than the rest of the industry. The SOEs had the highest ratio 
of the debt to assets among all economic actors and the lowest returns on their equity, 
well below the nominal growth rate of the economy (WB, 2011). The strong WTO’s 
commitments for opening both goods and services threatened the domination of SOEs 
                                                
67 In 2003, Vietnam still had 4,845 SOEs, accounting for 6.73% of the total enterprises, but producing 
29.3% of the industrial output and about 40% of GDP (GSO, 2008). 
68 In 2000, the average ratio of turnover to capital in SOEs was 1.6 compared to 8.8 for the entire 
enterprise sector, which mean nearly 9 units of capital to produce 1 unit of output (WB, 2011). 
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in competition and reduction in business privileges. Competition from the foreign 
companies would increase due to easy and more convenient conditions for trade and 
investment, which would attract more participation of foreign companies (MUTRAP, 
2007; Khanh, interview, 2012). WTO commitments and mechanisms ensured a level 
playing field for all sectors engaging in trade and investment, reducing the government 
preferences and subsidies to the SOEs (WB, 2006; MUTRAP, 2007; NCIEC, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 4.1: SOEs efficiency of using resources compared with industry 
average 
Source: WB, 2011 
 
One has to seriously question the real effectiveness of Accession on Vietnam’s 
SOEs. They remain the dominant force through covert means of subsidy (such as the 
Government transferring funds to Banks that are ‘instructed’ to loan to SOEs), coupled 
with almost total monopoly over the tender process (tender processes are carried out but 
often the participants already know who (the SOE) will get the contract). Government 
decision-makers were always directly involved in the executive management of SOEs 
and guaranteed business to SOEs regardless of their levels of inefficiency, lack of 
productivity and mishandling of capital. Individuals grew constantly richer while their 
SOEs were bringing the Vietnam economy to even greater levels of collapse. 
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After 20 years of reforms, Vietnam’s economy is still at a low development 
level. Advantages in export are mostly derived from labour and natural conditions 
factors, not from on technology and efficiency (Son, 2006). As a result, the export 
products are often a crude form and at lower value than the same products from other 
countries (Nguyen, 2008; MUTRAP, 2007). The Vietnamese private sector is still very 
young, small, scattered and inexperienced in international economic integration; 
significantly weak in terms of technology, production scale, management skills and 
access to the market (Son, 2006; Tai, 2006). 
 
With the accelerated WTO accession process, both Government and the business 
community were aware of the threat of the increasing competition through opening up 
to international economic integration. Government and business actively tried to 
improve and renovate to cope with the new challenge to the business environment. 
Thus, WTO accession acted as force for domestic reform in Vietnam. However, there is 
little evidence, either then or now, that the Government has really grappled with the 
dominance of SOEs, and the private sector suffers from an almost total control of the 
economy by inefficient and virtually bankrupt SOEs. Regardless of private company’s 
increases in productivity, efficiency, quality and good capital management, they still fail 
to win business in competition with many virtually useless SOEs. 
 
4.3.2 WTO accession process has influenced the political balance of interested 
groups for reforms 
 
The process of reform was slow and ineffective in the period 1996-2002. The 
main reasons were the decline of the momentum for continued reform and concerns for 
possible instability and derailment of society due to the negative side effects of the 
market economy (Sidel, 1999; Hung, 2000; Thayer, 2001; 2002). Chi Lan (interview, 
2012) suggested that “these concerns created a suitable environment for conservatives 
to press their prudent view in the process of economic reform”. Vietnam’s economy 
entered into a new economic cycle with economic slowdown and reform immobilisation 
(Sidel, 1999). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) observed “the reform immobilisation did not 
improve the economic situation or prevent the social instability due to the poor 
economic performance through only partial reforms”. The demand for reforms to stem 
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the crisis was increasing, but the delays in reform continued to occur. The reforms faced 
two major challenges. It was different from the previous reforms, as the goals of the 
second wave of reform affected more interest groups. The economic restructure for 
more efficient and competitive growth would create losers in the short term during the 
reform process (Nelson, 1990; Thayer, 2002). Losers in the reform process were 
motivated to combine to protect their benefits from the status quo and resist reforms. 
The second wave of reforms was far more technical, which was also challenging for 
Vietnam. The second reforms were more pertinent to policymaking and legislation to 
help the economic system develop into a transparent, equal and effective fashion. Thanh 
(interview, 2011) suggested that “this may require a strong capacity of the government 
in policy planning and implementation. In many cases, this capacity is lacking in the 
developing countries”. Reform applied to the private sector and the Government 
operation at public level, but privately the SOEs were almost immune from pressure to 
reform (Sidel, 1999, Hung, 2000). 
 
Reform regained momentum in 2002 and this was chiefly due to a combination 
of pressure from US BTA’s implementation and an accelerated WTO accession process 
(Luong, 2005; Masina, 2006). The Accession process mandated the trade and 
investment liberalisation, but also included many behind-border issues such as 
transparency, uniform and impartial law application, and creating a level playing field. 
The process widely affected different groups in trade and investment activities, such as 
protected SOE sectors, redundant labour, private companies, and policy makers and 
officials in charge of trade and investment (Basu, 2008).  
 
The primary resistant groups to reform were the SOEs and the government 
functional agencies (Thai, interview, 2012). The need for reform was centralised around 
the efficient use of resources and the transparency and decentralisation of authority 
(Thayer, 2002; Chi Lan, interview, 2012). Thai (interview, 2012) said “some groups 
enjoyed a close relationship with the power structures in Party-State via the ideology of 
the market economy with socialist orientation”. The CPV’s forced little change in the 
roles of the SOEs in the economy (Painter, 2005). The CPV wanted to use the SOEs as 
a main force to implement their ambitious industrialisation process, which was set to be 
completed in 2020. Through SOEs the CPV was able to closely control industrialisation 
(Le and Liu, 2006), and thus, SOEs were heavily invested in and protected by CPV 
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(Masina, 2006). SOEs continue to serve as a tool of CPV, and as the market regulators. 
The SOE and CPV relationship means that the Government continues to covertly 
operate a quasi central command system, but instead of doing it through political 
control, they convert that control into commercial partnership and privilege within the 
SOEs and prevent the Vietnam economy from opening up to competitive market forces. 
The very cornerstones of establishing reform in the Vietnam economy are often the 
main obstacles to that reform. SOE’s, although ideal ‘agents’ of reform for the CPV, 
they are, instead, often the least capable of change, with many having enjoyed decades 
of ‘business’ without ‘competition’ and subsequently come to enjoy a privileged 
position that many are resistant against losing. This has been the main shared value of 
the conservative leaders. They are not only conservative leaders, but often the very 
business leaders making the large government produced profits from the monopoly 
position their SOEs hold. Government subsidies provided by Bank ‘loans’ ensures that 
‘manufactured’ profits are produced, and the immunity from competitive forces means 
they have little reason to change, while the ‘gravy train’ continues to run. 
 
Communist ideology and the movement towards a free market economy become 
entangled in political contradictions. Thai (interview, 2012) suggested that “Whilst 
realizing that economic prosperity and the future of the economy rely on adoption of 
free market economic liberalism, and therefore accepting much of the ideology of 
capitalism, the Communist Party is not unaware that this course contains a ‘Trojan’ 
horse that threatens the very basis of power of a one-Party state”. Thus, reform itself 
becomes politically controlled by whatever means that the Party can, and chief among 
these are controlling the major business actors in the ‘business world’. Although much 
of the cause of economic disaster brought about by their misuse of resources, the levels 
of inefficiency and bad management, and the refusal to become competitive, SOEs 
remained largely ‘protected’ by the Party (Chi Lan, interview, 2012; Thayer, 2002; 
Painter, 2005). SOEs act as an ‘agency’ for government rule within the economy, able 
to control much of domestic business and through ‘relationship’ assume a role of 
governance within, and over the business world (WB, 2006; 2012). 
 
In assessing the impact and actual manifestation of ideology upon the Vietnam 
political, social and economic world it is important to understand what ‘communism’ is 
in Vietnam. Relating the ‘real’ impact of communism and correlating it with Marxist or 
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Leninist principles quickly brings a realisation that the ‘ideals’ are adapted in the 
political and public security fields with some credibility attached to the traditional tenets 
of the ideology. But economically and socially the Vietnamese system reflects a far 
higher correlation with capitalism than communism. The health and education system 
are not free and actually form a very active ‘commodity’ role in economy. There is little 
attempt to reduce the poverty gap and there exists a very wide range of divisions 
between the extremely wealthy and the poorest communities. The land is owned by the 
State but the ‘right to use’ element is an extremely competitive market based only on 
the ability to ‘buy’ and on ‘relationships’ to support that purchase. Unionisation is a 
strongly controlled element that reflects more the Party’s rights rather than those of the 
worker. There is little that can actually be called ‘communist’ in Vietnam and the 
ideology is now chiefly controlled by an elite interest group that is firmly in control of 
both the political and economic system. As McGough (interview, 2012) said ‘there is 
little that can be called communist in Vietnam. The ideology has long become the 
preserve of an ‘elite’ who have captured it for personal gain and power’. Vuving (2012, 
p.2) is clear on his view of the ideology as he declares “the marriage of the communist 
regime with the capitalist economy in Vietnam’s reform era has given rise to a new type 
of state that is similar to the classic communist state in form but different in substance... 
[and now has] the ethos of the rent-seeking state, which creates barriers and extracts 
rents from society...rent seekers have become the dominant force... and are thereby 
quietly changing the nature of the state they occupy”. The thesis case studies show how 
the operation of this elite/communist synthesis operates a system of wealth building that 
sees the country raised to middle income status, while the actual economic 
infrastructure and the lives of the vast majority of people remains in an under developed 
status. 
 
Thanh (interview, 2011) notes that “another group of interest exists in parallel 
with SOEs in the reform, and this is advisory bodies and regulators”. In a system where 
the regulators actions are not processed on the basis of transparent regulations, the 
power of regulators is enormous. Ministry of Trade is responsible for granting import 
and export quotas for trading companies that for a long time have been based on unclear 
regulations; or the Ministry of Planning and Investment’s licensing procedures for 
international and State-funded projects; the local governments allocate blocks of land 
for investors, etc. These special mandates help those institutions possess special powers 
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and interests, leading to a strong reluctance to reform, and a fear that they will lose their 
‘privileges’ if they do. These groups are the advisors to senior leaders, so they trigger a 
strong setback against progressive policies (Thai, interview, 2012; Chi Lan, interview, 
2012). Thai (interview, 2012) suggested that “SOEs are favourably treated and its 
reform is often slow as it’s attached to interests relevant to Ministries/agencies and local 
authorities”. The relevant agencies establish policies and mechanisms for the operations 
of companies. On the other hand, they are also the regulators of the companies in their 
own fields (Painter, 2005). The reform of SOEs hurts the economic interests of 
regulators and localities. Thai (interview, 2012) mentioned that “Through such 
companies, the line Ministries/agencies and localities accumulate economic benefits for 
their own institutions or as individuals”. Chi Lan, (interview, 2012) commented that 
“the influence of SOEs and advisory bodies on reform policy is tremendous, it is not 
only aligned to material benefits, but also political links”. In this covert and almost total 
control of the economy, the SOE and regulator relationship is built on mutual benefits 
that neither wanted to lose, but are more often than not corrupt, and completely against 
the spirit and intent of WTO accession and membership. 
 
Unemployed labour after the SOEs’ restructure was a ‘loser’ group in the reform 
process that strongly protested against accelerated reforms. Before the reform, SOEs did 
not operate under the pressure for profit making and were labour intensive (Le and Liu, 
2006). Employment in the SOEs was (and is) considered an ‘ideal’ job with long term 
contracts and better-paid employment then other sectors (Le and Liu, 2006; Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003). Thus, when the SOEs restructured, the first impact was dramatic 
reductions in labour (Le and Liu 2006; Thuong and Hung, 2010). Unemployment 
surged and employees at SOEs often strongly opposed the government’s plan to 
privatise or restructure the enterprises. Middle aged workers at SOEs had a strong voice 
and were respected due to their long years of service in the enterprises (Thai, interview, 
2012), but “the concern of this group is often expressed in forms of unorganised 
activities such as protests and social problems, thus utilised thoroughly by the 
conservatives and press to support their advocate for slower reforms” (Khanh, 
interview, 2012).  
 
Protectionism for SOEs also meant others had limited opportunities to access the 
sources of other economic sectors, especially in the strengths of Vietnam such as 
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agriculture, light and labour-intensive industries including textiles and garments, 
footwear, etc (Le and Liu, 2006). Advantages of agriculture have been long confirmed 
since the early days of Vietnam’s integration, namely its high ranking in rice export and 
in other items as well, such as sea foods, coffee, pepper, cashew etc (Son, 2006; Le and 
Liu, 2006; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Son (interview, 2010) suggested that “rural areas 
are disadvantaged compared with urban, specifically in terms of social conditions. The 
concentration on industrial development, which heavily depended on SOEs, had 
absorbed most of the domestic and external resources. FDI inflows and technology were 
steered into capital-intensive industries”. Yet the absence of priorities to agriculture led 
to the shortage of workforce in this sector as the youths migrated from rural to urban 
areas (Tu, 2008; Bich, 2007; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Industrial expansion claimed 
agricultural land, depriving the farmers of accumulation possibilities to invest in the 
quality and efficiency of farming (Son, 2006). 
 
A similar outcome occurred in labour-intensive light industries in Vietnam. 
These advantageous sectors of Vietnam also faced difficulties similar to the agriculture 
sector. Light industries consume less capital and technology, so they are open to private 
companies to engage in (WB, 2006; 2011). As a result of the broad participation of the 
private sector, subsidies for protectionism are fairly limited. According to Tuat 
(interview, 2011), “Private companies coped with challenges like ownership of land and 
capital. Lack of large areas of land for establishment of big facilities of private 
companies is one of the difficulties. In this connection, large and favourable pieces of 
land are often reserved for SOEs”. The biggest hurdle to the private companies is the 
access to capital (Hakkala and Kokko, 2007, WB, 2011; Sjoholm, 2006). Tuat 
(interview, 2012) suggested that “without property, these companies found it very hard 
to borrow money off the banks due to the requirement for the property ownership 
papers”. On the other hand, as capital was mainly put into SOEs, credit for these sectors 
are also very limited in terms of quantity and repayment periods, coupled with strict 
borrowing and mortgage conditions (WB, 2006). In calling for foreign investment or 
establishment of joint ventures, these areas are not keen on the investment sources as 
they have no preferential duties and no land to contribute to the business partnership. 
Tuat (interview, 2011) suggested “so such facilities often operate at a small scale, less 
than 300 workers and, as a result, the private sector and exports sector were unable to 
absorb the unemployed labour during the economic restructuring”. 
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The WTO accession process plays an important role in reducing the power of 
some interest groups in order to maintain reform. It also elevates the political voice of 
the groups benefiting from economic reform and integration, especially the Vietnam 
competitive industries such as agriculture and light industries, as well as the private 
sector (MUTRAP, 2007). WTO accession generates motivations for relevant groups in 
international trade and investment to struggle for their own interests. Admission to 
WTO helps open up opportunities of market access and expansion for consumption and 
bring about greater equality in the international trade. Before joining the WTO, Vietnam 
engaged in the regional FTAs like AFTA and BTA, bringing great benefits to the 
economy and advantageous areas of Vietnam, opening up markets through bilateral or 
regional FTAs, Vietnamese exports attained a higher ranking (Chuc, 2009). 
 
Admission to WTO ensured greater equality for trade. Previously, Vietnamese 
exports were often levied high tariffs and discriminated against (MUTRAP, 2007). 
Khanh (2010) mentioned “Many countries sometimes use the non-tariff measures such 
as quota, technical and SPS standards without a well-founded ground, as barriers to 
prevent the import of Vietnamese goods. So many Vietnamese items were undervalued, 
repatriated or levied high taxes”. Some exports were refused because of allegedly low 
quality and chemicals residuals. Many measures to limit Vietnamese exports are 
groundless (Son, 2006; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). With the potential competition in 
terms of price, it is certain that they will have more and more sophisticated barriers in 
the future. Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested that “the WTO is a helpful track for 
Vietnam to safeguard its legitimate rights of trade in a more equal manner”. 
 
Accession liberalised the industrial sector towards a level playing field for 
competition and helped reduce the pressure of interest groups opposed to reform 
(MUTRAP, 2007). Vietnam’s duty system substantially changed. The effective rate of 
protection came down significantly after the WTO accession. Most of the reductions 
were attributed to the reduction of the effective rate of protection in the manufacturing 
sector (CIEM, 2009; 2010; Tuyen et al, 2011). This reduction in import tariffs helped 
decrease protectionism in the domestic market and also meant promoting economic 
restructuring toward greater efficiency of resources distribution, enhancing 
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specialisation and large-scale production (MUTRAP, 2007; NCIEC, 2007). Because of 
the reduced effective rate of protection, the attraction of protected areas went down, and 
resources were transferred to other more efficient sectors. 
 
Vietnam must ensure a level of uniformity in its application of policies 
established during the GATT rounds (MUTRAP, 2007). The increased level of the 
uniformity reduces rent seeking behaviour (Olson, 2000; McMenamin, 2002, Kostecki, 
2007; MUTRAP, 2007). As a result, the State owned sector should lose its previous 
privileges. During the negotiations, “many members were concerned about the existence 
and function of the SOEs in Vietnam, which is a transition country and has been ruled 
by a communist party. They required detailed information on the policies and practices 
of the SOEs in the economy”, Khanh (interview, 2012).  Although the WTO does not 
prevent the existence and operation of the SOEs in the member states, it requests these 
companies to operate under two basic conditions: 
1. Commercial-based and non-discriminative business, and 
2. Transparency in export and import (MUTRAP, 2007; NCIEC, 2007). 
 
Under the Unified Enterprises Law (2005), the aim was to officially eliminate 
discrimination among economic sectors. A list of sectors that enabled 100% of State 
ownership was published, leading to equitisation of enterprises not included in the list. 
This is an important change as it marked the point where instead of the Government 
naming those industries that could be privatised; they named those that could not, 
meaning that all other areas of the sectors could correctly assume a carte blanche 
agreement on them being able to change ownership. As a result, the number of equitised 
SOEs surged since 2004 (WB, 2006; Sjoholm, 2006; Hakkala and Kokko, 2007). 
 
However, there is a need to be far more critical in this area of SOE reform. 
Although the surface research shows impressive efforts to end the monopolies of SOEs 
and their use as Government controlled and financed entities in the national economy, 
the reality is far different. In fact, the Party control of many SOEs of a number of 
sectors, such as construction, insurance, oil and gas, has never been stronger. SOEs are 
virtually immune from the competitive forces of the market and chiefly protected 
through back door subsidisation that include government loans directed through banks, 
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opaque tender processes that guarantee SOEs contracts and freedom from the threat of 
economic collapse through inefficiency, low profits and low productivity, by constant 
access to government support. In such an environment the reality of the situation is that 
the ‘free market’ economy and its forces of conditioning how business is conducted 
rarely applies to SOEs. Vietnam has not actually adapted to the free market economy, 
but instead created a market where SOEs operate exactly as they did in a command 
economy and through that power, centrally controlling the whole Vietnam economy. 
 
WTO accession did help reduce the pressure for slowing down the reform from 
the ministries and local governments. The WTO requires acceding countries to review 
and revise their existing laws to make sure the law and regulations are consistence and 
equal to all economic sectors in the economy (MUTRAP, 2007). The accession process 
also required Vietnam to make this law (and apply it) in an impartial and transparent 
manner. Thus, the legal system has had to improve to meet the requirements. This 
process helped to limit the power of the ministries and local government, who used to 
get their power and benefits from the vagueness of the previous laws and regulations or 
from the administrative control of economic activities (MUTRAP, 2007; WB, 2006). A 
new feature of the Vietnamese legal system was the ability to appeal against State 
administrative decisions and in the process make the Party-State more answerable for 
their decisions (MUTRAP, 2007; Phong, 2009). 
 
The accession process also weakens the interest groups formed by local 
governments. According to Hakkala and Kokko (2007), the local governments have 
little interests in reforming the SOEs and acted as interest groups against this process. 
More than half of the SOEs are actually under the control of the local government (WB, 
2011). However, up to late 1990s, the funds raised by the SOEs equitisation were 
controlled by the central government, and gave local government little incentive to 
equitise their SOEs. Later, the local government had the rights to control the funds from 
the equitisation process of their SOEs and use for their investment in local development 
projects (Hakkala and Kokko 2007). However, decentralisation in managing the SOEs 
equitisation was also damaged by the lack of capacity in implementing the privatisation 
process and using the funds. Due to lacks in capacity, transparency and supervision, 
corruptions or taking advantage of the positions in this process often occurred, and this 
led to the loss of funds, which were transferred illegally into private hands. Many 
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individuals were able to gain from assets of SOEs sold at outrageously low prices after 
they were equitised. McGough (interview, 2012) declared ‘in one major deal in the 
North, the land was valued at 10,000,000VND per metre, but local officials and 
investors acquired it for 2,000,000VND and immediately sold it on in a pre-arranged 
deal to international investors. This is a regular occurrence in which original capital 
outlay is quickly returned 5 even 10 fold in a very short space of time. The deals always 
involve local officials or higher and SOE executives”. The new ‘private’ entities 
enjoying all the same privileges as before, but now with capital and profits diverted into 
a few individuals private hands. Thus, the pressing problems of corruption and the 
widening gap between rich and poor were causing many social problems (Luong, 2007; 
2006; Fforde, 2005: Hakkala and Kokko, 2007). Stronger Central controls of local 
government since 2005 have actually further weakened the incentives for equitisation 
(Hakkala and Kokko, 2007). This is different from the China case, where the local 
governments actively pushed forward the process of equitisation (Le and Liu, 2006). 
The SOEs equitisation process must now be planned with definite roadmaps and 
reviewed annually. The Central Government needs to control and eventually eliminate 
the objections of local government against equitisation (MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
There was still a strong opposition from conservatives who were concerned 
about the role of the private sector. Tuan69 (2006, p.79) said “the development of the 
private sector should not be judged as the creation factors for the recent increasing 
social problems such as exploitation, competition and corruption. There should not be 
the prejudice to see these problems as the nature of the private sector which cannot be 
overcome”. Despite this, the top leadership still fear that Party control may be weakened 
by the increasing roles of the private sector (Forsyth, 1997; Masina, 2006; Painter, 
2005; Sjoholm, 2006). The Party-State has been to some extent disingenuous in its 
privatisation policy. The creation within the private sector of quasi government 
equitised SOEs which maintain all the same privileges and government benefits, falsely 
inflates the ‘private’ sector appearance, making it look as if there is significant growth 
and freedom in the sector, but it is actually a sector dominated by Government ‘Trojan’ 
horses that are nothing more than a ‘privatised’ version of the SOEs. 
                                                
69 A member of Advisory Board of Prime Minister and assistant to the Prime Minister, 
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The export sector, including the private sector, continued to prove its dynamic 
potential under the US BTA (CIEM and USAid, 2007). Khanh (interview, 2012) said 
“The signing and implementation of the BTA was one step closer in preparation for the 
WTO accession of Vietnam. Without the US BTA, the US and other big trading 
partners would not negotiate seriously the terms and conditions for the WTO accession 
of Vietnam”.70 The success of the US BTA implementation boosted the confidence of 
the private and export sectors of Vietnam, causing further economic liberalisation and 
integration. The process also generated millions of jobs and raised the income of the 
Vietnam economy (CIEM and US Aid, 2007). 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012) notes “The incentives for the further reform in the 
business environment and a level playing field among different economic sectors has 
not only come from the improved business environment due to the WTO accession 
process, but also the from the business opportunities from improved non-discriminating 
market access by the WTO accession”. The WTO accession would provide full and 
permanent MFN treatments by other WTO members as well as reducing the lingering 
non-tariff protections and procedures for export of goods and services (MUTRAP, 
2007). Thus, Accession provided opportunities for securing market expansion and 
improvement of the economic reform process. 
 
The WTO accession process promised fairer market access for the Vietnamese 
producers under the WTO mechanism for dispute settlement and for collective 
negotiation of reducing trade protectionist barriers (MUTRAP, 2007). These 
mechanisms are crucial for Vietnam producers because they are increasingly confronted 
with anti-dumping cases involving labour and natural intensive products. Khanh 
(interview, 2012) commented that “increasing anti-dumping cases against Vietnam 
export products might also be one of the major reasons for the Government to accelerate 
the WTO accession process to avoid trade protectionism on Vietnam’s products”. The 
                                                
70 Vietnam exports to the US reached 5.276 billion USD in 2004 compared to 0.82 billion USD in 2000. 
Most products exported to the US were manufacturing products. The garment industry accounted for over 
50% of the total export to US since 2003 
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WTO accession provided increasing opportunities for private and export sectors to raise 
their voice to the policy makers, and shift the political balance away from the 
protectionists (MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
Accession played an important role in influencing the conservatives. One of 
their concerns was the influence of the external forces to weaken the roles of the Party 
(CPV, 2006). A National Congress political report (2006) declared that “the hostile 
forces are continuing keenly to implement the ‘peaceful revolution’ plot, to make riots 
for overthrowing the CPV, to use the card of ‘democratic’, ‘human rights’, ‘ethnic’, and 
‘religion’ aiming to overthrow the political authority of Vietnam” (CPV 2006, p.22). 
This vigilance towards the threat to the political regime has been pointed out in every 
political report of CPV to date. Fear was greater at the end of the 1990s, when the 
normalisation process with the US began and many considered it a covert channel for 
anti-CPV forces, both in Vietnam and abroad, to attempt a ‘backdoor’ revolution 
through the undermining of the authority and power of the CPV (Hung, 2001). One 
senior diplomat had commented “the core objective of the US BTA was to have 
Vietnam collapse and overcome the Communist leadership” (as cited in Sidel 1999, p. 
97). Many leaders believed the relationship with the US always to be a cautious ‘carrot 
and stick’ approach that has extremely negative objectives towards the Communist 
party (Hung, 2000). It was true in the Vietnam case with a range of issues raised by US, 
such as human rights, labour rights, religious freedom, ethnic minorities as well as 
democracy issues (Sidel, 1999; Hung, 2000). Thayer (2002, p.88) suggested that “CPV 
conservatives, however, view the BTA as the Trojan house designed to undermine 
socialism in Vietnam”. The leadership of Vietnam had learned from past experiences 
not to rely on one source of economics and politics for the development (Chuc, 2009). 
Chi Lan has mentioned “the CPV did not feel secure for the growing ties in trade with 
the US”. Khanh (2012) said “the doubt in opening policies with the US was strong in 
Vietnam from leadership, business, to the people, due to the previous war’s history and 
memory”. This feeling was strengthened by a series of the anti-dumping case against 
Vietnam export by the US (Masina, 2006). 
 
Chi Lan (interview, 2012) said “one of reasons to accelerate the WTO accession 
process in Vietnam is to balance the dependence of the Vietnam economy on the US 
market. WTO accession was trying to broaden the market access for the Vietnamese 
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products. The leadership hoped to use this multilateral trade to balance the pressure 
from bilateral trade with the US. This was especially the intention of many conservative 
leaders”. WTO accession process played a role in maintaining the independence and 
self-determination of Vietnam, and provides more balance of demand and pressure for 
economic reforms and performance.  
 
The CPV conservative’s fear of the Accession process and the US-BTA being 
little more than a camouflage for the political overthrow of communism was a strong 
influence and may go a long way to explaining why the SOEs have actually failed to 
reform in any real and effective way. The opening up to the free market was an 
acceptance of the ideological failure of communism in the economic sphere. Yet 
communism is inextricably linked to economic determinism and political ideology, with 
the very basis of the politics founded on control of the economy for the interests of the 
‘People’, the Proletariat. To expect the Party to loosen completely the political central 
control of the economy was over ambitious, and the expectation that they would remain 
in the dominant economic role by directing their control through the SOEs and the so 
called ‘privatised’ SOEs was one that should have been expected. To date, the economy 
of Vietnam is still largely directed and controlled by the Party-State, and this control is 
concentrated in the SOEs and the now ‘privatised’ SOEs. Control of the economy is 
overtly operated through licenses, permissions, rules and regulations, but even stronger 
control is enacted through ‘relationships’ involving any enterprise only able to operate 
effectively if they have the right relations with the Government and/or their officials. 
But this has also created the ideal recipe for corruption, with the opportunities for 
individuals at the top of business and in Government to gain great wealth that is too 
attractive for many to resist. An example is the recent VINASHIN (a Vietnam 
Shipbuilding State-owned Economic Group) scandal, with it running up debts of $4.11 
billion and eight defendants (senior executives in the company) receiving $43 million of 
fines, which reflected the belief in the levels of private rewards the defendant had 
accumulated (Thanh, 2012). The economic system means that this kind of debt or 
personal rewards could not have been possible without high level ‘relationships’ 
involved and yet, the scandal has successfully been limited to but a few senior 
executives. 
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4.3.3 WTO accession process has guided the institution reform 
 
WTO commitments target the decisions and policy making of the Government 
in accordance with: 
1. State’s decisions and polices must be transparent and equal, prioritizing 
enforcement of clauses within international commitments; 
2. Vietnam must apply regulations consistently across the country. Laws, sub-
laws and other measures including regulations and solutions of the local 
government must comply with WTO rules; 
3. Judicial bodies shall have an independent and objective status when dealing 
with administrative decisions under the WTO regulations (MUTRAP, 2007; 
CIEM, 2010). 
 
WTO rules request members to assure stability, transparency and predictability 
in international trade policy and activity. They comply with the ‘rule of law’ promoted 
by developed countries in promoting their institutional and legal systems. According to 
Article X of GATT 1994, Article III of GATS and other requirements of policy 
transparency, all policies, laws, regulation, legal or administrative decisions pertinent to 
international trade must be published by all means to keep the Governments and 
businesses of other members apprised. Vietnam must commit to building an information 
centre to provide information of national laws and regulations on goods trade and 
services to meet the demand for information of other members (MUTRAP, 2007; Basu, 
2008) WTO also requests Vietnam to amend its regulations and laws related to 
investment, including the licensing and investment conditions, issues pertinent to IPRs, 
trade services, etc (MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
In 2005-2006 when Vietnam actively prepared for the admission to WTO, the 
institutional and legal reforms were robustly carried out (MUTRAP, 2007; CIEM, 2010; 
Tuyen at al, 2011). However, although the laws and regulations are in place, the actual 
enforcement of them is almost totally ineffective. Institutional and regulatory 
compliance procedures are inefficient and full of unnecessary delays, to a point where 
any sensible business person will often find the ‘backdoor’ method not only open, but 
 177 
necessary in order to conduct good business. This is a situation, which actively 
encourages corruption as a ‘normal’ practice, in order to achieve profitably in the 
economy.  
 
4.3.4 WTO accession process has influenced the ideology for economic reforms 
 
The process and speed of reform heavily depended on decisions and guidelines 
of the CPV (McCarty, 2006). Thai (interview, 2012) commented that “the CPV is 
characterised by the principles of centralized democracy, so real power belongs to the 
senior cadres of the Party, specifically the Central Committee and Politburo”. Yet, the 
decision-making process is not simple. Within the CPV, the struggle between reformers 
and conservatives is constant (Thayer, 2002; Phong, 2009). The conservative group 
always stressed the uncertainty and out-of-control developments in the course of reform. 
This group is often sceptical and hesitant about ideas of reform including the reduced 
roles of the government, increasing roles of private sectors, impacts of international 
economic integration on the sovereignty and security of Vietnam, etc (Phong, 2009). In 
contrast, the reform group tends to take strong and positive actions when it comes to 
reform. Therefore, the reform in Vietnam is always represented by contradictions 
among the thoughts of reform, stability and prudence in the socio-economic 
development and politics of the country. Apart from these two groups, there is a middle 
ground groups, choosing to support either reformers or conservatives in a sometimes 
arbitrary and unpredictable fashion (McCarty, 2006). The CPV leaders, according to 
Thai (interview, 2012), “mediate between a variety of different and competing thoughts 
to reach the final consensus, best fitting the national socio-economic development at a 
specific time. The speed of reform therefore primarily relies on the situation and 
willingness of senior leaders, particularly the Politburos”. 
 
There remain significant questions as to the viability of maintaining a 
communist ideology in a free market economy. The experience of China and Vietnam is 
but a few decades old and any certainty of its permanence as an economic model is far 
from certain. A factor further complicated in Vietnam by the position of SOEs. The 
SOEs remain reliant on support and capitalisation by the Government; they remain 
inefficient, and protected from the reality of the free market by a number of means, 
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which is further aggravated by the wholesale opportunities for rent-seeking and 
corruption that allows individuals the chance to accumulate vast private wealth and 
divert badly needed resources into their own private domains (ex-the VINASHIN 
scandal). Clearly in Vietnam today, many of the SOEs if not already bankrupt are on the 
verge of bankruptcy. Reuters reported in 2012, that even EVN- the Vietnam Electricity 
Group, which “builds apartments, runs a bank, oversees stock brokerage, provides 
electrical power to millions of homes and employs over 100,000 people’ is a ‘state 
behemoth’ that “symbolises the decline of the country” (Grudgings, 2012, p.1). An 
EVN official declared “debt is... hundreds of trillions of Dong”. The problem of many 
SOEs is ‘cronyism and muddled priorities that have allowed the 100 largest state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to run up debts of US$50 billion- equal to nearly half Vietnam’s 
annual economic output in 2010’ and they have no way of servicing the debt (Grudging, 
2012, p.1). Despite revenues of $5 billion a year, EVN is at least $11.5 billion in debt, 
as the SOEs went on a massive spending spree over the last decade and as Nguyen Duc 
Kien, the Deputy Head of the National Assembly said ‘they attached personal interests 
to investment decisions...there was corruption’ (Grudging, 2012, p.2). The Party’s 
survival is dependent on its economic control through totally inadequate SOE 
enterprises that have proven they are unsuitable for trade in a competitive market. 
Whilst conservatives and reformers within the party are in a contest to reform or not, 
both sides are often directly involved with SOEs and both are reluctant to bar the SOEs 
from the advantages of Government capitalisation, support and relations, and in the 
process throw them into a market where they must invest profits in long term planning, 
human resource training, higher salaries, better management training and pursue higher 
productivity and more efficiency. However, the power to reform is not solely political 
as all reforms require some form of economic power. Often, that power lies with 
reformers only when their businesses and business interests are firmly based in the SOE 
sector or in a now ‘privatised’ SOE. The contradiction is that only by being involved, 
and therefore supporting the Government and SOE relationship do reformers gain the 
influence to change things; which mean changing the very basis of their own power. 
 
The WTO accession was considered to play an important role in advancing the 
reform process in Vietnam. Indeed, the practices of integration have proven to be a 
reliable policy for Vietnam development despite believing it was a ‘tool’ of the Western 
countries to sabotage the domestic economy (Masina, 2006). Thai (interview, 2012) said 
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“previous integration into the ASEAN with the AFTA has proven that Vietnam gained 
more in terms of social and economic development than it lost in economic and 
sovereignty terms. The success of ASEAN integration removed all the CPV doubts on 
loss of sovereignty and control of the Party”. He also mentioned that “the US-BTA, was 
more influential on the leaderships thought and ideology and on economic reforms and 
the international integration than the WTO. The US market is much larger than 
ASEAN”. 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012) said “the benefits of the US-BTA have reduced the 
doubts over social stability in reform and integration at the top leadership. This gave 
enough weight for the reformers to push further reforms under the WTO accession”. 
The promulgation of Resolution 07-NQ/2003/TW (2003) on international economic 
integration by the Politburo has been the example of the change in ideology and thought 
over the international integration and reforms (Luong 2005; 2006). This Resolution 
affirmed and defined the process of active and proactive international economic 
integration and preparedness for WTO membership as soon as possible (Thuong and 
Hung, 2010). Khanh (interview, 2012) said “This resolution was a real milestone 
change for the integration process and economic reforms as the negotiators had had for 
the first time a compass and umbrella for their active involvement and preparation for 
the WTO accession and other international integrations. From that point the real 
negotiation for WTO accession process started”. 
 
4.4 Economic reforms after the WTO accession 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested that “the momentum for reform created by 
the WTO accession process is still effective due the nature of the commitments in the 
WTO. Many of the commitments are to be implemented in a period of 7 years, so they 
are still forces for the domestic reform complying with these commitments. However 
the pace and intensity of reform was not as fast and strong as during the period for 
accelerated accession. The reform process has been affected by the two major factors, 
the reform fatigue of the accession process and market opening and the impacts of the 
global financial crisis and recession”. 
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According to Khanh (interview, 2012), Vietnam has strictly implemented tariff 
cuts laid out in WTO commitments.71 Vietnam engaged in several regional FTA’s under 
the ASEAN integration such as ASEAN China FTA, ASEAN-Korea, ASEAN-Japan, 
ASEAN-Australia/New Zealand. Most of them are beginning in 2015 with 0% tariff for 
many goods. Thus, there is an expectation that the pressure from tariff cuts is still 
paramount in the manufacturing sector. More effort from both government and 
enterprises is needed to conduct further reform and renovation of policies and 
operations (Tuyen et al, 2011; CIEM, 2007). According to Khanh (interview, 2012), 
“this pressure is at the right level for Vietnam industries because the tariff cuts are 
gradual and take place in several years. These provide enough time for enterprises and 
the government to react and prepare for the changes”. CIEM (2010, p.4) stressed that 
“the government roadmap for tariff reductions since mid-2007 has been significantly 
faster than that in the WTO commitments”. Vietnam government fully implemented the 
tariff quote rate for the products allowed under the WTO commitments and removed all 
the remaining quotas and removed all agricultural subsidies (CIEM, 2010). 
 
Vietnam has a high level of market opening, with the volume of imports and 
exports exceeding 1.7 times of the GDP (WB, 2011). As a result, Vietnam is highly 
sensitive and vulnerable to external shocks, such as the fluctuation of world prices, 
economic situation of the main trading partners as well as the world economic situation 
(CIEM, 2010; Anh, 2012a). The current global financial crisis was the vivid example of 
the implications. The GDP has fallen down to lowest point of 5.3% since 1999 (Anh, 
2012a). So there is pressure for the government to continue their reforms and to 
coordinate the macroeconomic policies for a more stable and growth supported 
economy (Anh, 2012a). The Prime Minister confirmed that with the limited resources, 
inadequate legal system, lack of the experience in market economy operation, there is a 
big challenge of the government in running a stable macro-economy, having capacity in 
                                                
71 The average EPR for the whole economy has dropped 2.1 times from 21.4% in 2005 to 10,3 % in 2020. 
The nominal average tariffs also reduce 2 times from 11.1% in 2005 to 5.4% in 2020 (CIEM, 2007). 
Indeed, actual EPR may be lower due to the possibility of lower actual tariff (Tuyen et al, 2011). Thus, 
the pressure from the WTO accession is still high for the Vietnam producers. Manufacturing has the 
highest reduction rate from 40.4% in 2006 to 20.8% in 2020 (CIEM, 2007). 
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planning and forecasting as well as appropriating managing mechanisms for coping 
with the changing environment of the international market (Government Online, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4.2:  FDI inflow in Vietnam from 1988-2008 
Source: WB, 2011 
 
The benefits of the WTO accession are in terms of the opportunities, which need 
conditions for realising them in order to make real gains for the economy (Tuyen et al, 
2011). Table 4.2 shows that the FDI commitments have continuously reached new high 
records since 2006.72 Foreign Indirect Investment also increased significantly since 
2006 (CIEM, 2010). However, the Vietnam economy soon exposed its limits in 
absorbing the strong dose of investment flow, when the economy became macro 
economically unstable, with high inflation rates (CIEM, 2010; Anh, 2011a). CIEM 
(2010) judged that macroeconomic instability showed that the administration was not up 
to meeting the rapid and strong impacts of the economic integration. Moreover, this also 
proved that several bottlenecks in the economy still need to be addressed. These are the 
low quality and high cost of the infrastructure, the lack of skilled labour, low 
productivity, ineffective investment, etc (CIEM, 2010). There are real pressures on the 
government to maintain reforms and for overcoming such limitations in government 
                                                
72 In 2006, the FDI commitments reached USD 12 billion, which increased 75% of that in previous year. 
In 2008, this figure was USD 71 billions in 2008, which was 4 times higher than that in 2006  (GSO, 
2009). 
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capacities, the administration, mechanism, the infrastructure and productivity (CIEM, 
2010). 
 
The WTO accession process is still continuing to play an important role on 
changing the interest balancing favouring the economic reforms. Firstly, Chi Lan 
(interview, 2012) said “most of the government’s objectives of the WTO accession have 
been achieved in the first few years of the process”. This was a big boost for the 
reformers to expand their influence. The economy had achieved a record high growth 
rate of 8.5% in 2006 and the highest rate since 1997 (GSO, 2010). The structure of the 
economy has also changed, with an increasing proportion of manufacturing and 
construction and decreasing proportion of agriculture (CIEM, 2010). According to 
CIEM (2010), manufacturing and service industries achieved high growth rates above 
the increase of the GDP. The exports also gained benefits from the WTO accession, 
which contributed significantly into the growth of GDP (CIEM, 2010).73 As a result of 
the WTO accession, the trade barriers in the WTO trading members were significantly 
reduced (CIEM, 2010).74 However, the WTO accession is also associated with a huge 
trade deficit of 14.1 billion USD in 2007 (CIEM, 2010). The volume of imports also 
rocketed to 62.7 billion USD in 2007, which was an increase of 39.6% of that in 2006. 
The imports were mostly the input for the production and export, however, increasingly 
included consumer goods (CIEM, 2010). In 2007, the total investments hit a record high 
due to the sharp increase of FDI and of the State sector investment (CIEM, 2010).75 The 
sharp increase in the FDI might be the result of the WTO accession, which might show 
the improvement of the legal system and business environment and the potential of the 
market (Luong, 2007; CIEM, 2010). Moreover, Khanh (interview, 2012) mentioned that 
“the WTO accession also helped to diversify the export products of Vietnam. The 
                                                
73 The volume of export reached USD 48.6 billion in 2007, which increased 21.9% of that in 2006 (GSO, 
2009). 
74 The Volume of non-oil export was increased 27% in 2007 and 30.6% in 2008 (MPI, 2010), in which 
agricultural such as coffee, rice, and cashew and textiles and garments products had high growth rates 
(GSO, 2010).   
75 The total investment of the whole economy was 521.7 billion VND in 2007, which was equivalent to 
45.6% GDP. In 2008, the investment was equivalent to 43.1% GDP (MPI, 2010). The registered FDI was 
21.3 billion USD and unexpectedly high at 71 billion USD in 2008 (GSO, 2010). 
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export structure is also moving towards having more exports from manufacturing”. He 
also stressed that “US-BTA has brought a significant change in the market access for 
Vietnam products”. CIEM (2012) reckoned that the WTO accession has enhanced 
Vietnam’s image in foreign affairs. Since the WTO accession, Vietnam has actively 
broadened its involvement in foreign affairs and increased its diplomatic recognition 
around the work with bilateral and multilateral efforts. These processes have gained 
many successes for Vietnam in the both economic and diplomatic fields (Han, 2008). 
 
Table 4.4: FDI, Export and import value after the WTO accession (billion 
USD) 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FDI Commitments 6.83 12 21.34 71.7 21.1 18.6 
Implemented FDI 3.31 4.1 8.03 11.5 10 11 
Total export value 32.44 39.82 48.56 62.69 57.1 72.23 
% Increase  22.74 21.93 29.09 -8.92 26.52 
Total import value 36.76 44.89 62.77 80.71 69.95 84.84 
% Increase  22.12 39.82 28.60 -13.34 21.29 
Source: GSO, 2010; 2011. 
 
However, economic performance has deteriorated since 2008. Macroeconomic 
instability has persisted with high inflation, a large trade deficit and low GDP growth 
(Han, 2009; CIEM, 2010; WB, 2010). Since 2008, the inflation has been troubling the 
economy, with the highest rate of 28% in 2008 (Tuyen et al, 2011). GDP growth 
dropped dramatically from 8.5% in 2007 to the lowest rate of 5.3% in 2009 since 1999, 
and while also showing that the GDP growth has improved, it is still low and unstable 
(GSO, 2011). 
 
As the economy liberalised under the WTO accession, it was greatly affected by 
external shocks from the global economic crisis such as price fluctuations, economic 
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health of trading partners, etc (Tuyen et al, 2011). Another factor was the high price of 
imports and this bringing a higher trade deficit into Vietnam (CIEM, 2010; Tuyen et al, 
2011). Easy and cheaper imported products due to WTO trade liberalisation increased 
domestic consumption (Tuyen et al, 2011; CIEM, 2010). Vietnam’s experts have not 
seen this as the primary cause of Vietnam’s economic problems and instead point to the 
Government’s mismanagement of the macroeconomic and the partial reforms that have 
led to an economic slowdown and instability over the last 3 years (CIEM, 2010; Tuyen 
et al, 2011; Han, 2008; 2009; Fforde, 2012). Government policy has failed to handle 
adequately the macroeconomic instability, which led to negative impacts on growth and 
inflation. The State Bank increased the money supply to purchase back foreign 
currencies. The Bank also fixed a rigid exchange rate, which resulted in import inflation 
problems caused by rising world prices (CIEM, 2010). The main reasons for the 
economic instability of Vietnam in 2008 were domestic policies, which put a heavy 
weight onto high economic growth and were based on investments, especially the State 
investment (CIEM, 2010; Amer, 2010; Han, 2009; Fforde, 2012; Tuyen et al, 2011). 
Excessive state investment placed pressure on the budget deficit and economic 
instability (CIEM, 2010). The coordination between monetary policies and the fiscal 
policies was not in harmony as tight monetary and fiscal policies were aimed at 
achieving continuously high growth (CIEM, 2010). The Government did not plan the 
price liberalisation well. Maintaining high economic growth is one of important goals of 
the Party-State as this helps to ensure the leading role of the CPV in the society and the 
ideology of the “market economy with socialist orientation” is still the magnetic needle 
for economic development of Vietnam. Although WTO accession helped to speed up 
the level playing field for all economic sectors in the economy, the state sector plays a 
leading role in central tasks of economic development (CPV, 2011, p.35). The core and 
central commanding units are the State Economic Groups and Corporations (Chi Lan, 
interview, 2012; Thai, interview, 2012; WB, 2011; Anh, 2012a). After WTO accession, 
the process of SOEs equitisation and reform increased its pace and the number of 100% 
SOEs has been reduced from 3800 SOEs in 2005 to about 1400 SOEs in 2008 and to 
1309 enterprises in 10/2011 (Government Office, 2011). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) said 
on the SOEs reform “this does not tell the real pictures of the SOEs reforms”. The Party 
and Government believed the consequence of the WTO accession would be fierce 
competition by many international corporations. The principle of the market economy is 
the ‘survival of the fittest’, thus the domestic economy needs its strong ‘steel’ fists for 
coping with this competition. The SOEs were entrusted to play this role in keeping the 
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market economy and balancing the competition of the foreign companies. The 
government has paid attention to promoting the SOEs and placing them in a 
restructuring process. However, the SOEs promotion could not be done formally, but 
has been realised through a series of industrial policies including steel, cement, ship 
building etc.  Industrial policies are targeted to promote capital-intensive industries. 
These industries need huge resource investments and capacities, which were out of the 
reach of the private sector. As a result, the SOEs were the sole participants of the 
programme and were also responsible for strategic development for their industries. The 
central part of the plans was to get huge government investments into the SOEs to make 
them large-scale enterprises in the industries. 
 
The SOEs privatisation before the WTO accession satisfied WTO’s members 
(MUTRAP, 2007). However, this has not reflected the real picture of the SOEs reforms 
(Thanh, interview, 2011). Although the speed and number of the SOEs privatisation was 
quick and large, the capitals of the privatised SOEs were less than 10% of the total 
capital of the SOEs. The Prime Minister set new targets for SOE privatisation process in 
2006, but less than 30% of the target was achieved every year since 2006 (Chi Lan, 
interview, 2011). 
 
The Government has experimented on the transformation of the large SOEs and 
State General Corporations’ into holding-subsidiaries and to establish State-owned 
Economic Groups (SOEG) (Thanh, 2011). The SOEGs are groups of enterprises each 
with distinct legal status, which are gathered together through mutual investment, 
capital contributions and other forms of affiliation (WB, 2008). They are organised 
under the 100% state owned parent limited companies or limited holding companies, 
who share long term economic interests. These subsidiary companies may be joint stock 
companies or 100% state owned companies (WB, 2008). This experiment has aimed to 
change ideas on the role of Government in ownership of the SOEs. The Government, 
instead of investing and managing the enterprises can now limit this to having shares in 
the enterprises. However, McGough (interview, 2012), a political policy expert to the 
Vietnam government noted “the relationship between shareholders and senior 
executives in Vietnam is somewhat complicated, but basically it is beyond the owners’ 
capability to release power to second parties. Owners and executives are nearly always 
one and the same, and both major day to day decisions and the overall business strategy 
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is concentrated in the hands of the main shareholders”. Thus, Government ownership 
means they are still making all of the major decisions. Thai (interview, 2012) said that 
“Two State Owned Economic Groups (SOEG) were established for the experiment just 
before the WTO accession, which were the Vietnam Coal Groups in 8/2005 (which later 
become Vietnam Coal and Mineral Group (VINACOMIN) in 12/2005) and VINATEX 
in 2005. These two groups both have been upgraded from the two existing 
corporations”. Thanh (interview, 2011) suggested “the model was expanded in 2006 and 
after four years of experiment, there were 12 SOEGs in operation”. The model 
increased the size and power of the enterprises as it integrated the vertical production 
chain into one big economic group. Many of them even have their own banks or they 
have financial and securities subsidiary companies”. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) was 
concerned that “rapid expansion of the SOEGs is not only leading to concern over their 
size and monopoly power in the market, but also generated concerns on the process of 
SOE restructuring and privatisation. These economic groups are acting as an umbrella 
for the small and medium SOEs to avoid the privatisation process when they become 
members of the group”. As a result, the number of SOEs was reduced, but they have not 
disappeared. For examples, VINASHIN has 454 subsidiary enterprises. These groups 
become a closed circle of a business empire including providing services such as 
financial and distribution services. In 2008, most of these economic groups have 
diversified their core business to many other areas. With their concentration of capital 
and vertical integration, these Economic Groups are powerful economic entities. They 
further enjoyed the government’s connections and resources invested in them by their 
plan for the industry’s development. Fforde (2012) suggested that the SOEGs are also 
organised around family and relationship connections. These not only distort the market 
but also erode the disciplines of the market. This also facilitates the corruption epidemic 
in the country. People also complained that the government money invested in SOEGs 
for the industry’ developments have been extracted for the personal wealth rather than 
for the development of the industry. With these assets and connections, the SOEGs are 
making money for their own personal wealth but leaving the consequences for the 
government. The VINASHIN case was an example of the situation. It was established 
for the development of the shipping industry of Vietnam. The government guaranteed 
an international loan valued at 700 million USD for VINASHIN. However, VINASHIN 
was soon in debt and economic losses without any paying back capacity, due to its 
inefficient operation, wrong investment and corruption. The debt of the VINASHIN was 
recorded at over 4 billion USD in 2010. Although there has been high public attention to 
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the case, the Party and the state still concluded that it is not their fault in managing this 
EG and all responsibility rests on the Chairman and Director of the VINASHIN. 
 
Chi Lan (interview, 2012) has mentioned “the boom of the SOEG establishment 
has indeed reduced the ability of the government to conduct reforms following the 
WTO accession.76 The reforms have succeeded in several fronts such as trade, 
investment and legal framework, but the reforms for less intervention of the government 
into the economy through state investment and commands for better business 
environment has not succeeded. The current business environment is even more 
distorted, because the SOEGs have become very strong interest groups that obstructed 
reforms”. In the 3rd Central Committee Meeting in 2010, the Party recognised interest 
groups in the economy for the first time. This recognition of the Party is at a time that 
the corruption and SOEG’s are causing unacceptable losses (Fforde, 2012). Thai 
(interview, 2012) mentioned, “SOEGs are gaining greater powers and connections, 
which can influence the policy decision-making. Through personal connection they can 
influence directly the persons who are making the decisions and be able to by-pass the 
executives in charge of the decision-making preparation.” Chi Lan (interview, 2012) 
further stressed “SOEGs can lobby through various channels including the personal 
channels directly to the top leadership. With this great economic power, these groups 
can by-pass the Ministry in forming policies and regulations by approaching directly to 
government leadership. SOEGs are established by the decision of the Prime Minister, 
thus many of them even ignore the control and management of the Ministries”. Fforde 
(2012, p.183) found that “politics has changed, capitalism has been established and the 
Party is finding ways to make money from the political system”. As a result, Chi Lan 
(interview, 2012) and Tuyen (interview, 2012) believe that “the expected benefits of the 
WTO accession in regard to the SOEs and market reform have not been fully achieved”. 
 
 
                                                
76 Only two SOEGs were experimentally established in 2005. Without a proper evaluation and end of the 
experiment scheme, the number of SOEGs was increased sharply to 13 SOEGs in 2010. Most of the 
largest State Owned Corporations were upgraded to Economic Groups within 4 years since 2006.  
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Shareholding, SOEGs and Equitisation: Solution or a deepening of the 
problems? 
 
Despite warnings of the inadequate, and to some extent, false equitisation 
process in Vietnam, the Party continues a policy of cosmetic privatisation (Sjoholm, 
2006, p.2). SOE’s in Vietnam are plagued by a ‘complex maze of cross-subsidization 
and indebtedness’ (Sjoholm, 2006, p.3). WTO accession was an overt acceptance that 
SOE’s needed to privatise or equitise and that the private sector needed to be 
encouraged and supported. Yet, the Party’s covert approach has been a superficial 
approach and commitment to privatisation, accompanied by the adaptation of a 
corporate Party strategy involving the Party switching from State controlled status to a 
‘private’ entrepreneurial role that maintains political authority, even oligarchy, over the 
economic system (Sjoholm, 2006, p.17). The State’s actual dominance and control of 
the economy has remained constant, which is in a stark contrast to China’s record. The 
statistics show significant drops in the numbers of SOE’s, but this is accounted for by a 
large number of small SOE privatisations, while the large SOE’s have increased their 
size and monopolies of markets. State control is hidden behind the shareholding 
structure, where the Party maintains their interests through manipulation of 
shareholding control in foreign joint ventures and Stock companies (Sjoholm, 2006, 
p.17-18). Painter (2005, p.267) notes that Vietnam SOE’s strengthened their economic 
monopolies through a lack of effective Government controls, with regulation left to ‘a 
highly centralised, fragmented and sometimes incoherent set of state institutions’. The 
confusing and uncoordinated controls meant that ‘private actors’ in powerful political 
positions and the SOE sector are able to divert benefits given or created by SOE’s into 
their own ‘pockets’. This has been the primary foundation of the creation of an elite 
interest group, who can now be seen as the prominent political force in Vietnam. 
 
When equitised, the shareholding shape is questionable at best and fraudulent at 
worst. On average, the State retains 46% of shares, while workers have 29% and 
‘outside’ investors 24%. Even in this overt format the State retains sufficient ownership 
in the Vietnam shares structure and regulations to maintain overall control. However, 
the reality is worse, with the workers share having very little influence or power over 
decision-making, and the ‘outsiders’ share often involving a sharing out of holdings to 
Party connected friends and family’. These are often still left as ‘votes’ of an individual, 
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but disguised by being held in the names of family or friends. The situation grows 
worse as the divesting of multiple holdings of shares to one person is made possible 
through the ‘borrowing’ of family and friend’s names and signatures or the invention of 
non-existent individuals (Nghia, interview, 2011). The availability of shares is increased 
by a tendency for workers to divest their holdings of shares very quickly after taking 
possession and earning the ‘quick profit’. As Fforde (2003, p.21) notes, ‘in Vietnam, the 
private is not entirely private, and the public is not entirely public’. Foreign investment 
in the shares is minimal, with for example, only 25 privatisations/equitisations out of 
2600 (up to 2006) being allowed to offer shares to foreigners and shareholding limited 
to a point where foreign ownership is virtually without decision-making powers at any 
level (Sjoholm, 2006, p.23). Coupled with bad accounting standards, a still weak stock 
market and the embedded practice of providing false statistics and evaluations, the 
privatisation process is impossible to accurately assess or to evaluate against WTO 
commitments. However, it is fair to declare that equitisation/privatisation of large SOEs 
is virtually non-existent and ‘the State maintains control of the economy’ (Sjoholm, 
2006, p.29). The system clearly allows the ‘elite’ political-business interest group a 
means to monopolise finances and resources and divert them to SOEs and State owned 
‘private’ companies, which are then re-directed into their own ‘pockets’. The lack of an 
efficient institutional and regulatory system to enforce laws provides this elite interest 
group with even further opportunities for individualistic wealth and power creation. 
 
Although there have been significant improvements in the institutional reforms 
since the WTO accession, there are still many complaints about the reforms. Tuyen 
(interview, 2012) mentioned that “the process of institutional reforms have been short of 
the expectation for the impacts of the WTO accession on the speeding up of the 
institutional reforms. The CPV resolution mentioned that the WTO accession process 
might be a catalyst for speeding up the reform process. Apart from many improvements, 
there are still many shortages in the reforms of the roles of the government, the level 
playing field between economic sectors, the public administration, the transparency 
etc”. The CIEM (2010) believe that the quality of some legal documents is not high, 
comprehensive and clear enough, causing inconsistent understanding, arbitrary 
enforcement and corruption. Thus, many legal documents are unsuitable for a modern 
economy. Many also complained about the overlapping mandate of laws and regulation. 
For example, contracts are under jurisdiction of many laws and regulations such as Civil 
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Code 2005, Ordinance of Economic contracts, Trade Law, and other laws in different 
related areas (CIEM, 2010). 
 
A concern is the level of law enforcement, which is still a problem after the 
WTO accession. The WTO accession process has imposed remarkable improvements in 
the legal framework and the operation of the institutions (CIEM, 2010; WB, 2011; 
MUTRAP, 2007). However, Thanh (interview, 2011) criticised that “enforcements of 
these good improved laws and regulation are still a big problem. When they come into 
force, the enforcement is shambolic and the laws and regulations lose their affect.” 
Aggregate institution indicators are still at a very low rate and have not really improved 
since the WTO accession. The rule of law is improved, but is insufficient in the context 
of increasing quality of regulatory compliance and accountability, and this suggests that 
the laws and regulations are not effectively enforced. The control of corruption has been 
significantly improved but is also now in decline. This also suggests that the decline in 
enforcement of the rule of law can be correlated with the decline in the controls of 
corruption. Indeed, the corruption has been considered as a growing epidemic of the 
society, which has gradually eroded the control and credibility of the Party-State 
(Fforde, 2012). The corruption is now the highest concern in the society and the Party 
introduced new laws on anti-corruption and, this has been highly welcomed by the 
society, but it still needs time to see how it is actually realised in the current situation. 
Many believe that it will again be a case of a good law but absolutely minimal 
enforcement, which does little more than make the Party-State now seem ineffective, or 
even active and willing participants in the corruption. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The positive results of the US-BTA and the accelerated effort to join WTO 
contributed to a change of the views and thoughts of the CPV leaders on economic 
integration and reforms. Reforms brought a better environment for investment and 
business and helped towards creating a better society, which could only benefit the 
future position of the CPV. Support for development through ‘import substitution 
industries’ declined and was replaced by the strategy of investing and producing the 
competitive goods and services for the international markets.  
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The WTO accession acted as a measure to empower the reformers and give them 
an enhanced political basis for locking-in the progress of the reforms. However, 
although we have seen in this chapter how WTO and the USBTA helped structure and 
drive through a reform process, confidence in the future of the economy cannot be high 
as serious questions need to be asked. Central to these is the clear indication that a 
socialist oriented free market economy has come to be seen by many on the reformer 
and conservative side as some form of integrated and interdependent model of 
economics with a mixture of free market and central command features. There are no 
previous models to gauge or evaluate the present attempts by China and Vietnam to 
retain communist political control and ideology in a fast developing free market 
economy. Free market economics is the very core of the capitalist ideology with Adam 
Smith’s ‘hidden hand’ of the free market as much a political statement as an economic 
one. A belief that the two ideologies, Capitalism and Communism can be merged into a 
hybrid model is the very foundation and justification of the continuing authority of 
Vietnam’s CPV. But this may be an impossible dream unless the negative impacts and 
problems of its operation are not tackled by the Party.  
 
Vietnam’s economy has operated for centuries on a Confucius basis, where 
relationship and friendship are the paramount forces of successful business. Whether 
French or Chinese colonialism, American occupation or Communist Single Party rule, 
the strength of the business world has been its continued reliance on ‘relationships’ as 
the basis for  ‘doing business’. The relationship model is a product of Asian culture, 
colonialist history, the fights for independence and Communist Single Party rule, which 
also now imprints free market economics upon the society and country. But it is clear 
that this has often only served the interests of individuals and individualism. The 
VINASHIN scandal may merely be the ‘tip of the iceberg’ and beneath the surface 
SOEs, ‘privatised’ SOEs and the ‘relationship’ culture have meant that the economy 
suffers from a dramatic drain on its resources by individuals who are amassing gigantic 
fortunes at the expense of the country and its people. VINASHIN were able to corruptly 
subvert over $4 billion dollars and merely a fraction of that amount was handed out in 
fines ($143 million) to the convicted perpetrators of the crime. That $4 billion also has 
to be understood in relative terms, as Vietnam is a developing country and $4 billion in 
economic and political power terms is comparatively equivalent to 10 times that amount 
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in the Western economies. But the real problem was a system that enabled this type of 
corruption to take place. SOEs are remaining as chiefly political forces to maintain 
Central control over the economy and in the process are freed from the pressures of a 
competitive and free market system, whilst also stifling the incentives for truly 
‘privatised’ and competitive businesses to expand and profit from a open market 
system. 
 
Although the hybrid model of communist political control in a free market 
economic model, would seem a contradiction that is ideologically impossible to sustain, 
the development of a socialist based capitalism, similar to for instance to the 
Scandinavian countries is possible, and the future rule of a Single Party system is also 
thus possible, retaining its Communist ideology through the particular Ho Chi Minh 
morals and values being applied to the society and economy as a whole. The legitimacy 
of that model would have to rest on providing the benefits of development to all of 
society and not having them chiefly left in the hands of individuals who grow daily 
richer at the expense of the rest of society. WTO and the US-BTA have provided the 
means and opportunity to enter and compete in the global economy, but its future 
success will depend on factors such as attracting more FDI and welcoming foreign 
businesses on the basis of their efficiency, high productivity, capital soundness and 
benefits to Vietnam, and not on whether they are partnered with a particularly powerful 
SOE, or on relationships, or on a willingness to feed the system of corruption and rent-
seeking. 
 
Reforms and change would have appeared to only accelerate when Vietnam 
reached a critical point in any crisis. The WTO and the US-BTA would then appear to 
be the ‘tools’ to actually force through and manage these changes and reforms. This 
changes our concept of these Agreements as the initiator and cause of these reforms, 
and in Vietnam, move more towards understanding them as a means to an end, rather 
than the definer of what that end is or its cause. The imposition of the WTO model on 
Vietnam for instance, has been redesigned as hybrid political experiment in Single Party 
Socialist rule in a free market economy; something that the original creators of the 
WTO would have felt an impossible contradiction.  The impact and strategies for coping 
with crisis in Vietnam need to be understood from both a cultural and behavioural 
perspective, with change the result of the pressure of impending catastrophe and the 
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only real means to bring about reform in Vietnam. Set against this society wide aversion 
to change, and a belief in ‘better the devil you know than the one you don’t’ the 
movement of Vietnam to free market economics is truly a giant step into the unknown, 
and much of the reforms might then been seen as reactive, rather than planned. 
 
There is the possibility of developing a hybrid ideological model that involves 
Party power remaining, but only by the Party becoming the facilitator of the economic 
system whilst also ameliorating the negatives impacts such as unemployment and 
poverty. The WTO can remain as the means to support this, with Government providing 
guidance and power to establish a society of high morals and values based on 
Communist communitarianism and opposed to individualism, whilst maintaining a free 
economic market system that provides the financial wealth to further improve the 
economy and society through free education and health, and efficient and sufficiently 
rewarded administrative and legal systems that discourage corruption, rather than 
benefit from it. In this thesis it is vital to understand that in contrast to other countries 
that have gained accession to the WTO, China and Vietnam are aiming to maintain the 
basic ideology of Communism, while applying the economics of Capitalism. Success in 
this could further confirm Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote that “do not care if the cat is 
black or white, what matters is it catches mice” and prove that Communist ideology and 
single Party rule can continue as long as society as a whole benefits from its success. 
 
In order to further understand how WTO accession influenced the process of 
economic reform in Vietnam, the next three case studies are providing more details of 
the reforms under the WTO accession in three different industries: textile and garment, 
banking and agricultural industries. Each industry is representing a different interest 
group that has been affected by the WTO accession. 
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CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY: THE AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR’S REFORMS 
 
 
Vietnam implemented numerous economic and political reforms on the road to 
developing a market economy. The agricultural sector plays a vital role in the Vietnam 
economy and society. Commitments of WTO reform focused to a large extent on the 
agricultural sector, which came under extreme pressure as Vietnam converted from a 
chiefly rural economy, to a modern urban industrial economy. The impact has created 
both pressure groups strongly supporting the Accession process and staunch opponents 
to it, which have even resulted in violent protests and fears for the stability of the 
country and the rule of the Party. 
 
Accession accelerates the process of reform, provides opportunities for market 
expansion, and helps in adjusting the political and legal framework and better 
preparation for integration into the global economy (Tu, 2008). The reality of reforms 
and the reaction to them provides a clear picture of how WTO accession and the reform 
process are interlinked. It is clear that the liberalisation of trade provided numerous new 
opportunities for the expansion of agricultural markets and has resulted in vast new 
inputs of wealth and opportunity for the agricultural sector. However, a major concern 
is that the actual producers of agricultural goods (the farmers, seafood producers, etc) 
have been denied many of the benefits. Most producers remain on a subsistence farming 
level and have enjoyed few of the rewards of a rich and rewarding growth in 
agricultural exports. The benefits have largely gone to SOEs who have become vital 
‘middle men’. They act as the ‘agents’ between the international markets and the 
producers, amalgamating the profits and rewards of impressive levels of growth in 
exports and improving them by providing the producers with limits to prices that are 
more of the reflection of the past central controls of quotas and prices, than the delivery 
of new opportunities. Thus, producers, such as farmers, have seen little reason for 
celebration of WTO accession and instead find their opportunities for development 
stultified by prevention of direct access to their markets, and domestically limited by 
archaic regulation of ownership of land, limitation of investment and generally a 
wholesale denial of their ability to progress to an economically and politically powerful 
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force for change and development. This chapter will show that this is a deliberate and 
conscious policy and intended to ensure that agricultural producers/peasants do not 
become a powerful voice for reform at the lowest level of subsistence. This chapter will 
examine how the current development of the agricultural sector has progressed, the 
reforms undertaken in the last 20 years and the impacts of the WTO on the reform 
process. 
 
5.1 Overview of the Agricultural sector and policies 
 
Agriculture plays an important role in the political, economic and social 
development of Vietnam. More than 70% of its population live in rural areas, with the 
vast majority dependent on the agricultural sector (Son, 2006; Bich, 2007; Nguyen and 
Hoang, 2012).77 Agriculture provides inputs for processing and is vital to exports. It is 
one of the major political forces in the country and its influence is the very foundation 
for stable politics and society (Son, 2006; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Son, 2008b; Tu, 
2008). 
 
Since 1986, Vietnam’s agricultural sector has developed and contributed 
remarkably to the economy (Le and Liu, 2006). The agriculture sector has maintained 
rapid growth with an average of 5.8% a year (Tu, 2008). This growth rate is not as high 
as in the industry and service sectors, but is much higher than the average rate of many 
other parts of the world (Son, 2008). The contribution share of the agricultural sector to 
the GDP has decreased over time, owing to the more dynamic sectors of the economy 
(MUTRAP, 2008; GSO, 2012).78 The structure of the agricultural sector has also 
moving towards modernisation (Son, 2008).79 The agricultural sector has not only 
                                                
77 Seventy one per cent work in the agriculture sector (10.46 million households). Its most important role 
is to ensure food security for the nation. Eighty eight million require food and the population increases by 
1.2 million every year. 
78 The share of agriculture in the national economy accounted for around 20.58% in 2010, falling from 
27% in 1995 
79 Agricultural cultivation has reduced gradually from 78.1% in 1995 to 72.1% in 2011. The proportion of 
livestock farming increased from 18.9% in 1995 to 26.5 in 2011 (GSO, 2012). 
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guaranteed the steady provision of foods for the country’s industrialisation process but 
also contributed greatly into the state budget by its growing exports (Son, 2008; Nguyen 
and Hoang, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Export share of the major agricultural products 
Source: Custom News, 2012 
 
Before economic reforms, Vietnam imported more than 500 million tons of 
foods every year. Since 1988, Vietnam has produced enough foods for their large and 
increasing population and become the biggest rice exporter in the world. Many other 
agricultural products have achieved leading world market shares (Son, 2008).80 
Agricultural exports are a major source of foreign exchange earnings for Vietnam. 
 
Agriculture is not an attractive sector for investment (Son, 2006; 2008).81In the 
period of 2004-2010, public investment for agriculture just accounted for around 7% of 
                                                
80 In 2011, the export value of the agricultural products including forestry and fishery reached 16.8 billion 
USD, which accounted for 23.3% of the total exports (GSO, 2012) and is 28% higher than the previous 
year (GSO, 2012). In 2008, Vietnam also imported 4.5 billion USD of foods, foodstuff and live animals, 
which was up by 38% compared to the previous year (GSO, 2010). 
81 Private investment just made up 13-15% in the total amount of annual investments. 
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the total state investment (GSO, 2012; 2009). Son82 (interview, 2010) noted that “the 
industrialisation process has also attracted young labour out of the rural and agriculture 
areas and into the cities, which has further forced agriculture into more difficult 
circumstances”. Thus, agriculture is currently facing many difficulties.  
 
5.2 Agricultural Sector Reform 
 
Agricultural reform was in three major phases; from 1986 to 1995, as 
agricultural production develops in compliance with market demands; from 1996 to 
2002 with reform in terms of production structure and enhanced export capacity to keep 
up with the international economic integration since 2002 (Son, 2008; Bich, 2007). The 
third phase started from the time of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. 
 
5.2.1 Agricultural shift to an export-oriented economy from 1986-1998 
 
Agriculture was one of the first sectors to carry out reforms. Since 1979, “fence 
breaking” activities were spontaneously and secretly done in several local government 
areas. Farmers were contracted to collectives to take production responsibilities for a 
stage of production, then later for land and equipment (Phong, 2009). The difficulty in 
producing foods for the nation meant the success of these fence-breaking activities (with 
higher productivity and more foods supplied to the local people) led to the CPV’s 
informal acceptance of using these methods in the collectives from 1981. This was the 
first reform of the CPV under the pressure of the food shortages. However, this partial 
reform was soon exhausted in 1984, when the lands and equipment still belonged to the 
collectives and the returns to the collectives under the plan were increasingly high for 
the farmers (Phong, 2009; Bich, 2007). From 1984, the country again fell into a food 
shortage crisis, leading to wholesale famine in 1987 (Bich, 2007). 
 
                                                
82 Dr. Nguyen Kim Son is the Director of Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural 
Development.  
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The 6th National Party Congress (1986) concluded that “the centrally planned 
mechanism no longer creates momentum for development, weakens the economy, 
generates barriers to production, reduces productivity and product quality and places 
circulation of goods in chaos” (CPV, 2004, p.23). The Congress officially announced 
economic reforms, recognising the existence and role of a multi-sector economy in 
Vietnam and the free flow of goods in the market. Congress announced the shift in 
focusing on heavy industry to producing agricultural and consumer products (Phong, 
2009). In Decree 10-NQ/TW (1988) on management reform in the agricultural 
economy, farmers were allowed to lease the lands from collectives for durable contracts 
up to 15 years. They could own the means of production or contract the facilities from 
collectives for undertaking cultivation. Contracted households would complete targets 
for the State and then could decide on the remainder of production and conduct trade 
with collectives and State-owned institutions on the basis of equality and price 
negotiation (Phong, 2009). ‘Contract 10’ was a milestone for the development of the 
market economy and the agricultural sector, ending collective works and ‘liberalising’ 
the resources from these collectives to put them into individual households. They 
became key economic entities in agricultural production, working for the benefits of 
themselves and free to decide the methods and investment of productions and 
distribution of the output (Phong, 2009; Bich, 2007). State-owned agricultural and 
forest farms moved their focus to providing services and technology for the overall 
agricultural sector instead of just for large production units. The scale of agricultural 
and forestry farms were restructured according to their suitability in regard to their 
facilities, technology and managerial expertise. Redundant land was returned to local 
governments for handing over to households or leased to its members under the contract 
system (Bich, 2007). However, land ownership law in Vietnam remains to this day 
complicated, with only the ability to lease the ‘use’ of land. Land is owned 
constitutionally by the “People’ and administrated on their behalf by the Party and 
Government. There are no freehold hold ownership rights and the major ‘possession 
right’ is a ‘red book’. The red book is a certificate of land use and not ‘ownership’ but 
permission to use the land for a fixed length of time. 
 
Reform took effect immediately with food production scaled up to provide 
adequate food for the nation. The liberalisation in the production and distribution of 
agricultural products helped increase the productivity and provided incentives for 
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production. Vietnam was able to enjoy a new abundance of rice at low costs and 
exported rice for the first time in 1989. This ended the period of food shortages and of 
dependence on imported foods (Phong, 2009). 
 
At the 7th National Party Congress (1990), the Party Central Committee fleshed 
out the continued reforms and acceleration of socio-economic development in rural 
areas, which focused on the following points:  
1. Rural development moves toward commodities production as the top 
priority in the course of industrialisation; 
2. Implementation of a consistent policy on a multi-sector economy in 
agriculture and the rural economy, and; 
3. Expanding production in parallel with a broader market and encouraging 
application of technology and properly protecting domestic production 
(Bich, 2007, p. 298). 
 
A series of legal documents were released to create a framework for agricultural 
development (Bich, 2007; Son, 2006). The Land Law (1993) affirmed the long-term 
right to land use for the farmers. Households were authorised with the right to land use 
from 20 to 50 years on the basis of land type (Le and Liu, 2006). The Law regulated 5 
fundamental rights of households including inheritance, transfer, transform, leasing and 
mortgage. Many legal documents were issued to re-enforce the State’s policy such as 
the Law on Taxes on Use of Agricultural Land, the Law on Foreign Investment 
Incentives, the Law on Collective land, serving as legal platforms for mass production 
and agricultural economic reform, reform of State-owned agricultural and forestry 
farms. Re-organisation and reform of management mechanisms in SOEs created a legal 
frame for the development of a multi-player and market-regulated economy (Bich, 
2007). 
 
Vietnam’s agricultural sector recorded fast growth and increased exports 
(Nguyen and Le, 2010). International trade helped this sector shift its production 
structure (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008; Bich, 2007). The reforms enabled agriculture to develop 
specialised areas, for instance rice bowls in Mekong Delta region, tea production in the 
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Northern upland, rubber and fruit crops in the Southeast, Mekong and Red River areas, 
sugar cane in the Central area, etc (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). 
Agricultural products became staples for export such as coffee, rubber, cashew and 
pepper, etc. (Tu, 2008; Bich, 2007). The export value of agro-forestry-fishery products 
accounts for 38-40% of the total export revenue per year (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). 
 
From 1989 to 1999, agricultural production and fisheries grew by 4.3% and 5% 
per year respectively. People’s lives have been remarkably improved and the poverty 
rate has reduced by 2% per year. Agricultural development has substantially contributed 
to macroeconomic and social stability (Son, 2006; 2008). 
 
Weaknesses in the agricultural sector also became apparent, as it struggled to 
fully integrate with the international markets. Vietnam experienced a boom in food 
production, but such progress is mainly attributed to the lifting of regulations 
constraining production during the command economy period. Farmer households still 
used inefficient methods that affected the quality of products and services. Although 
sufficient for the domestic market, they were unsuitable to the demand and quality 
requirements of foreign consumers. Low-quality products are often purchased at low 
prices while exports are mainly unprocessed products (Tu, 2008; Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010; Son, 2006; 2008; 2008b). Vietnamese rice, in spite of its second rank in the 
world, is purchased at the lowest price among rice exporting countries, even lower than 
the rice of Thailand, and with Vietnam rice at US$ 40 per ton, compared to the US$ 300 
of Australia, the profit margins are extremely low. As for coffee, pepper and rubber, the 
price is usually much lower than that of other countries. Initial challenges in the 
integration process revealed the numerous weaknesses of Vietnam’s agriculture (Tu, 
2008; Son, 2006; 2008; 2008b; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Bich, 2007). 
 
5.2.2 Reform problems and slowdown: 1996-2002 
 
Despite the State’s good intentions, agriculture has failed to solve its 
weaknesses. Policies are slowly implemented and often unsuitable to the reality. Son 
(interview, 2010) suggested that “agricultural development is facing increasing 
difficulties in a competitive environment, leading to negative impacts in rural areas such 
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as abandoned land, migration to the city, unemployment and poverty, causing political 
instability” and unrest in several provinces such as the Thai Binh and Central Highlands 
protests (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Kerkvliet, 2001). It faces limitations in trade and 
investment, institutional reform, and slow agricultural development. 
 
Table 5.1: NRP and ERP estimate of Vietnam tariff from 1997-2003 
 1997 2001 2003 
 NRP ERP NRP ERP NRP ERP 
Weightedaverage       
Agriculture 8.12 7.74 6.28 7.43 11.06 12.52 
Mining 9.42 6.05 8.91 16.39 3.55 -0.03 
Manufacturing 30.63 121.47 25.28 95.97 29.23 43.94 
Total tradable 20.95 72.22 17.92 58.46 18.2 24.87 
       
Simpleaverage 23.32 59.54 20.14 54.1 19.98 26.23 
CV	   133.81 156.01 149.9 172.34 106.51 134.93 
Source: Athukorala, 2005 
 
Son (interview, 2010) noted that “Trade and investment policies were biased 
towards industry, where the Government advocated industrialisation and modernisation, 
at the expense of agricultural development”. The Government focused on promoting 
industrial policies that benefited import substitution industries and SOEs. Table 5.1 
showed that trade and investment were highly protected industries, and diverted 
resources from agriculture to industry (Son 2006; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). For 
Athukorala (2005), the systems of export and import tariffs of Vietnam before the 
acceleration process of WTO negotiations in 1997-2003 had discriminatory treatment 
against potential exporters (Athukorala, 2005).83 The 2003 increase was mainly caused 
by rising tariffs levied on outputs (Tu, 2008; Son, 2006). Vietnamese industry was only 
able to supply about 25% of tractors and machinery required for the agriculture 
sector.84Most chemical fertilisers, pesticides, veterinary medicine and plant seeds had to 
                                                
83 Effective protection rates for agriculture were lower than that of industry (7.74% in 1997; 7.43% in 
2001; 12.52% in 2003) (Athukorala, 2005). 
84 In 2001, economic units in rural areas possessed nearly 1.3 million water pumps, which increased to 1.9 
million in 2006. From 2001 to 2006, the domestic industry produced just 44,000 of these water pumps, 
accounting for around for only 7.5% of water pumps in the rural area and demonstrated the very low 
capacity of the industry to serve the domestic needs (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). 
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be imported. Every year, material demands for the husbandry industry are worth nearly 
US$ 1 billion (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). Son (interview, 2010) mentioned “whenever 
protection appears, farmers and agriculture have suffered losses from these protections. 
They have to buy products at a high price regardless of its origin”. 
 
An industry-biased trade policy widened the price gap between manufacturing 
goods and services and agricultural ones (Tu, 2008). The situation of ‘price scissors’ 
brought about adverse impacts on agriculture for years.85 Agricultural competitiveness 
was declining and the difference between price increases of agricultural products and its 
inputs increasing (Dinh, 2010). In provinces like Thai Binh, Hai Duong, farmers gave 
up their land or no longer cultivated due to high production costs and losses (Dinh, 
2010). 
 
Agriculture has low returns and protection and is a risky business, thus, 
unattractive for both domestic and foreign investment inflows (Son, 2006). Investments 
are often diverted to high protection areas such as the automobile, motorbike, 
electronics industries, etc (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). The lack of investment leads to low 
development in capital, science and technology growth and weakened the application of 
science and technology. Public investment showed the bias against agriculture 86 (Dinh, 
2010; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Son, 2008). In contrast, investment in industry was 
increasing (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008).87 The ratio of public investment in agriculture to GDP 
is much lower than that of other developing countries. The State has not encouraged 
                                                                                                                                          
The supply of trucks and tractors was just 28% of the additional increase required to meet the demand of 
the rural area (Tu, 2008; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). 
85 From 1989 to 2000, the growth of agricultural competitiveness was 7.3% per year, increases in 
agricultural products were 14.3% per year, and the increase in the price of inputs was 19.9% per year. 
From 2000 to date, that figure was 0.9%, 4.2% and 10% respectively (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Tu, 
2008; Son, 2006).   
86 Percentages of public investment in agriculture just accounted for 7% of the total State’s investment in 
the period of 2000-2006. Total social investment in agriculture was only 13.8% in 2000 while FDI 
inflows are only 3-4% 
87 The total social investment in industry rose from 28% in 2000, while public investment in industry also 
stood at 23% from 2000 
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timely and effective policies for producers to upgrade their facilities and production 
scale, and this has delayed economic re-structuring of rural areas (Son, 2006; Nguyen 
and Hoang, 2010). Agriculture remains out-dated and the rural economy is coping with 
poor competitiveness and lack of links between production establishments and the 
market. It was fundamentally dependent on plantation and rice cultivation without low 
technology application (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010).  
 
Son (interview, 2010) suggested “the priorities for industrialisation and 
urbanisation have continually seen agricultural land turned over to industry, and this at a 
time when there already exists insufficient agricultural land.88 Industrial zones are a 
major conversion from fertile land”. An additional problem created by this is that the 
previous system was based on integrated irrigation systems and the piecemeal 
conversion of plots of land means the system has provided more problems to farmers 
(Bich, 2008; Tu, 2008). No industrial zone or locality has generated adequate 
employment for the local population whose land they occupied. This growing poor rural 
unemployed are becoming a social and economic burden that threatens future political 
stability of the Party. With reference to Deng Xiaoping’s cats theory, it appears the cat 
is beginning to fail to catch mice. 
 
SOEs still have a lion’s share of agriculture as they possess most of the land, but 
consume lot of resources.89 The right to management of natural resources is unclear. 
Although the Land Law is revised, it is still not suitable to the real demand and is unable 
to generate a strong market (Son, 2006; 2008). Activities of trading land use rights, 
                                                
88 Between 2001-2005, the country had 366,000 ha of agricultural land transferred over to other purposes, 
with 6,124 ha in Ha Noi, 5,017 ha in Hai Phong, 2,287 ha in Ha Tay, 1,049 ha in Hung Yen, 1,200 ha in 
Hai Duong, 1,200 ha in Vinh Phuc, 3,087 ha in Bac Ninh and 16,627.5 ha in Binh Duong, etc (Son, 
2008). 
89 In 2001, agricultural SOEs accounted for 24.5% of 3600 enterprises operating in Agricultural sector. 
However, the state owned farms had managed a huge land resource of 700,000 ha agricultural land. State 
Owned afforestation farms also managed nearly 5 million ha of land, which included 3.5 million ha of 
forest (Son, 2006). On the other hand, the private agricultural companies were using only 23,600 ha of 
agricultural land (Son, 2006; Bich, 2007). 
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financing joint ventures and taking land for public goals are still limited (Nguyen and 
Hoang, 2010). 
 
Reform has been very slow since domestic food security was achieved. Though 
a lot of guidelines for development of this sector were put in place, they are still only on 
paper and very few successfully implemented. 
 
5.2.3 Reforms during the accelerated WTO accession process (2002-2006) 
 
CPV issued Special Resolution 06-NQ/TW (1998), recognising weaknesses of 
agriculture in initial integration, and highlighting reform towards large-scale and 
modern production systems. It encouraged private and public capitals to invest in 
agriculture (Bich, 2008). Resolution 03/2000/NQ-CP (2000) declared that the farming 
economy was yet to meet expectations, in spite of its enormous potentials and, 
presented unified policies to mobilise development resources for the farming economy, 
like leasing land on a long term basis, providing credit and assistance for farming. The 
Government’s decree ensured that legal property of farms would not be expropriated or 
confiscated by administrative measures. It focused upon market policy, including 
business orientation in line with the market to grasp market information and 
development. 
 
The 9th National Party Congress (2001) set out the building of a unified 
institution for the socialist-oriented market economy and strengthening of 
industrialisation and modernisation (CPV, 2001). Modernisation and industrialisation 
focused on the agricultural shift toward mass production, aligning the processing 
industry with the market; applying technology and science in agriculture to enhance 
productivity and competitiveness; increasing values of industrial products and labour in 
the rural economic structure and reducing percentages of agricultural products and 
labour; building socio-economic infrastructure, undertaking rural planning, protecting 
the environment; reorganising production and developing a rural area of democracy, 
equality, advanced society and continually improving spiritual and material life of the 
population in  rural areas (CPV, 2001). 
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Import and export activities were liberalised, including the fertiliser and rice 
industries (Son, 2006). The non-tariff measures such as quotas or licenses were 
gradually abolished and replaced by tariff measures to meet the requirements of 
international economic integration (Son, 2006; Bich, 2007). 
 
SOEs restructuring was very slow and the Government instructed the MOARD 
to restructure and consolidate its SOEs (Son, 2006). From 2000-2004, the MOARD 
restructured 155 out of 352 enterprises under the Ministry control, accounting for 44% 
in total90 (Son, 2006; MOARD, 2010). These SOEs often operated inefficiently and 
were small in scale.91 Son (2011), complained that “the process of privatisation and 
restructuring was behind the schedule of the original plan. SOEs were still believed to 
be forms of business and production representing the socialist production relations”. 
Many SOEs were restructured to become big Corporations and the main economic 
powers in their industry (Chi Lan, interview, 2012). Many used the capital very 
inefficiently, or corruptly and continue now to operate more as quasi state owned 
enterprises, retaining many of the disadvantages and faults of the command economy 
enterprises and chiefly immune from the competitive market forces of the free market 
economy (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Son, 2006). The leaders of SOEs and State 
management agencies still wanted to maintain the mechanism of some government 
control and in the process enjoyed monopoly positions and protected through supporting 
policies such as: monopoly in export-import, quota policies, focal points, interest 
subsidies, etc or priority positions in funding and investing in facilities, land, winning 
contracts for State invested projects, having debt frozen or supported when suffering 
losses. The Government gave vocal support to privatising the enterprises and opening 
up the market, but in reality did little more than create state monopolies that even when 
privatised were private entities in name only. The Vietnam economy stands on the brink 
of yet another financial and economic crisis as the debt of these companies grows to 
                                                
90 In the process, 105 out of 164 enterprises were equitised. The Ministry of Fisheries equitised 12 out of 
43 SOEs (Son, 2006). 
91 The loss making SOEs accounted for 27% of a total 880 enterprises in 2000. The profit was only 488.2 
billion VND (40 million USD) while losses were 339.1 billion VND (28.6 million USD) (Son, 2006). 
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levels impossible to service or control. Meanwhile the companies continue to operate at 
appalling levels of efficiency, safe in the knowledge that the Government will continue 
to provide support whenever they fail. 
 
By 2003, there were 314 national farms in the country. Pham Quoc Doanh92 
(interview, 2010) mentioned that “many farms didn't find ways to do business 
effectively. This was a waste, because the farms held a huge area of land, and inherited 
much from the infrastructure investment for many years”. The land use efficiency of the 
farms was very poor and the cumbersome management systems and the obsolete 
infrastructures resulted in poor labour productivity (Bich, 2007; Son, 2006). 
 
The law and mechanisms for agricultural development were improved. The 
rights and obligations of the farmers and for the Government were clarified. But, 
controversially, the Government retained overall stewardship of the land and the 
farmers, as ‘users’ had little rights or control of the requisitioning of the land by the 
Government and aggravated the situation by being able to set prices themselves and 
leaving no room for the negotiation of price compensation. Doanh (interview, 2010) 
suggested that “the farmer was limited to using the land for agricultural purposes and 
banned from using it for any other purpose. The rights for use of land were limited to 
30-50 year terms and the regulated price for land was equal to the market price in 
normal conditions. The Government autocratically set prices and maintained a 
monopoly over its use and control”. Thus, farmers and investors are less willing to 
invest capital on the land, and such conditions mean sufficient development is 
extremely unlikely to occur. 
 
Agriculture remains a means for well-positioned people in the Government to 
personally benefit from such things as land priced well below market value (Son, 2006; 
2008). Other laws, such as the FDI law and the Domestic Investment Law, stipulated 
that investment in the agricultural sector is prioritised with special terms for providing 
lands with concession rent and reduced taxes, but this has less impact if the basic 
                                                
92 Pham Quoc Doanh is the Director of Industrial Economics Department, Office of the Government 
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problem is that the law deters investment, rather than promotes it (Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010). The Government is more often than not trying to achieve mass production while 
maintaining uncompetitive and unattractive control over it. By clearly offering land 
‘use’ rather than land ‘ownership’ the Government makes large-scale investment and 
the introduction of technology, etc, almost an impossible task (Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010). 
 
Special credit policies were also created for the agricultural sector and the 
Government requested commercial banks lend money to farmers to invest. The 
Government also subsidised the farmers and businesses involved in the exporting of 
agricultural products. Since 2002, these policies were revised in order to meet 
international standards. ‘Policy’ loans were provided by ‘Policy Lending Banks’, not by 
Commercial Banks. Special banks for social policies were established, especially for 
projects resulting in poverty eradication. In 2002, new credit policies were also 
introduced to remove the mortgages for farmers lending small amounts, and to provide 
loans for businesses in the agricultural sector and rural loans for establishing or 
upgrading farmhouses (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). 
 
The Government provided incentives such as tax grants or incentives to carry 
out research and development agencies to cooperate with farmers to improve the 
productivity in the agricultural sector. A new program of cooperation between farmers, 
business people, scientists, and the Government was created for them to work together 
to transfer technology and promote agricultural products on the markets (Nguyen and 
Hoang, 2010; Bich, 2007). 
 
There were some significant changes of attitude and funding for the 
development of the agricultural sector, but they were still limited in the policy 
implementation process. The Party and Government developed progressive and 
important new policies, with good intentions. But, the virtual absence of any 
mechanisms or willingness to apply or enforce the new laws made their existence 
superfluous (Son, 2006; 2008). The agriculture sector is expected to improve only 
through the personal efforts and investments of the farmers themselves, and this 
promises only further hardship and under development for the agricultural industry and 
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the high levels of resistance to reform is to be expected. Farmers have no reason to 
reform, or support national reform when the only outcome is further hardship for 
themselves and very little rewards for the agricultural industry (Son, 2008; Bich, 2007). 
Farmers were a major resistant to WTO accession and most remain opposed now that 
Vietnam is a member. Their lack of development is creating a serious crisis, with 
subsistence farming remaining and the farms themselves run on out-dated technology 
and little mechanisation. The weaknesses found in the period of 1995-2002 remain or 
have improved very little (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Laws and policies changed in line 
with WTO accession procedures, but practices and conditions remained the same. There 
is a need to address the almost wholesale refusal of those responsible for application of 
Government policy to actually implement reforms. With the added problems only being 
able to ‘use’ and not own land the prospects for development are poor and the 
likelihood is that not only will they continue to resist reform they are likely to become 
the very core of social instability and unrest. 
 
5.3 Impact of the WTO’s accession process on the reform of agricultural sector 
 
5.3.1 Vietnam’s agricultural commitments to WTO membership 
 
Vietnam observed the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which regulates 
commercial agriculture in three areas: market access, domestic support and export 
subsidy (MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
Opening of the market: Committed tariff reduction is 10.6% compared with the 
current MFN tariff (determined by out-quota tariffs), a decrease of 20% of agricultural 
products against current MFN tariff (from 23.5% to nearly 20% - in-quota tariffs) 
(NCIEC, 2007). 
 
Quota limitations were removed, except for; eggs, sugar, tobacco and salt. 
Trading rights were also liberalised and foreign companies were allowed to trade in 
agricultural products, except rice. Vietnam committed to removing all export subsidies 
after joining the WTO (NCIEC, 2007). It fully observed the SPS Agreement without a 
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transitional period and has committed to transparency of all policies on food safety and 
hygiene. But even a cursory evaluation of this would show that while rules and 
regulations have been changed the actual standards are still closer to the old ways than 
they are to international standards (NCIEC, 2007). 
 
Vietnam WTO’s commitments are not considered as strong as the Chinese. The 
average tariff in agriculture is higher and dropped slower than those in China (NCIEC, 
2007). Vietnam also committed less than China in several non-tariff and institutional 
issues in agriculture, such as the number of goods entitled for tariff rate quota and of 
state trading (NCIEC, 2006). However, Khanh (interview, 2012) said “the commitments 
on agriculture of Vietnam are appraised as strong and adequate for the Vietnam future 
development and reforms”. The Vietnam economy is much smaller in scale and has a 
lower foundation and conditions for economic development than the Chinese economy. 
Taking into consideration these issues, the commitments of Vietnam is high and strong 
its level of development (NCIEC, 2007; MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
5.3.2 WTO’s accession process has provided pressure on economic reform in 
agriculture 
 
In theory, Vietnam’s agriculture with favourable conditions is the most likely 
beneficiary of economic integration. Agriculture has affirmed its competitiveness 
throughout integration at regional level.93 However, WTO integration is on a larger 
scale and provides tougher competition compared with other trade liberalisation 
agreements and was a challenge to agriculture as it increased the competition from both 
domestic and international markets (MUTRAP, 2007) 
 
One of the predicted challenges in the run up to WTO admission was strong 
competition both at home and abroad (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). WTO commitments would 
provide more favourable conditions for foreign companies to penetrate into Vietnam’s 
                                                
93 Such as AFTA since 1996, BTA and ASEAN- China Liberalisation Agreement, in which tariffs of 
many unprocessed agricultural products are reduced to 0%. 
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market, thus putting enormous pressure onto the domestic producers (Oxfam, 2004). In 
both the domestic and foreign markets, competition is high. Many competitors are 
already large and competitive exporters of agricultural products, such as China, the US, 
Australia, and Thailand (Son, 2008).94 
 
Vietnam’s agriculture is still exposed to a lack of capacity and competitiveness, 
and it is in slow development with low productivity, high costs and scientific and 
technological application is still limited (Son, 2008; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Tu, 
2008). The major driver of agricultural development is increases in area, materials and 
labour, even in highly competitive crops like rice (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). As a result, 
“Vietnam’s rice productivity is only about 65% of China’s and Indonesia; rubber 
productivity is just about 50% of Malaysia, Thailand and vegetable productivity is 
lower than the average of regional countries” (Tu 2008, p. 140).95 
 
The cost of agricultural production is high due to the country’s low level of 
development (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). The price of domestically-produced feed is higher 
than that of foreign countries-about 20-30% (Tu, 2008).96 Industrial inputs for 
agriculture like tractors, fertilisers and chemicals are scarce and expensive (Tu, 2008, 
Son, 2008; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Production costs are fairly high, for example the 
price of Vietnam’s processed sugar is US$ 220 per ton while that of Thailand, Australia 
and India is US$ 72, US$ 78 and US$ 118 respectively (Tu, 2008). Vietnam’s 
agriculture is yet to achieve sustainable development. Production services like 
veterinary, forest protection, flood prevention and environmental protection are 
underdeveloped. Natural resources are exploited haphazardly and inefficiently, 
                                                
94 For instance, the US export of agricultural products reached 77.5 billion, in which they exported 380 
million USD of agricultural goods to Vietnam, mainly wooden products, cattle feed, milk and milk 
related products (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). China exported 1.1 billion USD of agricultural products and 
material for agriculture to Vietnam (Dinh, 2010). In 2007, Thailand exported 307 million USD to 
Vietnam in agricultural and its related products (Tu, 2008). 
95 Pineapple productivity is 13 tons per ha and that of Thailand is 24.5 tons/ha. Tomato productivity of 
Vietnam is just 15-20 tons/ha while that of the world is 50 tons/ha. 
96 For examples, the price of maize in the world is just US$ 84 per ton and that of Vietnam is about US$ 
160 per ton. 
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threatening the long-term development of agriculture (Son, 2008). This demonstrates 
the seriousness of the situation and it’s aggravated by an almost institutionalised refusal 
to change. The industry suffers from high levels of rent-seeking and corruption that 
promises to eventually place Vietnam into yet another economic crisis, but this time 
there will be no WTO accession, or Trade Agreement to offset the losses borne from a 
refusal to change and develop. 
 
Rural business has expanded rapidly and is considered as the driving force for 
growth in the rural areas; but is still very small in size and quantity. In the Agricultural 
sector, household businesses are the majority (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010).97 They lack 
financial capacity and production management, are of limited scope and efficiency in 
production, produce poor quality products, as well as suffering from shortage of links in 
terms of trade, production technology and services (Tu, 2008, Son, 2006; 2008; Nguyen 
and Hoang, 2010). State Owned Enterprises, cooperatives and farms are in persistent 
difficulties (Son, 2006). The relationship between producers and businesses remains far 
from being a large-scale industrialisation form (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Although 
there have been several large-scale clusters of rural commodities production, they are 
not enough to create a fundamental change in the production nature of the agricultural 
sector (Son, 2006). Investment and technological application in enterprises are limited 
due to the risks and low profits of agriculture. 
 
Son (interview, 2010) mentioned that “managerial expertise in the agricultural 
business is limited, agricultural products are often monotone, inflexible and 
inappropriate for the international market given the fluctuations of the global agriculture 
market, processed items are still very few and mostly raw materials for simple 
processing, thus reducing export prices”. The information about markets is not 
developed and often untimely and inaccurate, particularly long-term forecasts. The 
Trade promotion network is ineffective. The policy on labelling and trademarks has not 
been established (Tu, 2008; Son, 2006; 2008). Farmers are yet to be equipped with 
adequate sources and skills to take advantage of international integration (Tu, 2008; 
                                                
97 Vietnam currently has 13 million rural households with average agricultural land area of 0.7 ha per 
household, which is scattered in nearly 100 million small fields. 
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Son, 2008; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Enterprises in rural areas are striving to grasp 
and master WTO rules. The lack of knowledge brings difficulties to many companies 
and high costs result (Son, 2008). 
 
WTO membership was a challenge for agriculture, which stemmed from a 
pressure for more reforms and investment in agriculture (Son, 2006; 2008; Tu, 2008, 
Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; MUTRAP, 2007). Agricultural production within WTO 
markets required large-scale production to take advantage of production scope and 
businesses must be able to compete in terms of market share and communication, ensure 
good packaging and quality of products, etc (Son, 2006; 2008; Tu, 2008). Vietnamese 
agricultural would appear to have failed to meet the challenge of reform. Son 
(interview, 2010) said “Internal shortcomings of agriculture have constituted pressure 
on policy makers in order to come up with stronger reform to adapt to WTO 
membership”. 
 
5.3.3 WTO accession process has influenced the balance of politics to support the 
agricultural sector 
 
During wars of resistance, peasants played strategic roles in amassing the whole 
people in the struggles for revolutionary victories (Son, 2006; Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010). In the post-reform period, agriculture has seen some developments and growth, 
but, innovation and investment for agriculture have shown signs of slowdown following 
those successes. State policies have transferred resources to industries through state 
investments and trade protection. Protected sectors are usually industries requiring 
extensive capital with few natural competitive advantages (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). 
Son (interview, 2009) said “Policy has resulted in slow and out-dated growth for the 
agricultural sector as well as disagreements between urban and rural areas... reforms 
have been hampered and realized very slowly due to the huge localised interests from 
industrial investment and protection activities”. 
 
Direct interest groups in the agricultural reform process include industrial, 
agricultural interest groups and relevant State agencies. These interest groups have 
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conflicting interests when the state changes economic policies (Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010; Tu, 2008; Dinh, 2010). 
 
Although agricultural interests are heavily impacted by state economic policies, 
they are not politically strong enough to assemble forces and demand their interests 
(Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Dinh, 2010). Farmers and small and medium agricultural 
enterprises, are inadequate at binding together to raise their voices against state 
economic policies. There are three causes for this scattered interest (Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010; Dinh, 2010). First, the more developed a society becomes, the lesser the role of 
agriculture in the economy (Son, 2006).98 Second, although farmers are an important 
political force, farming households are usually small production units, mainly producing 
on a self-sufficient basis (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Bich, 2007). Third, farmers have 
low incomes and savings and do not have much potential for development due to low 
knowledge levels and non-professional training. Son (interview, 2010) noted that “the 
interests of farmers are only seen in the short term, they are venture-shy, and are mainly 
occupied with how to make ends meet. Their political awareness and cohesion are not 
very high”.99 Farmers view socio-politico organizations as leader-exclusive and 
therefore have not realized the importance of standing together to protect group 
interests. Despite the existence of many vocational associations in rural areas, mainly 
State Owned Enterprises are taking part (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Farmers’ voices 
are barely heard during the policy making process (Bich, 2007; Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010; Dinh, 2010). The Party are aware of the social unrest that can be borne from the 
disenfranchisement of such a large group as ‘the farmers’ and although farmers have 
few avenues for impacting upon the political decision-making process, that very lack of 
access has caused serious and violent protests in the past (Dinh, 2010). Farmers are 
suffering negative consequences from WTO reform. 
 
                                                
98 In Vietnam, the ratio of agricultural contribution to GDP has been largely reduced from 38.6% in 1986 
down to 20.91% in 2009 (GSO, 2010). Agriculture growth is considerably slower than industry and 
service, averaging 4% as compared to 10% and 8% respectively (GSO, 2010). 
99 According to a report of the MOLISA in 2005, non-professionally trained labourers accounted for 
about 83.12% of the labour force, while this ratio in urban areas reached only 49.3% (Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010). 
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Doanh (interview, 2010) suggested that “From the history of feudal dynasty to 
the struggle for independence and unification recently, realities have shown that rural 
stability is the foundation for political and social stability of Vietnam”. Thus with WTO 
accession challenges, Vietnam’s agriculture has been able to attract more attentions 
from the Party-State for priority development policies and reforms. This is a good 
opportunity for the agriculture sector to express its view in the policy reform process of 
Vietnam, particularly in land, capital, trade liberalisation issues (Nguyen and Hoang, 
2010; Son, 2008; Bich, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, WTO accession will help reduce protectionist pressure from 
industrial interest groups since WTO requirements enforce development towards a more 
transparent and balanced commercial environment (Mutrap, 2007). This will reduce 
preferences in trade and investment policies that the government is reserving for 
industries, bringing industries down to a more level playing field and freeing resources 
from industries for Vietnamese sectors with more natural competitive advantages like 
agriculture (Mutrap 2007). During WTO accession, Viet Nam’s custom and duty 
systems have experienced fundamental changes. Table 5.1 showed that the real 
protectionist trend in industries decreased drastically from 121.47% in 1997 down to 
95.97% in 2000 and 43.94% in 2003. According to Athukorala (2005), this strong 
decrease is the result of significant reductions of import tax for industrial inputs, which 
will lead to a gradual decrease of the attraction of protected sectors and resources will 
instead be diverted to sectors with export advantages. This will in turn reduce 
production costs and improve competitiveness. Moreover, the real protection for 
agriculture increased markedly from 7.74 in 1997 to 7.43 in 2001 and reached 12.52% 
in 2003. Thus, agriculture has enjoyed a more suitable protectionist scheme, which 
encourages more investment in the sector. MFN customs for finished and by-products, 
inputs in agriculture were reduced to 25% in 2005, and following WTO accession, 
down to 20.9%. Almost 100% of agricultural produce falls under this MFN tax line 
(NCIEC, 2007).  
 
WTO accession requires Vietnam to realise non-tariff commitments in trade. 
Non-tariff trade barriers distort trade and lead to losses for agriculture. These policies 
were designed to protect agriculture sectors but in fact are catering to the interests of an 
interest group in charge of permits, specifically the MOARD. Since 2002, Vietnam 
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abolished all forms of import bans in agriculture, except for temporary bans for health 
reasons such as the SARS epidemic. Import permits for many agricultural goods were 
lifted or simplified including plant genes, veterinarian drugs, pesticides, livestock feed 
and inputs and new fertilizers (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Dieu et al, 2007). WTO 
accession negotiations also changed many customs regulations, facilitating easier 
import/export activities such as lifting pricing controls and imposed tax calculations of 
the past (MUTRAP, 2007). In the past, imported fertilisers must all be subject to 3-5% 
additional import duties. Since 2002, these additional duties have gradually been phased 
out. Minimum pricing was also lifted for import/export goods not on the Government 
taxing list prior to 2002. Prior to WTO accession, Vietnam was still subsidising exports 
and domestic production. These regulations were in contradiction of WTO regulations 
and therefore, during 2003-2006, Vietnam gradually restructured these subsidies into 
preferential loans or guaranteed loans. Loan recipients were also expanded to include 
any companies’ importing/exporting goods eligible for loans. Vietnam reserves almost 
no subsidies that are contrary to WTO regulations concerning domestic production; 
most subsidies are in the green box (NCIEC, 2007). Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested 
that “WTO accession has helped orient non-tariff policies towards international 
standards and promoted removals of inappropriate non-tariff barriers”. 
 
Agricultural export amounts to US$ 6.9 billion in 2006, a double increase 
against 2001. During 2004-2006, agricultural and forestry export grew by 23% on 
average (Tu, 2008).100 WTO membership promises new market openings for 
agriculture. Agricultural enterprises wanted greater market access. Vietnam agricultural 
products were subject to discrimination caused by sophisticated trade barriers like 
technical standards or dumping taxes.101 WTO membership is an effective channel for 
                                                
100 It is noted that the growth by 47% in 2002 is the result of Vietnam–US Bilateral Trade Agreement that 
removed US barriers against Vietnamese agricultural products 
101 For instance, Belgium and the EU refused to import 600.000 coffee bags from Vietnam and a huge 
amount of coffee from UK ports in 2006, accounting for around 72% of Vietnam’s coffee export due to 
low quality and ruined coffee beans compared with international standards. They demanded the return to 
Vietnam of that coffee or sell at low price, causing massive losses to coffee producers in Vietnam (Tu, 
2008; Son, 2008). In 2007, Vietnamese tea was also returned by Taiwan as the residuals of insecticides 
exceeded acceptable norms. By the end of 2007, Taiwan proposed imposing dumping taxes on 
Vietnamese tea as import of tea from Vietnam was skyrocketing (Son, 2008; Tu, 2008). Other incidents 
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Vietnam to defend its legitimate trade rights in a more equitable manner or dispute 
settlement by the WTO, instead of stand-alone negotiations with importing countries. 
 
The Special Safeguard mechanism under the Agreement on Agriculture enables 
developing countries to protect domestic producers with a sudden increase in imports of 
some special products related to food security (Tuoc, 2007; Cordella, 2007). For 
Vietnam, sensitive products like sugarcane, maize, husbandry products and cassava are 
staples of the poor and most disadvantaged areas in Vietnam. In addition, maize and 
cassava are also feeds for husbandry industry, and if they are competing with low-cost 
and subsidised products of other countries, negative impacts on agricultural producers 
and the poor in disadvantaged areas are obvious (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010; Bich, 2007: 
Son, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Import and export of agricultural products of Vietnam 
Source: Son, 2008; GSO, 2008 
 
5.3.4 WTO accession process has guided the institutional reforms in agricultural 
sector 
 
The most visible impact on economic reform is amendment of laws and 
localisation of WTO regulations. In acceleration of WTO membership from 2002 to 
                                                                                                                                          
related to Vietnamese livestock industry such as rice export to Russia in 2005, poultry export to China, 
Cambodia and the EU (Son, 2008; Tu, 2008). 
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2006, Vietnam has released, amended and supplemented a number of relevant laws and 
policies related to agriculture in order to meet integration and international 
commitments. First, is the amendment of laws and policies to create a level playing field 
for all stakeholders in agriculture and this is included in the Law on Enterprises (2005). 
The Law unified relevant laws on different type of enterprises and regulated all players 
(Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). WTO membership helped adjust most of the regulations on 
domestic subsidies in compliance with the Green Box of WTO (NCIEC, 2007; Nguyen 
and Le, 2010). By 2006, Vietnam complied with 60% of codex standards related to 
foodstuffs. 
 
The WTO accession required the acceding country to provide a level playing 
field for all economic sectors, good trading practices and public transparency in the 
macroeconomic management of the state (NCIEC, 2007). WTO commitments help the 
Vietnamese Government rebalance the policy towards greater neutrality. The tax cuts on 
finished products help reduce the protectionist barriers held by SOEs and lead to better 
competition (MUTRAP, 2007; NCIEC, 2007). 
 
In 2001, SOEs in agriculture accounted for 24.5% of 3,600 enterprises operating 
in agriculture, forestry and fishery with the total State-owned capital of US$ 470 mn. 
SOEs controlled activities related to export and import, supply of fertilizers, export of 
rice, rubber, coffee, tea, vegetable and fruit (Son, 2006).102 Son (interview, 2010) 
suggested that “SOEs are still weak in terms of its management, bulky apparatus, 
limited production and business efficiency”. 
 
The Politburo issued Resolution 28-NQ/TW (2003) on the reorganization and 
reform of national agro-forestry farms (Son, 2006). In 2005, the reorganization and 
reform of state-owned farms started to be implemented (Son, 2006).103 
                                                
102 Those companies are mostly under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (463 companies) and the State-owned Corporations under auspices of the Government and 
Ministries (155 business of 4 Corporations 91 and 255 businesses of 15 Corporations 90 (Son, 2006). 
103 The national agro-forestry farms were sorted into 107 agricultural enterprises operating under the Law 
on State Enterprises, 16 one-member limited companies, 1 two-member limited liability company, 25 
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5.3.5 WTO accession process has influenced the economic development ideology 
of the agricultural sector 
 
In the early years of reform, agriculture created momentum for more reform. 
Internal strength of agriculture held back during central planning economy was released 
and generated strong production for foods, which helped to stabilise the social and 
economic situation (Phong, 2009). In the 6th Party Congress, food production topped its 
agenda with the request for adequate food and a food reserve (Phong, 2009; Le and Liu, 
2006). There was a remarkable increase in food production, which not only provided 
sufficient food for consumption but also exported rice for the first time in 1989 after 
years of starvation and rice import (Phong, 2009; Bich, 2007). At the 7th Party Congress 
(1991), a more comprehensive direction and policy for the agricultural sector and rural 
economy were formed by the CPV resolution on “continued reform for strong socio-
economic development in rural areas” embracing the promotion of development of mass 
production and a multi-sector policy in the agricultural sector (Bich, 2007, p.298). A 
major goal of the CPV resolution was confined to production development aimed at 
meeting domestic demand and dealing with food shortages, not paying attention to 
promotion of a competitive agriculture in the international market (Bich, 2007). 
 
The real change in the CPV awareness on the potentials of agricultural was 
started by the process of international integration (Tu, 2008). Although many of the 
agricultural products were quickly gaining the world top position for market shares, 
they still suffer losses in terms of prices and preference in comparison with the same 
products from other countries. Many of them cannot be sold in the international market 
due to failures in meeting standards of the international markets (Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). 
                                                                                                                                          
joint stock companies operating under the Enterprise Law; one joint-venture company and 24 dissolved 
national agro-forestry farms. The national agro-forestry farms were arranged as the Forestry companies 
(136 companies) and three joint-stock companies operating under the Enterprise Law; 14 one-member 
limited liability companies, 68 national agro-forestry farms were converted into revenue-generating units 
which were the Forest management units; 28 new forest management units were established based on the 
separation of the protection forest areas from the national agro-forestry farms, 14 dissolved national agro-
forestry farms (Son, 2006) 
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The realities had alerted the CPV to the problems of the Vietnam agricultural industry 
(Bich, 2007; Tu, 2008). This changed the CPV’s thought on the scale and professional 
production of the agricultural sector. Resolution 06-NQ/TW (1998) emphasised the 
importance of mass production, increasing the percentage of industry and services in the 
agricultural structures and stimulating agricultural exports (Bich, 2007). 
 
At the 9th Congress (2000), its socio-economic development report continued to 
stress on the building of a mass production and market based agriculture (Bich, 2007). 
However, policy on development of a modern and large-scale agriculture was not 
implemented as expected. The thoughts on rapid industrialisation and import 
substitution have been the rationale of delayed implementation of State’s policy, in 
which there was the underestimation of agriculture and more attention to industry to 
create shortcuts to industrialisation (Son, 2006; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). Son 
(interview, 2010) suggested that “WTO accession process played a very important role 
on reminding the CPV to continue to transform the sector to be modern large 
commodity industry and redefining the importance of the agriculture in the economy”. 
 
Doanh (interview, 2010) agreed that “the positive results of the agricultural 
sector during the early integration have confirmed the determination and trust of the 
CPV in economic liberalisation and integration”. The WTO has a huge 5 bn consumers 
and 95% of global trade and import value up to US$ 635 bn per year. It’s a good 
opportunity for Vietnamese agriculture to continue to expand and increase market share 
(Tu, 2008; Son, 2008). 
 
Chi Lan (interview, 2012) said “the WTO accession means the acceptance of the 
market economy with fair competitions and rules of games of the international 
markets”. This indirectly influenced the CPV’s attention to the agricultural sector as this 
sector often plays a role as a buffer in turbulent economic times. Unemployed workers 
from other industry may go back home to rural areas and carry on their agricultural jobs, 
until difficult times are over and they can find new jobs again. The CPV attention 
helped reduce the tension and gap between the urban and rural areas in terms of living 
conditions and development (Tu, 2008; Son, 2006; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010) 
 
 220 
 
5.4 Reforms after the WTO accession 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012) said “WTO commitments have their implementation 
period from 5-7 years, and are still providing momentum for the domestic reforms”. For 
agricultural products, the implementation period was from 3-5 years (Tuoc, 2007; 
Cordella, 2007). The pressure for reforms is still very strong. The average nominal tariff 
of the agricultural sector has been reduced rapidly during 2005 to 2012. The low 
nominal tariff rates also come with the low EPR rate, which showed that this sector is 
relatively free of protection (CIEM, 2010).  
 
Applied tariffs have reduced faster and lower than the scheduled and committed 
level, such as in fresh and frozen meats, seafood etc (CIEM, 2010). Due to the opening 
of the domestic market, several highly protected agricultural products have faced 
difficulties in competing with the imported products, such as sugar, cotton, tropical 
vegetables. However, the pressure of the competition has led to the increase of several 
tariffs to protect the domestic industry, such as poultry and meats. 
 
The good performance of agriculture, during and after the WTO accession, has 
helped to elevate the position of the agricultural sector and farmers in rural areas (CPV, 
2008). According to Chi Lan (interview, 2012), “a goal of the WTO accession set by the 
government is the increasing of the market access for export products of Vietnam, and it 
has been successfully achieved. Although many are concerned about the competition 
pressure to the sector, it is still doing well and gaining the most benefit”. In 2009, the 
country was in recession, but the agriculture is still maintaining its growth (CIEM, 
2010). The growth rate of agricultural exports has increased remarkably and the 
agricultural sector is one of the rare industries that can produce a trade surplus for 
Vietnam (CIEM, 2010). As a result, the political voice from agriculture for its own 
development has been listened to more carefully (CIEM, 2010; Thai, interview, 2012). 
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Table 5.2: Total investment and its growth on extended agriculture 
products over the year 
Sources: GSO 2008; 2009; 2012. 
 
Table 5.3: FDI in agricultural and aquatic products since WTO accession 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No. of project 16 23 29 12 
Registered capital 58.6 223.5 134.5 36.2 
Source: GSO, 2012. 
 
The CPV’s Central Committee set up a special session in 2008 for discussing the 
development of agriculture, rural areas and farmers. The session ended with the 
Resolution 26-NQ/TW to establish a special scheme for development of the agriculture, 
rural areas and farmers to 2020, aiming to enhance the living standards of the farmers 
and rural people; develop a large, sustainable, high quality and effective industry, and a 
highly competitive multi-sector commodity industry; ensuring national foods security; 
enhance the human resource capacity for the rural, and enhance the strength of Party 
control in the rural areas (CPV, 2008). A list of measures was recommended and put 
into implementation for the development of the agriculture and rural economy such as 
attracting more resources, implementing industrialisation, building the large and modern 
commodity industry with high quality, efficient and competitive entities, increasing 
value added into the products, linking the infrastructure of rural to urban, equality 
between regions, etc (CPV, 2008). There have been changing priorities and thoughts of 
Year 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture, forestry 
and aquatic 
20933 22963 25715 30087 33907 39697 44309 51071 
% Change year by year   11.98 17.00 12.70 17.08 11.62 15.26 
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the leadership on the development of the agriculture. A range of the policies has been 
issued to implement the Politburo scheme to boost the development of agriculture and 
the rural economy (Bich, 2008; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). 
 
Parallel with the change in the Government thought on the role of the 
agriculture, SOEs reforms in the agricultural sector progressed and by 2010, the 
MOARD only managed 112 SOEs (MOARD, 2011).104 The restructuring process has 
helped enterprises reduce costs, and increase their scale and business efficiency. 
However, the process has been slow and most of the privatised companies were small 
companies only. SOEs are still holding critical positions in the industry (Tuoc, 2007; 
Cordella, 2007; Vinafood 2, 2011).105 
 
One of the most concerning issues on the institutional reforms of the agriculture 
is the matter of land ownership (Coxhead et al, 2010). The CPV has stressed one 
important task of the reforms in the agricultural is to transform the sector from small 
scale and self-reliant sector to a large commodity production sector (Son, 2006; Bich, 
2007; Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). In order to realise this task, the land use right and land 
ownership for the production process issue needs resolving. Land reforms in the past 
were the motivation and catalyst for the remarkable agricultural growth in Vietnam 
(Ravallion and Walle, 2008; Coxhead, 2010). Land is a vital issue because it is not only 
the input of the production process but also the assets and wealth for long terms 
investments. The Law on Land (2003) allowed the farmer to lease the land from the 
Government. The law shows several shortcomings for the new development of 
Vietnam. The land limitation per household has been a long pressing issue for the 
investment into the agriculture. Currently, each household or individual can have land 
                                                
104 These include 5 independent enterprises under the Ministry, 68 enterprises which were the members of 
1 Economic Group and 3 Corporations 91; 14 Corporation 90; and 38 100% SOE limited companies with 
the capital of VND 14,054.5 billion (USD700 million), 168% higher compared to 2001 The number of 
employees in these units was 107,207 people, 23% down compared with 2001. The revenues of these 
enterprises reached USD 1.2 billion and 145 million of profit (MOARD, 2011). 
105 For example, in the exporting of rice and some other products, Corporation 91 Vinafood 1 (Northern) 
and Vinafood 2 (South) are the two major stakeholders for rice exporting, although there about more than 
150 others rice exporters (Vinafood 2, 2011). 
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use rights for a maximum of only three hectare of agricultural and forest planting lands. 
Lands for other purposes such as long-term agriculture plants can be allowed for 10-30 
ha depended on the regions. The land right also has its own maximum expiry date of 20 
years for yearly agricultural and fishery lands and 50 years for long-term forestlands. 
Thus, the Law of Land has not provided enough incentives and legal rights for large-
scale commodity productions. With limited lands and time of rights, few are willing to 
make long term investment. Moreover, the Law on Land also stipulates two types of 
land use right withdrawal. One is done by the Government for the national or local 
projects and the other is done by the enterprises. The first withdrawal of right to use the 
land is often done with fixed compensation based on the Government prices on lands, 
while the enterprises must negotiate with the users about their compensation (Law on 
Land 2003). Thus, this law creates a loophole for SOEs and private enterprises using the 
Government projects names to confiscate the land with much cheaper value. These 
often create protests and complaints focused on land disputes (Coxhead, 2010). The law 
has been subject to several changes since 2006, however, for many reasons the changes 
have not been ratified by the National Assembly. In 2012 there were increased demands 
for change following violence resistance of the land users to confiscation of their lands, 
with one mass demonstration in Hai Phong illustrating the depth of protest against the 
Government and regular street protests in Hanoi by farmers from the countryside around 
the city. 
 
In 2007 a Government plan of action was released, emphasising the tasks to 
review the existing legal system, remove overlapping and inappropriate regulations, 
promulgate legal documents, mechanisms and policies, supplement and issue new 
documents and abolish documents unsuitable to the WTO mechanism and regulation 
(Dieu et al, 2007). In the MOARD, the review of all legal documents in the areas of 
agriculture is relevant to four important agreements in agriculture, the AOA, SPS, TBT 
and the TRIPS.106 From this review, the MOARD has revised the regulations and 
                                                
106 A total of 116 legal documents and policies had been reviewed and 73 documents were in accordance 
with WTO regulations, accounting for 63% of the total revised documents; 29 documents need to be 
amended, making up 25%; 7 documents were abolished, accounting for 6% and 8 documents need to be 
promulgated. About 31% of documents do not comply with WTO regulations, mostly in TBT and AOA 
(Dieu et al, 2007). 
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procedures for complying with the WTO agreements as well as removed the 
overlapping regulation and procedures for easing the administration procedures (Dieu et 
al, 2007). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Agricultural reform was carried out rapidly and strongly in the beginning of 
reform, transforming agriculture into the free production and market-oriented sector. 
Being liberated from the constrained mechanism agriculture advanced into being an 
important economic sector and involved deeply into the international economic 
integration process. Achievements gained in the agricultural reform laid the firm 
foundation for the national industrialisation and modernisation. Unfortunately, after 
periods of sustainable development, agriculture gradually suffered from discrimination 
compared to other services and industries sectors through trade and investment 
measures. With the majority of resources diverted to the industry sector, the agricultural 
sector was not paid enough attention to and left behind other economic sectors. 
Agriculture remained the small-scale production sector with low competitiveness and 
unstable developments. Direct producers only gained small benefits from agriculture, 
thus leading to the increasing gap between the rich and the poor in the rural and urban 
areas and more serious social conflicts and tension. 
 
Despites the Government’s acknowledgement on the inadequacies in agricultural 
development, the implementation of the agricultural policies remained slow. The roots 
of these inadequacies lay in the development ideology and agricultural protectionism. 
With the market-oriented economy model, the State-Owned Enterprises were given the 
leading roles in the economic development process. Industrialisation and modernisation 
were also considered the immediate goals of the national development process. Given 
such ideas, the majority of the SOEs were operating in the industry-related areas, which 
required a huge amount of capital and technologies. Moreover, the subsidised industries 
and enterprises also benefited mostly from the State’s investment and protection. 
Therefore, these beneficiary groups would protest any policy changes that were 
unfavourable to them (Son, 2006). 
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The State’s decision to expedite the WTO negotiation process in 2003 happened 
when the Government carried out the comprehensive economic structural reform. The 
WTO negotiations had huge impacts on the agricultural reform in Vietnam, helping the 
Government balance its priorities for agricultural development and promote the 
agricultural reform process. Despite the constant trade surplus, challenges on the severe 
competition from other agricultural markets when joining the WTO were quite visible. 
This created the impetus to review the agricultural policies and further promote the 
agricultural reform process. During the WTO process, Vietnam also gradually adjusted 
its investment and trade policies in compliance with the WTO regulations. This process 
resulted in the decrease of State’s interventions and subsidies granted to the protected 
industries and SOEs. Commitments to the WTO and the policy amendments helped 
mitigate the impacts of the subsidised sectors and State-Owned Enterprises. 
 
The improvements in agriculture due to WTO accession appear impressive with 
for example, 2009 seeing agriculture account for 22.1 percent of GDP, 13 percent of 
export revenue and creating employment for 61 percent of the labour force (Khai and 
Yabe, 2012, p.333). The agricultural-forestry-fisheries sector grew at an average rate of 
3.4 percent over the 2007-2011 period, which was 0.4 percent above expectations 
(VNS, 2012a). However, by 2013 growth fell to 2.4 percent, the lowest rise in 10 years 
(Vietnam News, 2013). By 2012, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (AFF) reached a 
production value of 173.7 trillion dong and nearly 9 million households by 2011 relied 
on agriculture as their main income source. By 2011 Vietnam’s AFF reached 42.3 
million tonnes of rice output, maintaining its self-sufficiency in meeting domestic 
demand and continuing its position as the leading global rice exporter (GSO, 2012). A 
worrying aspect is that despite the growth during WTO accession, a comparison with 
the 2002-2006 period shows that agriculture recorded better growth pre-accession, with 
the average then reaching 4.2% (GSO, 2012). In addition, the main benefits of export 
remain with the ‘agent’ (usually SOEs) while only 4% of farmers have actual direct 
relationships with foreign importers (Le, 2012, p.4). 
 
The integration process showed that although the competition capacity of 
Vietnamese agricultural sector was limited, its development potentials were enormous. 
The agriculture sector always enjoyed a trade surplus and was an important source of 
foreign currency for the country. Therefore, the successes in the agricultural 
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international trade activities were viewed as the motivation for the policy-makers to 
have more open-minded views on opening up the market and free competition. 
Accession facilitated economic reform through perfecting the institutions and legal 
systems, and towards creating a more transparent and just business environment. 
Vietnamese legal documents were reviewed and adjusted to be more suitable to the 
WTO requirements. WTO negotiations also forced the State to speed up its State-
Owned Enterprises’ restructuring process. WTO commitments helped the Government 
balance its trade and investment policies to be more neutral and allocate more 
reasonable resources into the sectors that Vietnam had the advantages, such as 
agriculture.  
 
Vietnam also made concrete commitments to WTO in the field of State-Owned 
Enterprises, in which they were requested to operate on the commercial basis. The State 
was not allowed to have direct or indirect interventions into the SOEs’ activities and 
SOEs’ procurements were not considered the Government’s procurements. In its 
commitments, Vietnam also pledged to report annually about the SOEs’ equitisation 
process. In fact, the agricultural policies were constantly adjusted during the WTO 
accession. The enduring issues in the agricultural sector such as land, credits, 
investment and SOEs reform were tackled more intensively. These efforts were clearly 
demonstrated in the 10th Party Congress (2006) and in the Resolution 26-NQ/TW of the 
Politburo (2008) on the comprehensive agricultural, farmers and rural development. 
WTO accession created enormous pressure on the agricultural sector of Vietnam. 
 
Accession and membership has established frameworks for reform that 
accelerate the development of agriculture to becoming a competitive industry. Severe 
food shortages in the past caused mass starvation and the focus of reforms was first 
making Vietnam self sufficient in food supplies. Nevertheless, in order to move from 
stability in domestic food supply, the agriculture industry needed to be assisted in 
transforming to a modern, mass production system that could compete with 
international producers. Despite the successes the process of reform has also 
demonstrated the massive problems with the industry. Not least is its appalling record 
on productivity compared to international competitors, but also the transparency of 
these problems has come with WTO accession, as the Government and business have 
been forced to reveal a number of practices that were harming the industry. These 
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practices continue with corruption and discrimination in land use rights leading to 
increasingly violent protests and clear evidence that dramatic changes need to be 
enacted on land ownership rights. There have been negative and positive consequences 
of using the WTO accession process as a driver of reform in agriculture, with the 
difficulties creating the right incentives for growing opposition to reform from groups 
affected in a negative way. Continued reform, backed up by WTO membership 
promises further reforms but could result in even greater and possibly more violent 
protests. 
 
Communist revolutions are often predicated on amassing support of the vast 
agrarian population and identifying the ‘elite’ Marxist elements with the ‘peasants’, to 
create a ‘single’ revolutionary class. Nevertheless, the ascending ‘rulers’ of a 
communist state often then fear the ‘counter-revolution’ and see the ‘peasants’ as its 
most sensitive source. This elemental fear is highly prevalent in the Vietnam 
Communist Party, creating a duality of crisis conditions. The CPV curbs the means for 
the Vietnam farmers/producers to become a powerful political force, restricting their 
type, level and size of land possession and barring them from direct communication and 
trading with the major buyers of their produce. This has placed farmers in a permanent 
state of crisis, reliant on barely enough ‘profits’ to survive and ensuring they have little 
opportunity to develop as an independent force in Vietnam. For example, the original 
distribution of land by the Party involved the issuing of land use rights and leases in 
1993 to millions of farmers, limiting them to only 7.4 acres of land and the Government 
retaining the right to re-possess the land in 2013. This left the farmers little incentive to 
invest in long term plans involving cultivating the land and investing in costly 
modernisation and mechanisation strategies. This led to protests in 2012/13 such as 
Doan Van Vuon and his family who refused re-possession demands and resisted 
military and police occupation through use of handmade land mines and guns. He was 
arrested and tried for attempted murder, but has become a ‘model’ in the minds of many 
farmers. In the major Ecopark project near Hanoi, with chiefly illegal moves to re-
possess the land for developers with Government’s relationships, it required the use of 
3000 military and police personnel, who brutally suppressed local farmers protesting for 
their rights. These and many other major incidents have become the subject of deep 
concern in US-Vietnam relations and in accusations of infringing international human 
rights laws (Hiebert and Nguyen, 2012, p.1). 
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Farmers are instinctive and reactive in how they manage their agricultural 
businesses, deepening the problems of a lack of sustainable development of their 
businesses and ensuring that they remain in a state of permanent crisis. This is 
compounded by low levels of education and skills training, restriction of development 
of economies of scale and little opportunities or abilities to form collective groups, 
Unions or associations. The agricultural sector stays in a permanent level of crisis, 
despite widening markets and higher profits as the benefits are retained at middle 
management (SOE) levels, and the overall mechanisation and modernisation of the 
industry remains impossible as Party/State strategies are focused more on retaining their 
avenues into enjoying the benefits while also constraining any opportunities for the 
farmers to become an effective and united political force for change and reform.  
 
A central issue is the influence of ideology and institutional reforms. The 
‘ideology’ of the Party is concentrated on its own power and constrains incentives for 
actually improving the independent power and wealth of the farmers, while institutional 
reforms are based on restricting the growth of political power in the ‘masses’ involved 
in the agricultural sector. These almost elemental influences means that the Agricultural 
sector is divided into major ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the process of WTO led reforms, 
with farmers actually seeing the WTO reforms as part of the problem, rather than one of 
the solutions. Profits are accumulated in ‘rent-seeking’ conditions and benefit few of the 
‘masses’; investment is directed towards the ‘middle-management levels; and regulation 
and institutional reform avoids creating independence, entrepreneurship and influence 
amongst the millions of ‘producers’, concentrating instead on providing them with a 
‘glass ceiling’ between them and the rewards of WTO accession and membership.  
 
The agricultural sector has the appearance and statistical evidence to generally 
be listed as beneficiaries of WTO led reform and a winner in the efforts to bring 
economic reform, re-structuring and financial success. Yet, beneath the perceptions of 
success is a ‘real’ story of growing instability, increasing political and violent unrest and 
the threat of a return to poverty levels of past ages for the vast majority of people 
involved in the industry. Many farmers can justifiably point to WTO accession and 
membership as a failure, although it is a failure of the Party/Government, rather than of 
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the WTO. That ‘failure’ is never more evident than in the Banking sector, where the 
influence of CPV ideas and the inappropriate and even criminal impact of vested 
interests has led Vietnam to the very edge of financial crisis. The following chapter 
describes how the WTO accession process helped structure the system into one that is 
based on elite interest group control, debt, corruption and the deepening of political and 
economic bonds, rather than a western liberal and capitalist separation of the two. 
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY: THE BANKING SECTOR’S 
REFORMS 
 
 
The banking and financial services industry has benefited from accession and 
entry into the WTO. The financial services, especially the banking sector, have played 
important roles in the economy. It ensures not only the provision of capital resources 
flows in the whole economy, but also acts as filters of the economy to select effective 
and potential investment opportunities (Rostowski, 2006; Dung and Hung, 2010). But in 
this chapter we learn that the reality is far more complicated and involves the realisation 
that although the US-BTA and WTO accession are steps on the development of 
Vietnam as a free market economy, the actual situation is proof that the system remains 
under politically directed central command control. Banks have been the major 
mechanism in this policy and the Party and Government have used it as a means to 
maintain control of the economy through the financing of SOEs via Bank loans. 
Inevitably, the Banking sector has become trapped in a debt cycle, where it has been 
forced to loan, sometimes at great risk and often to an end where bankruptcy and 
collapse has led to debt failure. Although laws and regulations have changed in order to 
meet WTO commitments, this has merely been a camouflage for a system where 
enforcement is almost non-existent and Banks themselves and their owners have 
become a central part of the corruption.  
 
Banking needed to reform in order to escape the failures of the past and create a 
new level of financial stability commiserates with membership of the global economy. 
Ideas and ideologies needed to change and incorporate a level of economic 
independence that allowed financial institutions to develop into market driven entities. 
The vast ‘cash’ benefits ensuing from foreign investment, new levels of profits and 
continually increasing access to wider markets needed to be directed and controlled by 
stronger and more effective regulations and institutions. In all these areas, the 
conclusion is not whether accession reforms were successful or a failure, but more 
accurately, how deep are the failures and to what extent can (if possible now) they be 
reversed by the Party. The thesis finds that the banking sector is quite possibly in a state 
of critical collapse and will be the start point for the eventual fall into the most serious 
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economic crisis possible, and the political upheaval that will almost certainly 
accompany that. 
 
This chapter will examine the impact of reform through the pressure of the WTO 
accession, but will finish on an evaluation of the present situation and how that affects 
our evaluation of the impact of WTO accession. 
 
6.1 Overview of the Banking Sector 
 
The Vietnam economy has encountered difficulties in recent years. Fforde 
(2012) suggested that the macroeconomic imbalances have returned since 2007 after 
nearly two decades’ of good performances. Rising inflation together with high loan 
growth and increased borrowing costs are threatening to undermine the credit quality of 
many banks. In addition, a number of large SOEGs have gone bankrupt or performed 
badly, with further problems with the credit quality of banks (Reuter, 2012; Economist, 
2012). The present crisis is believed to be far worse than any previous crisis (Fforde, 
2012). Vietnam’s banking sector stands on the brink of disaster and yet, the accession to 
the WTO promised far better outcomes.107 Banks are struggling to manage NPLs and 
liquidity problems (Fforde, 2012). In 2012, the Government introduced a scheme for 
restructuring the banking sector (Decision 254/QD-TTg) and save the banks from 
systemic risks and to develop a capable and healthy banking system from 2012 to 2020 
(Gafin.vn, 2011; SBV, 2010). Many experts believed that the banking sector problem is 
in a critical situation and on the edge of collapse, with the Government hesitating to 
conduct fast and costly reforms (Reuter, 2012). 
 
The last 20 years of economic reform has vastly improved the banking sector 
(Anh, 2012b). The growth of the sector has been represented in the increase of the 
chartered capitals of Banks.108 This has been together with the fast growth of M2, which 
                                                
107 WB, 2011; Brummitt, 2012; Bland, 2012 
108 The total equity of the banking sector has increased from 8.35 billion USD in 2008 to 13.7 billion 
USD in 2010 (Stoxplus, 2011).The total assets of banking sector have doubled from 52.4 billion USD in 
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registered an average level of 29.19% during 2005-2010 (Linh, 2011). The growth of 
the credit and the M2 have contributed positively to the high growth of the economy but 
also created an asset bubble in risky areas such as in the stock exchange and real estate 
markets (Linh, 2011). In 2011, the banking sector is able to provide credit for the whole 
economy at 135% of GDP (Thang, 2012). 
 
By the end of 2011, the system of credit institutions in Vietnam consisted of 101 
banks and foreign branches.109 The number of banks has increased from 78 banks in 
2006 (Linh, 2011). Small banks account for a large proportion of the banking sector 
(WB, 2011; Linh, 2011). Linh (2011) reported that 11 out of 43 domestic banks, 
account for 25.6% of chartered capital with USD 250 million or above. Many small 
banks have just been upgraded from rural banks to national banks and their expansion 
has been swift in order to meet the conditions for upgrade, but at the risk of poor quality 
management and operations (Linh, 2011). The main dominators of the banking sector 
are still the SOCBs as they have the chief advantages of having large capital assets. 
Several SOCBs have been equitised, but the Government has retained the largest 
proportion of shares (Linh, 2011). In 2010, four large SOCBs had a total chartered 
capital of 3.2 billion USD. Their traditional customers are often the SOEs (FRB of San 
Francisco, 2011). These customers have been posing both business opportunities and 
risks. They were big customers and ‘safe’ due to the government back up but also most 
risky for exposure to NPL risks (Linh, 2011; WB, 2012; Parker, 2012).110 
 
Private Banks under joint stock or joint venture forms account for most of the 
other banks, are often small in size and have low chartered capital. Most of them have a 
chartered capital under 150 million USD. Their customers are often the SMEs (Linh, 
                                                                                                                                          
2007 to 128.7 billion USD in 2010 (FRB of of San Francisco, 2011). The average growth was 31.55% for 
credit and 28.91% for deposits during the period of 2000-2010. The rates reached its peak of 53.89% and 
47.64% in the boom year of 2007 (FRB of of San Francisco, 2011; Linh, 2011). 
109 Including 5 state-owned commercial banks, 1 social policy bank, 1 development bank, 35 joint stock 
commercial banks, 50 branches of foreign banks, 4 joint venture banks, 5 100% foreign-owned banks; 49 
representative offices of foreign banks; 49 financial companies; 12 leasing companies; and about 1000 
people’s credit funds with a network of postal saving funds (SBV, 2012). 
110 SOEs have about 60% share of the NPLs of the sector 
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2010; WB, 2012; MPI, 2006; CIEM and UNDP, 2004; FRB of San Francisco, 2011). 
The SOCBs still dominate the banking market. Five SOCBs accounted for 49.3% of 
total loans, compared to 37.1% by the Joint stock commercial banks. However, this role 
has significantly reduced since 2005 and the SOCBs’s deposit market share also 
declined from 74.2% in 2005 to 47.7% in 2010 (Linh, 2011; WB, 2012). 
 
The younger players of the sector are the joint venture and foreign banks, which 
are quickly expanding their business activities, holding competitive advantages through 
sophisticated and high quality services as well as greater management expertise. Since 
2007, 100% foreign owned banks have been allowed to operate in Vietnam. Due to the 
limits on fund mobilisation based on the capital fund of their mother banks, their market 
share is still limited to 8.9% for deposits and 13.6% for credits. But their market share is 
expecting to rise because under the WTO commitments, these banks should enjoy the 
same opportunities in banking services as Vietnamese banks (WB, 2012; NCIEC, 2007; 
Tran, 2007; Linh, 2011). 
 
Banks have developed in number and size, and provide new services like ATM 
and Internet banking (Cong, 2010; Linh; 2011;Hong-Dung, 2012). Banking brands also 
have been upgraded with new technology and expansion throughout the country (Linh, 
2011). Thus the sector is able to provide more services and options for customers, which 
were not in existence in banking sector just 10 years ago (Hong-Dung, 2012). 
 
Despite significant progress the banking sector still suffers many problems and 
weaknesses, especially with loan quality. Many scandals in banking have been revealed 
in 2012, such as the higher real NPLs of 9% rather than the reported 3% and money 
circulating around banks rather than being distributed to the businesses or lenders (The 
Economist, 2012; Parker, 2012). Experts often express the sceptical view of the stability 
and possible collapse of the banking system (Parker, 2012; Brummit, 2012; Nguyen, 
2007). These problems have proved a pressing need for further strong reforms of the 
bank’s governances and SBV’s supervision roles as well as of the SOEs (The 
Economist, 2012; Mui, 2007). 
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6.2 Banking reform process since 1986 
 
6.2.1 Banking industry before Doi Moi 
 
After national reunification the old banking systems in the two regions were 
unified (North and South) into a national central command system (Phong, 2009). A 
new currency was issued by the State Bank of Vietnam to replace the separate North 
and South currencies (Phong, 2009; SBV, 2010). The new banking system was 
structured into a one-tier system, with the typical characteristics of a centrally planned 
economy banking system (Phong, 2009; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). Such a system 
embraced the State Bank and specialised banks including the Investment and 
Construction Bank, Foreign Trade Bank and Socialist Saving Fund. The State Bank at 
that time operated as an issuing bank, which was responsible for drafting and 
implementing the plans for cash and credit, supplying credits and loans (Phong, 2009; 
Le and Liu, 2006; Cong, 2010). The banking system basically functioned as an 
instrument of the State budget and was yet to conduct monetary business in compliance 
with market rules (Cong, 2010; Phong, 2009; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
 
6.2.2 Establishment of market-oriented banking system from 1988-1997 
 
Degree 53/HDBT (1988) had two major implications:  
1. Separating the state budget divisions out of the State Bank to establish the 
State Treasury for managing the State budget, and  
2. Establishing special functioning State Owned Banks in order to remove 
certain business functions from the control of the SBV (Cong, 2010).  
 
This is the first important step in banking reform, which initially separated the 
business functions and management functions of the SBV (Kovsted et al, 2005; Cong, 
2010). In 1990, two government ordinances on SBV (37-LCT/HDNN8) and on banks 
and credit institutions (38-LCT/HDNN8) were issued, which marked the officially turn 
of the banking operating mechanism from a one-tier system into a two-tier format. The 
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mandates and goals of each tier were legally separated (Cong, 2010). The State Bank 
acted as a Central Bank with the Bank limited to printing money and macro-economic 
management of the system. It managed monetary policy including the forex rate 
management and supervision of the second-tier banks (Cong, 2010; Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003). SBV was established as a regulator of the money market and monetary 
policy (Cong, 2010). 
 
Table 6.1: Number of Commercial Banks established from 1991 to 1999 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
SOCBs 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Urban Joint Stock Banks 4 16 25 29 29 31 31 31 28 
Joint Venture Banks 1 2 3	   3 4 4 4 4 5 
Foreign Banks Branches 0 5 8 9 18 22 24 25 26 
Sources: Kovsted et al, 2002 
 
The Commercial banks, financial and non-banking institutions were concerned 
with money circulation, credit, payment, forex and banking services throughout the 
whole economy (Cong, 2010). Four major specialised State-owned Commercial Banks 
were founded.111 These banks were responsible for their own financial operation and 
control (Kosvsted et al, 2005; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Cong, 2010; Phong, 2009). 
The Ordinance on Banks and Credit Institutions (38-LCT/HDNN8) lifted the ban on 
establishment of new commercial banks and private ownership of banks. Joint Ventures 
and Joint Stock Banks as well as the representatives and branch offices of foreign banks 
were established and developed shown as in table 6.1 (Kovsted et al, 2005). Nghia 
(interview, 2011) suggested that “as the reforms had just started, the private sector was 
very small and developed openly. Thus, although joint-stock banks represented private 
owners, their largest shareholders were often the State owned Commercial Banks. The 
private sector simply did not have the capacity or was not encouraged to do so”. Several 
joint venture banks were established between the State-owned commercial banks and 
                                                
111 The Agricultural Bank, Investment and Development Bank, Trade and Industry Bank and Foreign 
Trade Bank. 
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foreign banks.112 The number of foreign banks opening branches in Vietnam increased 
rapidly with 22 foreign branches launched in 1996 and engaging in activities related to 
financing trade, providing letters of credit for export and import, and transferring forex 
payments. These branches faced limitations in terms of operation such as operation 
time, licence time, capital mobilisation etc (WB, 2002; Ninh, 2003; Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003; Le and Liu, 2006; Cong, 2010; Phong, 2009).113 
 
Alongside commercial banks, credit funds played a role as a major institution in 
the banking sector. They mushroomed on a small scale following reform and then 
promptly collapsed in 1990 due to lack of managerial capacity and market volatilities.114 
The Government also tasked the SBV to rebuild a credit system at local levels by 
developing a new system of ‘People’s Credit Funds’ with three levels: central, regional 
and local.115 By late 90s around 950 local credit funds were established (Le and Liu, 
2006; Phong, 2009). 
 
The reform in the banking industry was further consolidated by the adoption of 
new Laws on SBV and the Law on Credit Institutions by the National Assembly in 
1997. The law stipulated that the SBV performed functions of state management on 
monetary issues and banking activities, as well as the independent supervision function 
of SBV over the financial system (Kovsted et al, 2005). The Department of Financial 
Supervision under the SBV was given the mandate to advise the Governor of the Bank 
to realise managerial mandates and functions of the Central Bank. Yet this Department 
is to some extent independent from SBV as the Director General of this Department is 
appointed by the Prime Minister as recommended by the Governor and the Chief of 
State Inspectorate (McCarty, 2002; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Tran, 2007). This was 
                                                
112 Bank Dagang National Indonesia, Public Bank of Malaysia, Korea First Bank etc 
113 The banks only have trade rights in 20 years, and are allowed to mobilise at maximum US$ 1.5 mn and 
to lend 10% of their capital (Ninh, 2003). 
114 More than 7,000 credit funds were bankrupted and only 160 credit funds operated  
115 First tier is the Local Credit Fund (LCF), providing credit to SMEs and households. Second tier is 
regional credit funds, managing regional credit funds. Third tier is central credit fund, supplying and 
balancing capital for regional funds. If the distance from local funds to regional funds is too far, local 
funds would be under direct management of SBV. 
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the first step of the process to legally separate the SBV from the political system 
(Kovsted et al, 2005). Nghia (interview, 2010), Vice Director of National Financial 
Supervisory Commission, commented that “the Law also states that SBV is not the 
ultimate institution making final decisions on monetary policy. SBV only advises the 
Government and final decisions belong to the National Assembly”. 
 
The Law on Bank and Credit Institution stipulated the legal independence of 
SBV against commercial banks. By law, interventions in operation of credit 
organisations are prohibited (Tran, 2007). The Law further confirmed the legal rights of 
the establishment and operation of private banks, representative offices of foreign banks 
by law, and provided the legal framework for a more level playing field for different 
ownerships of banks (Cong, 2010; Kovsted et al, 2005). The law specified the services 
and products that banks can provide, while new services and products were required to 
have a license from the SBV. 
 
Regulation and supervision 
 
Decision 55-CT and Decision 39-HĐBT (1989) stipulated that the real interest 
must be positive and adjusted following the market’s CPI, and paid for all loans and 
deposits (Cong, 2010). The policy on positive rates broke the stagnation in channels to 
absorb money and contributed to the success of inflation control in the subsequent years 
(Phong, 2009; Kovsted et al, 2005). However, the borrowing rate was still controlled by 
the SBV to set it lower than the mobilisation rate to support enterprises to move onto a 
market economy platform. This interfered with the normal operations of the banks and 
forced the banks to frequently receive assistance from the State (Kovsted et al, 2005). 
 
Since 1992, the Government has pursued more prudent monetary and fiscal 
policies with the aim of controlling inflation (Cong, 2010; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; 
Kovsted et al, 2005). Following the ordinance of the SBV in 1990, the SBV’s operation 
has changed by gradually using the monetary policy instruments to control the market. 
The Bank’s started to liberalise the interest rates of commercial banks. It requested the 
average lending rate to be higher than average interest rate and set the interest 
framework for the economy (Cong, 2010). Since 1996, SBV has lifted the interest rate 
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floor and only regulated interest rate ceilings for lending with the difference of 0.35% 
per month (Cong, 2010). The National Assembly of Vietnam has also removed revenue 
taxes on the banks, helping curb business costs and reduce the average interest rate 
(Cong, 2010). 
 
Since 1989, the management mechanism for exchange rates was also reformed. 
The multi-level exchange rate of the command economy was replaced with a unified 
USD rate. VND was substantially depreciated to engage in trade payments beyond the 
State plan (Kovsted et al, 2005; Cong, 2010). The rate was managed and adjusted 
gradually based on market signals, and SBV announced official exchange rates and 
adjusted this rate based on inflation, interest rates, payment balances and fluctuations of 
exchange rates in the market (Cong, 2010). In early 1990, two forex trading centres 
were established in Ho Chi Minh Cities and Ha Noi and were platforms for the inter-
bank forex market; maintain supply and demand of foreign currency to adjust forex 
policy in tune with market signals and the goals of the macro-economy (Cong, 2010). 
The Official forex was identified on the basis of trading sessions of the Centres, better 
reflecting the relations between demand and supply of foreign currency in the forex 
market, and narrowing the gap between formal and informal forex rates (Cong, 2010). 
 
Since 1990, the SBV also started to use the compulsory reserve rate for 
commercial banks as stipulated by the Banking Ordinance. Since 1992, the rate was 
fixed by the SBV at 10% on all the deposits of a bank. It was then relaxed in 1994 to be 
different for different types of deposit, which was enabling commercial banks to utilise 
effectively its capital (Cong, 2010). In Decision 261/QĐ-NH1 (1995), the compulsory 
reserve rate of credit organisations was adjusted to 10% of the Bank’s average balance 
of all VND and USD deposits and borrowings for less than 12 months (Cong, 2010; 
Kovsted et al, 2005). 
 
In 1995, a new development of the financial market in Vietnam introduced 
bidding treasure trusts, which was a significant institutional reform of the banking 
sector. This allowed SBV to manage the monetary policy by the open market derivative 
instruments, in which banks and other credit institution can participate to bid for the 
treasury trust and bonds (Cong, 2010). New interbank markets have been developed for 
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VND and USD. New forms of capital mobilisation have also developed including 
government bonds, commercial bank bonds, savings for long terms investment such as 
housing building, etc (Cong, 2010). All these developments helped to increase the 
mobilised capital of commercial banks and to reduce re-capitalised borrowing from the 
SBV. 
 
The evolution of monetisation in the Vietnamese economy sharply increased 
from 13% of GDP in 1990 to 27% in 1995 and 44% in 2000 (WB, 2002). The 
Government has stabilised the macro economy with a prudent policy to curb inflation 
and commit to building a multi-player banking system, resulting in increased 
monetisation, showcasing enhanced trust for the banking system (WB, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Credit ration to GDP 
Source: WB, 2002. 
 
6.2.3 Limitations and slowdown of the reforms in the initial stages 
 
In spite of encouraging progress, the fledgling banking sector was still showing 
many shortcomings in the system. The banking sector is still fragile in terms of financial 
capacity and management expertise, as well as limitations of mechanism for 
development of a sustainable banking sector (WB, 2002; Vo and Le, 2004). The low 
ratio of the banking sector in GDP reflects limited distribution and financial circulation 
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of the banks compared to that in other countries (Kovsted et al, 2005; Vo and Le, 2004; 
WB, 2002). 
 
Table 6.2: Percentage of circulated money in GDP of Vietnam and other 
countries 
 
 
The SBV 
 
The SBV is an advisory body of the Government on monetary policy to be 
submitted to the National Assembly for approval (Kovsted et al, 2005). SBV lacks tools 
to intervene into the market and relies on administrative measures to regulate the 
market, for instance requesting the banks to implement the Government’s orders or 
fixing the rate floor for deposit rates (Kovsted et al, 2005; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Weak banking institutions have led to a loss of control of the banking system, and an 
abundance of risks in operation. For example, banks are not requested to submit its 
reports to independent auditors. Accounting standards were indeed unsuitable to 
international benchmarks so assessment of the financial capacity of the borrowers 
through the Bank balance sheet is extremely difficult (Vo and Le, 2004).  There is 
limited supervision of the Bank, and a command economy mindset. SBV often abuse 
their administrative powers in managing banks and credit institutions, intent only on 
surviving daily challenges rather than actually dealing with long-term problems (WB, 
2002). 
 
The capacity of SBV is a major problem in its operations. Nghia (interview, 
2010) suggested that “there is a shortage of experienced and trained staffs for managing 
newly transformed banking and financial sectors moving towards the market oriented 
sector, despite a large number of staff being employed. Thus the capability to oversee 
banking activities and discover abnormalities and work out solutions to avoid risks is 
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still limited. International standards in accounting, supervision and preventing risks are 
yet to be applicable in the Vietnam banking system”. 
 
SBV still manages interest rates by approving interest rate ceilings and rate 
bands. The Lending interest rate ceiling is used based on lending terms (Cong, 2010).116  
Special projects and programmes are able to borrow at a preferential rate based on the 
policy, and not subject to market-based decisions. The control of the lending interest 
rate is aimed at primarily supporting the SOEs, giving them access to larger loans 
without investment efficiency. The State narrows interest rate bands, making the banks 
shrink their profits and produce no momentum for growth (WB, 2002; Kovsted et al, 
2005). 
 
Commercial banks  
 
State-owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) still retain a monopoly in the banking 
system, accounting for more than 70% of commercial activities and 75% of total assets. 
SOEs are their main clients and they receive support from the State in terms of capital, 
ensuring a stable market share with less competition (Oh, 2002). 
 
Non-State-owned banks compete with each other in the remaining part of the 
market. Their clients are mainly the SMEs. Thus, they are difficult to develop and invest 
in, or to operate on a larger scale (WB, 2002). There is a clear difference between 
domestic and foreign banks and this is reflected by strict regulations in mobilising 
capital, opening branches and using land use rights for mortgage (WB, 2002). 
 
Vietnam’s economy was adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1999. 
The sluggish economic growth due to the diminished FDI inflows and decline in exports 
directly hit the SOEs (Kovsted et al, 2005; Masina, 2006). The Government used the 
                                                
116 The highest lending rate is set at 1.2% per month (14.4% per year) for short-term loans and 1.25% per 
month (15% per annum) for long-term loans. 
 242 
banking system as a tool to stabilise the situation and assist the SOEs by means of direct 
interest subsidies, debt rescheduling or lower criteria for loans to SOEs (Kovsted et al, 
2005).117As the loans were given under the directives of the Government and without 
undergoing any standard risk assessment or risk prevention methods, NPLs accumulated 
to dangerous levels in the banking system (WB, 2002; Oh, 2002).118 Capital 
mobilisation scaled down, due to the lack of confidence in the banking system, forcing 
the banks to opt for short-term mobilisation to make up for the long-term, and this led to 
an inappropriate ratio of asset/liability of several banks. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) 
commented that “the situation in 2000 was so common among the banks that the entire 
system was facing a threat of collapsing”. 
 
The legal environment had many shortcomings, troubling the development and 
operation of the banking sector. The laws on ownership, transfer of property and 
inheritance were still ambiguous, making the real estate market enormously risky (WB, 
2002). The mortgage law was not unified as borrowing agreements are considered as 
civil or economic contracts, making it difficult for the banks to use the court as the 
arbitrator of mortgage disputes (WB, 2002). The Law on Bankruptcy in 1993 did not 
clearly regulate the bankruptcy of financial institutions, thus creating difficulties for 
restructuring, purchasing or merging the banks (Kovsted et al, 2005). 
 
6.2.4 Reforms restarted from 2000-2004 
 
By 2000, the Asian Financial Crisis negatively affected FDI and reduced 
exports. Economic growth slowed and the Government decided to prioritise political 
and economic stability instead of continued reforms (Oh, 2002; Cong, 2010). ‘Stimulus’ 
                                                
117 The assistance to the SOEs included the following measures (Kovsted  et al, 2005): 
• Remove the requirements on collateral of SOEs for loans from SOCBs. This meant that the 
SOCBs were allowed to give loans even to the SOEs suffering losses as long as the SOEs had 
developed their business plans, 
• Lower lending interest rates for SOEs, and 
• Allow rescheduling the loans to SOEs experiencing difficulties, from 1-3 years up to 1-5 years 
term. The NPLs of some SOEs were written off.  
118 In 2001, the official number of NPLs under the Vietnamese standards was published at about 14.7%, 
but the international banks circulated a much higher figure of about 30% (Kovsted et al, 2005; Oh, 2002). 
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packages containing credits were given to SOEs to ease their difficulties, and in 
consequence the Vietnamese banking system became weaker. The financial situation of 
the commercial banks of Vietnam became insecure and highly dangerous (Masina, 
2006; Hung, 2000; Nghia, 2010) 
 
SBV took steps to restructure the SOCBs to avoid a collapse (WB, 2002; 
Kovsted et al, 2002; Cong, 2010). According to Nghia (interview, 2010), “The SOCBs 
restructuring plans, which were drafted by the SBV, contained two fundamental tasks, 
i.e., to raise the financial capacities and re-organise the operations of the banks. The first 
task mainly involved dealing with the NPLs of the SOCBs, while the second task 
included banking administration, risk administration and development of new services. 
The plan was amended in 2000, embracing nine points:  (1) financial solutions, (2) 
banking governance, (3) organisational restructuring, (4) risk prevention, (5) internal 
auditing, (6) system safety, (7) MIS, (8) development of new services, and (9) 
equitisation”. 
 
Nghia (interview, 2010), who was in charge of the 9-point plan implementation, 
said that “the process had been progressing slowly with various difficulties, and that 
success was not seen across all fields. The slow progress was attributable to the 
technical difficulties within the reforms, the financial constraints of the Government and 
the protests from interest groups. Reform of financial settlement systems, bank 
administration, and restructuring was supported by the Government but in other areas 
such as risk management, internal auditing, system safety, and equitisation reform was 
slow due to the foreseen reduction of the credit institutions. They were focused only on 
short-sighted benefits”. 
 
The financial settlement was placed at the core of the banking reforms plan. The 
SOCBs were restructured by pumping more charter capital in, to attain the minimum 
capital safety ratio (CAR) of 8% under international norms (Oh, 2002; CIEM, 2004; 
MPI and UNDP, 2006). The SOCBs also sought to resolve the NPLs and reduce the 
growing overdue loans. Most of these debts were from SOEs, and were thus removed or 
rescheduled (CIEM, 2004; MPI, 2006; Lam, 2006). By 2002, the five SOCBs were 
recapitaliszed with nearly 330 million USD, and over 43% of the outstanding loans 
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were resolved and the rate of overdue loans declined from 13.2% in 1999 down to 8% 
and about 6% in 2001 and 2002, respectively (CIEM, 2004; Lam, 2006). Along with the 
SOCBs, the JSBs were also restructured by means of Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A).119 Regulations and requirements for the establishment of new JSBs were also 
revised to enhance conditions for establishment of new banks.  Several banks that did 
not meet the criteria, were ordered to close (Kovsted et al, 2005; MPI and UNDP, 2006; 
Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
 
The Government also took action to address the market distortions caused by 
policy lending (WB, 2006; MPI and UNDP, 2006). Banks for policy lending were 
separated from the commercial bank system. In 1999, the Government set up a 
Development Assistance Fund with the charter capital of 200 million USD financed by 
the State budget to replace the BIDV in policy lending. In 2003, the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies (VBSP) was established with the charter capital of 200 million USD. 
The VBSP’s mandate was to serve the poor and replace the SOCBs in policy lending 
(MPI and UNDP, 2006; Lam, 2006). The separation also facilitated the SBV to 
supervise the banks’ operations in a more transparent manner, and at the same time 
freed the SOCBs from policy lending, thus improving their business efficiency and risk 
management (Oh, 2002; MPI and UNDP, 2006; WB, 2006). 
 
The SBV revised the regulations and relevant procedures to improve its 
supervision over the banks (MPI and UNDP, 2006). Accordingly, a more risk-based 
methodology was applied in the supervision. The SBV also sought to enhance the 
capacity and skills of on-site inspection and remote supervision, and improve the bank 
auditing. CAMEL120 and BASEL121 standards have been gradually institutionalised and 
                                                
119Two banks had their licenses withdrawn, three others had to halt their operations and many were placed 
under the special control mode. 
120 CAMEL stands for Capital, Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity, which is an 
assessment system for the healthiness of a financial institutions based on the above 5 criteria.  
121 BASEL standards are set up by the Basel Committee on banking supervision, a banking supervisory 
authority set up by central bank governors of the group of 10 countries. These standards were a set of 
minimum principles for best practice of banking supervision, which include international standards on 
capital adequacy, the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Concordat on cross-
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applied (WB, 2006; Oh, 2002; Lam, 2006). Nghia (interview, 2011) noted that “the 
SBV requested the SOCBs to launch internal and independent auditing. Vietcombank, 
Incombank and BIDV implemented independent auditing in line with international 
standards by inviting international auditing firms to assist in the audits. The reports 
produced were all forwarded to WB, MOF, SBV, and the Executive Boards of the banks 
so as to verify the conditions of the banking operations and assess accurately the 
financial positions of the banks, including the appropriate loans classification and 
provision for credit risks”. 
 
SBV introduced regulations on the organisational reform of the commercial 
banks and improvement of banking administration, restructuring banks on the basis of 
their targeted clients instead of their functions (CIEM, 2004; Oh, 2002). A number of 
Committees related to the bank safety and risks were set up, helping improve bank 
administration and risk management.122 
 
A proposal on equitisation of the commercial banks was introduced in 2003 
(NCIEC, 2007). Vietcombank and MHB were to be equitised with foreign banks as 
potential shareholders. In parallel to the equitisation of SOCBs, the Government 
permitted the foreign commercial banks operating in Vietnam to buy up to 30% of the 
shares in local commercial banks, and the commercial banks were allowed to be listed 
on the stock market (Du and Anh, 2005). The quota of shares owned by foreign 
organizations in commercial banks was lifted from 10% to 15%. Meanwhile, the quota 
for individual investors remained at 10% (WB, 2007; Masina, 2006). 
 
Nghia and Lam (interviews, 2011) both suggested that “reform implementation 
had been very slow due to technical issues and difficulties in the resolution of the NPLs 
of SOEs”. The banks provided loans based on the ‘signals and guarantees’ from the 
                                                                                                                                          
border banking supervision (Bank of International Settlement, 2013). So far, their major set standards on 
the banking supervision subsequently have been developed and upgraded from Basel I to Basel III.  
122 Examples are the Risk Control Committee, Credit Council, Inspection Unit and Asset/Liability 
Management Board 
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Government. Nghia (interview, 2010) strongly emphasised “the banking sector reforms 
did not make much progress”. 
 
6.3 Impacts of WTO accession process on banking reform 
 
6.3.1 The WTO’s commitments on banking sector 
 
Upon accession, Vietnam had to comply with the GATS on an open market for 
the banking sector. Vietnam accepted all four modes of delivery for banking services. 
Foreign credit institutions could establish their commercial presence in Vietnam under 
such forms as a representative office, a branch of a foreign commercial bank, joint 
venture bank, 100% foreign-owned bank, joint venture finance company and 100% 
foreign-owned finance company, joint venture and 100% foreign-invested financial 
leasing companies. The 100% foreign-invested banks were permitted from 2007. 
 
Foreign credit institutions operating in Vietnam can offer most of the banking 
services described in the GATS Annex on Financial Services and issue credit cards123 
(NCIEC, 2007; US Aid and NCIEC, 2007). However, Vietnam also attached a range of 
exclusions and limitations on market access and on the national treatments to assist the 
effectiveness of the state management in the banking sector as follows: 
1. There was a schedule for foreign banks to take VND deposits based on the 
capacity of Vietnamese people who did not have credit relations with banks, 
2. Foreign banks not allowed to open other transaction points outside its 
branch office but entitled to install and operate ATMs, 
3. Limitations on equity participation of foreign credit institutions. Foreign 
capital contributions of the joint venture banks cannot exceed 50% of the 
chartered capital. Total equity held by foreign institutions and individuals in 
                                                
123 i.e, acceptance of deposits and lending, finance leasing, forex trading, money market instruments, 
derivatives, money broking, asset management, payment services, advisory services and financial 
information 
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Vietnam’s joint stock commercial banks may not exceed 30% of the bank’s 
chartered capital, and  
4. Licensing conditions for the 100% foreign-owned banks must satisfy 
requirements on capital safety ratio, solvency and corporate administration 
(NCIEC, 2007).124 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012) said “the WTO’s commitments on the banking sector 
are not far from the commitments in the US BTA. They basically sped up the schedule 
for implementation”. He believed that “the Vietnam commitments in the WTO are 
balanced, tight and safe for the development of Vietnam, which generated enough force 
for reforms but also not too strong to destroy the industry. The banking sector has 
prepared for these under the US BTA”. 
 
6.3.2 WTO’s accession process has provided pressure for reforms 
 
The banking sector saw strong pressure from the US BTA to open the sector but 
WTO accession generated a greater pressure for reforming the banking sector. The 
WTO is a larger market with a much larger community of trading partners. Lam, a 
member of the negotiation team and director of Central Banking Department, SBV, 
(interview, 2010), suggested that “services, especially in banking, were given a 
particular focus. Commitments in this area often exceeded the existing standards. 
Negotiations were very tense and sensitive for Vietnam”. He suggested “the 
determination of the Government to accelerate the accession to WTO since 2004 placed 
new pressure on the government agencies and enterprises to think deeper about self-
reforms given the growing pressures of integration”. 
 
                                                
124 The parent bank of the foreign bank must have total assets of at least US$ 20 billion in the year prior to 
applying for a license for the foreign bank branch. The conditions for opening 100% a foreign-owned 
bank or a joint venture bank, means the foreign parent bank must have total assets of over US$10 billion. 
For conditions to open a 100% foreign-owned finance company, a joint venture finance company, a 100% 
foreign-owned financial leasing company or a joint venture financial leasing company, the foreign credit 
institutions must have total assets of more than US$ 10 billion at the end of the year prior to application 
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Foreign banks are superior in terms of capital and foreign reserves thanks to the 
guarantee of their parent banks, and they also possess advanced technologies, enabling 
them to offer more advanced services. The profit- and market-based operations of 
foreign banks give them much greater expertise in risk management, project appraisal 
and system safety. They also display superiority in administration with experienced and 
well-trained human resources. Their clients are often generally foreign investors in 
Vietnam and they were pioneers in introducing new technologies and services into the 
country (Lam, 2006; CIEM and UNDP, 2004).125 
 
The Vietnam banks remained at a low level of development with restricted 
competition from foreign banks. The ratio of total assets of Vietnamese banks/GDP was 
merely 54% in 2003, far below that of other countries in the region (Kovsted et al, 2005; 
CIEM and UNDP, 2004; MPI and UNDP, 2006).126 Vietnam was still a cash economy 
(CIEM and UNDP, 2004).127 Therefore, Lam (interview, 2010) noted that “the domestic 
banks were inferior to foreign banks in all aspects”.128 
 
Nghia (interview, 2011) noted that “the competitiveness of the domestic banks 
was very low and the quality of the banks’ assets was poor, while ratio of NPLs under 
international benchmarks remained high. The level of technology application among the 
Vietnamese banks was low”. Due to their limited finance, the domestic banks also 
experienced difficulties in technological upgrade and introduction of new services (MPI 
                                                
125 i.e, internet banking, telephone banking and various complex derivatives 
126 For instance, the figures in Thailand, Malaysia and China were 145%, 193% and 211%, respectively 
127 The ratio of M2/GDP of Vietnamese banks was 62.4% in 2003 while the cash/ GDP of the Vietnamese 
banking system was 15%. 
128 After four years of raising capital, the total charter capital of the Vietnamese banks only registered at 
1.2 billion USD as in 2005 against 400 million USD in 2001. The largest Vietnamese bank only had 350 
million USD in charter capital (Lam, 2006). The average charter capital of the commercial banks was as 
low as US$ 10 million. CAR of domestic commercial banks averaged at about 5.3%, far lower than the 
8% of the international benchmark (MPI and UNDP, 2006; Lam, 2006). 
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and UNDP, 2006; MUTRAP, 2006).129 Lam (interview, 2010) suggested that “banks 
were not effective in retaining and training qualified staff. In many SOCBs, the staffs 
were mostly civil servant types, not the dynamic services provider type, and they tended 
to be afraid of responsibilities”. Most of the SOCBs were not dynamic as they waited 
for the clients coming to them instead of going out and seeking them (Oh, 2002; 
Kovsted et al, 2005). Services offered by credit institutions was low quality (Lam, 
2006). Domestic banks worried about losing their protected markets. They feared the 
competitive advantages of foreign banks and the weaknesses of the domestic banks. 
Lam and Nghia (interviews, 2010) shared that “the accession to WTO was indeed a race 
against time to adjust the competitiveness of domestic banks”.  
 
The accession increased the number of transactions and ensuing risks due to 
increasing market participants and services, as well as the dependence of the banks on 
the world market. This forced the SBV to adopt effective measures to forecast and 
stabilise the market. It required the SBV to actively renew its modus operandi so as to 
ensure that the market developed in a healthy manner with monetary tools matching 
international standards, while supervising potential risks for better performance of the 
commercial banks (SBV, 2012; Lam, 2006; MUTRAP, 2006; MPI and UNDP, 2006). 
 
6.3.3 WTO’s accession process has influenced the balance of politics to support 
reforms in banking sector 
 
The Asian financial crisis forced the Vietnamese policy makers to halt the 
reforms in exchange for economic stability (Chi Lan, interview, 2012; WB, 1999; Hung, 
1999; Thayer, 2000). Technical difficulties emerged in the restructuring of the banks, 
but the biggest impediment to the reforms was the strong opposition of interest groups 
whose core interests would be taken away by the reforms.130 Although the banking 
sector reforms might benefit the society as a whole, the interest groups who were likely 
                                                
129 By 2004, there were only over 700 ATMs, and 3 banks issuing international cards and about 1,250,000 
cards issued, and 15 banks issuing domestic cards and about 760,000 cards issued (Lam, 2006).   
130 For deeper reforms in the banking sector for instance the liberalisation of interest and exchange rates, 
the money market instruments, the application of international standards on loans and risk assessment, etc  
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to be ‘losers’. Policy change would strongly hit the interests of three major relevant 
groups (SOCBs, SOEs and the state management agencies) (Kovsted et al, 2005; Oh, 
2002). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) agreed that “these three groups were interrelated and 
benefited greatly from the maintenance of the old policy system”. 
 
SOCBs dominated the market in terms of market share and total assets (Kovsted 
et al, 2005; Oh, 2002). Any competition threatened their loss of market share, 
particularly given many issues related to their weak competitiveness. Despite the risks 
from lending under the government’s orders, their profits were made up for by many 
other benefits and privileges from the Government such as more concessional terms of 
loans, better discount interest rates, and Government guarantees etc (Lam, 2006; Oh, 
2002). SOCBs dominated the deposit-taking market, taking advantage of government 
support and their monopoly (Kovsted et al, 2005). The SOCBs understand that the 
liberalisation of the banking operations meant they would have to compete directly with 
one another and they showed resistance to reforms (Lam, 2006; Kovsted et al, 2005). 
 
Reforms of the banking sector required SOE reforms (Kovsted et al, 2005). 
SOEs are the biggest beneficiaries from the government’s interventions. They are still 
seen as the foundation of the economy and given priority for government investment 
(Kovsted et al, 2005; Oh, 2002). The Government often guarantees loans of the SOEs or 
‘instruct secretly’ the SOCBs to provide credits to them (Kovsted et al, 2005). The 
majority of the SOEs experienced frequent losses and had to rely on the assistance from 
the Government, especially in terms of capital (Masina, 2006; Painter, 2006; Le and 
Liu, 2006). 
 
The relevant state management agencies are also seen as interest groups in the 
banking sector reform. They are the agencies either controlling directly or drafting 
policies, and represent the ownership of the Government of the banks (Tran, 2007). The 
SBV assumed the role of the lead agency in managing monetary policy and banking 
operations as well as supervising the banks’ activities and being in charge of licensing 
credit organisations in Vietnam. It is responsible for macroeconomic policy, giving 
priorities to growth over stability. Limited capacity has forced the Bank to favour the 
old less complicated market and existing conditions rather than a new and unfamiliar 
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environment. If the banking sector reform is geared toward transparency and 
independence, the SBV will lose its exclusive power of licensing and administrative 
supervision over the SOCBs. Moreover, the SBV is also the authorized representative of 
the state as the shareholder at the SOCBs, thus, the banking sector reform would 
directly alter the management of the state’s capital at the SOCBs. Nghia (interview, 
2010) suggested that “if the international benchmarks on risks and loans are applied, the 
ratio of risk provisions will be higher, shrinking the profit margins of the SOCBs”. 
 
The second influential government agency is the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
The MOF is in charge of the finances of the financial institutions, insurance and 
development funds, and also responsible for steering the governments financial 
instruments like Treasury Bills and Government Bonds (Tran, 2007). The regulations 
issued by the MOF are relevant to the banks’ operations. The MOF also represents the 
government in managing the finances of the state corporations, including their 
expenditure and tax payments (Tran, 2007; Kovsted et al, 2005; WB, 2006). The 
liberalisation of the banking sector, including the removal of credit appointments and 
more competition among the banks, will affect a series of the SOEs, placing more 
burdens in terms of resources allocation and corporate reforms on the MOF (Tran, 2007; 
Kovsted et al, 2005). 
 
Groups representing the majority of businesses are adversely impacted by 
limited policies on banking reform, for instance private companies and foreign-invested 
enterprises. Despite the economic policy impacts and resources allocation, private and 
foreign-invested companies still account for over 61% of the GDP (Lam, 2006; MPI and 
UNDP, 2006; WB, 2006). Joint stock commercial banks (JSC) represent the private 
sector. In 2003, 30 JSCs operated on a fairly small scale. These banks target SMEs, but 
it is a small market fraught with risks as SMEs are tiny and inexperienced in business 
(Kovsted et al, 2005; Lam, 2006; Tran, 2007). For these banks, a fair competition 
environment is essential. Private Banks therefore tend to support reform in the banking 
sector (Tran, 2007). 
 
Foreign banks were mainly confined to trade finance and banking services for 
FDI companies in Vietnam (Kovsted et al, 2005; WB, 2002). Foreign banks have a 
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stable customer base as they have bonds with parent banks and they have enormous 
potentials in terms of capital, technology and managerial expertise (WB, 2002; MPI and 
UNDP, 2006). Nghia (interview, 2010) mentioned that “restrictions make the role of 
these banks in the entire system become modest. Further opening of banking system 
will surely help these banks expand their operations”. 
 
Nghia (interview, 2010) further mentioned that “groups having an important 
political role like management agencies, SOCBs and SOEs are cautious with reform. 
These groups indeed have direct relations with policy makers so reform is likely to be 
postponed. In contrast, groups wishing to speed up reform include private banks, 
branches of foreign banks and SMEs, but this group has a small political role. So they 
cannot put adequate pressure on reform and liberalisation policy conducted by the 
State”. In an environment tending towards a conservative tendency to fear change, 
influential anti-reform groups on policy means weak reforms in banking sector and 
reform thus tends to be slow and cautious (WB, 2006; Nghia, interview, 2010). 
 
Vietnam committed to assuring conditions for foreign companies to operate in 
line with the trade criteria; the State does not make any direct or indirect interventions 
in trade decisions of companies, except the interventions suitable to WTO rules 
(NCIEC, 2007; NCIEC and USAid, 2008). However, the practice of being government 
shareholders in private companies should be re-considered as this is merely an avenue 
for legitimising its continued intent to remain in ‘control’ of the economy and the 
private sector. WTO membership led to greater opening up of the banking market for 
foreign banks, while building a more equal and transparent market to all stakeholders in 
banking sector. 
 
The SOEs sector undertook several reforms due to the WTO accession, and this 
relieved the pressure of imprudent policy lending and NPLs for the banking system. 
SOEs were not only facing the threats of increasing competitions, but also were forced 
to change due to WTO commitments for transparency and fairness (Khanh, interview, 
2012; Basu, 2008). At the 10th Congress (2006), the CPV affirmed that “they would 
accelerate reform and increase SOEs’ efficiency, which focuses on equitisation and 
encouragement of strong development of multi-ownership, particularly for newly 
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equitised companies; so as this form of economy will become popular and make up a 
larger percentage in the economy” (CPV, 2006, p.84-85). 
 
The Unified Law on Enterprises (2005) eliminated many discriminative 
practices in economic sectors. The Government’s Enterprises Reform Board established 
concrete steps to speed up transformation of enterprises (WB, 2006). The number of 
equitised SOEs increased and big SOEs were restructured as 100% wholly State-owned 
limited companies (Nguyen and Hoang, 2010). SOEs appeared to be transformed 
toward a more independent sector in the economy, separated from the politics and state 
management. SOEs are still the main tool for the Government and Party to remain in 
control of the economy and centrally command its operation, while Banks are merely 
the channels through which the Government can divert finance to the SOEs. 
 
Private companies have increased from 31000 enterprises in 2000 to more than 
541,000 in 2011, accounting for around 40% of GDP in 2010 (GSO, 2011; Quang Ha, 
2010). Their rapid development is a potential for banks as they are dynamic and have 
diverse demands (Lam, 2006; CIEM and UNDP, 2004). Nghia (interview, 2010) said 
“banks also do not want to miss this opportunity and as a channel to diversify risks 
because the returns of these companies are often higher than that of SOEs. So the 
growth of the private sector also generates a wave of reform in banking system”. 
 
Foreign-invested companies often ask for professional and high-quality banking 
services. Therefore, this group tends to use services and products of foreign banks 
(Lam, 2006; Kovsted et al, 2005; CIEM and UNDP, 2004). Although State-owned 
commercial banks have advantages regarding market share, client and distribution 
channel, these banks are aware of the challenges facing them in the coming years. Lam 
(interview, 2010) suggested that “a new economic cycle appeared after the crisis in Asia 
and the wave of investment in Vietnam is mounting. The economy has developed since 
2004 with an average growth of 8.4%, generating new momentums for banking 
development. Against that backdrop, State-owned commercial banks are aware that 
without reforms, they will be left behind and face tough competition”. 
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Private Banks, in the context of WTO negotiations, play a critical role in 
changing the perception of the need for reforms. In spite of its small scale, private banks 
are very dynamic and active and seek to improve service quality with a view to 
generating greater competition in the banking sector (CIEM and UNDP, 2004; MPI and 
UNDP, 2006). Accession to WTO offers these banks a chance to extend their capital if 
foreign banks buy their shares or become their strategic investors. Many new banks are 
founded or the old banks expand their business strategy to wait for external investment 
following WTO membership. Private Banks promote banking reforms to gain profits 
through selling their shares to foreign banks (CIEM and UNDP, 2004; Barre, 2006). 
 
Foreign banks are willing to engage in Vietnam’s market acquiring Vietnamese 
banks. Standard Chartered Bank purchased shares in ACB and 3 other banks also 
contributed capital to Vietnamese banks, for example; CitiBank, HSBC and ANZ, etc. 
Western banks pay special attention to emerging markets like Vietnam. Many banks 
want to be the strategic partners of Vietnamese banks (Nhung, 2007; Thanh Trung, 
2012). 
 
WTO membership required Vietnam to comply with and revise the legal system 
to ensure transparency and equality, thus leading to the shrinkage in tools used by 
management institutions to support enterprises. The benefits from licensing of 
management institutions have been narrowed due to tightening mechanisms of control 
(Nhung, 2007; Bao, 2010). 
 
WTO membership generated a new balance for the support of reforms. Prudent 
groups in the course of reform are adhering to WTO regulations or realize the 
opportunities in reform, and this reduced pressure that prevented policy makers from 
planning policies for reform. Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested that “groups taking 
benefits from integration enjoyed a new status to gather stronger support for reform”. 
When political pressure for prudence in reform is cut down, policy makers are able to 
take stronger actions in carrying out necessary reforms. Reality shows that banking 
reform took placed robustly and quickly from 2004 to 2007. 
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6.3.4 WTO’s accession has guided institutional reforms in the banking sector 
 
The laws on banking and SBV were formulated during the Asian economic 
crisis, and suffered from a common cautious attitude towards financial liberalisation. 
There were strict articles to manage the operation of the domestic banks and market 
penetration (Masina, 2006; Tran, 2007; MPI and UNDP, 2006). Both Nghia (2010) and 
Thai (interview, 2012) has commented that “The laws were considered as a set-back for 
the process of financial market reforms, which were not as open as the previous decrees 
on banks and SBV”. 
 
The process of the WTO’s accession had exerted a positive influence on the 
reform of the banking system’s institutions. WTO agreements stipulate compliance with 
WTO commitments under direct or legalisation formats, unified application of 
regulations in the entire territory and establishment of independent judicial bodies in 
judging WTO issues (Basu, 2008). WTO required Vietnam to provide the national 
treatment for foreign suppliers of the service sector. Admission to WTO led to a series 
of reforms in laws and institutions in banking sector as follows: 
 
Reform of SBV  
 
The two laws on banking systems were revised in 2003 and 2004 with a view to 
building a modern banking system in compliance with international practices and 
standards, eliminating subsidies in monetary business, cutting down administrative 
procedures in the State management over banking activities, reducing unnecessary 
interventions of State management agencies in activities of credit organisations, 
expanding and working out new forms of credit organisations (Cong, 2010; MPI and 
UNDP, 2006). The roadmap of banking reform elaborated by SBV was endorsed by the 
Politburo in 2005. The plan revised the Law on Credit Organisations and the Law on 
SBV. With the draft Law, SBV was structured as an independent and modern Central 
Bank with the functions of implementing monetary policy, monitoring the banking 
system, ensuring commercial-based operations of commercial banks. Restructuring of 
SBV was conducted by cutting down SBV’s branches at local level, merging provincial 
branches in regional office to reduce interventions of provincial authorities in activities 
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of SBV and ensure more focused decisions and enhanced oversight of the system (Tran, 
2007; Cong, 2010) 
 
Banking inspection and supervision 
 
Bank inspection and supervision were reformed, with enhanced supervision on 
the banking system conducted by strengthening and upgrading the supervision through a 
new Committee on Financial Supervision. Regulations on banking safety were changed 
to be more suitable to international practices. The inspection and supervision 
mechanism was improved to increase effectiveness of distant supervision by using 
internal accounting, independent auditing as supporting tools for inspection to assure 
and assess transparency, objectivity of credit organisations’ information. Inspection and 
supervision duties were classified to devolve inspection power to SBV’s branches in 
provinces and cities (Lam, 2006; Tran, 2007). 
 
SBV customised its monitoring methods based on the CAMEL system, 
establishing a new information system and delivering reports suited to serve distant 
monitoring (Lam, 2006; Nhung, 2007). The Department of Control of SBV was tasked 
with auditing operations, finance and compliance for all units under SBV and its 
branches in provinces and cities, especially investment projects using and managing 
public assets within the system (Lam, 2006; WB, 2006; Barre, 2006; MUTRAP, 2007). 
In 2005, SBV started to assess its monitoring activities in accordance with BASEL 
standards (Lam, 2006). 
 
Monetary policy management  
 
Since 1998, SBV has gradually managed monetary policy through indirect tools 
instead of direct or administrative ones as it did previously (Cong, 2010; Don, 2009; 
Thanh et al, 2008).  Open market operation, refinancing and compulsory deposits have 
been flexibly and effectively utilised since 2000 and have become major indirect tools 
for monetary policy of SBV (Lam, 2006; Thanh et al, 2008). Since 2003, the State has 
allowed all long-term bank notes such as the Government’s bonds to be used in 
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transactions between SBV and other banks (Cong, 2010; CIEM and UNDP, 2004). This 
has substantially increased the volume of bank notes transacted with SBV, expanded the 
banks’ access to capital supporting channels of SBV, creating the SBV’s possibility to 
adjust the money market. Since 2003, SBV has adjusted the interest rates of re-
financing to play as an inter-bank interest rate ceiling, and bank discount rates have 
been adjusted to be closer to the rate ceiling. SBV has distributed discount quotas to the 
banks and accepted bank notes in refinancing transactions. So these two rates will form 
a trading margin for the banks, and indirectly adjust interest rates of commercial banks 
in markets. SBV has been more flexibly using compulsory deposits in monetary policy 
(Cong, 2010; CIEM and UNDP, 2004). Since 2004, SBV has encouraged credit 
organisations to make use of capital sources by paying interest rates for compulsory 
saving deposits in Vietnam Dong at the rate of 0.1% per month instead of just paying 
interest rates for the difference exceeding the compulsory deposit (Cong 2010). Besides, 
new tools have been taken up, such as foreign currency swaps as a tool of monetary 
policy (Cong 2010; CIEM and UNDP, 2004; WB, 2006). Through this operation, SBV 
has injected Vietnam Dong to support credit organisations temporarily facing 
difficulties in terms of disposable capital in Vietnam Dong (Cong, 2010). 
 
Since 2002, SBV has initiated negotiable interest rates in commercial lending in 
VND- the final step in liberalisation of Vietnam Dong interest rate and also an 
important breakthrough in management of monetary policy in line with market rules 
(Cong, 2010; Don, 2009; CIEM and UNDP, 2004). The banks can expand its 
operational network, provide loans and mobilise capital at an appropriate interest rate 
based on supply and demand, improving business autonomy and competitiveness of 
credit organisations. On loans in foreign currency, credit organisations are able to fix 
interest rate according to SIBOR rate plus a permissible margin (Cong, 2010). The shift 
to management on basic interest rates shows that this is a step forward in liberalisation 
of interest rates. Basic interest rate is determined based on market rate of low risk and 
assurance of rate control by SBV. 
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Foreign exchange rate management 
 
At present, Vietnam Dong is still under control of the State. Since 1999, forex 
rate management has been formed on the basis of market signals (Thanh et al, 2008; 
Ngoc and Nghia, 2008; Cong, 2010). Instead of announcing a formal forex rate, SBV 
publicises the average forex rate of interbank transactions of the most recent working 
day and commercial banks are allowed to trade within a forex rate not exceeding the 
rate plus a certain margin announced by SBV (Lam, 2006; Thanh et al, 2008; Cong, 
2010). Flexible management of forex rate in accordance with market signals will help 
promote export, control import, improve balance of payment and increase foreign 
reserves. Stability of the forex rates also facilitates the circulation of inflow and outflow 
capitals in Vietnam to absorb foreign investments (Thanh et al, 2008; Lam, 2006). 
 
Since 2003, foreign exchange surrender requirements of commercial banks have 
been continually cut down to 0% per year from 80-100% (Cong, 2010; Lam, 2006; 
Ngoc and Nghia, 2008). Liberalisation of current transactions has advanced, 
contributing to business financing. Regulations on opening accounts in foreign currency 
and transferring foreign currencies across the border have been eased (Ngoc and Nghia, 
2008). In addition, SBV has engaged a larger number of players in remittance services, 
creating favourable conditions to attract foreign currency from ‘overseas Vietnamese’–
Viet Kieu (Ngoc and Nghia, 2008; Cong, 2010; Thanh et al, 2008). 
 
Payment policy and mechanism 
 
Progress has been made in reform of banking services to meet the demands of 
WTO membership, with improvements in legal platforms for banking payment and non-
cash payment. A series of legal documents on payment have been formulated and 
enhanced such as the Decree on payments through payment services suppliers, the 
Decree on provision and use of cheques, a Statute on payment through payment services 
suppliers and a Statute on interbank e-payments and other related documents, etc (Lam, 
2006; Tran, 2007). These documents facilitate commercial banks to better conduct 
payments, attract clients to open accounts for using means of non-cash payment and 
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other banking services. The payment mechanism is built upon modernisation in line 
with international practices. 
 
Development of money market 
 
SBV has developed and upgraded the legal frame for activities of the money 
market in compliance with international practices. To promote the money market, SBV 
has released the statutes on money brokerage, new regulations on tools of money 
market, especially tools against risks in line with international practices (Lam, 2006; 
Cong, 2006; Thanh et al, 2008). SBV has also issued regulations on operations of the 
money market between SBV and credit organisations such as open market swaps, 
discount, lending mortgaged by bank notes, regulations on auction of treasury and 
Government bonds through SBV, regulations on custody of bank notes, etc. An 
Interbank money market has developed and links supply and demand of foreign 
currency of credit organisations. The Bonds auction market with its rising revenue has 
vibrantly operated and become a source to provide goods to money operations (Thanh et 
al, 2008; CIEM and UNDP, 2004; Cong, 2010; Lam, 2006). The money market system 
has been established and operated in a stable fashion (Cong, 2010; Lam, 2006). Through 
these markets, SBV is able to closely supervise market developments and adjust the 
market by indirect measures to help the market become more transparent and effective. 
 
State-owned banks’ reform 
 
One of WTO’s basic objectives is to create equal treatment in trade and 
investment. WTO Membership influenced reform and equitisation of State-owned 
commercial banks. Nghia (interview, 2010) noted that “Banking renovation was fast 
and strong in the early years of reform. Yet State-owned commercial banks still play a 
key role in the banking market and are associated with SOEs before the WTO 
accession”. Nghia (interview, 2010) suggested that “the Asian financial crisis was an 
external shock challenging the Vietnamese economy and SOEs, placing Vietnam’s 
financial system at risk of collapse. Against that backdrop, SBV has carried out 
tremendous reforms to restructure commercial banks to avoid a foreseeable collapse”. 
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International organisations are still much concerned over banking reform. Nghia 
(interview, 2010) was sceptical as “reforms have been delayed due to technical issues 
and financial constraints of the Government, and setback from interest groups”. All 
banks have carried out reform, but its implementation has been very slow. This has been 
reflected in the assessments of the IMF and international financial organisations that 
banking activities in Vietnam are still not transparent (Kovsted et al, 2005; Lam, 2006). 
For the banks, difficulties are dealing with debts and improving efficiency of SOEs and 
its reform (Lam, 2006; Nghia, interview, 2010). However, SOEs equitisation and has 
not achieved its goals (Chi Lan, interview, 2012; Anh, 2008; WB, 2006). The banks 
have also limited lending under direct guidance of the Government. Increased capital 
for SOCBs from the Government is continuing, even for the banks, which do not meet 
the conditions for increasing capital (Nghia, interview, 2010; Du and Anh, 2005). This 
results in a decreased pressure for reform in banks with the implication that capital will 
increase without consideration of outcomes or performance (Du and Anh, 2005). 
Application of international standards is also retarded. Nghia (interview, 2010) said 
“risky loans of the State make loan loss provision too large for the banks’ capital, 
reducing profits of the banks. This also makes the Ministry of Finance and even the 
banks find ways to deny this task”. 
 
Although the guidance on equitisation of SOCBs is welcome, the realisation is 
delayed due to many reasons. First is the technical issues, such as addressing 
outstanding debts, financial penalties and banking evaluation. Advisory bodies for 
banking equitisation are facing difficulties (Anh, 2008). However, the technical issues is 
just the tip of the iceberg. Issues related to banking ownership following equitisation are 
serious concerns (Du and Anh, 2005). The decision to hold large Government 
percentages of SOCBs’ shares is controversial and damaging to the industry. The 
State’s agencies are cautious on the decisions on banking ownership (Anh, 2008; Du 
and Anh, 2005; Masina, 2006).  The banking sector is decisive in the health of 
economy. The State therefore wants to play a key role in management of these banks 
(Masina, 2006). 
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Initial reforms of SOCBs have been conducted on the basis of urgent requests to 
avoid collapse of the banking sector. The reforms are mainly implemented at an 
extremely slow pace. Joining the WTO in 2006 left the Government little time for the 
banking sector to reform and meet WTO competition requirements (Minh, 2007; Barre, 
2006). WTO membership helped work out the benchmarks of reforms, but also 
generated a political strength and thoughts for a stronger resolve in reform, but despite 
all this, the actual depth and pace of reform is far from adequate and systemic problems 
continue. 
 
Given the pressure of WTO with the goal that by 2010 there will be a full 
participation of foreign banks’, SOCBs had to promptly carry out its reform, first and 
foremost in risk prevention and banking governance. All banks have applied new 
standards of credit risk and sought international standards in their operation. Banks have 
proactively expanded their operation to provinces and cities, developing broad networks 
to occupy the market. Banking services have been expanded, particularly modernisation 
programmes for banking information. Investment has gone into new services such as the 
ATM system, credit cards for international payment, factoring and banking services, etc 
(Lam, 2006; Trung, 2008).  
 
6.3.5 WTO’s accession process has influenced the economic development 
ideology of the banking sector 
 
Nghia (interview, 2010) suggested that “experts assessed that banking reform in 
Vietnam was fairly progressive and even faster than other sectors”. Yet banking reform 
faced external obstacles from the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Many SOEs at that time 
were on the verge of bankruptcy and the banks were burdened with bad debts due to 
deferred payment in foreign currency (Kovsted et al, 2005; Nghia, interview, 2010).131 
State-owned banks were in a fragile state and many private banks and credit funds were 
also on the verge of bankruptcy (Lam, 2006; Cong, 2010). The economic policy of 
Vietnam returned to protectionism, which was criticised by economic organisations 
                                                
131 Such as Epco Minh Phung Company 
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(WB, 1998; Thayer, 2001). In the banking sector, many experts held the view that the 
Law on SBV and credit organisations in 1997 partly reflected concerns on integration of 
banking sector.  The Law strictly regulated conditions of market penetration (Nghia, 
interview, 2010; Oh, 2002). Nghia (interview, 2010), Thai (interview, 2012) and Chi 
Lan (interview, 2012) agreed that “Government protected groups criticised that the 
domestic crisis was the result of fast opening and economic reform. In that context, the 
gloom of the Asian crisis cut down the spirit of reform”. Significant was the refusal to 
sign the US BTA in 2000 (Nghia, interview, 2011; Chi Lan, interview, 2012). Thai 
(interview, 2012) said “policy makers at that time argued that the early conclusion of 
BTA with the US would not benefit Vietnam and lead to the penetration of American 
businesses in Vietnam, causing tough competition with Vietnamese companies”. 
 
SBV proposed reforms in 2000 with a view to enhancing financial capacity, 
banking management, and promoting integration of banking sector. Not much progress 
was recorded from 2000 to 2003 (Nghia, interview, 2010). After the signing of US 
BTA, the economy saw positive progress and a new cycle of economic development 
started. GDP growth recovered and hit above 7% since 2003. Exports to the US market 
skyrocketed (Masina, 2006; Fforde 2005; Luong, 2006). Foreign investment, after 
stagnation, rebounded. This was a surprise to policy makers as before such signing 
many people forecast that American companies and goods would penetrate into 
Vietnam, putting the Vietnamese economy at risks (Masina, 2006). 
 
US BTA was a strong driver for Vietnam to further promote its admission to the 
WTO. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested that “success of export to the US market 
and limited penetration of American companies strongly affected the prejudice on the 
impacts of integration. Domestic companies not only had more opportunities for export, 
but also for capital, technology, and managerial expertise, creating conditions for them 
to grow. Economic integration helped ministries and sectors readjust their management 
policy in a proper manner, coordinate with various agencies and improve their 
efficiency”. 
 
Political thought was vigorously transformed in the 9th Party Congress 
Resolutions, to “active integration into the international economy, expansion of external 
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economic relations aligned with improving independence and autonomy of the 
economy” (CPV, 2006, p.120). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested that “along with 
transformation in political and economic ideology, the market economy has increasingly 
affirmed its advantages compared with a centrally planned economy. Thus, 
determination to join WTO by the Vietnamese Government was increased”. A resolve 
to join WTO put forth a demand for SBV and other banks to actively prepare for 
membership. Khanh (interview, 2012) suggested that “this pressure came from initially 
favourable conditions of opening up the banking sector in line with the BTA”. In 
contrast to predictions, the market share of saving deposits and lending of foreign banks 
was substantially reduced. In 2003, the Bank of America- a major bank also withdrew 
from Vietnam. The market share of private banks went up. Vu Quang Minh132 
(interview, 2010) suggested that “the outcome of the BTA was a surprise to the banking 
sector”. With an appropriate level of opening up, Vietnamese banks continued to grow, 
and transformations in both banking capacity and policy for integration generated a 
healthier and better financial market. This encouraged SBV and SOCBs to prepare for 
admission to the WTO. 
 
Chi Lan (interview, 2012) suggested that “By participating in a bigger playing 
field [WTO], policy makers and banks all hoped that Vietnam’s general development 
would attract even more foreign investments such as FDI, indirect investments, ODA 
and new business opportunities for domestic companies”. This correlated directly to a 
more dynamic banking market yet also required a higher level of development (Lam, 
interview, 2010). 
 
6.4 Reforms after the WTO accession 
 
Banking reforms still continued to meet the WTO requirements and challenges.  
Khanh (interview, 2012) said “WTO commitments have a period of implementation, 
thus still put strong pressure on the reforms of the banking sector”. The foreign banks 
were entitled to full equal national treatment in 2011. They could mobilise VND and 
                                                
132 Vu Quang Minh was the Director of the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
He has been appointed to be the Ambassador of Vietnam in the UK and Ireland since 2011. 
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open branches in Vietnam the same as domestic banks with some limitations (NCIEC, 
2007). The government issued Decree 22/2006/ND-CP (2006) allowing establishment 
of 100% foreign owned banks in Vietnam with conditions of minimum capital of the 
mother banks. Five new 100% foreign owned banks were granted licenses to operate in 
Vietnam. Four other foreign bank branches, three 100% foreign owned financial service 
companies, and six representative offices were granted licenses (Nguyet Anh, 2010). 
These banks and financial institutions quickly expanded their business and network of 
branches. In the last three years, they have opened more than 30 branches nation-wide 
(Hai, 2012). New joint stock banks were established.133 
 
According to Chi Lan (interview, 2012), “there have been significant increases 
of incoming resources flowing into the country right after the WTO accession, which 
was expected by the decisions for WTO accession”. In 2007, there was a record of the 
FDI registered in Vietnam with investment of over 70 billion USD (GSO, 2010). 
Exports increased, especially in textiles and garments, agriculture, electronic appliances 
etc. These external factors gave a real boost for the economy (CIEM, 2010). The boom 
of the private sector has created incentives for banks to undertake further reforms and 
upgrade their service qualities. Banks have constantly upgraded and expanded their 
offices, branches and ATMs network and business quality (Linh, 2011). Private and 
foreign banks expanded quickly. Nghia (interview, 2010) suggested that “their ability to 
influence the policy for a healthy system is still limited or in the negative way”. There 
have been several reasons for this. Firstly, the banking sector reforms are very much 
related with the SOEs reforms. Reforms in SOEs needed to resolve the NPLs problems 
of the SOCBs (WB, 2011; Lam, 2006; WB, 2002; Oh, 2002). However, Chi Lan 
(interview, 2012) suggested that “the SOEs reform has not achieved the expected 
results. The reforms seem to be accelerated in a number of the equitised enterprises and 
on paper. The Government has silently supported them and consolidated them to be 
larger SOEs and Economic Groups. In 2011, it had increased to 13 State Owned 
Economic Groups without any review of performance. The establishment of SOEGs 
was a set-back for the SOEs reforms. The SOEGs have been getting bigger by 
acquisition of many smaller SOEs and they act as an umbrella for avoiding SOE 
reforms”. SOEGs receive secret government supports via the SOCBs under the loan 
                                                
133  Lien Viet Bank, the Tien Phong Bank, and Bao Viet Bank. 
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contracts, which often do not go through the complicated procedures of risk evaluation 
and prudent lending (WB, 2011). These supports are considered as the soft budget of the 
Government. If these SOEGs are making losses then the SOCBs see the loans frozen or 
rescheduled (A, 2010). Parker (2012) suggested that the SOEGs have built up a huge 
debt of about USD 50 billion with their privileged access to credit. This is accordingly 
made up of huge NPLs for the SOCBs as well as other private banks. This was 
confirmed by the recent SBV announcement of the status of NPLs in the banking sector 
to nearly 9%, rather than the previous figures generated by the banks at 3% (The 
Economist, 2012; Parker, 2012; Thang, 2012). As a result, the banking sector is 
constantly facing liquidity problems, which are pressing banks to increase the deposit 
rate to a record high (Thang, 2012). This contributes also to the distortion of the interest 
rate and the market, as many banks have their short-term rate higher than long-term rate 
of deposit. These all have created a seriously distorted and risky situation for banking 
sector (Thang, 2012). Brummit (2012, p.1) said “SOEs are stacked with friends and 
allies of the CPV” to create a crony capitalism. Jonathan Pincus said “the State is being 
manipulated by people within the State to make money” (as cited in Fuller, 2012, p.1). 
This system has led these people to gain all the benefits, while leaving the loss and risks 
to the state. 
 
Moreover, the SOEs and SOEGs also expanded their business to the banking 
sector. Many SOEs and SOEGs bought shares from the SOCBs and joint-stock banks. 
Thus, they can influence the banks operations, although the law in Vietnam allows a 
small percentage of shares for each investor in the banking sector (WB, 2011). These 
SOEGs also preferred to borrow money from the banks rather than mobilising money 
via IPO or stock exchange. They often gain the benefit of an easy lending policy and 
less supervision than other channels, especially IPO or stock exchange because these 
channels require more transparency and accountability (Chi Lan, 2012b). 
 
The second reason for failures in reforms of the banking system is the drive of 
the private sector in banking. According to Nghia (interview, 2011), “private banks 
including joint stock banks and joint venture banks are not representing good market 
forces for fostering the banking reforms. As the banking sector is rapidly developing, 
many private banks have been established. In many cases that one bank is owned by one 
big stakeholder. One main private owner can own more than 50% stake in a bank and 
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can own several other banks. Thus, banks often operate under the objective purposes of 
the main owners of the banks rather than providing credit based on the risk. Secondly, 
many owners are unaware of risk management and do not have the experience and 
knowledge enough to operate banking services. As a result, the private banks are at risk 
of imprudent lending and mismanagement for quick profit”.  In August 2012, a banking 
tycoon Nguyen Duc Kien, founder member of the largest joint stock bank ACB was 
arrested on several charges. At the time of the arrest, he was the main stakeholder of 
many large private banks in Vietnam.134 Questions related to the charges are illegal 
banking acquisitions and deliberately carrying out illegal business including issuing 
bonds and borrowing money from their own bank to buy other companies and banks. 
From his companies and position in the banks, he is able to overcome the prudent 
lending mechanism, borrow money illegally to finance mergers and acquisition of other 
companies and banks. These activities are seriously hampering the effort of the SBV to 
reforms banks and conducting monetary policies as well as control the banking market 
(Robinson and Bland, 2012; BBC, 2012).135 These are now common practises in the 
banking sector according to Nghia (interview, 2011). In many cases, private banks are 
acting like interest groups and taking advantage of weak legal institutions including 
competition laws and supervision of SBV to drive and sometimes control the banking 
sector for their own personal power and benefit (Dung Ha, 2012). 
 
The foreign sector has played an important role for fostering the development 
and reforms of the banking sector. WTO commitments lead to the expansion of the 
foreign banks and branches in Vietnam since 2007. The new Government Decree issued 
in 2006 not only allowed 100% foreign own banks but also relaxed restrictions on 
banking sector by extending license periods and allowing the expansion of ATM service 
points for foreign banks and branches (FRB of San Francisco, 2011). Although there are 
also restrictions based on capital capacity of mother banks and gradual process of 
relaxing restrictions on foreign banks under the WTO commitments, foreign banks are 
                                                
134 Such as Kien Long Bank, Eximbank, Sacombank, DaiA Bank etc. 
135 Vnexpress Online News, 2012; Parker 2012; Le Duong, 2012; Tuoitre Newspaper 2012a. 
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increasing their penetration to the domestic market.136 In 2010, these banks have built 
up 14 branches with many new and modern services. The balance between revenue and 
expenses reached 170 million USD. These banks are operating soundly with the NPLs 
rate accounted for only 0.4% of total credit balance (SBV, 2012a). 
 
The current global financial crisis has limited the ability of international banks to 
expand business overseas (Van, 2011; WB, 2011; IMF, 2012). The development of 
major interest groups in the banking sector is showing a mixed picture of the impacts of 
the WTO accession process on the reforms of the banking sector. Although WTO 
accession has created a strong force and framework for reforms, the reforms on the 
banking sector are still considered as slow and hesitant (WB, 2010; The Economist, 
2012; Parker, 2012). Delays in reforms have been caused by the failure of expected 
forces to act as agents for reforms. In this case, the private banks are acting as interest 
groups to distort the markets. This group together with the SOEGs and SOCBs are 
further pressurising the Government for slower reforms. 
 
The WTO commitments are leading the institutional change of the banking 
sector but, these institutional changes may not be effective enough. After the WTO 
accession, the financial market has faced higher volatility risks due to the deeper 
international integration (CIEM, 2010). Thus, SBV has spent most of their efforts and 
time to cope with volatility of the financial market and macroeconomic instability 
(MUTRAP, 2011; CIEM, 2010; Nghia, interview, 2010). The flood of FDI inflows 
together with extended relaxed monetary policies for promoting economic growth has 
resulted in serious economic instability in 2008 (Tuyen et al, 2011; Fforde, 2012). This 
led to a policy switch from relaxed to a tight monetary policy in order to control the 
inflation and macroeconomic imbalance (Tuyen et al, 2011; CIEM, 2010). In 2009, the 
Vietnam economy also suffered from the Global Financial Crisis, which further 
worsened the economic decline (Tuyen et al, 2011). The monetary policy was adjusted 
                                                
136 In the third quarter of 2010, foreign banks mobilised 3.5 billion USD of capital. Their total assets 
reached 4.65 billion USD at the 3rd quarter 2010, which increased 29.8% compared to 2009. The credit 
balance recorded at 1.9 billion USD, which increased 11.9%. 
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to support growth, but again brought back inflation. WTO accession has helped to 
expose the Vietnam economy to the volatility of the world economic situation. 
 
SBV needed to consolidate and upgrade themselves on management procedures, 
capacity and on their priority of goals and targets (Bao, 2010). It adjusted monetary 
policy from following multi goals to prioritising goals and selecting goals flexibly for 
each period (Bao, 2010). These challenges are also pushing the SBV to use a greater 
variety of monetary policy tools, and be more flexible and skilful (Bao, 2010; Cong, 
2010; Tu, 2008). Beside the flexible and combined usage of traditional tools such as 
interest base rates, discounted rates, refinancing, compulsory required reserve ratios, the 
open market tools have been primarily the buying and selling of valuable papers, 
bidding for capital in inter-banks market, trust and bonds, etc (Bao, 2010; Cong, 2010; 
Tu, 2008). 
 
The SBV has called for improvement of legal frameworks and documents for 
meeting the commitments and the level of the Vietnam development, such as legal 
documents for foreign currency management, the capital adequate ratio, loan 
classifications, provisions of risks and its usage, licensing for establishing and operating 
joint stock banks etc (Tu, 2008: Cong, 2010; Tuyen et al, 2011). 
 
Although the SBV is changing itself to cope with the situation, it has revealed its 
weaknesses as an institution. The monetary policies have not been managed correctly; 
they changed erratically and with no real planning, which created shocks to the market 
and businesses (Tuyen et al, 2011). The coordination between the monetary policies and 
other policies, especially the fiscal policies, has been inappropriate due to the limited 
capacity of SBV. There are also complaints about the lack of information, analysis and 
forecast support for the management of the monetary policies (Tuyen et al, 2011). Chi 
Lan (interview, 2012) said “the main problem may be rested on the level of the 
independence of the SBV”, because the SBV governor is a member of the cabinet and 
responsible before the Prime Minister and the National Assembly. The SBV has played 
a limited role as an adviser to the Prime Minister on building the plan for the monetary 
policies to propose to the National Assembly. They then implement these plans 
approved by the Government and the National Assembly (Chi Lan, interview, 2012
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Giang, 2011; Yen and Nhat, 2009). They cannot set the goals and target independently 
for their operation, thus this causes constraints on their flexibility and delay in managing 
the monetary policies. They are far from being an institution independently managing 
the monetary policies and the stability of the macro-economy (Giang, 2011). 
 
Since 2009, the banking sector has been affected severely by the economic 
turbulences such as inflation, monetary tightening, growth slowing down and an asset 
price bubble (WB, 2011). Thus, many policies of the SBV rely on administrative 
measures to rescue the situation, such as a cap on credit growth, on deposit rates and a 
ban on gold mobilisation and lending (WB, 2011).  For the current instability and 
decline of the financial market, these measures have proven to be effective, however, in 
the long term these direct measures may be harmful to the soundness of the banking 
system (WB, 2011). 
 
The SBV’s supervisory and regulatory framework has shown inadequate 
capacities and thus, in 2009, a banking supervision agency named as the ‘Banking 
Inspection and Supervision Agency’ was established under Decision 83/2009/QD-TTg, 
with the tasks of supervising and inspecting administratively all activities of the banking 
sector under the SBV management. This is a significant improvement from the previous 
mechanism, in which the inspection and supervision unit for banking sector belonged to 
the State Inspectorate General. The new division is directly undertaking the supervision 
and inspection tasks for the governor of the SBV and the Prime Minister. Two 
procedures have been compulsory in the banking sector since 1998 - on-site supervision 
and off-site supervision mechanisms (Le and Bui, 2010). The off-site supervision has 
been also conducted following the CAMELS criteria since 1998. However, the new 
supervision and inspection agency of the SBV has shown many shortcomings in their 
functions and performance (Le and Bui, 2010; WB, 2011). Their efficiency in 
performing the task has been limited by the limitations of the law, regulations and the 
standards of the accounting. There are still problems in regulation of risk classification, 
assessment mechanisms, and measurement methods. There are also too many laws and 
regulations applied on credit institutions, which are often not clear and compatible. The 
legal framework for supervision and inspection of macro safety risks is not adequate or 
applied properly (Nam, 2012). This reduces the effectiveness of the agency (Le and Bui, 
2010). The standards of accounting in Vietnam do not comply with international 
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standards, which have led to false and inaccurate assessment on capital, reserve, CAR, 
cash income and expenditures, etc. Vietnam is still using Basel I standards while the 
most other countries are using Basel III for their calculation of the banking indicators. 
Information technology is under-developed and retards bank’s networking, automatic 
information records, compatible platforms and formats. It does not provide adequate 
and timely information (Cuong, 2011). The SBV often complain about their lack of 
human resources and their poor quality for complicated and booming activities of the 
banking sector (Le and Bui, 2010; WB, 2011; Nam, 2012). The inspectors sometimes 
are young and less experienced and thus may not see through many complicated and 
diverse aspects of banking activities (Le and Bui, 2010). 
 
Facing challenges of rapid development of the banking sector, four major pieces 
of laws and regulation have been issued to meeting the needs for a better legal 
framework for the banking sector and improved performance of the supervision of the 
banking system of SBV. The two new Laws on SBV and Law on Credit Institutions, 
which have been promulgated at the 7th and 8th meetings of the National Assembly XII 
in 2011, have provided a clearer regulation and they are more compliant to the WTO 
commitments and the current new development of the banking sector (Giang, 2011, 
WB, 2011; IMF, 2012; SBV, 2010). 
 
SBV roles have been upgraded to higher levels of independence and authority. It 
is now specified to be a Ministry equivalent agency and to have clear functions and 
responsibilities of the Central Bank of Vietnam, who are implementing the monetary 
policies and supervising the banking sector operations (SBV, 2011). The new law has 
also specified clear positions, roles and authorities of different government ministries 
and agencies on deciding and implementing the monetary policies. The Law also 
confirmed the authority of the SBV in the supervising the operational safety of the 
credit institutions. The ‘Banking Supervisory Agency’ has been established under the 
SBV to closely monitor the credit institutions. The laws also state the responsibility of 
the SBV to be clear and transparent and have direct accountability to the National 
Assembly, the Government and the public. This is a new and significant change from 
the previous law as it is aiming to transform the SBV to be more transparent and 
publicly accountable in their operations and decisions on the banking sector (SBV, 
2011). These laws has been changed to upgrade the SBV to new roles and to comply 
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with the WTO commitments on transparency, accountability and creating a level 
playing field (SBV, 2011). But new laws are ineffectual if the enforcement mechanism 
are not also appropriately and professionally applied, and at the moment the situation as 
regards enforcement is extremely disturbing. 
 
The new Law on Credit Institutions has also been welcomed by the market 
participants. It has improved the shortcomings of the previous law on clarifying which 
services they are allowed to carry out. The law specified clearly the type of institutions, 
the scope of their operations and to be the reference for regulating the scope of other 
institutions operations. The separation line between banks and other credit institutions 
has been clarified. Non-bank credit institution cannot receive deposits from the public 
and provide payment services via personal accounts. The credit institution also 
regulated clearly the professional services automatically allowed to do business and the 
services required to have licenses from the SBV, as well as the services prohibited 
(SBV, 2011). One of the changes of this law is to enhance the safety level in operation 
of the credit institution and approach the international standards (SBV, 2010). 
 
Circular 13/2010/TT-NHNN in 2010 regulated the operational safety of the 
credit institutions, regulating the safety of operations and investment activities 
(Vneconomy News, 2010). The circular has implied three major points for enhancing 
the operation safety of credit institution: (1) increasing the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
from 8% to 9%; (2) restricting the commercial banks to participate in stock and real 
estate activities; (3) enhancing regulations on the solvency capacity of banks (Cuong, 
2011). 
 
The Law of Supervision and Inspection was promulgated in 2010. The law 
clearly indicates the organisation of the supervision and inspection agencies as well as 
their rights and responsibilities, making these activities more transparent and 
accountable, for both the agencies and the public. 
 
WTO commitments and their impacts have assisted Vietnam to improve the 
legal frameworks for the banking sector of Vietnam. However, the reality also proves 
that the law and regulation enforcement appears to be very weak (WB, 2011). Most of 
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important laws and regulations for a safe and competitiveness banking sector are in 
place, but the banking sector has still fallen into the deep systematic crisis in 2012 with 
problems of serious NPLs, solvency, credit vulnerability and unhealthy competition 
(The Economist, 2012; Van 2011; WB, 2012; Parker 2012).137 One example of the weak 
enforcement is recent pressing issues of bank acquisition and cross ownership of banks. 
Nghia (interview, 2012) has suggested that “the market manipulation problems has been 
alerted by the National Financial Supervisory Committee to the Prime Minister two 
years ago”, but it has not been supervised, inspected and dealt with until now. SBV and 
the authority have not monitored and inspected the money invested in the banking 
system and how they raise their chartered capital. Recently the Governor has admitted 
in a questioning session at National Assembly that he does not know how and where a 
group of organisations and individuals mobilised the capital to acquire a big private 
bank- Sacombank (Nhat Anh, 2012). 
 
The Commercial Banks have shown some alarming signs of institutional 
problems (Van, 2011; WB, 2011). SOCBs still hold large market shares and important 
positions in the market (WB, 2011). Equitisation of SOCBs has been very slow. The 
banking sector is experiencing an institutional problem at the micro-level, which is the 
weak and sometimes negligent governance of banks (Van, 2011; WB, 2011). This 
problem has led to a serious vulnerability of the current banking system to crisis and 
possible collapse. The authority and banks blame these problems on the global 
economic crisis, the inflation surge, and economic difficulties in Vietnam. But the main 
reason may be rooted in weak institutions at macro and micro levels, lack of supervision 
and enforcement, alongside the weak governance of banks (Van, 2011). Many risky or 
even illegal transactions still by-pass risk preventing mechanisms. This is often led by 
the decisions and autonomous implementation systems carried out by the Banks Board 
of Directors. They often act as if immune from censure or regulation and the reality is 
that through relationships and corruption they have largely been free from regulation.  
There is also no effective mechanism for dealing with this problem in credit institutions 
or Banks. This inspection often rests on the independent Board of Supervisors to stop or 
prevent these kinds of activities. However, the supervision of the Board of Supervisors 
often centres on the operation of the Executive Board, but not on the decision of the 
                                                
137 Reuter, 2011; Bland, 2012; Nguyen and Brereton-Fukui, 2012; Reuter, 2012. 
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Board of Management. Internal auditing is often an important division and tool of the 
Board of Supervisors. However, the Internal Auditing unit does not have enough 
independence in their operations. In the Vietnamese system, the Head of Internal Audit 
has been appointed by the Board of Management and dismissed on request of the Head 
of Supervisors Board (Van, 2011). The credit institutions do not invest time and effort 
in strategic planning for long-term operations. Many institutions do not have special 
strategic and risk assessment committees. This is leading to difficulties in long-term 
competitive situations or changing environments (Van, 2011). These special strategic 
and risk assessment committees of the Board have quite limited capabilities due to the 
lack of information, mechanisms and capacities. They often make decisions on large 
loans or transaction based on the explanation of Executive Board without their own 
independent view on these matters being taken into consideration. Finally, the Board of 
Management is often comprised of groups of related or connected people. In many 
cases, one owner actually holds a dominant share of the banks but does this secretly 
under the name of different closely connected people or companies. They serve as 
interest groups who use banks as the fundraiser for their own projects without paying 
interest and overcoming all the complicated risk assessment mechanism of banks 
(Thanh, 2012; Doanh, 2012; Van, 2011). The organisation and operation of the Board of 
Management is closed and not transparent, serving the interests and benefit for 
particular private individuals only (Van, 2011). Nghia (interview, 2010) said “many of 
the banking owners are holding large shares (even 80% of a bank), do not have much 
experience and training. So they often seek short-sighted profits and leave the banks at 
risk of long term problems”. All these problems are showing that there is a loophole in 
the institutions of the bank sector at the macro level. These problems have actually led 
to the current consequence of high NPLs and liquidity problems, which have threatened 
stability of the macro-economy of Vietnam and the efforts to reform the banking sector. 
 
WTO accession has brought many changes in the banking sectors, but changes 
seem to be in the laws and the day-to-day operation, but not in its enforcements and 
long-term stability and development of the sector as a whole. This may be the limitation 
of the WTO accession’s impacts. Nghia (interview, 2010) said he was sceptical and said 
that “due to the distorted business environment, business operation in Vietnam needs 
relationships rather than their core competence, thus the banking sector is the same. 
There is encouragement from the Government to ask both SOCBs and private banks to 
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find strategic partners to improve their governance and technology. But domestic banks 
often choose domestic partners who have relationships and powers rather than 
international partners who have technology and skill. All banks’ need is connections 
and privileges, which foreign banks do not have”. 
 
The current global economic downturn has an important effect on the will of 
reforms. Thai (interview, 2012) has suggested that “WTO accession has opened up the 
economy further to the world economy, which has also meant reducing its abilities to 
prevent the negative impacts of these external turbulences”. Many people often blame 
the WTO accession as a factor in destabilisation of the economic performance rather 
than thinking about their own economic problems (Thai, interview, 2012; Chi Lan, 
interview, 2012). SBV has been struggling to keep their macroeconomic situation 
stable, while many enterprises have gone bankrupt and left huge NPLs for the banks. 
The easy target for blame has been the fast reforms pushed by the WTO accession. 
Thus, the will for reforms has been slowing down in the banking sector in the last years. 
In a conference organised by MUTRAP in 2012, people from the business communities, 
authorities and scholars voiced the view that there needs to be some measures to protect 
Vietnam’s enterprises and goods from the international imported goods and services.138 
This environment in a conference surely represents the present atmosphere for reforms 
in banking sector at present. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
WTO accession had a significant impact on reform of the banking sector. It led 
to new competitiveness, pressures for reforms in management, technology and human 
resource development. It brought opportunities for new markets, new products and 
services and the development of strategic partnerships with foreign partners, bringing 
increased capital, access to modern technology and demonstrated the vital need for 
reform. However, the reliance on relationships and the acceptance of corruption as an 
almost normal business practice within the banking sector has brought the system, the 
                                                
138 The conference of “review of 5 years of WTO accession” was organised by MUTRAP in Hanoi in 
2012. 
 275 
economy and Vietnam to the brink of disaster. The level of crisis is difficult to ascertain 
as the individuals in control of Banks seem intent on acting in almost total disregard to 
the law and regulations and are convinced of their invulnerability to censure. Debt of 
banks in 2012 was declared as being twice last years at 8.6% while international 
analysts believe the figure is actually two to three times this (ThanhNien Daily, 2012). 
In essence, the banking sector is more reflective of the fact that the greater the fraud, the 
more intense, sophisticated and covert is the strategies for hiding the faults beneath a 
veil of apparent success. The lack of real reform is hidden behind an appearance of 
almost revolutionary change. Devolution of power has been used as a means to 
centralise authority and control. Financial success has covered up corruption and wealth 
creation reserved only for a very small elite interest group. Resolution of manageable 
crises has been replaced by a decline into a major catastrophe and thesis research has 
found numerous justifications for assessing the situation as one that was avoidable and 
is the consequence of a failure to reform as required under WTO accession 
commitments and responsibilities. For example: the Nguyen Duc Kien’s hostile 
takeover of Sacombank was not a simple case of financial entrepreneurship and 
innovation, but a deliberate attempt to gain total control of the financial system, and it 
illustrated the close ties between financial affairs and political relationships.  
 
The WTO involves merging into a global free market economy and changing 
systems, laws and practices to reflect a free market environment, but in the case of 
Vietnam the very core of the economy has become little more than a quasi command 
controlled system. This has led to the very brink of financial crisis, with the Party 
maintaining control of the economy through subsidisation of SOEs via government 
directed loans from Banks (Bloomberg, 2012a). The SOEs are controlled by individuals 
who are also directly related to the Party and Government, and through relationships 
have enabled themselves not to invest or support the SOEs, but instead use the loans to 
finance their own wealth creation schemes. Subsequently, the SOEs as mainstays of the 
economy are instead massive and crippling burdens upon development, prone to 
economic collapse and in the process leaving both Banks and Government in the grip of 
a financial debt calamity. All present data show the decline of the Vietnam economy, 
with for instance the recent fall of Vietnam’s debt rating to B2, to the same levels as 
Cambodia and one of the largest SOEs, EVN, declared itself $11.5 billion in debt 
(Blomberg, 2012a; Grudgings, 2012). WTO accession and membership relies on an 
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economy following a free market system, but in the case of Vietnam, the rhetoric is 
belied by the practice of the Party and Government refusing to release the centrally 
commanded system of control of the economy. 
 
The banking sector is a vital reform area in development of a market economy. 
Centrally controlled economy is reliant on their dominance of the financial sector and 
banking is the chief mechanism for political mastery of all sectors of the economy. Its 
financial resources and how they are distributed determines the success or failure of 
almost every enterprise, and in a market economy the private sector is developed, 
shaped and economically controlled by the professionalism, independence and 
economic acumen of the Banking sector. This chapter has shown that the Banking 
sector depended on escaping the damage from crises such as the collapse of the 
economy in 1985, the slow introduction of Doi Moi and the Asian financial crisis by 
reforming under the guidance and assistance of the WTO reform process. The 
consequences of nearly a decade of reform was a sector crippled by debt, bad 
management, unclear and unsatisfactory financial practices and methods of ownership 
and control that means they have little independence from political control and have 
easily become the manipulative mechanisms of elite interest groups, intend on gaining 
total control of the financial and economic systems (Vuving, 2013, p.1-5). 
 
The financial and banking sector was in need of reform in 1985 and required 
transforming from a State controlled centre of Party dominated systems of finance to 
one more reflective of adjustments according to market conditions. Doi Moi began the 
process and the Asian financial crisis, entry into international agreements, such as the 
US-BTA and the WTO, preceded revolutionary transformation in the financial 
infrastructure. These banking reforms were reactions to internal and external crises, 
with problems such as inflation, currency values and changes in patterns of foreign 
investment encouraging the banking sector to globalise its operations, become more risk 
aware and seek to manage the financial economy through a growing independence from 
political controls and influences. The US-BTA engendered an unrealised fear of crisis 
brought about by foreign competition, professionalism and business acumen threatening 
the very existence of a banking system burdened under the weight of too many small, 
insufficiently capitalised banks and larger banks entirely unprepared for the 
competitiveness of the global financial system. The US-BTA outcome was a period of 
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growth and improvements in the banking system, while foreign competition was 
successfully ‘crowded out’. The chief mechanism of profit and growth in the domestic 
market was the business of financing SOEs through Party directed loans; an area that 
was and could be monopolised to only the home banking system. This created a false 
economy for Vietnam banks to survive and grow in, attracting high profits and a sense 
that they were becoming competitive, when in reality the Banks were being cushioned 
against global pressures to reform. The system was predicated on the fact that at some 
point the SOEs would repay the debts, but eventually the loan time limits arrived from 
2008 onwards, only for the Party to instruct banks to cancel/restructure or extend the 
loans so that SOEs were free from any demand to repay. Numerous bank heads resigned 
in protest, but the ensuing debt crisis was allowed to build into a major crisis. Many 
loans were set against real estate property/land values and the market had collapsed, 
aggravating further the burdens on Vietnamese banks, while a number of large loans 
were unsecured or based on collateral that did not exist. Fuller (2012, p.1) called its 
onset ‘crony capitalism with a communist twist’. Hua Ngoc Thuan (as cited in Fuller, 
2012, p.1), Vice Chairman of a People’s Committee said ‘I can say this is the same as 
the crisis in Thailand in 1997’ (which was the main cause of the onset of the Asian 
Financial Crisis). Jonathan Pincus (as cited in Fuller, 2012, p.1) declared ‘the state is 
being manipulated by people within the state to make money’. Cox (2012, p.1) said 
Vietnam is ‘an example for emerging countries such as Myanmar of exactly how not to 
manage the opening up of an economy... in short, [Vietnam] has gone from global 
investment darling to poster child for mismanagement’. Economist Nguyen Quang A 
declares that Vietnam is ‘experiencing its worst ever economic crisis (as cited in AFP, 
2013, p.1). Fforde (2013, p.1) notes how this ‘crisis’ has resulted from a growing 
inability of the Party to govern and the replacement of their authority by a ‘special 
interest group’. 
 
The Party introduced a plethora of reforms during WTO accession, intending to 
appear that it was meeting its commitments. Institutions were restructured or newly 
established to help develop a market economy. Laws and regulations were introduced to 
help enforce the reforms. But the economy moved from trying to reform such sectors as 
banking, as a means to escape crisis, only for the banks to become the crisis. The ‘elite 
interest group’ is increasingly recognised as a reality and its power is accepted as being 
even greater than the Party. There is a growing acceptance that the reforms of 
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institutions and laws were in name only and that enforcement is almost non-existent. 
The Party’s covert determination to centrally control the economy and use their 
dominance of the Banking sector as a means to centralise their power in SOEs and 
subsequently do the same to the economy, became instead a means for the elite interest 
group to gain power and wealth. The fact that the elite interest group is chiefly made up 
of people in the Party compounded the eventual loss of ability of the Party to govern the 
country, or control its economy. Even the most superficial examination of the Banking 
sector now shows that WTO reforms of the financial economy are merely visual images 
of change that conceal a deliberate lack of reform and non-compliance. Leading 
international experts on Vietnam (ex- Fforde, 2012; 2013; Thayer, 2009; Fuller, 2012) 
are now regularly supporting many of the main findings of this thesis. Institutional 
reform has not taken place, new regulations are not enforced, central control still exists 
and the general conclusion is a nation that is far more complicit with non-compliance 
than with commitment to reform through the guidance of the WTO. 
 
In contrast to both Banking and Agricultural sectors, the T&G sector has seen 
far more benefits accruing to the vast majority of actors involved in this sector. 
Companies have grown profitable, workers conditions and salaries have improved, the 
levels of skills and education in T&G are higher and profits have been diverted to some 
extent into modernising, mechanising and developing the sector. Yet, the following 
chapter will again show that appearance belies reality, as the T&G sector should not 
only be judged on what it has achieved, but also on the levels of development it should 
of reached by now and the potential opportunities wasted. 
  
 279 
 
CHAPTER 7 CASE STUDY: THE TEXTILE AND GARMENT 
INDUSTRY’S REFORM 
 
 
The Textile and Garment industry has a long and important tradition in the 
Vietnamese economy. The industry greatly contributes to the GNP and generates 
significant levels of employment. The industry carried out significant reforms to align 
with the integration process. WTO membership made an enormous impact on the textile 
and garment sector, creating opportunities for its development, penetration into new 
markets and increased investment. The sector played a strong role in encouraging the 
Government to join the WTO and strongly conduct reforms in the economic 
mechanisms to help the sector develop and integrate. 
 
Yet, even in the midst of this apparent success in reforming, becoming more 
competitive and successfully taking advantage of new opportunities found in being part 
of the global economy, the T&G sector is still seen as another example of non-
compliance. The power of SOEs remains, either through controlling the conditions in 
which the private and foreign sector has to operate, or through SOEs dominating the 
profitable areas of export trade. The industry still remains beset by problems with 
under-skilled workers (chiefly due to under-resourced and badly managed education and 
vocational training systems), a lack of investment and foreign investment with limited 
returns due to such burdens as corrupt payments for assistance in buying land, 
construction ‘fees’ and paying ‘illegal’ fees to customs. 
 
This Chapter will examine the reforms in the Textile and Garment sector, the 
challenges and opportunities in the integration process and analysis its effects on 
promotion of admission to WTO. 
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7.1 Overview of the textile and garment sector 
 
With the reform policy during the last twenty years, the T&G sector enjoyed 
favourable conditions for its development and played a key role in the strategy on the 
export direction of the Vietnamese economy (Hill, 1998, MUTRAP, 2007; Tuyen et al, 
2011). It has been paid due government attention in its development into the national 
integration, modernisation and industrialisation processes as it has advantages in terms 
of a large labour force, low-cost investment and high returns on investment (IBM 
Belgium, 2009; Bui, 2003). Truong (interview, 2011) commented “the T&G sector is 
the first and relatively most successful in the international economic integration 
process”.139 
 
The T&G industry is the leading export industry in Vietnam, outperforming the 
oil and gas export in 2007 (Quan, 2010).140 Data shows the sectors stability and the 
export market potential, despite the severe impact of the recent global economic crisis. 
In 2012, Vietnam is among the top-five exporters of textiles in the world (Vietnam 
News, 2013). Textile products mainly focus on fibre, silk, knitting products and ready-
to-wear clothing. The report on the “assessment of export potentiality of Vietnam” 
studying 40 goods and sectors by UNCTAD/WTO and Trade Promotion Centre 
(Ministry of Trade) shows that T&G industry will remain a major exporting sector. 
Through export, Vietnam is integrating into the regional and global economy and 
increasingly accumulating capital and foreign currency for national industrialisation and 
modernisation (UNCTAD/Viettrade, 2005) 
 
                                                
139 The industry contributes more than 17% of the GDP and employs over 2.5 million workers, accounting 
for more than 9% of labour in industry and nearly 5% of the national workforce (VINATEX, 2010). 
There 3,208 businesses. Since 2002, the textile and garment sector has recorded firm progress with an 
average growth rate of 17% per year. Its industrial production value of textiles increased by 17.9% in 
2007 against 2006 (WS Security, 2010). 
140 Export turnover in 2010 reached US$ 11.2 billion, a rise of 23.26% against 2009 and accounted for 
16.02% of Vietnam’s total export values (Habubank Securities, 2011). In the year 2011, the industry 
achieved a record high of USD13.8 billion, up 38% against 2010 (NgocVan, 2012). 
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7.2 Reform of the textile and garment industry. 
 
7.2.1 Textile and garment industry before Doi Moi 
 
Under French colonialism, Vietnam developed a series of modern T&G 
manufacturing facilities across the country. Craft villages were also popular. Following 
the victory over the French the T&G establishments were re-built in the North and 
placed under the State’s management. Craft villages and T&G collectives continued 
with their traditional production methods (Chiem, 2003). 
 
After 1975, the Government took over the factories in the South to develop a 
T&G manufacturing industry to supply products to the domestic market (Chiem, 2003). 
In the North, many new factories were established in the 1960s (Chiem, 2003; Phong, 
2009; MOEAITC, 1999).141 They operated under centrally planned management and 
output was at the request of State’s order. Inputs for production were provided 
according to the central plan and the finished products were controlled and distributed 
by the State (Chiem, 2003; Phong, 2009). Materials and machinery were chiefly 
imported from socialist partners, such as Russia. The market was strictly managed, and 
goods were only distributed by the State (Phong, 2009). T&G products like fabric, silk, 
wool, ready-to-wear clothing, knitting products, socks, thread, scarf’s, towels, cotton, 
scraps of fabric, etc were all under strict State management (Phong, 2009; Le and Liu, 
2006; Chiem, 2003). During the planned economy era the T&G supply only met modest 
domestic demands set by the Government at a rate of 5m2 per person (Phong, 2009). 
 
After 1975, given the difficulties of the whole nation, the T&G industry also 
coped with challenges. The State could not supply adequate spare parts and inputs for 
production. Factories were out-dated and badly maintained (Chiem, 2003). Inputs of the 
State were only meeting 20-30% of the demand (Phong, 2009; Chiem, 2003). Workers 
                                                
141 Such as Nam Dinh textiles Nam Dinh Silk, Hai Phong Wool, 8/3 Textile, Dong Xuan Textile, and at 
the local level, Thang Long Textile, Minh Khai Textile and Garment 10, Thang Long Garment, Chien 
Thang Garment Company, etc. 
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were often laid off and the productivity rapidly declined, while production was 
stagnant.142 Shortages of raw materials, power and wages forced the factories to the 
edge of closure and many workers to return home to work in agriculture (Phong, 2009). 
 
The problems were caused by the adherence of the leaders to an inefficient 
economics rooted in the leaders’ thoughts (Phong, 2009; Le and Liu, 2006). Truong 
(interview, 2011) suggested that “the biggest barrier for the industry was not the 
competition, but sources of raw materials and rights to sell their products, which were 
restrained by the planned economy’s mechanism”. Since 1979, the difficulties at 
grassroots level led to a wave of ‘fence breaking’ in many facilities in order to find 
loopholes in the planned economy’s strict regulations on production and circulation 
(Phong 2009; Le and Liu 2006; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The activities were also 
given a green light from the local government, who shared the difficulties of enterprises 
and workers (Phong, 2009; Tuoi Tre News, 2005). 
 
Several enterprises in HCMC secretly colluded with Vietcombank to 
temporarily borrow foreign currency to import inputs such as cloth, dyeing chemicals 
and spare parts. Finished products were then sold in the tourist areas, bringing in foreign 
currencies to re-pay the bank loans. Later, they cooperated with other state import-
export companies to exchange their products for agricultural products, which were then 
exported to buy inputs for the enterprises. These ‘fence-breaking’ activities helped these 
factories to survive in this difficult period (Phong, 2009; Tuoi Tre News, 2005). In 1980 
Thanh Cong Textile Company secretly decided to borrow US$ 180 million off 
Vietcombank to import raw materials and machines such as silk, thread, spare parts, etc.  
The end product was then sold to trading companies to earn foreign currency. That 
money helped the company repay its debts and accumulate US$ 82,000 for their own 
production. After two years of production, Thanh Cong Company accumulated US$ 
1.3m and increased its capital to US$ 2.5 m. By 1985, the company attracted 18,000 
workers with the output increasing by 3.3 times compared to 1980 (Phong, 2009, Tien 
Phong News, 2005). Truong (interview, 2010) said “The success of Thanh Cong later 
                                                
142 For instance, the fabric output of Thanh Cong Textile Company in 1970 was at 4.2 million meters but 
in 1980 decreased to only 2.5 million meters (Phong, 2009). 
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became an example on handling economic difficulties, which was considered as the first 
motivation factor for implementing reforms”. 
 
Truong (interview, 2011) suggested that “generally, this was a tough period for 
the whole economy as the planned mechanism restrained economic growth. The T&G 
industry however, was very pragmatic and sought ways of reform to seize opportunities 
and overcome difficulties”. 
 
7.2.2 Reforms from 1986-1997 
 
Since 1986, new policies produced positive influences on factories, as well as in 
craft villages (FEI, 2003; MOEAITC, 1999). The market, showed massive increases in 
the demand for consumer goods, regardless of their quality (Phong, 2009). With 
limitation in foreign trade rights, the SOEs and households in the handicraft villages 
became the main suppliers of the domestic market (MOEAITC, 1999; FEI, 2003). A 
more open mechanism enabled State-owned factories to produce goods outside the 
planned system in order to address the shortages in domestic supplies. After meeting the 
planned supply, excess products were sold at market prices, which brought new sources 
of income for the factories (Phong, 2009). The household sector was engaged in 
production for the market through contracts with SOEs. Rapid expansion of production 
also secured large contracts from the Soviet Union for processing garments, where 
Vietnam companies imported thread from the Soviet Union and exported the finished 
products back to Russia (MOEAITC, 1999; Phong, 2009).143 In the period of 1987-
1990, the industry grew impressively with the establishment of new factories 
everywhere, generating employment and substantially contributing to the State’s budget 
(MOEAITC, 1999). Truong (interview, 2011) suggested “in the period of the central 
command economy and in the first period of reforms, the T&Gs industry demonstrated 
that it was the leading force in economic liberalisation and integration process of 
Vietnam. The T&G sector was the first sector to establish a joint venture company with 
a British company in 1988, right after the promulgation of the Law on Foreign 
                                                
143 This form of business was later expanded to include countries like Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, and East 
Germany 
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Investment in 1987, with the registered capital of US$ 1 million”. Chi Lan (interview, 
2012) suggested, “the growth and expansion of the T&Gs sector was not the result of 
the loosening of producing factor control mechanisms, but to the efficiency and the 
competitiveness of the industry. The industry had to rely on materials from, and markets 
of, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, as; generally, Vietnam was 
diplomatically and economically isolated”. 
 
The industry faced a very difficult period from 1990 to 1995. The economic 
reforms on SOEs, market opening and the shrinking in the traditional export markets 
forced the industry into difficulties (MOEAITC, 1999; Truong, interview, 2010). The 
Government gradually removed the subsidies for the SOEs, forcing them operate under 
the market economy and, the collapse of Socialist countries in Eastern Europe deprived 
them of the traditional markets of the industry (Le and Liu, 2006; FEI, 2003). It also 
affected the supplies of materials and machinery to the industry. Most of Vietnam 
equipment was imported from these countries since 1960s, and they thus depended on 
these countries for both spare parts and inputs material such as cloth and dye chemicals. 
Meanwhile, other options for import materials and spare parts were limited by the US 
embargo (Masina, 2006; MOEAITC, 1999).  In addition, the economy was gradually 
reforming, but foreign trade was still under tight control of the government. Thus the 
problem of input shortages for production increased (MOEAITC, 1999; Truong, 
interview, 2011). Vietnam began to liberalise its trade relations with the outside world 
and normalised relations with China (Le and Liu, 2006). China’s cheaper textiles and 
garments strongly competed with Vietnamese products in the domestic market (Phong, 
2009). Truong (interview, 2011) commented “in this situation, Vietnamese 
establishments faced a lot of difficulties in re-investment for production. Profits 
therefore shrunk due to losses of export markets and competition in the domestic 
market. Indeed the demand of replacing equipment and importing materials threw many 
establishments into financial difficulties. Profits could not compensate for investment 
costs, leading to the collapse of factories”.  Truong (interview, 2010) commented that 
“most private businesses were in contracts with the SOEs for large orders for the export 
market. Many of them used material from SOEs to make their final goods for the 
market”. Truong (interview, 2010) also commented the industry was still dominated by 
the SOEs and the Private sector was small and lacking sophisticated machinery. 
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Truong (interview, 2011) provided an example: Nam Dinh Textile Company 
demonstrated the difficulties of textile companies in the 1990s. “It was the largest and 
most advanced factory in Indochina, providing employment for 18,000 workers. The 
factory was the centre and pride of the T&G industry, through its large scale and 
modern infrastructure for production and good conditions for workers. However, this 
company fell into financial difficulties because of the removal of subsidies, bad 
management and shrinkage in its markets. The factory faced difficulties in mobilising 
capital for re-investment and finding the markets for selling their products. Finally, it 
lost its liquidity due to repaying its debts”. This has been the typical case for most big 
SOEs companies in 1990s (FEI, 2003; VINATEX, 2010).  
 
Truong (interview, 2010) suggested that during 1990 to 1995 there was rapid 
transformation of the T&G industry. The Government’s Decree 388-HDBT (1993) was 
issued to reorganise SOEs, forcing them to operate under the market mechanism and 
ending subsidies. T&G factories were merged, liquidised or equitised if they were not 
making profits. Surviving firms had to change their operations, become more flexible 
and look for market contracts, instead of producing products by State orders as they had 
done previously. These difficulties encouraged SOEs to find their own way to rescue 
themselves (MOEAITC 1999; Hill 1998; Nadvi et al, 2003; Viet 2005). Truong 
(interview, 2011) suggested “under the threat of bankruptcy, SOEs searched for new 
potential markets in Europe and Japan for fresh capital for re-investment”. Under the 
US trade embargo, Vietnamese enterprises still found ways to reach new export markets 
in Europe and Japan. At the same time, new FDI inputs entered Vietnam for the T&G 
sector. Truong (interview, 2011) commented “these markets were a real life buoyant for 
T&G enterprises, which were caught in difficulties at that time. Many first contracts to 
these markets were in the form of CMTs (Cut-Trim-Make), with little value added, in 
which the payments were made by machines, spare parts and chemicals rather than 
cash. These contracts helped the Vietnamese enterprises to replace their obsolete and 
old Eastern Europe technology with Japanese machines and technology. This was a 
breakthrough step for the development of the T&G sector”. After 3 years of 
restructuring the T&G industry was able to export 43% of its output to Europe and 42% 
to Japan in 1996 (Institute of Economics, 2001; Hill, 1998; MOEAITC, 1999). The 
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industry took advantage of its labour intensive production to cope with the challenges of 
the market mechanism (Truong, interview, 2010).144 
 
Strong economic reforms led to the development of a multi-sector T&G 
industry. According the Tuat (interview, 2010), the Director of Institute of Strategic 
Policies of Industry, “the T&G industry was based on labour intensity, with very small 
amounts of capital investment. Average investment for setting up one work place was 
only about USD 1,000 therefore, the industry attracted many FDI inputs and private 
domestic investment”. There was a fundamental change in the diversity of the 
ownership structure during this time, including SOEs, the private sector, and the foreign 
sector (Institute of Economics, 2001; Nguyen, 2010). SOEs were still the leading sector 
in industry, possessing large and long established production infrastructures. They also 
had advantage in capital access from State banks and the Government guarantees for 
borrowing, and an advantage of access to land, with good locations and large enough to 
accommodate new factories’ (Institute of Economics, 2001; Nguyen, 2010).145 The 
private sector was growing rapidly by taking up the opportunities of economic 
liberalisation. They included the household sector, private companies, collectives and 
the mixed economy sector (Nguyen 2010; MOEAITC 1999; Institute of Economics, 
2001). Small economic units (households) invested in machinery for their traditional 
crafts and worked long hours to provide their products for the expanding markets 
(Institute of Economics, 2001; FEI, 2003). In textiles, the private sector played a 
moderate role, accounting for only 25.9% of total output in 1995. In garments, this 
figure was higher at 47%. This was the result of their small size and lack of modern 
technology for producing textile and garment products (Institute of Economics, 2001). 
 
                                                
144 The export values of the textile sector increased from US$ 6.5 million in 1988 to US$ 175.5 million in 
1996. The garment sector increase from US$ 21.1 million in 1985 to US$ 1162.7 million in 1996. Since 
1992, it contributed more than 17% to the total exports and more than 45% of industrial output. This was 
impressive after only 10 years of development (MOEAICT, 1999; Hill, 1998). 
145 SOEs accounted for 56.8% of the total industry production in 1995, due to the need for complicated 
technology and larger investment. In the garment industry, SOEs accounted for 35% of the total 
production in 1995 (Nguyen 2010, p.32; Nadvi et al, 2003). 
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FDI grew rapidly and played an increasingly important role in the industry. The 
preferred form of business for FDI was joint ventures with the SOEs, which possessed 
advantages of having lands, skills for large businesses and connections with the 
Government. 100% foreign owned enterprises were increasingly established 
(MOEAITC, 1999; Institute of Economics, 2001). 
 
Since 1995, there were significant changes in the business environment in 
general and the T&G sector in particular. The Law on Company, the Law on Private 
Enterprises and Law on SOEs were issued to regulate the activities of these companies 
(Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Masina, 2006; Le and Liu, 2006). However, Chi Lan 
(interview, 2012) commented that “the laws were considered to be too strict for 
establishments of new businesses. Private firms could only establish and operate in 
areas that were allowed in the laws”. The discrimination between sectors had been also 
reflected on the separate laws for these sectors (Thai, interview, 2012). Experts often 
complained that the Government started to develop import substitution policies, in 
which several important industries were well protected by trade policies and state 
investment via big SOEs (Masina, 2006; Womack, 1997; Sidel, 1998; Chi Lan, 
interview, 2012). These policies attracted much of the limited resources of the country 
into these industries and big SOEs. In the T&G industry, the State decided to establish 
the Vietnam Textile Corporation (VINATEX) with a vision of having a large-scale 
T&G company constituting a number of central large state-owned T&G companies 
(Truong, interview, 2011; VINATEX, 2011). It started with 52 members and over 
85,000 workers, operating throughout the supply chain and included import-export 
companies and a fashion design institute (Sung, 2011). They soon accounted for 90% of 
fibre production, 50% of cloth production and 40% of the T&G production of the whole 
country (MOEAITC, 1999; Institute of Economics, 2001). Sung146 (2010, p.205) 
suggested that “establishment of VINATEX was intended to re-organise the current 
structure of the SOEs in the T&G industry, because many SOEs at that time were facing 
difficulties or on the edge of bankruptcy. With the support of the Government, 
VINATEX as a group overcame their difficulties and built up into a State Corporation 
leading the development of the T&G industry”. 
                                                
146 Tran Quang Sung is the former Chairman of the VINATEX 
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VINATEX was heavily invested in and supported to become a controlling 
corporation and monopolise scarce resources for its own development. This put the rest 
of the sector in the difficult position of competing for other available resources. The 
private sector suffered from the lack of access to capital and land, and difficulties in 
accessing new technology needed for developing large-scale businesses (FEI, 2003). 
The share of the private sector, especially the household sector, decreased since 1995 in 
both the T&G industries. This reflected partly the biased policies and operating 
conditions in the private sector. Many handicraft villages also faced reduced markets 
and returns due to their lack of access to capital and land to upgrade their businesses or 
to invest in new machines (FEI, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, 15 years of the reforms still brought a positive change for the 
industry. A market economy saw the sector gradually progress into a diversified multi-
sector industry (VINATEX, 2010; Institute of Economics, 2001; MOEAITC, 1999). 
The annual export growth rate of this industry is 23.8%, making it the 2nd place in terms 
of export volume. In 1989, the Vietnamese textile products could access only 30 
countries in the world but in 2000, they sold in more than 100 countries and territories. 
The export volume totalled US$ 1.89 billion in 2001, 16 times greater than that in 1990 
(Viet, 2005). 
 
7.2.3 Reform’s shortcomings in the industry 
 
During the reforms, the industry was able to develop a production base of 
diverse forms of ownership and to penetrate and compete in international markets 
(Truong, 2011). In spite of fast and flexible growth the T&G sector still faced barriers 
from their own internal policies and those of the government. 
 
Lack of capacity and of large-scale production 
 
The problems were production capacities and productivity (FEI, 2003; Hill, 
1998). The industry was beset with problems in acquiring new technology, gaining 
 289 
access to materials, the low skills of labour and limited capabilities in marketing and 
design (FEI, 2003; MOEAITC, 1999; Hill, 1998). The T&G equipment was still out-
dated and inconsistent with modern production demands, with of shortages of capital, 
and many factories possessing obsolete machinery that had been acquired from a 
multitude of different sources, creating many compatibility problems. The production 
chains in the factories were highly inefficient and resulted in very low productivity and 
a limited number of products (Tuat, interview, 2011; FEI, 2003). Production chains 
were outdated compared with that of the rest of the world. Production chains consisted 
of numerous risk factors and were not standardised, thus, made-in Vietnam products 
were under-valued and not very competitive (FEI, 2003; Hill, 1998; Institute of 
Economics, 2001). 
 
Materials for the T&G manufacture were an obstacle to the sector’s 
development. Truong (interview, 2011) suggested “the sector could only meet 5% of the 
demand for cotton products, and synthetic and cotton fibres, while chemicals and dyes 
were all imported”. Domestic materials were low quality and could not meet the 
demand. The dependence on imported materials made it impossible for the factories to 
manage the supply and price of materials for fibre production, particularly in the tough 
competition of international markets (FEI, 2003, Institute of Economics, 2001). With 
80% of fabrics and 90% of materials for garments such as buttons, zippers and threads 
being imported the reliance on imports resulted in ineffective control of the final quality 
and low added value of garment sector (FEI, 2003). 
 
The T&G industry is specialised and intensive manufacturing so the issues of 
discipline, health and wages are always challenges to the enterprises (FEI, 2003; 
MOEAITC, 1999). In manufacturing, price competition is severe, so the already low 
salaries are pushed even further down. Tuat (interview, 2011) suggested that “therefore, 
finding sufficiently trained workers was always a challenging task for the industry. This 
was compounded by a lack of qualified managerial expertise. Many senior managers 
‘learned by doing’, not by training and this led to severe difficulties in integrating into a 
global economy based upon higher productivity, technology and quality goods.” 
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The garment industry focused mainly on CMTs for the export markets, while 
total reliance on foreign designers and fashion brands led to severe shortages of talent 
and skills in designing (FEI, 2003; Nguyen, 2010). Therefore, under the pressure of 
fashion changes and customer loyalty to a brand in the T&G industry, the industry was 
far from developing its own domestic brand names worthy of inclusion into the global 
fashion market. Tuat (interview, 2011) said “with the total focus appearing to be on 
benefiting from cheap labour and accessing as cheap as possible production methods, 
the industry could not hope to reach further stages of development, and risked future 
disaster as economic growth caused higher labour and resource costs, while witnessing 
no significant improvements in the skill of workers and the quality of the products”. 
 
Trade and investment barriers 
 
The export/import tax system of Vietnam was still complex, ambiguous and 
discriminated across industries (Hill, 1998). There were serious problems with the 
smuggling of finished products in order to avoid taxes (Hill, 1998; Nguyen, 2010). The 
tax structure was aimed to support the SOEs, particularly when those companies were in 
difficulties (Institute of Economics, 2001; Hill, 1998; Nguyen, 2010). In addition, the 
tax system was frequently inconsistent and unclear, with a variety of tariffs on similar 
products, often leading to the authorities applying multiple taxes onto the same item 
(Nguyen and Le, 2005; Institute of Economics, 2001). The tariff schedule publications 
were not available to investors, creating an ambiguous and confusing situation. Many 
non-tariffs measures were also not documented or published accurately enough to 
explain essential information (Hill, 1998; MOEAITC, 1999; Nguyen, 2010). Thus, 
custom officials were regularly applying a matrix of different regulations and tariffs on 
the same goods, in an atmosphere of secrecy and in an arbitrary way that made 
corruption in the industry rife (FEI, 2003; MOEAITC, 1999; Nguyen, 2010). 
Companies were either penalised or protected in the application of rules that either 
unfairly ‘taxed’ them or provided financial support/incentives. Thai (interview, 2012) 
commented “the opening up of the free market economy and its application to the T&G 
industry provided tools for officials and powerful Vietnamese to accrue personal 
fortunes from the misuse of the system through favouritism and relationships or by 
applying ‘official’ charges to competitors”. The distribution of quotas for export of 
finished products and quotas for import of machinery and materials were still carried 
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out more on the basis of relationships and personal greed serviced by bribery and 
corruption than by efficiency, productivity, quality and ability of the producers involved 
(FEI, 2003; Nguyen, 2010). 
 
Export and import procedures were improved, but problems still faced the T&G 
industry. The period of exemption from import tax for inputs of production was too 
short (90 days), making the management of inputs difficult and complex, and not 
suitable to a cycle of production and selling products. Import and export procedures 
were still complex and troublesome. Priorities often focused on industrial processing 
zones, leading to preferences in choosing production locations (Institution of 
Economics, 2001; Nguyen, 2010).  
 
Bias in the structure of ownership 
 
SOEs enjoyed preferential treatment through State’s subsidies, prioritised access 
to capital sources, export quotas, availability of land and facilities and close relations 
with senior officials (FEI, 2003; Nguyen, 2010; Hill, 2000). VINATEX consisted of 
various companies, where a number of under-performing companies actually acquired 
resources at the expense of better performing ones, and investment was unfairly and 
unprofessionally distributed to inefficient and badly managed SOEs (Hill, 1998; 
MOEAITC, 1999). 
 
The bias towards the SOEs led to an inefficient investment environment, where 
resources were diverted to the SOEs, creating a major challenge for foreign and 
domestic investors. The private and non-State companies faced difficulties in obtaining 
land and capital for production facilities. This process was very complicated, expensive 
(especially in non-official payments) and time-consuming (Nguyen, 2010). Access to 
loans was also difficult for enterprises, compounded by the fact that some of those costs 
were not official and declarable. Financial services were mainly controlled by State-
owned banks and they were hesitant to provide loans to private companies and often 
required large collateral, especially in the form of property and assets of the companies. 
They also could not access foreign banks for loans. Thus, private companies were beset 
with difficulties in mobilising capital for production and investment. Many big T&G 
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companies developed on the basis of financial sources from illegal sources, such as 
loans at high interest rates from unofficial moneylenders (Hill, 1998; FEI, 2003; 
Nguyen, 2010). 
 
The access to export quotas was also an obstacle for the private sector. Quota 
allocations were often granted by the Ministry of Trade under a non-transparent process 
and criteria, which often benefited the SOEs and well connected businesses to the 
authorities (Hill, 2000; Nguyen, 2010). Hill (2000) suggested that gradually, and 
following much concerted lobbying and tedious bureaucracy, a trickle of private firms-
usually those whose owners had good connections, began to receive small allocations. 
Many firms had to purchase quotas in the black market (Hill, 2000; Nguyen, 2010). 
Other firms had to bribe officials for their allocation of quotas and this damaged the 
competitiveness of the T&G sector and deterred investors (Nguyen, 2010). 
 
Legal institutions shortcomings 
 
Legal institutions for businesses were fraught with shortcomings. Regulations 
were unclear, making it difficult for interpretation (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Bureaucratic and complex management systems also prevented enterprises’ 
development. State agencies often harassed companies, even on small issues, 
consuming the time and money of companies (Nguyen, 2010). Many companies 
employed people solely to navigate through the difficult relationships and dealings with 
the Government officialdom, with some companies seeking special relations with senior 
officials, and enjoying preferential treatment solely due to corrupt relationships with 
officials (Hill, 1998; Nguyen, 2010). The laws and regulations were not consistently 
applied due to vague and badly constructed regulations that were often enforced in a 
biased and unfair manner. Localities often had their own regulations that ran counter to 
the State’s policy and guidelines (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Masina, 2006). This 
caused companies to spend significant time simply on communicating with the 
authorities in Hanoi, merely to just understand new policies and regulations of the State, 
and often then finding themselves unable to cope with badly constructed legal 
regulations. A further enhancement of the levels of difficulties was the export and 
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import procedures that were often complex and time-consuming, and also constituted 
obstacles to international and domestic business (Nguyen, 2010; FEI, 2003). 
 
7.2.4 Reforms since 2000 
 
The period 1990-1998 saw both problems and impressive developments for the 
T&G industry.147 The industry developed a diverse structure and increased its 
competitiveness in the international market (FEI, 2003; VINATEX, 2011; Institute of 
Economics, 2001). The industry was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, lowering its 
growth to 10% a year (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). A new wave of reforms started to 
restructure the economy to overcome the effects of the Crisis and improved its 
efficiency. Decision 161/1998/QD-TTg (2010) stated: "Development goals of the T&G 
industry to 2010 are to enhance exports to increase foreign exchange revenues, ensure 
payment balance of debts, expand the production facilities, meet domestic consumption 
demands in terms of quantity, quality, varieties and prices and gradually build the T&G 
industry as a key export sector, contributing to economic growth, jobs creation and 
industrialisation and modernisation of the country" (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). 
 
From the Governments’ new initiative for development of the industry, the 
industry was able to reinvest in production and find new markets for exports. They were 
able to penetrate the European and Japan market. In the EU market, T&G products 
accounted for 25% of the total export volume to the EU.148 In the Japanese market, the 
2nd biggest T&G market in the world, the Vietnamese T&G products increased due to a 
reduction in non-tariff barriers. Vietnam became one of the top 4 countries exporting to 
this market, despite the strict fashion requirements and the short cycle of products. 
Although the Vietnamese products could not meet the fashion criteria, they still 
                                                
147 Growth of the industry hit more than 30% from 1995-1997 (Vinatex, 2010) 
148 For garment products, the EU was the largest import market of Vietnam, comprising 40% of the export 
volume. In 1999, textile and garment product exports to the EU reached US$ 700 million. In 1998-2000, 
after the signing of the Vietnam – EU Textile Agreement, the export volume to EU went up to more than 
31% compared to the 1992-1997 period. 
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competed through low prices and quality. Export volume in 2000 reached US$ 620 
million (Truong, 2011). 
 
The industry was facing severe challenges for further development from 2000. 
Vietnam’s export markets became saturated and products suffered from the harsh 
competition from other countries such as China, India, and Bangladesh, with cheaper 
prices and more options (Nguyen and Dang, 2010; Nguyen, 2010). As a result, exports 
to the EU and Japan decreased problems increased in the US market due to a lack of 
mutual consent and failure to sign the necessary Trade Agreement (Nguyen, 2010; 
Truong, interview, 2011; VINATEX, 2010). Import taxation to the US was very high, 
thus, the Vietnamese products were unable to compete.149 
 
Against such a backdrop, the garment and textile industry, led by VINATEX, 
had consistently proposed to the Prime Minister to actively engage in negotiations of the 
Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement. According to Truong (interview, 2011), “all 
progress reports of VINATEX submitted to the Ministry of Industry and the Prime 
Minister included a section on the issue of creating a US garment and textile market 
accessible to Vietnamese exports. According to the projections of VINATEX and 
VINATAS, the Vietnamese garment and textile exports would increase about 35% with 
a US-Vietnam BTA”. Decision 55/2001/QD-TTg prescribed the main goals.150 During 
the following 5 years, the industry became one of the spearheads in exports of Vietnam. 
It employed nearly 5% of the total labour (over 20% of the industrial labour), and 
accounted for 8% of the output value of the processing industries. The exports turnover 
of the industry ranked second after crude oil, and formed over 16% of the total exports 
value (Nguyen and Dang, 2010; Government of Vietnam, 2001). 
 
                                                
149 The export volume to the US only stood at US$ 26.4 million in 1998, US$ 48 million in 1999 and US$ 
60 million in 2000 (VINATEX, 2010). 
150To increase the exports turnover of the industry from approximately USD 2 billion in 2000 to USD 5 
billion by 2005 and USD 8-10 billion by 2010; increase employment; increase the rate of localisation of 
the exports from the 25% of 2000 to 50% by 2010. 
 295 
Signing the BTA in 2001 was a turning point for the T&G industry. The US 
lifted the quota embargo against Vietnam and lowered the export taxation from 40% 
down to 20%. After one year implementing USBTA, the Vietnamese T&G products 
became the 2nd top products exported to the US. Export products also diversified. The 
share of export to the US also increased rapidly from 4.7% in 2001 to 24.2% in 2002 
(Institute of T&G, 2009; VINATEX, 2010; Nguyen and Dang, 2010; MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
From 2005, the T&G quota restrictions were abolished among the WTO 
members. Thus, the T&G trade in the world developed quickly. China, India and 
Bangladesh raised their markets shares for both T&G products. According to the WTO 
roadmap, special trade defence measures against Chinese T&G imports were removed 
by the end of 2007 (for the EU) and by 2008 (for the US), bringing about both 
opportunities and challenges to T&G export countries in general and Vietnam in 
particular (Nguyen and Dang, 2010; MUTRAP, 2007). The industry was facing both 
new opportunities and challenges. From 2005, Vietnam expedited its negotiations 
process for WTO accession. Decision 36/2008/QD-TTg approved a new “Development 
Strategy” aiming to establish industrial clusters and zones for better competition given 
favourable geographic conditions and available workforces and addressing 
environmental issues locally (Nguyen, 2010). 
 
7.3 Impacts of WTO accession on the textile and garment industry 
 
7.3.1 Vietnam’s Commitments to WTO related to textile and garment industry 
 
Khanh (interview, 2012) said “the industry has performed better and reformed 
quicker each time the Vietnam has gone deeper into the international integration 
process”. After the success of the US BTA, WTO accession brought hope for further 
development and reforms (Khanh, interview, 2012). 
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Table 7.7. Vietnam’s Commitments to WTO on Import Tariff Reduction 
for Textile and Garment Products  
 MFN tax rate 
prior to 
accession 
Committed tax rate within WTO 
At accession Final Implementation Period 
General Tariff 17.4% 17.2% 13.4% 3-5 years 
Average tariff for 
industrial products 
16.7% 16.2% 12.4% 3-5 years 
Average tariff for 
textile and garment 
industry 
37.3% 13.7% 13.7% Immediately 
Fabrics 40% 12% 12% Immediately 
Clothes 50% 20% 20% Immediately 
Fibres 20% 5% 5% Immediately 
Source: NCIEC, 2007; USAID and NCIEC, 2007; VCCI, 2011. 
 
Under accession, there were 16 major agreements in the areas of trade and tariffs 
(GATT, 1994), T&G, trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), and anti-dumping, 
etc. Vietnam was also required to make all economic and trade policies transparent, and 
review all law-making programs to ensure the capacity for its commitments realisation 
(NCIEC, 2007; Nguyen and Dang, 2010). There were several agreements dealing 
directly with the T&G sector. Firstly, the GATT 1994 stipulated common regulations on 
MFNs and National Treatments of the goods trading, including the T&G industry. This 
agreement not only dealt with commitments on tariff schedule for goods, but also had 
commitments on Non-trade barriers such as quotas, import licensing, trading rights, 
subsidies and so on. A second agreement was on technical barriers to trade, ensuring 
regulations, standards, and inspection procedures and licensing did not create 
unnecessary obstacles to the trade. WTO members actively issued many new 
regulations and standards to ensure the quality of the goods and regulations on goods 
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origins also influenced the market penetration capacity of T&G goods. New Custom’s 
processes were implemented to set the value and tariff rate of the import goods. 
 
Table 7.8: Summary of commitments to tariff reduction for textile and 
garment products in the Regional Free Trade Agreements. 
Year Tariff Rate under 
FTA 
Tariff Rate under ACFTA Tariff Rate under AKFTA 
2006 5% 27.8% 33.4% 
2015 0% 1.97% 9.3% 
Source: Nguyen and Dang, 2010 
 
Vietnam abolished a range of non-tariff barriers and the quota system was 
eliminated immediately. Incentives given for the FDI in the T&G sector were 
eliminated upon WTO’s accession. The trading rights (export and import rights) were 
also granted for foreign companies and entities to have the same rights as domestic 
companies or entities, with exceptions of several State managed products (NCIEC, 
2007).  The SOEs had to operate on a commercial basis without the direct and indirect 
interventions of the Government. Vietnam was required to make all economic and trade 
policies transparent, review all law-making programs to ensure the capacity for its 
commitments realisation (NCIEC, 2007). Khanh (interview, 2012) commented that 
“Vietnam’s WTO commitments were aiming to prevent the distortion of trade and 
production as well as to ensure more predictable and fairer environment between sectors 
in the economy. These were what the Government of Vietnam was aiming for and 
implementing”. These commitments created a great impact on the operation and 
management of T&G sectors. However, actual lapses in enforcing regulations weakened 
the impact of many of the new reforms. 
 
Under the bilateral negotiations for market opening, Vietnam committed to 
opening up the domestic market to foreign products, mainly through tariff reductions. 
For the commitments in the T&G sector there is no implementation period for tariff 
reductions. Vietnam had to reduce tariffs for T&G products right after it became a 
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member of the WTO, while the roadmap for tariff reductions concerning other 
commodities often ranged from 5 to 7 years. Thus, this industry had no time for 
preparation, but had to compete immediately with other imported products due to tariff 
reductions. The sector had the highest reduction rate out of all commodities, including 
fibre, thread, fabric, clothes and ready-made clothes (NCIEC, 2007). 
 
7.3.2 WTO’s accession process has provided pressure for reform 
 
The Vietnamese economy and enterprises were also facing enormous challenges, 
with fierce competition in both domestic and international markets, due to the removal 
of the protection barriers and the realisation of the MFN and National Treatment as well 
as the abolishment of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in 2005 (Nguyen 
and Dang, 2010). The global T&G production and business had an impact on the market 
with: 
1. Removal of quotas led to changes in the free trade agreements, preferential 
tariff systems and protective tariff barriers; 
2. There was a shift in labour, T&Gs technologies and equipment to countries 
with the most comparative advantages. Access to fabric and materials of 
high quality was decisive to the competition in this sector. Fabric products 
involving high techniques were increased.  Orders were offered to 
enterprises with good material supply, high production and competition 
capacities; 
3. Retail and multinational groups dominated the retail networks; 
4. Rapid growth of countries with T&G export competition capacities 
hampered the production of countries with less comparative advantages, 
which led to unemployment and social unrest; 
5. Lower prices of T&G products helped consumers and promoted 
consumption. Lower prices would reduce the profits of the T&G export 
companies, limited production and lessened the incomes of countries where 
the T&G exports were a major part of their economy, and lead to payment 
balance deficits (VCCI-WTO Centre, 2011; MUTRAP, 2007). 
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As a result of the abolishment of the ATC in 2005, Vietnamese producers were 
forced into a difficult position with two major challenges. Vietnam limited their export 
quotas into WTO member’s countries, because it was yet to be WTO member, while 
WTO members were entitled free quota markets, thus they could compete to sell their 
products as much as wanted. Big producers in WTO took this opportunity to increase 
their exports. Vietnam exports were limited by its quota and competed with the big 
producers from other WTO members with free quotas (Nguyen and Dang, 2010; 
MUTRAP, 2007). 
 
The other challenge was the changing nature of the T&G market. New T&G 
markets were dominated by the big and competitive T&G companies, who have been 
able to provide large and efficient orders to the distributors.  Due to the competition and 
large production capacities, the T&G market tended to be organised around vertical 
chains. In this model, the distributors looked for capable producers to integrate into a 
chain from production to distribution and saved costs, controlled quality and were easily 
managed (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). WTO accession presented pressure for the Vietnam 
T&G sector to speed up their reforms for better efficiency and a large scale, in order to 
compete in the global market. The traditional markets of Vietnam such as US, EU and 
Japanese markets, witnessed strong competition from producers from China and 
India.151 Without quick reforms Vietnam risked being left behind by its competitors, 
who had been able to establish long-term relations with the retail companies or signed 
long-term contracts with the T&G distribution chains in the US (Truong, interview, 
2011).  
 
T&G goods had sharp and quick reductions in tariffs (Nguyen and Dang, 
2010).152 Real protection for the T&G dropped significantly from 126% to only 34% in 
one year, due to the reductions in tariff of finished products. Such a sudden drop 
                                                
151 In 2005, the revenue of Chinese textile and garment products into the US increased more than 67% 
(Nguyen and Dang, 2010). 
152 The average tariff was reduced from 37.3% in pre-WTO period to 13.7% without any implementation 
period s in other industries. For examples, tariffs for fabric were reduced from 40% to 12%, for ready-
made clothes from 50% to 20% and for fibre from 20% to 5% in 2007 
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affected all branches of the industry. As a result of the reduction in import tax and 
protection, the value added in the enterprises was reduced if they did not improve their 
competitiveness and value added content (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). 
 
Table 7.9: Effective Rate of Protection of the Textile and Garment industry  
(%) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2015 2020 
Textile and garment 124,71 34,06 34,74 35,28 35,61 33,31 28,59 
Thread fibre 4,00 -4,97 -4,46 -4,06 -3,81 -3,10 -2,66 
Clothing 135,70 58,02 58,44 57,72 57,48 58,26 57,83 
Carpet weaving 56,00 25,02 25,22 25,38 25,47 19,81 20,32 
Embroidery (excl. Carpet) 62,33 17,44 17,69 17,90 18,05 16,03 16,31 
Source: Adapted from Nguyen and Dang, 2010 
 
The T&G industry could no longer enjoy the subsidies from the government. All 
export subsidies and incentives from the Export Subsidy Fund, tax exemption or 
reduction measures, land-leasing fees in association with export conditions, and 
preferential credit for development investment, were abolished. Some preferential 
measures to promote exports were maintained until 11 Jan 2012 (Nguyen and Dang, 
2010; VCCI-WTO Centre, 2011). 
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Table 7.10: Anti-dumping case against Vietnam’s export products from 
1994-2004 (see appendix 14 for more updated information) 
Year Products From country Measure against Vietnam 
1994 Rice Columbia  
1998 Glutamate EU 16.8% 
 Footwear EU  
2000 Gas lighter Poland 0.09Euro/unit 
2001 Garlic Canada 1.48CAD/kg 
2002 Water proof Footwear & sole Canada  
 Gas lighter EU  
 Gas lighter Korea  
 Catfish US 36.84-63.88% 
2003 Oxide zinc EU 28% 
 Shrimp US 4.13-25.76% 
2004 Metal ring EU 51.2-78.8% 
 Tyre Turkey 29-49% 
 Bicycle EU 15.8-34.5% 
 Steel type EU  
 Stainless fastener EU 7.7% 
 Fluorescent lamp EU 66.1% 
 Surfboard Peru 5.2USD/unit 
Source: Adapted from Van and Tong (2009); VCCI, 2012 
 
Nevertheless, the industry also faced higher risks of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy 
and defence lawsuits in its large export markets. Vietnam was still subject to the non-
market economy status for 12 years from the accession date (NCIEC, 2007). This was 
the legal basis for any WTO members to start a lawsuit or a defence mechanism for 
antidumping. Thus, they expected more lawsuits and defence mechanisms when dealing 
with any surge of imports in their countries. They could also use the price index and 
standard from other members to accuse Vietnam of dumping their T&G products 
(Nguyen and Dang, 2010). Table 7.10 showed that, Vietnam had to deal with 7 out of 
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18 anti-dumping lawsuits in 2004 alone (See Appendix 14 for updated information).153 
On 11 Jan 2007, the US officially started its Supervision Program on Vietnam’s T&Gs, 
in order to monitor Vietnam’s export to the US and be prepared for legal proceedings if 
there were any violations, causing a challenge for the industry because many customers 
were afraid of possible anti-dumping lawsuits from suppliers who had more stability in 
terms of price and supply (Van and Tong, 2009; VCCI, 2012). 
 
Another side effect came with the increase of labour costs. Although Vietnam is 
labour abundant, the trained labour is still limited for industrial productions. Given that 
situation, T&G offered the lowest salary in the economy, but labour costs increased in 
order to retain their workers (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). 
 
Despite rapid developments since 2002, the sector had been facing some 
essential weaknesses, which limited its competitiveness in both domestic and 
international markets following Vietnam joining the WTO. Firstly, the T&G enterprises 
were mostly on the small and medium scale due to the low investment requirements and 
lacking flexibility for the international market (Truong, interview, 2011). Many 
enterprises were upgraded from the household sector. According to Le Duong Quang154, 
suggested that “after few years of accessing the US market, enterprises were able to 
invest in new technology and expand their business significantly, but still limited in 
scale with a majority of small enterprises” (as cited in FEI, 2003, p.142).155 The 
capacity of the garment industry was equivalent to 16% of Thailand and 13.3% of 
Indonesia (FEI, 2003). The biggest company was the VINATEX. However, its members 
had mixed performance results. Some of them operated efficiently with modern 
technology, such as Thang Long Garment, Viet Tien Garment, Duc Giang Garment, but 
many of them were still struggling with efficiency and liquidity (NgoiSao Online, 2004; 
                                                
153 EU topped the complainant list with 9 cases, followed by the US and Canada with 2 cases. Since WTO 
accession, there have been 20 cases against antidumping of Vietnam export products 
154 Former Director of Planning and Investment Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment 
155 At the end of 2002, there were only 700 garment enterprises in the whole country including 150 SOEs, 
in which only half of the non-state enterprises were on a very small scale with only 100-400 machines 
(FEI, 2003, pp.148). 
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Mai, 2003). The products did not develop well with poor designing, branding and 
fashion fields (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). 
 
The inputs for the garment sector were mostly imported, thus, production was 
unstable and low value added. Vietnam enterprises preferred and targeted the CMTs 
market, rather than building their own brands or doing FOBs products (Nguyen and 
Dang, 2010). The localisation of the Vietnamese garment was only at 20-25% in 2003, 
which was mostly the labour contribution into the value added of the export products 
(Nguyen and Dang, 2010; VITAS, 2006; FEI 2003). Meanwhile, the textile products 
produced domestically, could not meet the standards of export productions in domestic 
enterprises. So the industry was still heavily dependent on the inputs from outside the 
countries. 
 
7.3.3 WTO’s accession process has influenced the balance of politics to support 
reforms in T&G 
 
In late 1990s, the Vietnam Government tended to follow the strategic industrial 
policies with the intensified trade protection and investment for the SOEs to produce 
export replacement goods (Thai, interview, 2012). However, the Asia financial crisis in 
1997 and its effects put many of these SOEs onto the edge of collapse (Masina, 2006; 
Thai, interview, 2012). In order to rescue the economy, the Government tried a range of 
reforms, but they slowly progressed (Chi Lan, interview, 2012). Chi Lan (interview, 
2012) suggested that “given the preferential treatment of the State, SOEs became a 
strong interest group that would opposed any policy changes that might affect their 
existence. Their influence based on their dominant role in the economy with the heavy 
investment of the government on them and their large number of employees”. The 
Government still had to provide many relief packages for the SOEs to survive the crisis, 
and government officials were cautious about the reforms. These middle level 
management agencies were mostly in charge of granting licences and providing 
government funds for the economy. Many still kept an old fashioned philosophy of the 
central command economy and saw reforms as risky and hard to control. Others had 
their own organisational or personal misgivings related to the loss of power. These 
groups acted to prevent further reforms. 
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The industry has utilised well the country’s advantages in labour. Truong 
(interview, 2012) suggested that “the T&G is a dynamic industry and always pioneering 
in the reforms process. Each time, Vietnam took reforms and further integrated into the 
world economy, the industry has taken opportunities to further develop itself for higher 
demand of the market”. 
 
The T&G industry benefited from the reform and integration process. The 
Government policies of late 1990s provided protections and investments towards the 
import substitution industries such as steel, cement, ship building, chemical, 
construction industries etc. These companies were often the capital-intensive industries, 
and thus required heavy government investment and protection but, were not efficient 
and well managed. The Government subsidised these companies’ losses. Capital was 
diverted towards these companies, and away from export competing industries and 
private companies (Nguyen, 2010).  The Government’s protection facilitated foreign 
investment inflows into the protected areas, making the investment structure move 
towards the industries in which Vietnam did not have comparative advantages. 
 
Shortage of capital in 1997-2000 put T&G companies in difficulties as regards 
their re-investment in production and forced the companies to accept processing 
contracts to gradually repay their investment to build up their facilities (Nguyen, 2010; 
Truong, interview, 2012). By 2000, T&G companies were coping with new challenges 
as demand of all major markets (except America) came to a saturation point and 
penetration into new markets required a huge amount of investment. SOEs were heavily 
affected by the Asian Financial Crisis and forced to the edge of collapse. This forced the 
State to provide more support for them through preferential credits from the State Bank 
(Nguyen, 2010). According the Mai Hoang An, the General Director of the VINATEX, 
“the corporation needed USD 230 million USD in 2001, but the Development Fund 
could only provide USD 26 million. In 2002, it needed USD 258 million, but received 
only USD 32.2 million, less than 10% of needed capital” (as cited in FEI, 2003, p.308). 
This is a demonstration of the shift of capitals to protected areas compared with that of 
those areas with comparative advantages. Apart from drawing capital investment SOEs 
attracted a large number of labour and left the T&G industry with human resource 
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problems (WB, 2002). Companies put pressure on the State to continue retaining 
protection policies based on rationales of employment and strategic development of 
areas, with the focus of support on SOEs. These SOEs diverted capital out of the T&G 
industry and into a variety of other industries, such as taxi companies, hotels, etc and 
this led to further difficulties for many enterprises.156 
 
Policy makers represent a large interest group, capable of delaying changes in 
policy. Due to the lack of coordination between agencies and no clear laws and 
regulations, policy-makers filled the vacuum between the laws and regulations 
inefficiency and the market mechanism required to regulate and run the market 
operation (McCarty, 2001). They had authorised powers to issue licenses for operations 
and made administrative decisions to adjust the market in line with the State’s purposes 
and management of export and import trades (Thai, interview, 2012). They were also in 
charge of reporting, consulting and drafting policies for high-ranking agencies or 
leaders. So as changes in policies occurred, the interests of the management agencies 
were directly affected and those involved in controlling the markets found their power, 
influence and benefits under threat. Those policy-making groups often found change 
difficult as they previously held a privileged position in their means to influence senior 
policy makers. These were often the middle ranking bureaucrats who controlled not 
only the regulation and management of the market but often earned bribes and favours 
from their powers to control the trade. The corruption at this level was almost unbridled 
and created extra costs, tedious administrative tasks and untold damage to any private 
company seeking to gain profitable business. In addition, Chi Lan (interview, 2012) 
suggested that “the corruption of these officials was more firmly embedded in many 
SOEs with both SOE leaders and government bureaucrats able to enjoy highly lucrative 
‘relationships’ that benefited them personally, but did little to actually benefit the 
industry”. 
 
                                                
156 The Phuoc Long Textile Company was an example. It was a leading company before and during the 
first phase of reform from 1990-1995. However, the increasing competition and weak management forced 
the company into a liquidity problem that made finding resources for reinvestment impossible. It is 
similar situation for the Long An textile company, another large and long established manufacturer in the 
industry, which had been forced to the edge of bankruptcy (FEI 2003; Vietnamnet Online, 2004) 
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Management of export and import trade directly affected the industry and was 
biased against the private companies. The Ministry of Trade (MOT) is responsible for 
management of licensing export and import for T&G products. Before Vietnam joined 
the WTO, all Vietnamese T&G exports to Europe and US were subject to quotas. 
Following the boom of export to the US market, Vietnamese companies started to face 
difficulties in getting export quotas to the US (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). The 
distribution of quotas became a hot issue from 2003. The Department of Export and 
Import at MOT had the mandate to distribute the quota to T&G companies. Though this 
was work to manage appropriately and maximise the use of resources and quotas, it 
became a tool to generate power for managing agencies due to its ambiguous criteria 
and regulations on quotas allocation (Vnexpress Online, 2004; Phong and Vinh, 2004). 
Quotas were allocated to the companies based upon their export performance in the 
previous year, multiplying with a coefficient set by an inter-agency board instead of 
introducing a competitive bidding mechanism. The quota allocation mechanism 
appeared fairly transparent as it was based on the record of the previous year. However, 
the criteria for determining the coefficients in the mechanisms of each company were 
vague and unclear. Thus, it led to lack of transparency in determining quota 
distributions. This resulted in negative incidents, as capable companies failed to receive 
export quotas, while many companies receiving the quota were unable to actually 
produce enough for the quota allocation (Phong and Vinh, 2004; Thanh, 2004; 
Vnexpress, 2004). Quotas were not correctly transferred and the result was:  
1. Companies, which lacked quotas, had to pay to re-buy quotas from 
companies having abundant quotas,  
2. Companies having abundant quotas had to pay to return quotas to managing 
agencies without deduction of quota in the following years, and 
3. Companies which needed quotas had to pay for receiving the quota from the 
return of companies having abundant quotas. 
 
The cost of quotas was too low enabling speculation and corruption. Many 
companies’ used illegal ways such as bribes, false performance results or purchasing 
quotas from other enterprises (Thanh, 2004). The quota allocation mechanism was too 
vague, leading to the official agencies abusing their power on a massive scale (Vo, 
2004). In spite of claims of abuse in the quota distribution, this mechanism was 
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unchanged and remained active for many years, indicating the depth of corruption 
within the Ministry of Trade. Thai (interview, 2012) said “maintaining such a 
mechanism was ineffective but the managing agencies still kept it on purpose for 
protecting their department and personal benefits”. 
 
The roles of the private sector in the industry contributed to the downward trend 
of the SOEs shares and the slight increases of foreign sector shares in the total output. 
But, VINATEX retained an advantage as the dominant player in the market, yet it failed 
to attract sufficient capital, investment and market share to the Corporation. Due to its 
large share in the export trade, this Corporation was able to maintain close links with the 
central and local government. In an interview, the General Director Mai Hoang An 
mentioned that “ the industry had achieved two important targets of the CPV and 
government’s concerns, which were (1) enhancing the export performance to earn 
strong foreign currencies and (2) generating jobs for millions of people with thousands 
of new jobs every year. The CPV and the Government reckoned special supporting 
policies for the development of this industry were needed” (as cited in FEI, 2003, 
p.308). Local governments welcomed VINATEX due to its need for labour and its 
payment of taxes. Thus, special treatments often generated even further advantages for 
VINATEX (Nguyen, 2010). Based on their scale and backup from the Government, 
they were able to gain large loans from the Government with very low collateral terms. 
It had further privileges in obtaining land for setting up production facilities, especially 
from the local government, due to its advantages of being large scale and connected 
directly to the central government (Nguyen, 2010; Nguyen and Le, 2005; Hill, 2000; 
MOEAITC, 1998). Quota allocation was also an example of the SOE bias. Firms often 
got more quotas than they could produce, and often sold these on the black market, to 
smaller firms, at higher prices. These firms were often short of investment and unable to 
meet the quotas. In the investigation on corruption cases concerning quota allocations, 
there were about 45 SOEs involved in bribing or using connections for gaining quota 
allocations and selling them in the black market. Chi Lan (interview, 2012) said 
“providing a more level playing field in the T&G means more opportunities for the 
private sector to grow. In this sector, there is no need for the domination of the State 
sector, because the private sector now has the capacity to invest and to lead the sector”. 
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In the context of the slow reform progress in early 2000s, the interest groups 
were able to influence the policies for reforms because they were the products of the 
CPV’s ideology and close connection to the system. Reforms were re-started in 2001 to 
rescue the poor performance of the economy with lack of growth, poor performance of 
SOEs, budget deficits and fragile banking sector. However, the normal politics could 
not provide much force for progress in the domestic reforms because of the deep 
commitments of CPV and Government to anti reform groups, and the rampant levels of 
corruption that both officials and SOEs were involved in; levels of corruption that 
persist to the present day. 
 
Clearly, the persistent tendency towards corruption and relationships between 
SOEs and the Government officials means that although the surface presentation is of 
compliance, the reality is far from this and involves massive bribery and corruption that 
regularly threatens not only WTO membership, but also the very future of the industry. 
 
As a result of the WTO negotiation for accession and the USBTA, the trade 
regime of Vietnam had changed significantly (in appearance) towards a more 
transparent and neutral regime since 2001 (MUTRAP, 2008). These changes were to 
have helped to neutralise the bias for the import competing industries and to create a 
more efficient business environment for better resource allocation. Law changes under 
the WTO accession helped to remove, gradually, protection for the SOEs and the 
control of the SOEs on the import and export activities (MUTRAP, 2008). But one has 
to treat this with great caution, as the reality is that the relationships have become even 
more covert, and continue to bestow great advantages on the SOEs. Secondly, the non-
tariff barriers were removed significantly since 2001 as a result of the negotiations for 
the WTO accession. They were actively used before 2001 for several ‘key’ goods157 for 
protection of import competing industries with the reason being a balancing of supply 
and demand. Under the negotiation for the WTO accession, the tariff rate was also 
reduced sharply from 19.98% in 2003 to 10.53% in 2006 (Athukorala, 2005; Tuyen et 
al, 2011). According to Athukorala (2005), the reduction of EPR in manufacturing was 
mainly due to the increase in the tariff for inputs and the WTO accession process 
                                                
157 Such as car, cement, steel, sugar, etc... 
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gradually corrected the bias against export competing goods by the liberalisation of 
trade under the WTO framework and negotiations. This would help to redirect resources 
from the capital-intensive industries towards the labour-intensive industries like textiles 
and garments or agricultural, where they are holding competitive advantages for 
Vietnam (Athukorala, 2005; Nguyen and Dang, 2010).158 
 
The WTO regulations helped build a transparent and non-discriminative market. 
WTO requirement for SOEs is to operate under commercial-based standards and the 
State can only influence enterprises by its ownership (NCIEC, 2007). It also required 
Vietnam to report its progress of SOEs equitisation programme every year to the WTO, 
providing a framework for the relationship between SOEs and the Government, which 
would help to reduce intervention from the Government on the behalf of SOEs and 
make the market a more level playing field for all companies in the sector. At the 10th 
Congress (2006), the Party highlighted its policy that “speeding up the reshuffle, reform 
and enhancement of SOEs’ efficiency with a focus on equitisation. Encouraging 
business forms of multi ownership, concentrating on newly equitised companies to 
make it become a popular format and make up a high ratio in the economy”. The result 
of the WTO accession process and change in the CPV policies was the basis for the 
Unified Law on Enterprise (2005). Enterprises increased from 150,000 in 2002 to 
500,000, accounting for 40% of the GDP in 2010 (WB, 2012). The Government’s 
Board of Enterprises’ Reform introduced concrete solutions to accelerate the 
transformation of SOEs, such as categorising SOEs by business performance and 
dealing with under-performing companies. As a result, the number of equitised SOEs 
surged since 2004 (WB, 2006). The Government had to adjust the mechanism for 
supporting their strategic industries in order to comply with WTO regulations. These 
commitments further neutralised the privileges of the SOEs, who were the main 
receivers of the Government investments and supports (NCIEC, 2007). However, for 
one to understand the reality, it must be understood that these equitised SOEs were 
privatised in name only on many occasions, with their past ‘relationships’ maintained 
and advantages through bribery and corruption as prevalent as ever before. 
                                                
158 The Effective Rate of Protection was reduced sharply from 2001 to 2005, from 54.1% to 20.43% in 
2006. In manufacturing, the EPR was reduced rapidly from 95.97% in 2001 to 43.94% in 2003 (54%) 
(Athukorala, 2005; Tuyen et al, 2011). 
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Accession did help to enhance the political power of the private sector 
(MUTRAP, 2007). The private sector has had direct benefits through expansion of 
business opportunities and from the increased market access, as Khanh (interview, 
2012) notes “The incentives for the further reform in the business environment and a 
level playing field among different economic sectors has not only come from the 
improved business environment due to the WTO accession process, but also from the 
business opportunities from improved non-discriminating market access via the WTO 
accession”. Although the importance and the contribution of this sector have been 
acknowledged by the Party-State since 1986, this sector was often discriminated against 
through State investment and preferences (Sidel, 1999; Tuan, 2006b). There was still a 
“strong view from conservatives who were concerned about the role of the private 
sector in the economy” (Tuan, 2006, p.79). This viewpoint has been not only been the 
anchor for the special roles of the SOEs but also the basis for discrimination over the 
private sector (Dixon, 2004; Forsyth, 1997; Masina, 2006; Painter, 2005; Sjoholm, 
2006). 
 
The interaction between different interest groups on reform was exposed during 
the WTO accession process and this was seen as an external levelling force to motivate 
the pro-reform groups to assemble and put pressure on the Party-State on the reform 
progress. It restrained the interest groups, who were against the reforms, and influenced 
the Party-State through its regulations and standards. WTO accession was significant to 
the industry as it presented an opportunity of access to huge markets for exports and 
also of easier access to materials not yet available domestically (Hanh, 2005). WTO 
compliance produced a safer and more open investment climate, enabling the industry, 
with its inherent competitive advantages, to attract more foreign investment and 
development assistance from countries and such international financial institutions as 
the WB, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. Thus, the industry 
was further enhanced thanks to the know-how and management experience transferred 
through foreign-invested projects (Hanh, 2005). Given such enormous benefits, the 
garment and textile industry was one group who strongly advocated the economic 
reforms and WTO accession. 
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One fact that convinced most policy-makers was the benefits gained by the 
garment and textile industry after signing the US-BTA. The Vietnamese exports 
turnover increased impressively.159 Success of the garment and textile exports into the 
US market strengthened the confidence in the potential economic benefits gained from 
deeper integration and reforms. This also built an impetus for the Vietnamese 
Government to consider the acceleration of WTO accession as opening the market 
would likely bring about enormous economic benefits to industries where Vietnam 
possessed comparative advantages (Truong, interview, 2011). The previous isolation 
from the WTO had placed the garment and textile industry in a disadvantaged position 
given the termination of the ATC in 2005 (Nguyen and Dang, 2010).  It was easy to 
notice that Vietnam’s exports of garment and textiles plunged immediately in 2005 
when the ATC was terminated, and that many CAT items experienced negative growth 
(Nguyen and Dang, 2010; Nguyen, 2010). Without fundamental reforms of institutions 
and an economic governance approach, it would have been difficult for Vietnam to join 
the WTO. 
 
One of features of the industry is the large number and diverse ownership of 
enterprises, but often small in size ranging from households to small and medium size 
enterprises (FEI, 2003; Nguyen, 2010; Nguyen and Dang, 2010). Many of them were 
spontaneously developed from the household sector, thus they were in the situation of 
‘every man for himself’ without any coordination of market and production (FEI, 2003). 
Truong (interview, 2011) suggested that “[at that time] private firms were very small 
and often surviving around the operation of the SOEs. Many of them often made use of 
superfluous and discarded material from the SOEs or did subcontracts for the SOEs. 
They had limited capacity in marketing and collecting information in the international 
market as well as access to the customer network. Thus, their operations were not able 
to create enough profit for reinvestment to upgrade their business”. Moreover, the Asian 
Financial Crisis had had deep impacts on the T&G industry due to the decrease of 
orders from international markets and increasingly competitive foreign goods160 in the 
home market (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Kokko, 1988; Hung, 2000; 2001). The small 
                                                
159 The exports turnover of the garment and textile industry increased by more than 190% in 2003 and 
260% in 2004 and registered at USD 2.484 billion in 2009. 
160Due to the currency depreciation in most Asia countries.  
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and medium enterprises became vulnerable before the crisis, as the SOEs received most 
of the quotas and orders due to its connections and capacity (FEI, 2003).  There was a 
need for an organisation to assist these small and medium enterprises negotiate for the 
contracts and provide information for the trading partners. As a result, the Vietnam 
Textile and Apparel Association (VITAS) was established in 1999, marking one of the 
earliest business associations established after the economic reforms. This Association 
acted as a bridge between enterprises, the Government and the international market 
(FEI, 2003).161 VITAS members, especially the SME were able to express their 
concerns on the development of T&G enterprises. This helped to mobilise diverse, 
scattered and weak voices from many enterprises for their potential benefits and 
developments of the industry. Thus, it plays a more natural role of mediating all 
industry’s sector to represent their industry interests. Truong (interview, 2010) 
suggested that “the Vietnamese garment and textile industry, particularly through the 
VITAS exerted their influence on policy-makers in considering reforms in various 
sectors of the economy in exchange for the benefits of the garment and textile industry”. 
The channels for their concerns were based on two strengths. First, the performance and 
contribution of the industry to the economy was significant to the country, especially 
during the first phase of the reforms (FEI, 2003). Second, VITAS members also 
included VINATEX, as the largest and core SOE for the Government strategic plan for 
the development of the industry. The VITAS also represent the concern of the SOEs in 
the industry. From connections of VINATEX and other member SOEs, VITAS was 
able to approach Government agencies and officials to lobby and consult their concerns 
and suggestions to the Government (VINATEX, 2010). 
 
Since its establishment, the VITAS worked closely with the Government to form 
the strategic policy for development of the T&G industry towards 2010. The industry 
was given mechanisms and targets for development, in which they encouraged the 
multi- economic sector including private and foreign sectors in the development of the 
industry. The Government set up a financial mechanism for the development of the 
industry, in which it allocated 2.3 billion USD for the years from 2001-2005 and 2 
billion USD for the period from 2006-2010 and arranged a range of tax and financial 
                                                
161 Within 3 years of establishment, it had attracted more than 450 enterprises, out of 1200 T&G 
enterprises, and included foreign invested enterprises (FEI, 2003). 
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incentives (Government Office, 2001). VITAS have made used of the industry 
strengths, which are its rapid growth in exports and contributions to the export volume, 
to negotiate and consult with the government for policies and resource allocations. 
 
Truong (interview, 2010) declared “VITAS worked actively and hard to lobby 
for the international integration as they understand the vital roles of the international 
standards for market expansion. The associations, together with VINATEX, reported 
monthly and in these reports, there was a profit and loss analysis of different scenarios 
with or without integration under the USBTA or WTO”. WTO accession provided 
incentives for VITAS and the T&G enterprises to assemble together to bid for the 
economic changes and reforms to meet the WTO requirement for accession. 
 
WTO accession process played an important role in balancing the political 
economy on the reforms in the T&G sector. It helped to change the trade policy towards 
a more neutral regime in which competitive advantage sectors like T&G can get more 
resources for their development. The WTO accession provided a motivation for groups 
benefiting from reforms to form their own interest groups to influence policy markers. 
Thus, the balance of political economy of economic reforms changed towards a more 
positive approach.  
 
7.3.4 WTO’s accession process has guided the institutional reforms 
 
The WTO accession process has made both direct and indirect impacts to the 
process of institutional reforms. Direct impacts of the WTO accession have been the 
changes of laws and regulations to comply with the WTO standards and requirements. 
Meanwhile, the WTO accession process has helped to set up a more neutral market 
economy with less dominant roles of the state sector. 
 
 
 
 
 314 
Reducing the role of SOEs 
 
Since 1995, the Government of Vietnam intended to establish large SOEs, which 
could take leading roles in development of the strategic industries. The Vietnam Textile 
and Garments Corporation (Corporation 91) was one of them and established under the 
Prime Minister Decision 91-TTg in 1995 (FEI, 2003). The performance of VINATEX 
was not highly rated as the ROE of the entire corporation was 3.2%.162 Most of its 
companies suffered losses (Institute of T&G, 2010).163 The performance of subsidiaries 
was worrisome despite the designated role of being the leading Corporation for the 
development of the industry. 
 
After the Asian Financial Crisis, the second stage of economic reform was 
started to enhance the efficiency of the economy. The restructuring process of the SOEs 
was a practical strategy in order to improve the governance and efficiency of the SOEs 
for a more market oriented economic environment as well as to reduce the financial 
burden of inefficient SOEs (Le and Liu, 2006; Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). VINATEX 
was also undertaking the Government’s equitisation process under the Decree 
44/1998/ND-CP. However, the process of equitisation was very slow. Only 13 of 
VINATEX subsidiaries were equitised. Most of them were garment subsidiaries, which 
were easy to be equitised because of its high returns and small investment. Later, the 
subsidiaries with poor performances were equitised. The progress of equitisation was 
slow in this period (IOTG, 2010; VINATEX, 2011). The cause of the slow equitisation 
process involved the still strong discrimination between SOEs and the private sector, 
where leaving the state sector meant giving up benefits and privileges attached to the 
SOEs status, and several unsuccessful cases of equitisation. A number of enterprises, 
after becoming joint-stock companies, became loss-making enterprises, due to 
mismanagement and lack of supports; such as Chien Thang, Thang Long and Binh Dinh 
                                                
162 Revenue: VND 7,761 billion, profit: VND 74 billion, tax: VND 287 billion; Equity: VND 1,840 
billion; Debt-to-Equity: 2.9%; Average income of an employee: VND 1 million/year.  
163 10 subsidiaries suffered losses, four made no profit, 12 had the ROE under 0.01%, three had the ROE 
above 10%, three had the ROE ranging between 5-10 %, and 13 subsidiaries had the ROE between 1-5 %. 
This meant that 30% of the forty-five 100% State-owned subsidiaries of VINATEX made no profit and 
only 13% produced profit with the ROE above 5% (Institute of T&G, 2010; VINATEX, 2010). 
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Joint-Stock Garment companies (IOTG, 2010; Truong, interview, 2011). Third, was due 
to reasons ranging from lack of finance to confidence in the companies. 
 
However, the equitisation process picked up its speed from 2002, when the US 
BTA came into force and brought the significant increase of nearly 200% in the export 
of garments and textiles to the US market. From the positive results of the US BTA, the 
WTO accession process was accelerated from 2003 by strengthening views on the 
benefits of the international economic integration process (Masina, 2006). The process 
provided a new impetus for the SOEs restructuring process. It provided a new hope for 
market access, especially when the ATC expired in 2005. Firms needed to enhance their 
capacity and quality in order to take this opportunity and cope with the change and 
increased competition from international markets after the ATC ended. On the other 
hand, the WTO accession process also generated pressure for firms to restructure 
themselves to face more challenges from increasing competition in the domestic market 
due to the market opening under the WTO negotiation process. Truong (interview, 
2012) said “enterprises in the industry had been propagandised for the better preparation 
for the event. They wanted these SOEs taking this opportunity to improve their 
governance and capacity to face the new challenges of the market”. A range of policies 
were issued to facilitate this process and equitisation was further strengthened with 
much stronger policies since 2004, when Vietnam accelerated its negotiation process to 
join the WTO. 
 
WTO accession provided new business opportunities but also was expected to 
provide much needed capital inflow into the industry and many SOEs found that their 
current ownership system and operation might not fit for the future development under 
the new market opportunities. Three years of the US BTA also had helped them to 
improve the capacity and the chance to be independent operations. Some SOEs were 
willing to undertake equitisation. The conditions for equitisation were vastly improved. 
Not only the mechanism and procedure were improved but more important the tools for 
equitisation also contained more options. The success and fast growth of the stock 
market also became an attractive channel for equitisation. Thus, SOEs were more 
willing to go down the route for equitisation.  
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2004-2006 were the pivotal years of Vietnam’s WTO accession. The strong 
determination coupled with the approaching deadline, placed increasing pressure on 
proper restructuring of economic sectors. The legal system was promptly reformed with 
new regulations and in a more transparent and equitable manner for economic 
stakeholders. The introduction of the Enterprise Law 2005 addressed the long-standing 
inequality among economic stakeholders as well as the perception of differences 
between SOEs and joint-stock enterprises. The changing of perceptions, the demand for 
funding and administrative reforms forged momentum for the equitisation of garment 
and textile enterprises (IOTG, 2009; VINATEX, 2011).164 
 
Vietnam amended the majority of its laws and policies in compliance with WTO 
rules prior to membership. Between 2003 and 2007, Vietnam gradually removed all 
regulations and policies that hindered trade. The T&G industry relied on export-import 
and world markets. Approximately 80% of the machineries and inputs were imported 
and also about 80% of the outputs were exported (Nguyen and Dang, 2010; Habubank, 
2010; IOTG, 2009). Therefore, the trade policies of Vietnam would exert direct impact 
on the industry. 
 
Prior to 2001, the foreign-invested companies were only permitted to export the 
items registered in their business license. After 2001, these restrictions were removed. 
The Investment Law and the Foreign Investment Law were also combined into a single 
Law on Investment to ensure that the legal framework on investment was compatible 
with international norms and practices given the deeper integration of the country 
(Dordi et al, 2008). 
 
One of the major changes in the assistance policies for the T&G industry was the 
termination of subsidies to domestic enterprises. Between 2003 and 2007, Vietnam had 
removed all policies and regulations on prohibited subsidies. The removal had taken 2 
forms: 
                                                
164 During this time, forty enterprises had been equitised wholly or partly, under Decree 187/2004/ND-CP 
dated 24/12/2004 which nearly doubled the number of equitised SOEs in 2002-2003 
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1. Complete abolition of the related subsidies; or 
2. Adjust the related subsidies in compliance with the WTO rules. 
 
Export subsidies and bonuses for the T&G industry were terminated. The Export 
assistance programmes and bonuses from the Export Assistance Fund were no longer 
applicable from 2007. At present, a Fund for trade, investment and tourism promotion is 
being developed to replace the Export Assistance Fund. In the draft proposal, all 
prohibited subsidies described in the Export Assistance Fund were removed and the 
goals of the Fund were adjusted in compatibility with WTO rules. The investment 
incentives, i.e. exemption and reduction of corporate income tax, tariffs, land use tax, 
land lease, which had been attached to the export conditions under the regulations on 
foreign investment were removed (IOGT, 2009; Tuoc, 2007).165 The incentives on 
credit for development investment, including loans, interest subsidies, credit assurance, 
bidding assurance, contract implementation assurance, based on the export criteria 
described in the Development Assistance Fund.166 The Development Assistance Fund, 
with the mission of assisting export-based enterprises, was transformed into the 
Development Bank operating under market principles (WB, 2006; WB, 2011). 
 
Subsidies to encourage the consumption of domestic produce, based on the rate 
of localisation, were also abolished or adjusted in compliance with WTO rules and 
market economy principles. Tax incentives, based on the localisation rate, applicable to 
all industries were terminated.167 The localisation-based investment incentives, 
including the waivering and reduction of corporate income tax, import tariffs, land use 
                                                
165Under the Law on Investment 2005 and Government Decree 108/2006/ND-CP on guidelines to 
implement the Law on Investment 2005 
166Founded under the Prime Minister’s Decision 195/1999/QD-TTg, were also terminated under the 
Prime Minister’s Decision 108/2006/QD-TTg. The Government Decree 151/2006/ND-CP and Circular 
69/2007/TT-BTC stipulated that the levels of interests for export credit should be identified on the basis 
of market interests rates. Decree 24/2007/ND-CP provided for a phasing in period of 5 years for 
investment incentives, including the export-merit based tariff incentives granted to projects licensed and 
put into operation prior to Vietnam’s accession to WTO (Nguyen and Dang, 2010). 
167 On 1/10/2006 by Decree 43/2006/ND-CP. 
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tax and land lease were all abolished (WB, 2006; 2011; NCIEC, 2007).168 A peak of 
subsidy cuts for the textiles and garment industry was the termination of Decision 
55/2001/QD-TTg. This included abolishing preferential credit for investment, 
preferential VAT and other incentives described in the Law on Domestic Investment 
(Dordi et al, 2008).169 
 
The Prime Minister’s Decision 108/2006/QD-TTg on transformation of the 
Development Assistance Fund into the Development Bank ensured that the assistance 
criteria of the Fund excluded the export subsidies or subsidies to encourage the use of 
domestic produce. The Prime Minister’s Decision 279/2005/QD-TTg on the Trade 
Promotion Programme provided for the automatic termination of subsidies not in 
compliance with the WTO rules. 
 
 In summary, it can be concluded that Vietnam no longer maintains any policy 
or regulation on prohibited forms of subsidies against the commitments of Vietnam and 
relevant WTO rules. 
 
7.3.5 Reforms after the WTO 
 
WTO’s accession continued to generate the motivation for the reform process 
through the implementation period. Khanh (interview, 2012) said “Vietnam has 
implemented many tariff reduction’s commitments and border issues seriously. They 
are playing important roles in keeping the pace of the reforms after the WTO 
accession”.  The structure of the economy has shifted gradually towards the industries 
that Vietnam has competitiveness advantages in (CIEM, 2010). All commitments on 
tariff reductions and subsidies to the industry have been implemented and removed  
(NCIEC, 2007; IOTG, 2010). 
 
                                                
168Under the Law on Investment 2005 and Decree 108/2006/ND-CP on guidelines to implement the Law 
on Investment 2005. 
169 Vietnamnet Online News, 2005; Vietnam News Agency, 2006. 
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Motivation for the reform process in the industry comes mainly from the 
competition in the both international and domestic markets. As a member of the WTO, 
Vietnam can export freely to the WTO members’ markets. However, they have to 
compete fairly under market economy conditions, rather than be allocated certain quotas 
for market access with less competition (Nguyen and Dang, 2010; Nguyen, 2010; FEI, 
2003). This removal of the quota system will mean a survival of the fittest only, and the 
Vietnam industry will have to compete with countries like China, Pakistan, India, etc. 
Thus, pressure for reforming and upgrading the industry still exists. The slowing down 
of the industry’s’ exports after the end of ATC in 2005 was a clear sign for a need to 
strongly compete in the international markets (Kien Giang, 2005)170. Vietnam applied 
the US special import monitoring program on Vietnam’s exports, which easily set the 
grounds for the anti-dumping measures from the US. In addition, the industry was no 
longer entitled to the support from the government in the form of subsidies for 
development. The Decision 55/2001/QD-TTg, a strategic policy for development of the 
T&G industry from 2001-2010 was cancelled under the WTO’s commitments (IOTG, 
2009). Thus, the enterprises have had to increase their productivity in order to hedge 
against the economic risks. The pressure for reforms also comes from the range of 
behind border measures on trade and investment. The industry is required to obey and 
implement the WTO’s regulations such as CSR, SA8000; Oeko-tex, Reach’s waste 
processing and TBT. These regulations are complicated and mean increased costs for 
Vietnam enterprises. 
 
The domestic market was opened dramatically after the accession by its 
commitments to the WTO. The average real protection rate of the garment and textile 
garment has been reduced sharply in 2007. The international market is more 
competitive and put further pressure on the industry to become more efficient and 
competitive (Truong, interview, 2011). 
 
After the accession, the WTO is still providing the motivation for reform by 
changing the balance of the political economy of reforms for the T&G industry in 
particular and the economy in general. The export performance of the T&G sharply 
                                                
170 Nguyen Thuy and Kieu Giang 2004; Son Nghia, 2005. 
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improved since 2007.171 In 2008, this industry took over from the oil and gas industry to 
be the largest export industry in Vietnam (Tuoi Tre Newspaper, 2007).172 The industry 
has been in the top 10 of the world’s exporters in garments and textiles since 2007, and 
moved to 7th position in 2010 with nearly 3% of the world market in 2010 (Habubank 
Securities, 2011).173 Vu Duc Giang, (2010), the Chairman of VITAS and VINATEX 
mentioned that “the industry has been considered the key industry of the economy, as 
well as playing a key role in the economic recovery process. It helped to earn foreign 
currencies and reduced the trade deficit of the economy” (as cited in VINATEX, 2010). 
Thus, the industry’s performance has proven its advantages and economic strength over 
the other industries, shifted significantly the thought and balance of political forces 
towards the competitive industries as against support the protected ‘strategic’ industries 
for import substitution. 
 
The change in the political position of the industry has also been reflected in the 
enhanced role of VITAS in the Government policymaking process. Since the WTO 
accession process, VITAS has participated in consultation sessions and cooperated with 
Government for the bilateral and multilateral negotiations. At the beginning, the role of 
the VITAS was not significant in these negotiations. However, Truong (interview, 
2012) said, “ after the WTO accession, its roles has been improved significantly due to 
the industry performance and its active contribution and consultation on implementing 
the WTO commitments, the strategy for T&G development to 2020 and the successful 
settlement of the US Monitoring Mechanism for the T&G industry. VITAS is the 
capable partner of the Government and assists in consulting and forming policies and 
strategies for negotiations, as for example with the TPP Agreement”. This has been a 
significant outcome of the WTO accession process, and indicates the increased 
influence of the enterprises in the policy-making processes of the Government. Truong 
(interview, 2012) commented that “VITAS has been calling for further improvement in 
                                                
171 The value of exports in 2007 had jumped dramatically with 33.5% compared to that in 2006. It 
continued to increase by 16.5% in the following years. The export revenue was not increased due to the 
effect of the Financial Crisis in 2009, however, it picked up sharply at 23.2% in 2010 (IOTG, 2009). 
172 IOGT, 2010; AFTERX, 2010; Tran, 2012. 
173 After China (36.6%); Bangladesh (4.32%), Germany (5.03%), Italy (5%), India (3.9%) and Turkey 
(3.7%) 
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the policy-making process, and movement towards transparency and efficiency, 
especially in the commitments and the implementation schedules in the FTA and WTO, 
as well as for accelerating negotiations for TPP, FTA with EU and Russia, etc”. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Reforms in the T&G industry are still continuing after the WTO accession. The 
general tariffs have been significantly lowered (Nguyen and Dang, 2010; Athukorala, 
2005; MUTRAP, 2007; Tuyen et al, 2011). The custom procedures have also been 
upgraded and simplified for both import and exports. Currently, the electronic custom 
procedures have been experimentally applied with the participation of 21 Custom 
Offices and 50000 enterprises throughout the countries as part of efforts in 
administrative procedures reforms (Huy, 2012).174 The authorities, including the 
Ministry of Finance, the Custom General Office and Tax General Office have regularly 
conducted consultation conferences with enterprises all over the country, in order to 
exchange views on policies and concerns of the enterprises since 2004. In the first 9 
months of 2012, there have been 41 conferences organised between Custom Offices and 
enterprises in all sectors, at both province and city level, and are used to explain the 
policies and listen to the concerns of the enterprises, which are reported back to the 
Customs General Office for improvement of the procedures (Huy, 2012).175 Despite 
improvements and increasing consultation levels, there are still many complaints from 
the T&G enterprises about the Custom procedures. Most of the complaints are about the 
quick and frequent change of the regulations on export and import and overlapping of 
these regulations. Thus, these created difficulties for enterprises to follow and obey the 
regulations (Ha Mai, 2009). T&G enterprises also complained in the consultation 
sessions with the Ministry of Finance and Custom General Office about the 
inconsistency and arbitrary nature of the application of regulations and laws, especially 
in the field of tariff rates, tariff categories and values. There are also different 
procedures, applications and decisions of custom offices in different provinces (Bao 
                                                
174 Huy 2012; Hai Yen, 2012; Custom Office Online, 2012;Minh Tam, 2012; Thanh Tu, 2012 
175 Huy, 2012; Custom News, 2012 
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Hanh, 2012).176 The new Circular 79/2009/TT-BTC, concerns the procedures for 
supervising customs, monitoring trade, and the tariff management of import and export 
goods.  There were complaints about the increasing complexity of procedures (Thu, 
2012).177 
 
The benefits and working conditions of the employees have been improved 
remarkably. The employees bought shares at discounted prices and were given 
appropriate jobs in a dynamic business model. The labour force was refined with better 
quality. Many employees who were either old or not compatible with the jobs, received 
pension benefits under Decree 41/2002/ND-CP of the Government, and the majority of 
them were satisfied with the pension. Meanwhile, those who were retained 
demonstrated better productivity and enjoyed higher incomes (IOTG, 2009). 
 
WTO accession rapidly exposed the T&G industry to the demands of 
competitive dynamics and brought about revolutionary changes that resulted in 
attraction of international investment and development of the industry that brought 
much needed impetus to economic growth. By providing both guidance and incentives 
to reform, accession enabled the industry to break free from reliance on subsidies and 
developed an international level ability to grow as a worldwide exporter. This provided 
capital, employment and future opportunities for even more growth that is vital to the 
country and essential in avoiding the impending economic crisis.  
 
Much of the development of T&G industry was initiated by crisis, with the 
industry secretly reacting to that crisis by expanding its exports and financing this 
through ‘loans’ that were illegally acquired. The Party and its policies of quotas and 
deterring export trade left the industry no other choice but to tackle crisis through its 
own means and deliberately ignore Party policies and direction. The success of this 
strategy forced the Party to join in the industry’s own version of ‘central control’ and its 
growing demonstration of market driven competitiveness. However, SOEs dominated 
                                                
176 Government Online News, 2012,; TuoiTre News, 2012  
177Bao Hanh, 2012; Quoc Anh, 2012 
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the ‘reforms’ and continue to be the main force of control of the sector. Foreign 
investment is declining, while ‘State’ investment and support still favours SOEs and 
discriminates against the private sector. Institutional and regulatory reforms are ignored 
with impunity, and the sector should be more accurately judged on the heights of 
growth it should have reached, rather than the success that now exists. Even major 
positive institutional reforms such as the establishment of VITAS are questionable, 
given the dominance and control of the institution by the SOE – VINATEX. The profits 
of exports are still largely not returning to the State in the form of taxes, and debts 
continue to build even in the face of growing revenue and the benefits are still the sole 
preserve of an elite interest group rather than in the re-investment into higher salaries, 
better working conditions and training of workers, and the greater mechanisation and 
technological improvement of a successful industry. 
 
In the conclusion the thesis now considers the overall benefits to Vietnam of 
WTO accession and membership, and considers it in the context of a threatened 
economic crisis that was avoidable, but may have been caused by the Party and the 
Government having actually thrown away most of the possible benefits of the WTO 
process.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has examined the impact of the WTO on the Vietnam economy and 
its reform from a central command economy to one based on the WTO free market 
doctrine.178 Balding (2010, p.193) found that the WTO was the “defender and promoter 
of free trade... opening up markets and facilitating the unparalleled growth of economic 
interdependence. Until recently, however, little systemic research had studied the 
impact of the WTO”. Yet, despite those who find that it ‘freed global trade’, its critics 
believe it favours “multinationals and rich countries while ignoring the development 
concerns of lesser developed countries” (Balding, 2010, p.193). This thesis finds that 
the position of Vietnam in global trade has improved due to WTO accession and 
membership. There has been dramatic economic growth, reductions in the influence of 
Government and Party on the economy, improved laws and institutions along market 
principles and unprecedented improvements in prosperity. However, the foundations of 
that development remain problematic. As McGough (interview, 2012)179 summarised 
‘WTO accession provided Vietnam a gateway to the global economy, yet its impact has 
to consider where the failures continue to threaten the future stability of the economy 
and even economic collapse’. Although focused on trade and trade freedoms, the WTO 
was seen as a far more influential process upon the economic and political system in 
Vietnam’. McGough (interview, 2012) notes ‘A simplistic approach to the impact of the 
WTO would do little to help understand its actual purpose as a tool of reform. It goes 
beyond just being a trade improvement tool, and instead it can be understood by the 
Vietnamese as a mechanism for reforms across the whole system. From SOE 
                                                
178 Free market doctrine and the WTO see Chomksy N (2007) Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: 
Doctrines and Reality. http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199711--.htm 
179 Dr. Sean McGough ADB/World Bank- Political and economic advisor to the Vietnam Government 
and Professor of Economics in Vietnam National University/Andrews USA partnership. 
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restructuring to addressing the capacity problems in governance, the WTO is seen as a 
panacea for all of the development concerns, and judgement of its success must address 
these expectations, however unjustified or how far removed they may be from the actual 
purpose or intent of the WTO.  What the Vietnamese believe the WTO to be differs 
significantly from foreigners understanding’.  
 
The impact of the WTO has brought major improvements in Vietnam, but 
aspects of its impact, such as the advancement of a wealthy and powerful elite interest 
group, the continued failures of the education and training system, the sustenance of 
corruption and the increasing governance problems are all directly related to the impact 
of the WTO upon Vietnam; as failures to improve them threatens the benefits accrued 
from accession and membership. As Chi Lan (interview, 2012) says “to restrict its 
evaluation to simple trade outcomes is neither helpful or a true reflection of its impact. 
The WTO shone a light upon the system and provided new ways to evaluate its 
outcomes and the weaknesses that it has now helped identify”. Although we can see the 
benefits of WTO, the failings in the economic structures continue and negatively affect 
the future outcomes of WTO membership. 
 
In examining the impact upon Vietnam of the WTO it has become clear that one 
meets a prior problem that needs presentation and analysis. The WTO impacts are often 
negated by the domestic reform process which subsequently shows Vietnam as a 
country more identifiable as a case of non-compliance, rather than a country constantly 
moving towards the developments recommended and aided by WTO accession and 
membership. Reforms are carried out against a back cloth of conservative influences 
and interest group resistance that more often than not changes the intent and outcomes 
of the actual reform implementation. However, the success of this resistance against 
WTO led reforms is usually buried beneath a surface impression of change, reform, 
development and compliance. Beneath this cloak of compliance lies an embedded 
refusal to change and results in economic growth without sustainable development and 
an economy beset by debt, mismanagement and central central control based not upon a 
logical and structured ideology (whether communist or capitalist), but an almost 
irrepressible desire for Communist Party survival at all costs. 
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The original hypothesis was a simplistic belief in the WTO as an accelerator and 
structural supporter of reform, providing the tools to assist in the macroeconomic 
development and the opening up of Vietnam to the global economy. Vietnam entered 
into WTO accession in order to improve their dynamic competitiveness and competitive 
advantages, through opening up to the market system and participation in the global 
economy. The WTO was clearly seen in Vietnam as an entrance doorway into a ‘free 
market’ system. As Chi Lan (interview, 2012) said, “the general understanding was that 
Vietnam had moved away from the command system and decision-makers here saw 
WTO entry and further ‘free market’ reform as one and the same thing”. Little was 
actually understood about free market or market economy doctrines and more often than 
not the concepts were conflated by decision-makers and politicians. By the beginning of 
the new century the CPV realized that multilateralism and bilateral participation in the 
global economy was necessary to accelerate and structure domestic reform, and the 
WTO was seen as the gateway into this system, with membership a recognition that 
Vietnam was ready and able to accept its’ doctrines.  
 
However, for the Party the benefits of WTO entry were a logical and positive 
prospect that they believed would provide the necessary development and advantages 
that would safeguard their own dominance of the political system. Compliance was 
something they believed could be controlled by the Party and where it challenged their 
authority (such as with a developing private sector, promotion of the ‘rule of law’ 
principle or independence of the financial system) they had the tools to direct and shape 
its impacts to a point where they remained its chief beneficiaries. The outcomes are very 
different, with non-compliance being the main strategy and deliberate undermining of 
the reforms engendered by WTO accession resulting in little change to the way the 
political system dominates the economy and virtually all sectors are chiefly directed 
through a central control, challenged only when a domestic interest group of wealthy 
elites interests are negatively affected, because they hold both the political and 
economic ascendency to overturn those decisions. 
 
Bilateral reform (such as the US-BTA) and multilateral reform (such as the 
WTO) enabled Vietnam to lessen the influence of protectionism and gain access to 
foreign capital, technology and new markets. The WTO membership presented Vietnam 
with an opportunity to achieve four main benefits: 
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1. WTO accession as a means to accelerate and lock-in domestic reforms. 
WTO strengthened domestic policies and institutions through reforms of 
laws and regulations; 
2. The changes in economic policies and institutions that often accompany 
WTO accession also increase the credibility of governments in the eyes of 
the international business community; 
3. Membership improved the access to major export markets; and 
4. Vietnam now has access to a global disputes mechanism for trade policy 
conflicts. 
 
The WTO is a global network offering its members a mechanism to reform their 
domestic economy and use it as a template for reforms to accelerate and sustain 
economic development (Weimann et al, 2006). Entrance into the WTO was a means to 
concentrate reforms on ‘long-term goals, which are industrialisation, modernisation and 
poverty reduction’ (Doanh, 2007). By 2000 it was realised that reforms were not 
keeping pace with economic development (Thanh, 2005). The government used WTO 
accession to lock-in internal reforms, to increase internal political support from export-
oriented sectors, and to send a signal of stability and compromise with economic 
liberalization to international markets and foreign (Olivie and Steinberg, 2011). By 
setting targets that reflected international standards in economic performance and 
participation in the global economy, the WTO provided the impetus, guidelines and 
knowledge the Vietnamese needed to develop their openness to the global economy. 
 
WTO accession accelerated reforms and encouraged transparency and 
accountability and reform of institutions. Yet, the process has been one of fragmented 
reforms, with no consistency and piecemeal in application, resulting in, for example, 
institutions still being dominated by a ‘legacy of central planning’ and often functioning 
badly because they are ‘missing, poorly formed, or incomplete’ (WB, 2012, p.19). In 
conjunction with this has been a decline in the Governments’ effectiveness, with both 
policy formation and application falling below required standards (WB, 2012). 
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Export growth, increased FDI and new supports and mechanisms for 
industrialisation were a direct consequence of WTO accession and membership. A 
primary responsibility of membership was the need to continue to improve the 
economy, firms and products, to strengthen economic and social institutions and ensure 
economic stability. In return, Vietnam was expected ‘to fulfil the sets of laws and 
commitments to non-discrimination, tariff reductions, open markets, intellectual 
property rights, regulations on law and social commitments’ (Doanh, 2007). 
 
Central to understanding the domestic economic conditions structuring the WTO 
accession and membership is the political framework of Vietnam, which is based on the 
one Party rule of the Communists. The Party provides political stability and 
incorporates different forms of ‘democratic’ debate within its structures to gain 
legitimacy. However, the WTO process has eventually challenged that legitimacy. One 
Party rule in a ‘free market with socialist orientation’ is now a concept challenged by 
the accelerating problems of debt and economic crisis. Yet all interviewees, despite 
many critical views, believed that one-Party Communist rule remains the optimum 
solution to present and future problems. This is due to a faith in the ideology and a 
commitment to the continued legitimacy of the Party. The interview respondents felt 
strongly that the immediate situation required political stability and, that the Party was 
in the strongest position to provide that, alongside long-term plans to improve the 
political infra-structure and the democratisation of the Party system. McGough 
(interview, 2012) says ‘Vietnamese believe the WTO was created as a vehicle for US 
hegemony in trade, providing a support for its political aspirations and regime shaping 
principles. The victory of capitalism in the Cold War accelerated its intent as a means to 
shape the global economy in ‘its own image’ and although ruled by consensus, WTO 
membership is dependent on aligning to principles that basically reject the conflation of 
politics and economics. But Communists in Vietnam believed they could retain the 
ideological foundations of the politics and still play a part in a global ‘free trade’ 
regime’.180 However, McGough (interview, 2012) also identified a contradiction in this 
as ‘the Vietnamese also felt the US-BTA was a very strong vehicle for American trade 
                                                
180 For further discussion of this see Chomsky N (1997) The Passion for Free Markets, 
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199705--.htm 
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power over Vietnam, and the WTO appeared as a softer alternative through which to 
manage trade relations with the US’. 
 
In the thesis case studies of agriculture, banking and textiles there is clear 
evidence of success in integrating into the regional and global economy and domestic 
improvement of socio-economic infrastructures and institutions. However, national 
competitiveness has not been improved; institutions have reformed, but maintain an 
unsuitable administrative framework for socio-economic development; sectors have 
developed but still rely on an abundance of low cost labour and resources, with little 
improvement of levels of added value in the distribution chain. Transfer of technology 
has been inadequate and there is a consistent problem with productivity. These are not 
the most critical problems. A failure to adequately reform the SOE sector has led to a 
Banking crisis, with debt at unsustainable levels. There remains a problem with 
corruption at all levels of business and government, which threatens the authority of the 
Communist Party (Wiemann et al, 2006). 
 
8.1.1 Vietnam and Compliance with International Agreements 
 
Vietnam has successfully entered into a number of international agreements and 
membership of major international organisations, but the entry and actual positive, 
transparent and active participation are questionable. While overtly a member pursuing 
compliance, Vietnam has domestically avoided its commitments, illustrated for 
example, by the increasing number of anti-dumping cases. 
 
 Vietnam’s membership of ASEAN reached a pinnacle when it hosted numerous 
summit and ministerial meetings of ASEAN in 2010. As an ASEAN member it was 
encouraged to then join AFTA, APEC and the WTO. In assessing the success of 
Vietnam’s commitments to international/regional integration, one needs to examine the 
domestic objectives in joining. Whether the WTO, ASEAN, APEC, etc, Vietnam has 
sought trade agreements as an avenue into larger markets. They have aimed to increase 
their multilateral bargaining powers. Through reciprocal concessions on trade barriers 
the opportunities for economic growth through trade liberalisation has clearly been 
achieved. Security arrangements in the agreements have helped improve Vietnam’s 
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position in such matters as the South Asian Seas disputes. Vietnam also improved its 
place in the international community, while its external trade relations are sufficiently 
improved to the point where Vietnam is now taking a strong role in the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) between the US and 11 Pacific Rim nations. However, even the TPP 
is negatively affected by Vietnam’s relatively poor levels of domestic reforms. Chief 
concern for the US is that Vietnam’s domestic reforms of SOEs lags far behind an 
acceptable standard, and the continued levels of protection is far below an acceptable 
level for US negotiators (Fergusson et al, 2013, p.21). Clearly, the external approach of 
Vietnam to international agreements has involved more interaction, cooperation and 
compliance, but these actions need to be supported by domestic reform that illustrates a 
far deeper sense of change from within. The position of SOE’s in relation to the TPP 
demonstrates that lack of real domestic reform will eventually, negate any levels of 
international progress, and at worst, present Vietnam with outcomes that leave it 
seriously disadvantaged in international trade agreements.  
 
8.1.2 Vietnam Crisis: The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Poorer 
 
The WTO has led to improvements in markets and in foreign direct investment, 
which has helped transform the country into middle-income status. Economic growth 
has brought impressive GDP growth. But Vietnam is a classic example of how the 
benefits of this can be misappropriated and the lack of sustainable development lead to a 
worsening situation for the majority of people. Tung (2013, p.1) notes how horizontal 
growth based on ‘cheap labour, capital land and low technology’ leads to a ‘growth 
trap’ or ‘middle-income trap’. Vietnam has in reality become locked into a groove of 
horizontal growth. Vertical growth, with ‘increased productivity of labour through 
improved qualifications of workers, application of advanced science and technology, 
organisational and production management reforms... efficient use of materials and 
natural resources... environmental protection’ is essential to achieving ‘real’ growth. In 
all aspects of vertical growth Vietnam is deficient. 
 
The horizontal model accrues the main benefits to a ‘small number of upper 
class people’ (Tung, 2013, p.2). The vast majority of the population are by-passed by 
development. Essential services increase prices beyond the poor’s affordability with 
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regular above inflation increases. Education and health costs are increasingly taking a 
large portion of many households income. Unemployment benefits (for the very few 
who can successfully complete the procedures to access the benefits- aggravated by the 
fact that the most poor are the least educated) are low, providing very little support for 
an individual and virtually worthless aid to the family. Reform of SOEs often 
concentrates on divesting labour, and this is aggravated by a decline in the seasonal and 
temporary jobs available to rural workers supplementing income through occasional 
work in the cities (Vietnam News, 2011). The levels of social safety nets, especially in 
concern to unemployment, are at best inadequate, and more often than not, inaccessible, 
creating a society with a growing divide between the ‘haves and have not’s. 
 
A common mistake in understanding communism in Vietnam is to believe that 
the social and welfare systems are a priority and support for the poor is credible. Health 
and education are costly at even the lowest levels. Speed or quality of service is 
dependent purely on how much can be paid, and often payments made in ‘envelopes’ 
and the ‘envelope culture’ is a way to access any form of effective health or education 
service. The prospects for the poor to improve their situation are low, with skilled 
workers only accounting for 13.3% of the population and only 200 students per 10,000 
people and only 6% of the population having a degree or college qualification. There is 
little development of the situation and where it does occur then corruption soon limits 
its potential changes (Tung, 2013, p.1).  
 
Reform has concentrated on horizontal growth and WTO entry has helped 
improve the rewards of this strategy. The WTO support and enhancement of vertical 
growth strategies was hoped to encourage the Party and Government to improve its 
workforce, encourage management reform, develop institutions and regulations and 
promote sustainable development. The present failures in all areas may be a result of 
non-compliance and refusals to carry out real domestic reforms in the economic and 
social infrastructures. The State has welcomed the benefits, while ignoring the 
responsibilities and the result is a prime example of economic growth without 
sustainable development. 
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8.2 WTO influence on economic reform 
 
The slowdown in reforms prior to the WTO accession resulted in a growing 
demand for change. WTO accession provided a new pressure for reform, with the 
process of accession setting new guidelines, standards and objectives for economic 
development. The subsequent benefits from the reforms also changed the balance of 
interest groups. The interest groups that benefited, such as in the private and export 
sectors, found that the WTO accession provided them new legitimacy and powers; and 
increased their dominance over the conservative elements that opposed the movement 
towards a market economy. The accession process also enhanced the need for legal and 
institutional reform, with sweeping changes needed in order to meet the requirements of 
future membership of the WTO. The clearest statement of assenting to participate in 
accession was that the centrally planned economy model had failed and that 
Communism needed to move towards acceptance of the market economy as the only 
way to achieve further economic growth. Before this point the conservatives were the 
dominant force and reformers needed a mechanism and aspiration for restructuring the 
economy. WTO accession marked a point when reformers finally overcame the 
conservative ascendancy in economic planning. It also helped accelerate reforms and 
provided clear means to overcome many of the structural problems in the economy.  
 
Changes in the Vietnam economy are clearly evident since accession and 
membership. Trade policy has reformed with commitments to reform in both 
manufacturing and service industries. Removals of quotas and trading licenses, 
improvements in custom valuations and procedures and significant reforms of the legal 
framework, provided vital improvements to the general economy. Institutional reforms, 
such as the delegation of greater powers to provincial levels of economic decision-
making, enhanced the efficiency of the system to take advantage of new opportunities in 
the global economy. 
 
The WTO accession provided each case study sector with the right tools for 
development. New markets helped agriculture achieve dramatic success in export 
growth and food security. Accession saw quota limitations removed, trading rights 
liberalised and directed non-tariff policies towards international standards.  Institutions 
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were reformed to create a level playing field for all stakeholders. In the WTO process, 
the movement from not being able to provide sufficient food for its population to being 
the leading rice exporter in the world was enhanced. Improvements continued in 2012 
with 4% growth, it accounts for 22% of GDP, 30% of the country’s exports and 52% of 
the country’s employment. Through improvements in technology, irrigation, investment 
incentives and better land use strategies, the agricultural sector has become far more 
competitive (FSP, 2012). The growth in agricultural exports and the importance of this 
to the national economy provided agriculture with increased levels of influence over 
economic decision-making. More attention was paid by the Government to the concerns 
of the farmers and resulted in more friendly policies towards agriculture. 
 
The banking sector has seen chartered capital increase; Banks provide more 
services and options for customers and developed a market-oriented system. 
Institutional reforms accelerated; independence of the banking system improved; state 
banks were restructured; governance improved and the Government addressed market 
distortions caused by policy lending; bank supervision and accountability legislation 
was reformed; forex rate management was changed to react to market signals and the 
legal platforms for banking payment and non-cash payment were developed. The money 
market complied with international practices and reforms have enhanced Banks 
financial capacities, management and banking systems, and the success has encouraged 
the enthusiasm for further reforms. 
 
The T&G industry has probably gained most from WTO led reform. The 
industry has actively joined in international economic integration and become a major 
exporting sector, accumulating capital and foreign currency for national industrialisation 
and modernisation. Because of WTO pressure to reform trade policy towards a more 
neutral regime, the competitive advantages of the textile industry forced the 
Government to provide it with more resources for development. With improved access 
to global markets, the Vietnamese textile industry found itself with ideal external 
conditions for expansion and its economic performance has become a mainstay of the 
Vietnam economy and proved its advantages and economic strength. 
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Joining the WTO has advantages for developing countries. Market access is a 
primary objective but the WTO process also gives gains with ‘the transparency, stability 
and security of these market conditions’ (Catteneo and Braga 2009, p.3). WTO 
membership means reductions in the cost of trade negotiations. Domestically, the 
necessary reforms result in ‘larger, more secure and predictable access to markets 
(Catteneo and Braga, 2009, p.6). It protects business against abusive state interferences 
and is an anchor for domestic regulatory and administrative reform. 
 
On average it takes five years for accession. In the case of Vietnam it took 
twelve years. Past accessions show that the smaller the country and the more liberal the 
regime the quicker the accession process (Turksen and Nguyen, 2012). Vietnam slowly 
progressed through the accession process, but there were clear signs that the WTO help 
was needed. Domestically, the CPV was facing difficulties and WTO membership was a 
mechanism for solving the problems. It offered integration into international markets 
and the guidance on law and institutional change was believed a possible answer to the 
growing corruption of cadres and public servants who were by 2003 now seen as largely 
‘ill-disciplined, corrupt and inefficient’ (Fforde, 2004). As Thanh (interview, 2011) says 
“Vietnam entry into the WTO provided the access to new markets and the incentives to 
carry out further reforms. Out of the pressure for increased competitiveness and 
improvement in systems, institutions, productivity and management, there was 
significant changes that contributed to impressive economic growth. The WTO 
membership was the initiator for these reforms and development was carried out with a 
Vietnamese perception of what the WTO required.” 
 
In assessing the relationship between the WTO and Vietnam the essential factor 
is how non-compliance is addressed by the WTO. In the first place, any dispute is 
initially handled through the Dispute Settlement System. The Director General of the 
WTO in 1997 said that the system was ‘the most individual contribution to the stability 
of the global economy...which provides security and predictability to the multi-lateral 
trading system’ (Ali, 2003, p.2). Any issue of non-compliance is initially dealt with via 
the WTO requesting the member ‘bring the measure into conformity’. The member can 
end the dispute by offering compensation. If compensation is inadequate or rejected, the 
member asking for address of a problem can request counter-measures, including 
economic sanctions. Counter-measures are restricted to a level ‘equivalent to the level 
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of nullification or impairment’ (Ali, 2003, p.9). The reality is that a country bringing 
forth the dispute and ‘winning’ the case ‘has little or no option to ensure that the injury 
caused is reversed, compensated or even prevented from re-occurring in the future’ (Ali, 
2003, p.11).  
 
However, non-compliance is generally addressed through a dispute system 
designed to settle issues between members. It is not predicated on forcing members to 
carry out essential domestic reforms. The clear logic is that there is an assumption that 
States will support their international strategy with the necessary domestic reforms, 
especially when not reforming is obviously going to damage their own economy. 
 
The US has raised numerous concerns about Vietnam non-compliance, including 
anti-dumping cases, issues with Single Distribution Restrictions, violation of WTO and 
BTA commitments, weakening of retailing services commitments, the lack of publically 
available procedures in services and very poor guidelines on Economic Needs Tests 
(Amcham, 2013). Yet, the complaints are indications of accusations of international 
non-compliance which is fairly insignificant compared to the levels of domestic non-
compliance. By not reforming SOE’s, enforcing essential regulations allowing new 
institutions to operate effectively and developing improved infrastructures, such as 
transport, health and education, Vietnam creates weaknesses in its own competitiveness 
against other WTO members, and leaves other members little reason to complain about 
a fellow members economic ‘suicide’. However, the overspill from any major decline in 
Vietnam’s economic, social and security stability will lead to destabilisation of the 
region and affect global security problems such as the South China Sea disputes. It will 
place a country centrally positioned in the Asian economy in an unstable economic 
crisis that could seriously affect a region that has so far escaped the main affects of the 
global financial crisis. Large foreign investments made into Vietnam would be 
endangered and default on international loans is not just possible, but has already 
occurred in the case of VINASHIN, a crisis originating from default on a $600 million 
international loan. Nguyen Quang A, head of the only independent think tank declared 
‘Vietnam is dancing on a razor blade’ (Hookway and Tudor, 2010, p.1). 
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The problem for the WTO is that Vietnam’s crisis is an internal affairs created 
by the Party and Government and fuelled by the individualist self-interests of an elite 
interest group. Yet, the consequences may be heading towards creating an international 
crisis for the global economy. The crisis is a result of Vietnam’s failures to abide by the 
recommendations and commitments to the WTO. Yet, the WTO has few procedures to 
censure, control or remedy such domestic failures of a member to avoid a ‘crisis of its 
own making’. 
 
In examining the impact of the WTO we can see progress in institutions, reforms 
in business and overall economic growth. However, a better evaluation can be made by 
looking at specific problems prior to membership and the degree to which accession 
helped provide solutions. Although the impact of the WTO on Vietnam is clear and 
measurable the core problems of corruption remain; there remains an SOE refusal to 
reform/restructure and the Communist Party’s governance is increasingly challenged. 
 
We can also make a comparison here with China, and in doing so find that 
Vietnam’s performance in the process of WTO led reform, and the subsequent 
outcomes falls far below the standards of China. With similar political systems, many of 
the same problems and challenges, the present levels of each country means that 
Vietnam’s record of achievement and development, set against China, is one of failure.  
 
8.2.1 Comparisons with China 
 
 An essential point in assessing the Vietnam performance in the WTO accession 
process is that Vietnam, on balance, can clearly be seen as an overall failure, while 
China continues to progress towards even greater economic success. Whereas 
Vietnamese banks are burdened by unsustainable levels of debt, the Chinese Banking 
system flourishes. Vietnam SOEs are still mis-managed, inefficient, lack any real 
competitive edge and, while they dominate economic sectors, they have failed to use 
this advantage beyond being able to divert their funds and profits into the pockets of 
elite individuals. 
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 The results of this are an impending crisis of levels never experienced before 
and the reasons for this are now much clearer, emphasised by the contrasts that can be 
made between Vietnam and China. The comparison demonstrates Vietnam’s faults and 
the Government’s inability to successfully manage the economy, or look beyond a 
fixation on their own survival, regardless of the costs to the Vietnam economy or 
society. Chinese leaders focused on policies to encourage banks to manage risk and 
improve genuine profitability, which also led to giving preference to the privatised 
sector, rather than risky lending to SOEs (Naughton, 2007, p.288-289). In contrast, 
Vietnam banks became virtually reliant on lending to SOEs, increased by Government 
pressure and coercion to make highly risky loans. This has been recently aggravated by 
direct instructions from the Government for banks not to demand repayment, regardless 
of the impact this will have on the Banks financial future. While China imposed market 
discipline on its state-owned firms and forced through sweeping reforms on the SOE 
sector, Vietnam made mostly ‘cosmetic’ reforms and created a debt-laden banking 
sector, further complicated by a lack of regulation, even less transparency and a system 
of cross-shareholding that has left banks hostage to the economic mismanagement of the 
CPV and the financial whims of the SOEs. 
 
 In Agriculture, China reduced the role of collective organisations and allowed 
farmers the independence to achieve higher profitability, competitiveness and 
productivity (Naughton, 2007, p.90). Although Vietnam farmers have increased 
productivity, they remain at subsistence levels, denied much of the extra profits gained 
from increased market access. China’s agricultural sector is successfully moving 
towards higher value crops and developing the required sophisticated infrastructure, 
while Vietnam’s farmers chiefly remain locked into an agricultural existence more 
suited to a bygone age. Farmers are denied access to advanced horticultural education, 
limited to only small holding farming, cut-off from the direct channels to their 
prospective markets and barred from amalgamating into any cohesive and effective 
political force for change. 
 
 In the textile industry Vietnam’s chief competitor for exports remains China, as 
they retain many of their competitive advantages over Vietnam. Despite both enjoying 
advantages borne from trade liberalisation undertaken through WTO accession and 
membership, China retains cost structure advantages over Vietnam in “sector, size, 
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orientation and ownership types” (Tuyet, et al, 2007, p.22). Chinese firms are more 
profitable and competitive. In comparative terms, Vietnam’s workers are less skilled, 
the infrastructure and supply chain is under-developed, there is an uncertain investment 
climate and foreign companies find challenges such as confusing and non-transparent 
regulatory and financial procedures (Zhao, 2011, p.1). 
 
 Vietnam’s textile and garment industry totalled $15.8 billion in exports in 2011, 
with record growth each year. But the main challenge is the subsequent cost of imports, 
with raw materials for T&G firms increasing to $9.3 billion in 2011 and demonstrating 
a worrying challenge to the industry. Alongside poor management capacities, high costs 
of imported machinery and technology and weak and inefficient marketing strategies, 
Vietnam’s T&G is likely to remain at a major disadvantage to China, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and India (Textile World, 2012) 
 
 Corruption still besets both the CCP and the CPV’s drive towards development. 
However, the CCP would have seemed to have made more concerted efforts to combat 
it. As with Vietnam, the major difficulty is enforcement, rather than any lack of 
regulations. The deterioration of Government prestige incurred from the growth of 
popular disillusionment with the lack of governance capacities to reduce corruption is 
countered in China by quicker, more open and more effective and public punishment of 
offenders. Yet, as the thesis has argued here, the chief threat to communism would not 
appear to be democracy, but instead, the development of an elite dictatorship. As Pei (as 
cited in Li, 2008, p.247) declares, a “resulting democracy could easily fall under the 
control of its own oligarchs, whose illicitly acquired wealth could accord them great 
resources to manipulate an infant democratic system”. 
 
 There are many advantages the Chinese have over Vietnam that accounts for 
their greater success in participating in WTO accession and membership. They joined 
ten years earlier than Vietnam and possess far more advantages in geographic scale, 
economic and historic features. Decentralisation of economic management to the 
Provinces has been far more effective and successful with effective strategies in 
developing special economic zones, which were created quickly, effectively and with 
more cooperation between the Central Party and the provincial authorities (An and Duc, 
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2010). Yet, in relative terms, Vietnam has clearly not taken full advantage of what 
benefits they did have in joining the WTO, simply illustrated by China being financially 
stable, while Vietnam is virtually bankrupt. This thesis has shown that this has not been 
because of faults in the WTO, but because of failures to genuinely carry out wholesale 
domestic reforms in a credible and effective way.  
 
 Vietnam and China’s record on GDP growth is equally impressive. However, 
An and Duc (2010, p.10) declare that “fast economic growth does not mean sustainable 
growth”. Vietnam has strongly justified the analysis of the compatibility between 
economic growth and development. The thesis has found numerous illustrations of 
growth leading to great individual wealth creation, vast improvements in markets for 
many sectors, export trade dominated development and high levels of GDP growth over 
the past two decades. Yet, as shown with the comparisons with China, Vietnam has 
failed to deliver the necessary improvements in productivity and competitiveness. Its 
SOE’s remain mistakenly dominant, even oligarchic, but continue to fail to improve 
efficiency, management, productivity or competiveness, while also deliberately stifling 
the development of the private sector. The banking sector remains hostage to 
Government directed reliance on debt laden business with the SOE’s, who in turn gain 
even greater control over the Banks decision-making processes through increased 
crossed-shareholdings. Institutions and the regulatory system are weakened by non-
enforcement, compounded by a lack of capacities to successfully censure corruption 
when cases are carried through to arrests. As when shown in the quest for gathering 
information for this thesis, official data is corrupted either by manipulation or incapacity 
within the system to collect and correctly analyse it. Major economic and political 
decisions are being made upon the results of analysis of the economic situation accrued 
from various vital data sources. Yet, these essential decisions are often decided on 
‘facts’ that bear no relation to the real situation. As for example in the data for debt ratio 
to GDP, which officially stands at a safe level but is more accurately calculated as being 
at a dangerously critical level. 
 
 Officially, GDP in 2011 sank to 5.9% and even lower in 2012 at 5.2%. In 
examining Vietnam’s GDP growth since 1990, a rollercoaster pattern is identified, with 
it peaking in 1995 at 9.5% and then falling to 4.8% in 1999, than rising again to 8.5% in 
2007. Sustained economic growth came in the 1990’s and its fall following the Asian 
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Crisis saw Vietnam turn to WTO accession as an answer to the crisis. This led to 
another rise in GDP with the induced trade liberalisations greatly assisting in bringing 
the benefits of more exports, markets, profits and investments. But the latest declines 
not only shows that the WTO membership is not a panacea for all economic failures, but 
also demonstrates that trade and market improvements must also be accompanied by 
real improvements in economic infrastructures and sustainable development (WB, 
2012). Excessive reliance on factor accumulation has produced cosmetic displays of 
growth that have pushed Vietnam to a middle-income status, but left much of the 
economic infrastructure in a less-developed status. The GDP growth is real, but its final 
destination has not been effective improvements in the economy and society. Instead, its 
main financial rewards have been accumulated by an elite oligarch that now controls 
many major sectors. GDP growth, FDI investment levels, statistics on SOE equitisation, 
the issuances of numerous new regulations and the establishment of new institutions 
have been attributed to some degree to WTO accession and membership. Yet, their 
value is brought into question by the levels of debt to GDP, the increasing poverty gap 
and insufficiency in education, transportation and health sectors that indicate declines in 
the infrastructure and obsoletism rather than development. GDP has been used as a 
cloak for the failures in actually dealing with the core problems in the economy. It is 
probable that even extremely low or negative statistics in GDP would force any real 
change of direction, but by that time the damage may be irreparable. In predicting the 
levels of danger now evident, one needs to examine what type of economic model 
Vietnam is following and the role the new ‘elite interest group’ has to play in this.  
 
8.2.2 Vietnam’s ‘East Asian Miracle’ and the role of special interest groups 
 
 In examining the impact of external forces such as the WTO, ASEAN or the US-
BTA, the major difficulty is that it soon becomes clear that the Party and Government 
have dominantly focused on domestic influences, interests and outcomes. Interviews181 
showed a political and economic situation that understood little about the commitments, 
responsibilities, influences and outcomes that would ensue from participation in 
international agreements. Such lacks in the capacities of the bureaucratic administration, 
                                                
181 Such as Chi Lan, 2012; Thanh, 2012; Thai, 2012; Nghia, 2011; Khanh, 2012. 
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diplomacy and economic reform meant that alignment of policy and strategies with any 
well-defined, logical and planned East Asian economic ‘model’ is impossible. Vietnam 
has been dominated by its reactive governance, which is based upon the Communist 
Party passion to retain power. This governance acts as a major distortion of the 
domestic markets and economy and enslaves the private sector to a State system that 
maintains political central control over all aspects of business and society. Whilst 
advocating a path to free market economics, the single Party system of Vietnam 
maintains its past control of the economy and results in reforms being merely surface 
compliances to commitments. 
 
 An example here is the role of the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) and their 
growing (not declining as officially declared and regulated) corporate interests in the 
economy. Those corporate interests are actually illegal as the Army is directed to 
control corporate interests related solely to national defence and security, and are 
directly in contradiction of Party ‘policy’. The VPA is probably the largest and most 
powerful ‘voice’ in the Vietnamese economy. Their main corporation-Viettel Telecom, 
alongside nine other major SOEs, including the Military Bank and over 200 other 
companies in every sector of the economy, dominate the markets. Viettel revenue in 
2012 was over $7 billion and is growing at 20% per year. The VPA owned Saigon 
Newport Corporation controls over 46% of all container freight business (Nhung, 2013). 
 
 The military economic and commercial interests “directly clash with the 
imperatives of global economic integration when Vietnam became a member of the 
WTO” (Thayer, 2012, p.1). This non-compliance not only continues, but increases 
rapidly each year as the Army advantages in land ownership, political connections and 
monopoly over resources continues to crowd out all private competitors. Yet, there is an 
error in accusing the Party of being the ‘winners’ in this strategy of oligarchic 
economics. Although the Party ‘survive’, the prime victor in this model of a 
‘Vietnamese economic miracle’ is the elite interest group. 
 
 To further understand this ‘elite interest group’ one needs to examine the 
Vietnam culture and the subsequent dangers within it of individualism. The elite interest 
group remains chiefly a group with little of the overarching formal organisation and 
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coordination of a traditional interest group. Although there are growing rumours that a 
formal ‘group’ or ‘party’ is developing ‘behind the scenes’. Their ‘common’ interests 
are their own individualism and the independent wealth creation. Individualism itself 
has a particularly negative connotation in Vietnam culture and Ho Chi Minh declared 
‘individualism is the cause of red tape, bossiness, factionalism, subjectivism, corruption 
and wastefulness. Individualism is a brutal enemy’ (CPV, 2011). 
 
 The original focus of this thesis was the positive examination of how the WTO 
had affected the Vietnam economy and its political system. However, the thesis shows 
excessive levels of non-compliance disguised under a veil of enacted commitments that 
have proved ineffective through a wholesale lack of mechanisms to enforce them, and a 
deliberate intent on taking benefits, but ignoring responsibilities. 
 
 An equally disturbing finding is that reform itself has become a victim. Whilst 
GDP grows, markets expand, poverty is reduced and development seems to progress, 
the stark reality is that reform itself has to be questioned. Whilst now listed as a middle-
income country and subsequently seeming to have ‘developed’, Vietnam actually 
remains far from being a stable country or economy. London (2013, p.2) identifies a 
‘dysfunctional political system’, the ‘State harshly punishes calls for fundamental 
change’ as growth is ‘ruined’ by economic mismanagement ‘driven by a brand of 
interest-group politics whose main product is profligacy and waste’. Infrastructure 
bottlenecks, a lack of a skilled workforce and the continual focus on secrecy, rather than 
transparency has ended with a system where ‘state power is too often used by elites for 
elites and their associates’ (London, 2013, p.2). 
 
 Reform in Vietnam was planned through a gradualist transition strategy (Tho, 
2013). This usually involves three phases: The non-state sector is promoted, with its 
development slowly replacing the economic dominance of the SOEs. Then SOEs are 
reformed and made to be more efficient and competitive, at which point the 
privatisation of SOE’s becomes the third phase (Tho, 2013). 
 
 In Vietnam, the non-SOE sector has been deliberately suppressed. In the Textile 
industry, even FDI companies are dependent in some aspect on ‘relationships’ with 
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officials and business leaders connected to the State sector. In banking, the State Banks 
depend on their profits coming mainly from loans to the SOEs, while in Agriculture, the 
SOEs dominate the ‘private’ producers by enforcing a middle management ‘wall’ 
between the producers and the ‘buyers’. A barrier that sweeps up all and any benefits 
that accrue from access to the global markets, while ensuring a subsistence environment 
onto the producers/farmers, which then leaves they remain economically and politically 
ineffective. The treatment of farmers and agricultural producers shows how political and 
economic strategies are entwined to make the ‘status quo’ remains at one level, while 
the rewards of reform and globalisation are given to one elite interest group. The 
outcome is declared by Cain (2012, p.2) as a “Vietnam... a country struggling with a 
weak currency, inflation, red tape and cronyism that has led to billions of dollars of 
waste’. A ‘waste’ that should have been directed into restructuring the economic 
infrastructure and investing in the future of the economy. The failure to do so means the 
economy will not have the skilled workers its needs to survive, that the infrastructure, 
such as in the transport system will remain obsolete, under-developed and under- 
invested, and that debts will cripple the financial system for decades to come. 
 
8.3 Political and Economic update: Dangers and problems 
 
In evaluating the impact of the WTO the present impending crisis can be linked 
to how the positive aspect of reforms were possibly undermined by a failure to address 
political and economic structural faults. By 2004, Fforde (2005, p.146) noted that the 
‘situation in the country continues to deteriorate’. A ‘crisis of authority’ was clear and 
the Communist Party was faced with a human resource predicament (a lack of skills and 
knowledge and an educational and vocational training system plagued by corruption and 
unwilling to confront its low quality problems); the excessive bureaucracy and its 
‘desire to control business (and secure bribes)’ (Fforde, 2005, p.147) and the ‘leakages 
in the flows of government funds’ (Fforde, 2005). Even though numerous reforms had 
taken place, it was clear that no ‘fundamental change’ had taken place (Fforde, 2005, 
p.147). The involvement in the decline of moral and principled governance was clear 
with ‘resource allocations… made outside formal state channels’ through ‘horse-trading 
between corrupt officials’ (Fforde, 2005, p.150). 
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By 2005 the debt crisis was beginning to climb towards its present levels, with 
SOEs diverting their Government directed loans into priming the real estate market; at 
the expense of using the capital to reform production, management and mechanisation. 
Individuals used SOE banks loans as their own personal funds for private venture 
capitalism. Meanwhile, reductions in the poverty rate concealed the growing gap 
between the rich and poor. The increasing gap was compounded by the rising costs of 
education and health care (Luong, 2006). 
 
In 2006, economic growth and stronger global integration continued (Luong, 
2007). But inflation, labour unrest and corruption continued to undermine the successes. 
Concerted efforts were made by the CPV to ‘make bureaucracy more accountable and 
to tackle corruption and abuse of power’ but despite high profile trials, the reality was 
still an inability to prevent or punish many of the ‘crimes’ (Luong, 2007). 
 
By 2007, as export growth and liberalisation pushed Vietnam to ever higher 
points of success, the infra-structure supporting it (power, water supply, transportation 
and lack of skilled workers) demonstrated that the Party had been unable to adequately 
fulfil the necessary demands of the economy and failed to prevent politically aligned 
individuals gaining vast personal wealth and immediate returns, while the structures and 
long term planning needed to maintain economic growth were given almost no attention 
(Han, 2008). Chi Lan (interview, 2012) noted, ‘An evaluation of the WTO ‘venture’ has 
to now consider to what extent the Vietnamese economy and political structure was 
‘ready’ for such a demanding process. The reality was that surface changes were not 
supported by deep innovation and reform in the structures and supporting mechanisms 
of the economy. Dramatic changes were made for instance in the institutions and laws, 
but the systems and capacities to enforce the changes were not altered and subsequently, 
some of those reforms have become burdens rather than improvements’.   
 
By 2008, the buds of the present crisis were firmly taking hold. High inflation, 
economic slowdown, falls in GDP, widening trade deficits and governance that 
reflected ‘faulty policies and institutional shortcomings’ were aggravated by a growing 
global financial crisis (Han, 2009, p.187). By 2009 the economic crisis in Vietnam was 
firmly taking root; FDI was declining and the beginnings of an explosion in capital 
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flight were pointing to the long-term erosion of the benefits of WTO accession and 
membership (Amer, 2010). 
 
Although membership was achieved in 2007 and the pressure for the reforms of 
the accession process diminished, the demands of now being fully part of the global 
economy, alongside the identification as a non-market economy member, maintained a 
pressure to move into yet further levels of change, in order to meet the new demands on 
the economy. It was not the case that on membership the reform process slowed down; 
because problems that impaired the economy’s’ competitiveness, such as the capacity 
problems in management and administration, maintained a pressure to reform. 
Membership now highlighted many of the weaknesses in the economy and maintained 
the pressure for renovation and restructuring. The responsibilities of membership acted 
as a direct force on the Government to bring in significant improvements, in order to 
maintain the advantages achieved throughout the accession process. In accession, the 
need for change was clear, and mainly structured by the external demands of the WTO 
process. Now in membership, the leverage for reform is internal, with the Government 
and Party realising that many of the structural problems, such as SOE reform and 
governing capacity, must be addressed as primary priorities. Although one must also 
realise that Non-Market Economy Status for Vietnam to some degree maintains an 
accession mindset, and directly denotes that Vietnam has yet to achieve through reform 
the required standards for listing as a market economy.  
 
A disturbing picture was being revealed that indicated that the Party was facing 
difficulties in governance. There were numerous cases where various means were being 
found to deliberately countermand or ignore new laws and regulations. An example is 
‘Official Letters’ issued by local government agencies in the process of applications for 
the issuance of investment certificates. These are used to limit foreign shareholdings of 
companies but are ‘not stipulated in law’ and indicate a ‘new legal regime’ driven by 
administrative documents in contradiction to legislation (law directly designed to 
address WTO standards on market entry). These ‘official’ letters are widely used, but 
the Government declared they are not ‘valid’ and ‘don’t exist’ (Turksen and Nguyen, 
2012). Turksen and Nguyen (2012) point out that this ‘is a matter of transparency… the 
current misuse and publicity of official letters by state authorities can be considered an 
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act of non-compliance to WTO commitments’ while also an example of the endemic 
corruption. 
 
There has been clear indications of a decline in the administration and 
management capacity of the state system. The failures are widespread and go far beyond 
just a failure to deal with the corruption. In addition to this is the lack of capacity of 
personnel in both the Government and in SOEs. The capacity problems exist not only in 
the bureaucracy, but even at the high levels of the Government. Many decision-makers 
do not possess the knowledge, skills or experience in economics, politics and the varied 
demands of governing a nation in a modern, global economy. Their understanding of 
the complex and integrated policies and mechanisms necessary for economic survival in 
a fast paced world of modern global governance is limited. This has also resulted in 
clear signs of an inability to manage, monitor and evaluate correctly government 
performance, while also allowing detrimental forces a free hand to subvert and defraud 
the system. As McGough (2012) said “there isn’t just an ‘anti-WTO’ movement here, 
but, also an inability to fulfil obligations or maximise benefits due to failings in 
capacities of both business and government personnel”.  
 
8.4 Limits on WTO influence on domestic reforms 
 
WTO accession provided not only access to global markets but also the tools to 
be able to deal with the demands of the market economy. This included templates for 
legislative reform to international standards and the restructuring of the economic 
framework. Essential was long-term stability and real reform that involved genuine 
transformations of the centrally commanded system; into a market model that is 
designed to best manage a liberal economy run on a market liberalism philosophy. A 
market economy involves the unhindered balancing of supply and demand, with 
minimum intervention from government. Vietnam failed to do this and instead relied on 
factors that would not provide long-term economic security. The strongest elements for 
supporting the reforms of the WTO accession were short term and insufficient to 
maintain progress once the country moved from less developed to middle ranking 
status. 
 
 347 
Factor endowments have increased in Vietnam and the primary cause of 
economic growth has been factor accumulation. This has left Vietnam challenged by a 
need to improve the education and skills of its workforce, and a failure to adequately 
address the problem has left the country subject to macro-economic instability. Core 
consequence of this has been a failure to improve productivity, at a time when 
Vietnam’s participation in the global economy makes efficiency and competitiveness 
central needs for survival. But, declines in growth, FDI and productivity, alongside high 
inflation, indicates that Vietnam, despite WTO accession and membership has failed to 
address the problems root causes. 
 
The obligations to improve trading conditions, such as removal of tariff/non-
tariff barriers and the ending of the quota systems were largely fulfilled, but in areas 
such as institutional reform the record is not as successful. A level playing field with the 
right balance between SOEs and the private sector has not been achieved and the 
continued dominance in the economy of SOEs is causing numerous structural problems.  
Major aspect of government intervention into the economy was the maintenance of 
support for the SOEs. 
 
A primary focus of conversion from a controlled economy was the reform and 
restructuring of SOEs. Since the start of accession dramatic changes have appeared to 
occur, with SOEs reduced in overall numbers and claims that their power in the market 
has been greatly reduced. In fact, since 2008 there has been an increase in overall 
numbers and although gross numbers were used as a means to provide evidence 
throughout accession of SOE decline, the reality was that many were merged into State 
Owned Enterprise Groups. For example, VINASHIN accumulated 454 subsidiaries that 
were not required to change in any significant way and could continue in exactly the 
same way as before. The merging of subsidiaries into SOEGs required no changes on 
the parts of the companies and they carried into their environment all the problems of 
the past, free to aggravate these distortions of the market, rather than eliminate them 
(WB, 2012). 
 
Today, those problems threaten the very core stability of the national economy 
and the future of the Party. Across the board, both large and small SOEs are crippling 
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the economy with productivity at least five times lower than the genuine private sector. 
SOEs require nine units of capital to produce one unit of output compared to the 
industry average; the average ratio of turnover to capital is falling to critical levels; 
turnover to employee ratio is declining; debt to equity ratio is double that of the private 
sector and nearly all SOEs are virtually totally reliant on Government bails outs/loans to 
survive (WB, 2012). Yet, the more support they have received the less inclined they 
have been to reform, and instead, under the luxury of domestic market domination and 
constant Government support they have grown even more inefficient, secretative and 
arrogant, safe in the knowledge that their control of the economy is guaranteed by the 
State. It is estimated that SOEs have cost the economy 0.6 to 0.7% in GDP growth 
every year since 2002 (WB, 2012). This was calculated to have meant that average 
standards of living, with this growth, would have been double the present figure. The 
trust of the Party in believing the SOEs would remain their vanguard in the economy 
has clearly not been returned and instead their lack of transparency, inefficiency, waste 
of capital and refusal to reform has left the nation in economic difficulties where SOEs 
‘have become too big to fail and too big to save’ (WB, 2012). A major part of the SOE 
problem has been how it has caused significant problems for the banking sector, 
especially in concern to NPLs. 
 
Pincus et al found that the declared Non-Performing Loans levels may be five 
times more than the official figure and much of the official data is simply identified as 
an ‘accounting illusion’ (Pincus et al, 2012 p.19). Many NPLs have ‘disappeared’ and 
even been re-classified as ‘assets’ in illegal accounting methods made possible through 
cross shareholding between banks and SOEs. The SOEs are avoiding reform through 
Government created and protected domestic monopolies (this takes away any pressure 
for the SOEs to ‘serve’ the export market and excludes foreign competition). SOE loans 
and profits are diverted to individual wealth creation through secret real estate deals 
(Pincus et al, 2012, p.20-25). It is economic blindness to ignore these factors when 
assessing the impact of the WTO on the Vietnam economy. Each factor influences the 
direct outcomes of membership and the effectiveness of the reforms that process 
supported. 
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8.4.1 Reasons for the ineffectiveness of WTO’s led reforms 
 
The initial intention was to use the WTO process as a means to advance 
economic growth and development of Vietnam. Yet, although Vietnam now stands as a 
middle ranking economy, much of this rests on unstable and unsustainable economic 
grounds. Essential to the development of the economy through accession and 
membership was a need for structural reform across a number of areas; from education 
to legal reform and improvement in the governing capacities of the Party. 
 
The numerous problems became fully evident at the same time as the onset of 
the global financial crisis. Although the financial crisis has often been used as the main 
reason for problems with many of the reforms, President Sang (2012) made it clear that 
the crisis was influential, but the primary causes of the problems were domestic rather 
than external (Dung, 2013). One major concern is the continued opposition to reform, 
with both elements in the conservatives and reformist factions distrusting the opening 
up of Vietnam to the global economy, and still retaining many isolationist tendencies. 
Although the general belief is that participation in the global economy is essential, they 
fear lack of control over that process.  
 
The incapacities at bureaucratic and administrative levels can be directly linked 
to the corruption within the education and training systems. Buying of certificates and 
qualifications (or paying bribes for exam answers or changing ‘marks’) is endemic and 
many ‘qualified’ people have neither the knowledge nor skills apportioned to them in 
their ‘passed’ courses. Through ‘relationships’, plus the necessary ‘payments’, they are 
rewarded with positions at crucial levels of decision-making in both the political and 
economic systems. The combination of corruption and low levels of knowledge and 
skills means institutions, legal systems, government processes and the business world is 
often subjected to levels of operation that provide mismanagement and failure on a scale 
that no modern economy can sustain. This is further aggravated by a systemic 
undermining of any talented individuals, from primary to adult levels, who attempt to 
replace the corrupt systems with a genuine thirst for better skills and knowledge. All 
interviewees confirmed this situation and expressed their grave concerns at its 
consequences, believing that even the best possible policies would meet serious 
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problems in their application in the system as the capacity to carry them out has never 
been weaker. This problem cannot be underestimated or its consequences diminished.  
 
In examining the impact of reform, aided and abetted by WTO accession and 
membership, this thesis has identified a confusing mix of movement towards a ‘free 
market’, while consolidating central control over the economy through Banks and the 
SOEs. It has discerned that economic growth, the development of food security, 
restructuring of institutions to achieve international standards and the dramatic success 
of some industries has come at a high price, with unprecedented levels of corruption, 
distortions of the markets to a point where business oligarchs (usually embedded in the 
SOEs) enhance individuals wealth at the expense of the economic survival of the 
enterprises they run, and the country faces economic crisis in the face of a domestic 
banking crisis. The individuals responsible for this have manipulated both political and 
economic power to amass vast personal fortunes and achieve power in the political 
system.  
 
Yet, the signs were clear many years ago. Gainsborough (2005, p.24) pointed 
out that Vietnam ‘should not be seen as the withdrawal of the State, but rather the shift 
to private indirect government by the political elite, which is finding new ways of 
enriching itself and exercising power even in the external pressure [WTO, US-BTA, 
etc] to reform’. As noted by Gainsborough, civil servants can easily fulfil two roles: 
‘one public but not very active, the other private and often highly lucrative’. 
 
However, this thesis must contest Gainsborough’s findings and posit that 
corruption is not piecemeal but concentrated and systemic, with control organised and 
planned by an elite of powerful individuals who hold powerful decision-making 
positions in both politics and the economy. Gainsborough is convinced that the 
‘corruption is not centralised’; but recent cases such as VINASHIN and Vinalines, 
where billions of dollars were misappropriated, resulted in only business executives 
being arrested, tried and convicted. Even here it is hard to justify the misappropriation 
of over $4.4 billion resulting in a mere $149 million of fines. The popular illegitimacy 
that the Party and the Government now suffer is encouraged by such evidence of 
corruption and the lack of censure of it. McGough (interview, 2012) notes ‘the future of 
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Vietnam as a WTO member depends on how the Party handles corruption and the elite 
wealthy interest group. This requires the maintenance of Communist authority and 
political idealism while incorporating the economic neo liberalism of the global 
economy. It is essential that the Party is allowed to maintain the necessary social 
stability, in order that the full benefits of membership can be realised.’ 
 
The declining performance of SOEs, the debt laden problems of the Banking 
sector and the Party/Governments’ lack of control of the impending crisis has already 
nurtured the first signs of social instability and unrest. Fforde (2012) identifies the 
public disquiet at limited responsibility being taken for scandals such as VINASHIN 
and the lack of responsibility to be assigned to any ‘officials’. There is increasing 
confusion and corruption; public demonstrations are becoming larger, more vocal, more 
frequent and sometimes violent (Fforde, 2012). The new elite interest group of 
extremely wealthy individuals are able to manipulate the political and economic system 
for their own personal gain with no regard to the negative consequences for State and 
Society. McGough (interview, 2012) said “The Party has constantly sought to achieve 
the right conditions for WTO membership and take full advantage of the new 
opportunities, but a new elite interest group of powerful and wealthy people have both 
the means and will to subvert that, basically in their own interests”. Recent speeches by 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party demonstrated the awareness in the 
leaders of this problem and their belief that it is a major reason for the present 
difficulties. “Only by directly centralising and taking back power from this new oligarch 
of wealth can the Party regain legitimacy and the right to govern the country” 
(McGough, interview, 2012). 
 
The State system is becoming weaker, and the new elite interest group is 
attempting to govern the system (Fforde, 2012; WB, 2012). In order to avert further 
crisis the Party needs to consolidate its power, while also creating more independent 
regulatory and judicial bodies. 
 
 Vietnam’s increasing risk of a severe economic crisis is illustrated in a new 
report from the Vietnam Executive Leadership Programme at Harvard University 
(Pincus et al, 2012). Mirroring this thesis, the report identifies the banking system, 
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SOEs and inefficient public investment as major problems. A primary concern is that 
the situation appears far worse than officially revealed; McGough (interview, 2012) was 
concerned that ‘deliberate data distortions and suppression of negative data returns’ and 
the Banks cross shareholding model enabling a system of liquidity and capitalisation 
that is positive only through deliberate manipulation, was creating an impossible 
background for effective reform. Government debt is disguised through manipulation of 
contingent liabilities, while cross shareholding enables banks and firms to lend to 
themselves through bank ownership and large banks transfer debt out to small banks 
that are actually insolvent (Pincus et al, 2012). For McGough (interview, 2012) this 
creates conditions which impair the Party’s ability to actually deal with the crisis and 
disguises the extent to which development is challenged. Whilst WTO has provided the 
markets and the mechanisms for growth, the failings of the present system make their 
actual application far more difficult. 
 
By 2011, the problems were no longer avoidable or concealed as there was an 
unprecedented tension. Unresolved and deep-rooted political issues harried politicians, 
bureaucrats, foreign investors and the long-suffering population. The lack of effective 
political change suited to the contemporary requirements of a dynamic, diverse and 
outward-oriented society, of itself, posed major questions to political actors about the 
‘capacity of Vietnams’ political system’ (Fforde, 2012, p.176). Power could clearly be 
seen to be influenced strongly by elite interest groups and the Party was becoming 
merely an available scapegoat for the hidden and growing power of extremely wealthy 
elites, empowered by both political and economic ascendency. Their power now is so 
pervasive and corrupt that the Party fears less its break up by democracy, and now is 
concerned by the far more likely threat of an elite dictatorship intent on sustaining and 
protecting its power by force if necessary. The likelihood of dictatorship, rather than 
Communist rule or a new democratic process should not in any way be under-estimated, 
or the probability that the Vietnamese culture of respecting strength, authority and 
control will chiefly welcome a more authoritarian regime, rather than a democratic 
process that bestows on them greater responsibility and involvement in governing the 
country. 
 
The Party desired acceptance into the global economy, whilst retaining its core 
ideology and identity as a ‘Communist’ country; so they enthusiastically pursued 
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membership, believing they could shape the process to ‘fit’ the politics. The Party 
underestimated the perverting forces of greed and self indulgence that the ensuing 
opportunities for wealth would unleash. Convinced of the unanimous patriotism of 
leaders and decision-makers, and their loyalty to the principled morals and social values 
of Ho Chi Minh’s teachings, the Party manipulated the WTO process to fit an undefined 
vision of a ‘free market with socialist orientation’. The ideology of a ‘socialist 
orientation’ was immersed into a conservative Communist dogma that did not allow the 
Party to separate as far as possible the economic management from political doctrines, 
and convinced the leaders to use ‘conservative’ means to ensure their overall control of 
the economy and the politics. They had neither the confidence nor the lack of fear of 
‘capitalist’ opposition to communism to entrust the Vietnam economy to the ‘hidden 
hand’ of the free market, but realised the translucent demonstration of this reluctance to 
accept the veracity of the claims of an ‘apolitical’ WTO, would at best, make accession 
difficult and at worst ‘impossible’. Forced by economic crisis and belief in the need for 
reform, they tried to balance their fears with their hopes by undertaking WTO accession 
in a strategy of compromise, that is epitomised by SOE reforms and the failings in that 
process. 
 
8.4.2 Non-Market Economy Membership: A ‘Half-Way’ House 
 
A consequence of the problems found in Vietnam’s accession and membership 
of the WTO is its failure to yet be accepted as ‘full member’. WTO classifies Vietnam 
(until 2018-the maximum period) as a Non-Market Economy (NME). This term is 
controversial in that many feel non-market economy classification is an ‘obvious 
violation of the WTO fundamental principles of non-discrimination’ and is more 
‘politically motivated than economically justified’ (Son et al, 2007, p.4). However, it is 
difficult to criticise Vietnam’s classification as a non-market economy. It means that all 
factor production costs in such a country are ‘regarded as a distorted reflection of the 
markets supply and demand relationship’ and in the case of Vietnam such an assessment 
is hard to argue against (Son et al, 2007, p.4). 
 
NME has led to a ‘two-tier WTO membership’ with Vietnam seen as a ‘second-
class’ member (Son et al, 2007, p.5). NME status indicates the ‘official’ mistrust of 
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Vietnam’s actual legitimacy as a market economy and points to a probability that 
Government’s attempt to conceal its basic retention of central control has not been as 
successful as it thinks. 
 
The use of NME classification is primarily a tool to handle former centrally 
planned economies; initially targeted at Eastern European members of the WTO 
countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova (Son et al, 2007). NME is the chief 
means to operate anti-dumping measures and this is justified by the US in that an NME 
‘does not operate on market principles of cost and pricing structures, so that sales of 
merchandise do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise (Son et al, 2007, p.13). 
Neither NME nor ME are clearly defined by the WTO. The NME status does appear a 
form of temporary probation, with the NME country not yet fully trusted. Movement 
from NME status involves proving that the State is not subsidising firms through soft 
loans, granting privileged access to resources and allowing questionable auditing 
methods. Production costs and the financial situation are required to have eliminated 
past centrally controlled influences and distortions. There must be no bankruptcy 
subterfuge. On all accounts there is strong evidence to show that Vietnam significantly 
fails on all counts. Although experts such as Son et al (2007) complain bitterly about 
NME status for Vietnam and find it unfair, a one-way process and forced onto countries 
in the case of Vietnam, after five years of membership with more superficial reform, 
rather than ‘real’ reform, the status would appear ‘generous’ rather than unearned or 
‘unfair’. 
 
8.5 Solutions for the Future 
 
A central point here is the degree to which WTO led reforms can be utilised to 
advance Vietnam economic growth in the future but McGough (interview, 2012) points 
out that, ‘WTO membership relies on the Vietnam Government managing the reform 
process and maximising its benefits. But this depends to a large extent on their ability to 
enforce their policies and laws. At the moment this is challenged by the negative 
influences on enforcement. The new elite interest group is often in control of this’. 
Although legislation and institutional reforms, promoted and structured by the WTO 
process provided the means to control and monitor economic developments, the elite 
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interest groups have both the access to wealth and the political influence to subvert the 
integrity and accuracy of assuring the validity of the ‘ends’. In such circumstances it is 
highly unlikely that democracy in Vietnam will provide answers, or that further 
weakening of the central power and control of the Communist Party will solve the 
problems. The Vietnamese culture has far less problems with authoritarianism or one 
Party rule than does the West and it is suited to strong central control, with the 
language, culture and family system paying homage to the elder, leader and family 
head. But that patronage is backed up by a strong survival instinct that is ready and 
willing to revolt when leadership fails in its responsibility to sustain and provide for the 
society, the family and the life. The control of the negative influence of the elite interest 
group can only be addressed through strong Party control. 
 
 For Pincus (2012, p.44) ‘two foundations for security and strength of the nation-
state- strong economy and stable society- have been undermined’, and ‘the power of 
entrenched interest groups… benefit from maintaining their status quo’. Fforde (2011, 
p.185) notes that the political system is seen in the ‘South as fundamentally 
illegitimate… in the North as by now irremediably corrupt’. However, a primary actor 
in the dramatic development of the Vietnam economy has been the stability and 
guidance of the Communist Party. Its problems now are a result of a loss of power and 
an inability to re-adjust to the negative forces bringing Vietnam to the brink of 
economic crisis. There is needed a quicker and more decisive decision-making 
framework, but one underpinned by greater regulatory and monitoring mechanisms, 
with credible and active enforcement. The World Bank (2012) recommended the 
establishment of a National Economic Restructuring Commission working to the 
DREAM framework (Disclose, Regulate, Equitise, Accountability, Monitor). Central to 
this would be credibility, the ability to enforce and punish illegalities and an 
independence from politics borne from trust and power-sharing between the Party and 
the Institution. The reality is that elite interests groups with decisive power have 
developed through infiltration of the political and economic systems and the corruption 
they have created and controlled is a consequence of having unbridled levels of power. 
McGough (2012) declares “my direct advice has been that more transparency, 
accountability and enforcement of the law are required. The WTO led reforms can be 
more successful but it requires committed efforts to purge the Party and Nation of the 
individuals responsible for the problems, regardless of their levels of power and wealth. 
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In evaluating WTO accession and membership, plus the future benefits, it is essential 
that the impact upon it of corruption is taken into account”. 
 
WTO accession and membership has probably gained its most successful impact 
by providing the ‘light to shine’ (the demand for transparency and accountability) on the 
obvious faults in Vietnam and presented the tools to help turn the economy and political 
systems to turn to a more ‘rewarding’ pathway for Vietnam’s economy, society and 
politics. 
 
Given the present problems following WTO membership, additional means to 
support future development and alleviate the crisis are being sought. One is a proposal 
that Vietnam takes on a $12 billion IMF to rescue the banking system; presented in a 
report issued by the National Assembly. McGough (interview, 2012) explains 
“understanding the Vietnamese psyche allows one to realise that they always look for 
panaceas for immediate problems”. As Doanh (2007) said, the old way of thinking is 
‘grabbing and running’- meaning that Vietnamese tend to rely on immediate fixes for 
even the most complex problems without regards to the long term consequences. Doi 
Moi was the first and replaced by the WTO. Now some see IMF loan as the next step, 
with all three justified as being reform vehicles as well as panaceas for all other 
problems. 
 
8.5.1 IMF Loan: Easy Solution? 
 
One possible solution to the problems and avoidance of economic crisis is 
accessing an IMF loan for $12 billion.182 The WTO offers access to markets and its 
regulatory framework is rooted chiefly in the willingness of its member states to 
                                                
182 The nation may need IMF aid to recapitalize banks and must act quickly to clean up bad debt or risk 
“prolonged stagnation,” the National Assembly’s economic committee said in a Sept. 4 report published 
on its website yesterday. The financial system needs an injection of 250 trillion dong ($12 billion) to 300 
trillion Dong, according to the 298-page report that included recommendations to address economic risks.  
Vietnam Risks Biggest East Asia IMF Rescue Since 1990s (Bloomberg, 2012). 
 357 
comply. In contrast, the IMF offers money on conditional terms and has very different 
mechanisms in rule-making, rule-applicability and rule-enforcement (Chorev and Babb, 
2009). A major difference is that the WTO encourages members to remain in the 
system, while the IMF has a more ‘take it or leave it approach’ that ‘forces’ its 
borrowers to comply. IMF loans require ‘conditionality’ which often manifests itself as 
a form of coercion on borrowers with the ability of the IMF to force members to adopt 
new economic policies as the ‘price’ for the loan. This conditionality is seen as a 
primary demand from the US and this seen by developing countries as evidence that the 
IMF is chiefly a vehicle for US hegemony (There is abundant evidence that both the 
IMF and the WTO are chiefly seen here as vehicles for US power and control. Ranieri 
(2008) found ‘credible and measurable evidence of a distinct level of advantages that 
the US enjoys when compared with other members’. While there is evidence of the 
continued relative decline in US power ‘there is no indication that the liberal 
international order crafted and sponsored by the US is faltering’. John Ikenberry argues 
that the US constructed the predominant international order of the WTO and IMF to 
‘perpetuate US hegemony’ (Ranieri, 2008; Owen 2012). The conditionality forces 
macroeconomic reforms that control inflation, money supply and government spending, 
with pre-determined fiscal and monetary targets (Chorev and Babb, 2009). The 
structural conditions forces borrowers to follow strict neoliberal market friendly policies 
and surrender vast elements of their economic sovereignty. 
 
Although an IMF loan would appear a pre-condition for surviving the present 
debt-laden problems of the Vietnam economy, the Party is adamant that taking an IMF 
loan is definitely not the way for the Party leaders to find a way through the crisis. 
Whereas the WTO is seen as a ‘soft and easily manipulated process and membership, 
where compliance is ‘negotiable’, the IMF is seen as surrendering economic and 
political sovereignty and a force for ‘economic colonisation’ (McGough, interview, 
2012). There is a strong aversion to an organisation that the Party leaders see as the 
chief instigator of the fall of communism in the Soviet Union. The leading Party 
members felt the IMF was merely a force for politically motivated policies that would 
challenge Party rule in Vietnam. McGough (interview, 2012) believed that the auditing 
involved would inevitably lead to ‘embarrassment’ as past financial misdeeds would 
clearly be revealed and increase the image of a failure to adequately govern the 
economy and begin a ‘Cold War’ type collapse of communism in Vietnam. 
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           In Vietnam, the problems have been identified as ‘crony capitalism with a 
communist twist’ (Fuller, 2012). But the crisis has probably come at the worst time 
possible. Le Dang Doanh, a prominent economist, observed that “the problem in 
Vietnam is a very toxic cocktail, from the European debt crisis, the stagnation in the US 
economy plus a critical situation in the domestic economy” (as cited in Fuller, 2012, 
p.3). Managing this crisis and developing as a WTO member requires action be taken in 
both problem areas: corruption and the influence of the elite wealthy interest group. 
 
8.5.2 Following China again: A future rescue or another failed strategy 
 
 A major problem for Vietnam in the wake of the financial crisis is how it will 
handle the future economy. Central to this is that for the past 15 years the strategy for 
growth has relied on trade liberalisation and foreign investment. WTO entry contributed 
further to this reliance and provided immediate growth for the economy. However, as 
Riedel’s study (2009) shows, Vietnams growth has relied on exports to Europe, the US 
and Japan, where the financial crisis has had a significant effect upon demand and is 
likely to negatively impact on Asia for some years to come. Riedel (2009) suggests that 
China will follow a process of decoupling from its dependence on trade and foreign 
investment and develop such strategies as a growth in its domestic markets. Vietnam 
may be inclined to follow their lead. In fact, McGough (interview, 2012) noted ‘in 
recent talks with the Ministry of Planning and Investment over the movement of an 
American/UK billion dollar plus manufacturing facility and trade to Vietnam, the senior 
official involved amazingly declared that MPI’s new policy was to deter manufacturing 
investors and welcome more investors into development of domestic financial services. 
Further questioning revealed that the officials present believed that Vietnam could 
decouple from its dependence on exports and manufacturing and rely more on bringing 
in tourists and global financial services. My clients left the country in some state of 
bemusement’. However odd this approach may seem for a Vietnam so under-developed 
in financial services and suffering from incapacities in management and business 
acumen, it illustrates the equal lack in understanding and ability within the major 
decision-maker levels. Such incapacities make a decoupling strategy from trade and 
foreign investment a distinct possibility, greatly enhanced by any major movement of 
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China towards this strategy. But Riedel (2009) clearly indicates the faults in this 
approach. In the first place, Vietnam has proven in the past that it has the will to follow 
China’s lead but not the capacity. Riedel (2009, p.44) notes: ‘In terms of per capita 
income, China is about 15 years ahead of Vietnam. China is far more industrialised and 
its base is far more diversified than Vietnam’s. China is far less dependent on trade, 
with an export/GDP ratio half that of Vietnam. Household and corporate saving rates 
are almost double those of Vietnam... the middle class plays a larger role...its real 
income is growing more rapidly...real appreciation can be more readily absorbed in the 
non-tradable sector at a lower adjustment cost than would likely be the case in 
Vietnam’. Riedel (2009) points out that Vietnam has no ‘viable alternative’ to its 
present strategy and notes that Vietnam must develop its private corporate sector and 
develop the social and economic infrastructure. WTO accession and the reforms 
engendered by participation were focused on doing this. Yet, the years of unenthusiastic 
participation and non-compliance make these two areas major concerns at present and 
provide evidence of the lack of progress, rather than any real improvement. The very 
basic reforms believed to be part and parcel of the reasoning for Vietnam joining the 
WTO are now indicated as the vital strategies needed for Vietnam to avoid the 
deepening of the economic crisis. “Protecting the price competitiveness of its tradable 
goods sector... structural changes in industrial output and ownership... efficiency of 
investment... strengthening the economic infrastructure... including education and 
health” were critical requirements before the WTO and why it entered accession. The 
lack of sustainable development in these areas is a chief reason for its failure to take 
advantage of membership, and the future of Vietnam’s economy and its membership of 
the WTO are brought into question by the lack of any real indication that the history of 
non-compliance is going to be replaced by far more commitment to the promises and 
commitments made to the WTO. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO began as a struggle between conservatives and 
reformers who disagreed on how reform should progress. Crisis meant that reform 
became an imperative and Conservatives were purged from the Party in order that 
reformers could be free to bring in the necessary changes in policies and practices. The 
WTO was seen as the vehicle for providing the means to enhance these reforms. By 
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encouraging transparency and accountability and rewarding that with access to global 
markets, the WTO became the reformers panacea for all Vietnam’s problems. However, 
it would be unfair to judge the success of WTO membership on the same criteria, as the 
WTO is not, and was not, designed for such a role. Instead, we can see that by 
facilitating Vietnam’s inclusion into the global economy, the WTO has successfully 
supported the development of Vietnam into a middle ranking economy. The changes 
needed for further development are solely the responsibility of the Communist Party and 
their active promotion of strategies to deal with the elite interest group, the corruption, 
debt and the reform of the SOEs is now an imperative.  
 
The lesson of Vietnam’s accession and membership of the WTO is that it 
provides a number of tools and mechanisms for structuring and locking in essential 
reforms. The objectives of the reforms are aimed at facilitating a country’s entry into the 
global economy, improving its competitiveness and encouraging economic growth and 
development. However, besides the reforms to institutions, the transparency and 
accountability and the general building blocks needed for a market economy, a country 
also needs to thoroughly reform its infrastructure. Central to this ensuring an efficient 
and meaningful system of enforcement of new laws and regulations, the re-structuring 
of the private and public sectors on the basis of competitive dynamics and finally, the 
creation of institutions with real powers and responsibilities. 
 
A further lesson of the Vietnam case is the need for prospective entrants to move 
away from only short term goals and objectives; and plan long term strategies for not 
only the accession period but long after membership. This entails maintenance of the 
levels and speeds of reform, and avoids a tendency to see accession as the process and 
membership as the final goal, without any further need for reform once accepted. The 
reality is that membership indicates a new era of competitive dynamics that requires 
continual improvements in efficiency, productivity and economic performance. Such 
demands can only be met through a commitment to further reforms and an 
understanding that the successful participation in the global economy requires a 
constant pressure for economic development. The accession process soon reveals the 
problems in a developing economy and indicates where the possible solutions to them 
may be. Without WTO accession the structural and developmental problems of Vietnam 
may have taken many more years to uncover, but with accession Vietnam has quickly 
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become aware of costs of neglect of the basic foundations of economic development. 
Institutional reform, improvements in productivity and financial efficiency and integrity 
are vital elements in successful economic development. 
 
A major warning to other future entrants is the need for awareness and direct 
controls against the rise of wealthy, elite interest groups who have achieved their 
position through corruption and abuse of power. While entrepreneurialism is welcome 
and needed, the opportunity for a few to abuse the situation is increased, especially if 
insufficient care is taken in the reform of institutions and if enforcement is lax. This 
problem is aggravated when the capacities within business and politics are insufficient, 
and the education, skills and knowledge of bureaucrats is so low as to provide ‘easy 
pickings’ for the corrupt. 
 
The Party embarked on a $100 billion expansion in domestic credit stock from 
2003 to 2010, but diverted it into state enterprises rather than the more efficient and 
competitive private businesses, and helped create ‘a country struggling with a weak 
currency, inflation, red tape and cronyism that has led to billions of dollars of waste’ 
and creation of greater wealth in a politically powerful elite interest group (Cain, 2012, 
p.1). Cox (2012, p.3) identifies clear ‘capital misallocation, embezzlement and 
corruption, stemming from the billions of foreign investment where the ‘creaky 
communist institutions couldn’t absorb all the funds’. Cox (2012, p.2) shows that 
Vietnam is a ‘classic case of a small country that had greatness thrust upon it’, but its 
‘rulers were neither prepared nor competent to handle the huge inrush of foreign 
capital’. The outcome included an explosion of credit flows that were controlled by 
‘political apparatchiks and the well-connected beneficiaries of a Party spoils system’ 
(Cox, 2012, p.3). 
 
A final issue is the need for pre-planned and well thought out strategies for 
adapting two ideologies to work in tandem. In Vietnam the communist system found 
itself having to suddenly adjust to neo-liberalist ideas and methods in the economy, 
while maintaining the political tenets of its ideology. This was soon found to be a 
difficult affiliation, with many contradictions and difficulties, which mainly 
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metamorphosed in Vietnam into a constant fear of the Party in releasing ‘central 
control’ of the economy. 
 
Further research highlighted by this thesis concerns first the need for clear 
identification of what a free market with socialist orientation involves. The merging of 
communism and capitalism into an economic model containing the political ideological 
foundations of Marxism, with the economic principles of neo liberalism is a new and 
challenging project. Clear guidelines and objectives need to be formulated as a 
consequence of research into how such a model would work. 
 
 Second question is whether or not a bi-lateral strategy would have provided 
Vietnam with a better model of development than the WTO accession. Research into the 
WTO accession showed that a major inadequacy was the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms in the process to ensure application of the reforms. WTO itself now 
struggles with this problem in the wake of the Doha Round and the stalemate that has 
ensued. A reason for the continued problems of the WTO maybe the consequence of the 
global financial crisis, which has encouraged many states to follow more zero sum 
strategies, rather than pursue the past tendencies towards consensus politics. Whether or 
not a bi-lateral or a multi-lateral path (or a mixed version) is more beneficial to 
economic development is a question that further research should answer. In the case of 
Vietnam the choice that has to be made is further cementing of the benefits of WTO 
membership, or finding an alternative method, such as IMF or bi-lateral/regional 
agreements.183 
                                                
183 Social Science Research in Vietnam (especially in Political economics) is extremely limited in scope, 
under-funded and lacks any level of quality. Higher education ‘lacks even a single university of 
recognized quality... lack intellectual dynamism... use [their own] standards that bear no resemblance to 
those used elsewhere’ (Vallely T and Wilkinson B (2009) ‘Vietnamese Higher Education: crisis and 
response’ Harvard Asia Programme). McGough (personal communication, 2013) said ‘research is a 
sensitive subject, directed and constrained by the Party and limited by researchers outcomes being more 
often and not, what they think the Party wants to hear, rather than what the research uncovers’. Political 
economy research is further limited by the lack of credible data and the fact that all economic thought is 
‘politically sensitive first, and based on economic reality, second. McGough (2013) added, ‘University 
research is far too limited to be even considered as of any quality, while research committees, groups, etc 
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are bound almost totally by political influence and rely for their existence on how ‘friendly’ their reports 
are to the Party. They lack any independence and almost all rely on Party patronage’.    
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APPENDIX 
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APPENDIX 1 : Summary of the WTO’s commitments of Vietnam 
 
Vietnam accepted all WTO’s agreements and committed to have a ceiling rate 
for the whole goods tariff table of 10,600 lines and 11 services with 110 categories out 
of 155 categories specified by the WTO (Khanh, 2007). The commitments are phased in 
over a periods of a few years, and they are rather strong for a country with low levels of 
development (NCIEC 2007). These commitments are not only for the tariff ceiling on 
goods but also go deep into ‘second generation’ institutional reforms such as 
transparency procedures, judicial and administrative review and other domestic 
regulation such as intellectual property and product standards.  
 
Khanh (interview), commented that “Vietnam achieved good acceding 
commitments compared with other countries. Although the commitments are detailed 
and concise, but secured for Vietnam. They put a lot of pressure on the domestic 
economy but, also allow enough room for the domestic economy to adjust under these 
pressures. They not only put pressure before and on the event of WTO accession but 
also maintain the pressure after the WTO accession due to the phasing out period of 
commitments”.  
 
For WTO accession, the members often see Chinese commitments for WTO 
accession as a standard of strong and determined commitments. It not only reduced the 
tariffs significantly, but also committed strongly in service and institution reforms 
(Sally 2004).  
 
The average import tariff’s commitments of China were reduced to only 10.1%. 
In comparison with the level of commitments of China, the level of commitments of 
Vietnam is lower in terms of the absolute figure. China also committed to lower levels 
of agricultural subsidies (of 8.5%), while Vietnam’s commitment was 10%. However, 
Vietnam has lower levels of development as well as a much smaller market than China, 
so this commitment on goods is considered as being very bold for Vietnam (NCIEC 
2007; Tran Quoc Khanh 2007). As a latecomer, many commitments of Vietnam in 
services were actually higher than China (NCIEC 2007).  
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Vietnam commitment on WTO accession can be briefly summarised as 
follows: 
 
A. MULTILATERAL COMMITMENTS: 
 
Multilateral commitments are agreements on changing and revising regulations, 
policies or laws in order to comply with WTO regulations and some special 
commitments for Vietnam specifically. Vietnam fulfilled all WTO’s agreements upon 
the accession. 
 
Vietnam agreed to abide fully on the Article X of GATT 1994, Article III of 
GATS and other requirements on WTO’s policy transparency, including requirements 
for notice, comments and publicity (NCIEC 2007). Upon the accession, Vietnam fully 
committed to leave 60 days for public comments on proposed laws and regulations 
under the WTO’s requirements.  It also disclosed publicly all legal documents in 
Ministry and industry’s newspapers and websites. Laws and regulations relating to 
WTO obligations had to be applied uniformly throughout Viet Nam's customs territory 
and other territories under its control. Independent and impartial tribunals review 
administrative acts including implementation of WTO commitments. Individuals, 
agencies and organizations have the right to lodge a complaint against administrative 
decisions issued by, or administrative actions taken by, a State administrative agency or 
a competent person of the State administrative agency. All these have been fundamental 
innovations in the legal system in Vietnam, which were major steps in the direction of 
the ‘rule of law’. 
 
Commitments on non-tariff barriers of Vietnam were equally bold in liberalising 
the trade regime. Vietnam reserved import bans on very few goods, basing these on the 
concern for social security, environment and health protection such as arm and 
ammunitions, explosive materials, toxic chemicals, used electronics, etc (Ministry of 
Trade 2007; NCIEC 2007). These bans fully complied with WTO regulations, and were 
based on scientific research. Under the WTO commitments, several import bans were 
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removed such as cigarettes, cigars, motorbikes with more than 175cm3 engines, and 
used cars under 5 years of use, etc. Import and export quotas have been eliminated upon 
accession, except in the case of four goods; sugar, eggs, tobacco leaf and salt, which are 
reserved for tariff-quotas184 (NCIEC 2007). These industries are very important for a 
large rural population of Vietnam, which provides jobs and earning for them for many 
generations. Although salt is not considered as an agricultural product, it secured a TRQ 
status due to its traditional role in the culture and life of many Vietnamese villages. 
Vietnam agreed to bring its customs valuation, non-preferential rules of origin, custom 
procedure and pre-shipment-inspection procedures into line with relevant WTO 
agreements from the date of accession. Vietnam adopted the WTO’s agreements on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS), 
also without transition periods as the current legal system and SPS measures do not 
contradict the SPS and TBT Agreements (NCIEC 2007). Vietnam also committed to 
apply fees and charges for public services under the WTO regulations, which reflected 
the right value of these services, such as custom fees and charges. Previous fees and 
charges were considered too high for the services.  
 
Vietnam has also made strong commitments on issues relating to enterprises and 
trading rights. Vietnam agreed to abide by the WTO’s regulations on the SOEs. WTO 
does not have any regulation on prohibiting members in the setting up and development 
of SOEs. However, Vietnam agreed to apply fully WTO’s regulation on SOEs 
operations upon the accession. In particular, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) would 
operate based purely on the market criteria. The state would not intervene directly or 
indirectly in SOEs operations, except when allowed by the WTO or by their role as 
shareowners in these SOEs. Vietnam also makes sure that enterprises from WTO 
members can compete fairly with SOEs (NCIEC 2007). The State enjoys the same 
status as other shareholders in managing, operating and making decisions in all matters 
of these enterprises (NCIEC 2007). Viet Nam agreed to submit its annual report on its 
equitisation progress to the WTO. Upon the accession, Vietnam allowed foreign 
                                                
184The in-quota tariff rates for these 4 products are equal to the current MFN tariff (i.e. 40% for 
eggs, 25% for raw sugar, 40-50% for refined sugar, 30% for tobacco, 30% for cooking salt). Out-quota 
tariff rates are much higher. It committed to apply, allocate and manage tariff quotas in the manner of 
transparency, non-discrimination and in conformity with WTO rules 
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enterprises and individuals to enjoy the same import and export rights185 as the 
Vietnamese enterprises and individuals, except several products under the State trading 
list such as Petroleum, cigarettes, cigars, video, newspapers and magazines. Some other 
sensitive products such as rice and medicines were opened up to foreign enterprises and 
individuals after a transition period. Foreign enterprises and individuals not located in 
Vietnam were also granted the right to register in Vietnam according to international 
standards. The licensing mechanisms are to follow the WTO’s rules and regulations on 
transparency and non-discrimination (NCIEC 2007). 
 
In regard to subsidies, Vietnam agreed to abolish all subsidies prohibited by the 
WTO’s regulations. Vietnam also committed to eliminate trade-distorted subsidies for 
agricultural products from the date of accession. Other subsidies such as subsidies for 
poverty reduction, infrastructure building and agricultural encouragement under the 
green box are allowed. Vietnam were granted the exceptions under the ‘treatments’ for 
developing and under-developed countries, in which Vietnam as a developing country 
are allowed to maintain trade-distorted subsidies with the maximum of 10% of its 
output volume (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2007). Under the Agriculture 
Agreement, Vietnam is also not committed to eliminate export subsidies for agricultural 
products, as they are not prohibited and specified in the Agriculture Agreement. For 
non-agriculture products, Vietnam fully committed to remove all prohibited subsidies in 
the WTO regulations such as export subsidies and localisation subsidies. However, it 
was able to reserve the preferential treatment for investment in export production 
granted before its WTO entry date in a transition period of 5 years (except for garment 
and textiles). 
 
Vietnam agrees to fully implement the responsibilities set forth in the TRIMS 
Agreement from the date of accession. Vietnam were required to remove all the trade 
related measures in the FDI policies, which violated the principles of national 
treatments and liabilities on eliminating quantities restrictions (NCIEC 2007) such as 
local content requirements, investment linked to domestic resources development, 
foreign currency balance, import-export balance or export restrictions. Vietnam 
                                                
185The export-import rights here are just the rights of undersigning customs declarations for export-import 
procedures, not including the right of domestic distribution. 
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committed not to use these measures as the conditions for granting investment licenses 
or providing investment preferential treatments (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2007).  
 
As Vietnam’s domestic legal system on intellectual property right conforms to 
the corresponding regulations of TRIPS Agreement; therefore Vietnam adopted WTO’s 
TRIPS agreement in full without a transition period. Vietnam also issued several legal 
regulations to comply with the Berne Convention.  
 
In safeguard measures, Vietnam commits to applying WTO’s relevant 
agreements on antidumping, subsidy and countervailing measures, safeguard measures. 
Vietnam also agreed to inform the WTO on its countervailing and safeguard measures. 
However, WTO members still considers Vietnam as a non-market economy until the 
end of 2018186. This is a disadvantage for Vietnam because the non market economy 
status can be used as the reason for other WTO members to activate anti-dumping 
measures to protect their own market against Vietnamese exports (Ministry of Industry 
and Trade 2007).  
 
B. COMMITMENTS ON OPENING THE MARKET 
 
Vietnam is committed to reducing the average tariff rate to 13.4%, which was a 
significant reduction from 23.32% in 1997 and from the current 17.4% (current applied 
rate) (Ministry of Trade 2007; World Bank 2008). The final average tariff was 23% 
lower than the rate before the accession. This breaks down into 20.9% in agricultural 
goods (from the current rate of 23.5%) and 12.6% on industrial goods (from 16.8%) 
(Table 3.2). Many tariff reductions came into effect upon accession in 2007; most of the 
remaining reductions in 5-7 years. Vietnam agreed to bind the whole current import 
tariff schedule with 10600 tariff lines. Among them, there would be tax cuts on 3800 
tariff lines (35.5%), no change in 3700 tariff lines (34.5%), and committed at higher 
rates in 3170 tariff lines (30%). Products with high tariff of over 30% had tariff’s 
reduction immediately upon the accession. As a result, the most drastic tariff reductions 
                                                
186 12 years after accession 
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were in garments and textiles, fish and fish products, wood and paper, other 
manufactured goods, electric and electronic machines and equipment (NCIEC 2007).  
 
Vietnam also participated fully in 3 sectoral liberalisation agreements, which 
were IT, textiles and garments, and medical equipment. It also partially committed in 
agreements for aircraft equipment, chemicals, and building materials. There tariffs were 
gradually reduced over the period of 3 to 5 years (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2007).  
 
Average Tariffs by sectors 
Specific sector Number 
of tariff 
lines 
 
MFN 
Commitment 
(%) 
Bound rate 
at date of 
accession 
(%) 
Final 
Bound 
(%) 
Concession 
compared to 
the present 
MFN rate 
(%) 
WTO 
commitments Of 
China (%) 
Agricultural 
products 
1,219 23.5 25.2 21.0 10.6 16.7 
Fish, Fish products 176 29.3 29.1 18.0 38.4 8.9 
Oil and gas 37 3.6 36.8 36.6  4.6 
Wood, paper 630 15.6 14.6 10.5 32.8 5.3 
Garment and textile 1,159 37.3 13.7 13.7 63.2 11.6 
Leather, rubber 341 18.6 19.1 14.6 21.5 13.0 
Metal 1,201 8.1 14.8 11.4  7.3 
Chemical 1,579 7.1 11.1 6.9 2.8 7.7 
Transportation 
equipment 
1,026 35.3 46.9 37.4  17.1 
Mechanic 
machinery and 
equipment 
1,436 7.1 9.2 7.3  7.8 
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Source: Ministry of Trade 2007 
 
C. COMMITMENTS IN SERVICES 
 
Vietnam has offered significant liberalisation commitments in services under the 
WTO accession. In general, the level of WTO commitments in services is the same as 
the level committed in the US BTA. These commitments are considered as strong with 
some breakthrough commitments in banking, telecommunication and stock exchange 
services. As a result, the service industries encountering heavy pressures for change 
were banking, stock exchange services, distribution and marine transportation support 
services.  
 
In general, Vietnam allowed foreign companies to operate in service sectors, to 
buy shares in Vietnamese companies187, and to bring their foreign staff to Vietnam188. 
However, they are not allowed to have a commercial presence in the form of a branch in 
Vietnam, except in specific sectors. Vietnam also reserved all preferences given to 
foreign providers before the WTO’s accession and subsidies for creating employment 
for ethnic minorities, research and development, and SOEs privatisation (NCIEC 2007). 
 
The commitments of Vietnam can be summarised as follows: 
                                                
187Their maximum ownership is limited depended on ceiling given in commitment table.  
188But required at least 20% of the managers of the Vietnam-based offices as Vietnamese.  
Electric machinery 
and equipment 
766 12.4 13.9 9.5 23.5 7.9 
Mineral 396 14.4 16.1 14.1 2.3 9.5 
Other 
manufacturing 
products 
723 14.0 12.9 10.2 26.9 11.1 
Total 10,689 17.4 17.2 13.4 23.0 10.1 
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In business services, Vietnam committed to 26 sub-sectors out of 46 sub-sectors 
under GATT’s classification. Most of the services were opened to foreign companies 
and foreigners after one to five years of the WTO accession. Several sub-sectors 
required foreign companies to establish joint-ventures with Vietnamese companies, 
including advertising, agricultural and forest services. 100% foreign owned firms in 
computer services can provides services to only other foreign-owned enterprises and 
foreign projects operating in Vietnam (NCIEC 2007) 
 
In Information services, most of services were opened to foreign firms including 
100% foreign ownership forms after a period of 5 years from WTO accession. 
However, 100% foreign ownership is not allowed in telecommunication services. 
Despite that, foreign firms can have substantial market access. Foreign investors are 
permitted to form joint ventures with the Vietnamese operators with a maximum of 49% 
of ownership in infrastructure-based services, of maximum of 65% of ownership in non-
infrastructure based services after three years of the WTO accession. In Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) and value-added telecommunication services, foreign investors are 
allowed to opt for partners to set up joint ventures and their ownership is at a maximum 
of 70% of the charter capital. In general, Vietnam’s commitments are higher than 
China’s ones in 2000, but much lower than commitments of other countries joining 
WTO after China (NCIEC 2007). 
 
In distribution services, the restrictions on ownership (maximum ownership of 
49%) remained until 2009. After 2009 wholly-owned foreign enterprises were allowed. 
However, foreign firms are not allowed to engage in distribution services of sensitive 
goods such as petroleum and gasoline, pharmaceutical products, books, magazines, 
video tapes, tobacco, rice, sugar and precious metals. Services in other sensitive items 
such as steel, fertilizer and cement, etc. were opened up to foreign firms after three 
years of accession. Most importantly, Vietnam also puts restrictions on opening retail 
points of foreign-invested companies. Indeed, Vietnam’s commitments under WTO are 
lower than the status quo as several 100% foreign-invested supermarkets operate in 
Vietnam.  
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In financial services, Vietnam committed to open three sub-sectors at a 
relatively high level of liberalisation. This was an area that demanded high levels of 
commitments from many WTO members.  In insurance services, 100% foreign invested 
insurance enterprises were allowed to engage in all kinds of insurance in Vietnam from 
one year after the WTO accession. After 5 years from the date of accession, non-life 
branches of foreign insurance enterprises were permitted. In banking services, Vietnam 
also allowed foreign banks to establish wholly foreign-owned subsidiary banks and to 
provide services such as credit cards and deposits in foreign currencies. They allowed 
branches to be set up, but not sub-branches. Capital transactions were not liberalized. 
They are also not allowed to own more than 30% of the total equity of a Vietnam's joint 
stock commercial bank, unless otherwise provided by the country's laws or authorized 
by a local competent authority. In Securities service, foreign companies were permitted 
to provide securities’ related services across the border such as financial information 
and consultancy, support and intermediary services for securities business etc. After 5 
years of accession, they are allowed to establish wholly foreign owned companies 
(currently joint ventures with a maximum of 49% of ownership) and branches to 
provide securities services with some types of services such as asset management, 
payment, consultancy related to securities and exchange of financial information 
(NCIEC 2007) 
 
In transport services, Vietnam also opened all of the market with the following 
commitments. In Maritime transport services and maritime auxiliary services, Vietnam 
allowed foreign suppliers to provide services in goods transportation across the border, 
but made no commitments in transportation of passengers. However, foreign suppliers 
are permitted to establish joint-venture shipping companies to transport goods and 
passengers with a maximum of 49% of the total registered capital and to use Vietnam’s 
flag. Upon accession, foreign companies are permitted to provide in-land and maritime 
auxiliary services189 in the form of joint-ventures with 51% of foreign ownership. In 
Road transport services, Vietnam does not have any commitments on transport of goods 
and passengers across the border. Partners are permitted to set up joint-venture 
companies with foreign investment of 49% and increased to 51% after 3 years of 
                                                
189 such as cargo handling services, customs clearance services, and container storage and warehouse 
services. 
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operation. In Water-borne, rail and air transportation services, similar to that of the 
road transport services, Vietnam does not have any commitments on this matter. 
Foreign companies are allowed to establish joint-ventures with a maximum participation 
of 49% in both rail (goods only) and water-borne transport service (NCIEC 2007) 
 
In education services, foreign firms can establish education facilities in Vietnam 
upon accession. However, curriculums must be approved by the Ministry of Education 
and Training of Vietnam. The reality is that there very little enforcement if regulations, 
very little assessment and it is easy to make corrupt payments to bypass regulations. In 
Environment services, wholly foreign owned enterprises will be allowed by the end 
2012 to replace the joint-venture form with maximum foreign ownership of 49%. In 
construction services, foreign investors are allowed to establish branches. In Medical 
services, foreign providers are allowed to set up joint ventures and sign business 
cooperation contracts or establish wholly foreign-owned hospitals in Vietnam. Vietnam 
also put forth principles on a minimum capital of US$ 200,000 to set up treatment 
facilities. In tourism services, foreign providers are only permitted to establish joint-
ventures. In travel services, foreign invested companies are not allowed to provide 
outbound services and domestic travel services. In the hotel and restaurant business, 
they are required to build, upgrade or re-buy facilities after 8 years of WTO accession. 
In Cultural and entertainment services, foreign parties are only allowed to set up joint 
ventures by the end of 2012 with a maximum capital ownership of 49%. In regard to 
electronic game business area, the provision must be carried out through a Business 
Cooperation Contract or joint ventures with Vietnamese partners who are granted 
licenses and the foreign capital ownership is not more than 49% (NCIEC 2007) 
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APPENDIX 2 : Number ofSOEs or SOEs holding units in Chinafrom 
1998-2007  
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 1999-2008 
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APPENDIX 3 : GDP growth and GDP capital growth (1977-1980) 
Year GDP growth (%) GDP per capita growth (%) 
1977 4.4 2.8 
1978 4.0 2.3 
1979 -1.7 -2.0 
1980 -1.0 -1.4 
5 Years 5.8 1.2 
Annual Average 1.4 0.4 
Sources: Dang Phong 2009 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 : GDP and its composition growth 
CHAPTER 9  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.8 8.4 8.2 8.5 6.3 5.3 6.78 
Agriculture 3.0 4.2 3.6 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.8 4.1 1.8 2.7 
Industry & 
Construction 
10.4 9.5 10.5 10.2 10.7 10.4 10.2 6.1 5.5 7.0 
Services 6.1 6.5 6.5 7.3 8.5 8.3 8.9 7.2 6.6 7.5 
Sources: GSO, 2010 
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APPENDIX 5 : GDP growth of Vietnam from 1984-2008 
 
Source: General Statistic Office (1990, 1995, 2000, 2008) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 6 : FDI inflow in Vietnam from 1988-2008 
 
Source: OECD, 2009 
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APPENDIX 7 Number of enterprises in different ownership sectors 
Year 1990 2000 2003 2004 2005 
Total  42288 72012 91756 112950 
State sector 12300 5759 4845 4597 4086 
Non state sector 332 35004 64526 84003 105167 
Foreign investment sector 0 1525 2641 3156 3697 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 % 
Total 131318 155771 205668 248847 100 
State sector 3706 3494 3328 3369 1.3 
Non state sector 123392 147316 196779 238932 96 
Foreign investment sector 4220 4961 5625 6546 2.7 
Source: General Statistic Office 2011 
APPENDIX 8 : Number of enterprise by size of the employees and types 
of enterprises 
 Total Under 10 
employees 
10-49 
employees 
50-199 
employees 
200-299 
employees 
SOEs 3287 55 576 1180 2145 
Non state enterprises 196776 114256 67467 11847 1319 
FDI enterprises 5626 617 1669 1741 430 
  300-499 
employees 
500-999 
employees 
1000-4999 
employees 
Above 5000 
employees 
SOEs 3287 1751 1311 956 91 
Non state enterprises 196776 941 591 311 17 
FDI enterprises 5626 399 387 342 41 
Sources: GSO 2009 
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APPENDIX 9 : Number of enterprises by size of capital and ownerships. 
 Total Under 
£30000 
£30000 – 
£150,000 
£150000 – 
£300,000 
£300000 – 
£1,500.000 
SOEs 3287 43 226 1180 968 
Non state enterprises 196776 48899 94935 25257 21811 
FDI enterprises 5626 247 712 646 1949 
  £1,500,00- 
£6,000,000 
6,000,000-
15,000,000 
Above 
£15,000,000 
 
SOEs 3287 966 425 393  
Non state enterprises 196776 4585 866 423  
FDI enterprises 5626 1283 446 343  
Sources: GSO 2009 
 
 
APPENDIX 10 : Process of equitised SOEs in Vietnam 
Year Number of 
equitised 
SOEs 
Total number 
of equitised 
over the years 
Year Number of 
equitised 
SOEs 
Total 
number of 
equitised 
over the 
years 
1992 Started 0 2000 212 577 
1992 - 1995 3 3 2001 149 726 
1996 5 8 2002 164 890 
1997 7 15 2003 532 1422 
1998 100 115 2004 753 2175 
1999 250 365 2005 754 2929 
 Sources: PWC, 2008 
 
  
 441 
APPENDIX 11 Average Tariffs by sectors 
Source: Ministry of Trade 2007 
Specific sector Number 
of tariff 
lines 
 
MFN 
Commitment 
(%) 
Bound rate 
at date of 
accession 
(%) 
Final 
Bound 
(%) 
Concession 
compared to 
the present 
MFN rate 
(%) 
WTO 
commitments Of 
China (%) 
Agricultural 
products 
1,219 23.5 25.2 21.0 10.6 16.7 
Fish, Fish products 176 29.3 29.1 18.0 38.4 8.9 
Oil and gas 37 3.6 36.8 36.6  4.6 
Wood, paper 630 15.6 14.6 10.5 32.8 5.3 
Garment and textile 1,159 37.3 13.7 13.7 63.2 11.6 
Leather, rubber 341 18.6 19.1 14.6 21.5 13.0 
Metal 1,201 8.1 14.8 11.4  7.3 
Chemical 1,579 7.1 11.1 6.9 2.8 7.7 
Transportation 
equipment 
1,026 35.3 46.9 37.4  17.1 
Mechanic 
machinery and 
equipment 
1,436 7.1 9.2 7.3  7.8 
Electric machinery 
and equipment 
766 12.4 13.9 9.5 23.5 7.9 
Mineral 396 14.4 16.1 14.1 2.3 9.5 
Other 
manufacturing 
products 
723 14.0 12.9 10.2 26.9 11.1 
Total 10,689 17.4 17.2 13.4 23.0 10.1 
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APPENDIX 12 : NRP and ERP estimate of Vietnam tariff from 1997-2003 
 1997 2001 2003 
 NRP ERP NRP ERP NRP ERP 
Weightedaverage       
Agriculture 8.12 7.74 6.28 7.43 11.06 12.52 
Mining 9.42 6.05 8.91 16.39 3.55 -0.03 
Manufacturing 30.63 121.47 25.28 95.97 29.23 43.94 
Total tradable 20.95 72.22 17.92 58.46 18.2 24.87 
       
Simpleaverage 23.32 59.54 20.14 54.1 19.98 26.23 
CV 133.81 156.01 149.9 172.34 106.51 134.93 
Source: Athukorala. 2005 
 
 
APPENDIX 13 : Nominal and Effective Rate of Protection under the 
WTO commitments (%) 
 
Year 
Agriculture and 
seafoods 
Mineral, oil and 
gas 
Manufacturing Whole economy 
ERP Tariff ERP Tariff ERP Tariff ERP Tariff 
2005 7,40 6,10 4,39 3,85 40,38 19,45 21,43 11,12 
2006 6,42 5,37 4,33 3,84 38,93 18,69 20,43 10,53 
2007 6,20 5,17 4,38 3,84 31,21 15,25 16,93 9,04 
2008 5,50 4,72 4,41 3,84 29,58 14,45 15,97 8,54 
2009 5,00 4,39 4,43 3,83 28,00 13,71 15,10 8,11 
2010 4,59 4,13 4,45 3,83 26,78 13,14 14,41 7,78 
2011 4,20 3,88 4,46 3,83 25,53 12,53 13,72 7,43 
2012 3,92 3,72 4,48 3,83 24,57 12,05 13,20 7,18 
2013 3,85 3,67 4,49 3,83 24,08 11,80 12,96 7,05 
2014 3,85 3,67 4,49 3,83 24,05 11,77 12,95 7,04 
2015 3,51 3,25 -0,29 0,17 21,14 10,65 10,57 5,64 
2016 3,51 3,25 -0,29 0,17 21,13 10,64 10,56 5,63 
2017 3,50 3,25 -0,28 0,17 21,12 10,64 10,56 5,63 
2018 3,35 3,11 -0,33 0,13 21,01 10,51 10,44 5,52 
2019 3,35 3,11 -0,33 0,13 21,00 10,51 10,44 5,52 
2020 3,36 3,11 -0,32 0,13 20,76 10,30 10,34 5,43 
Sources: Tuyen et al, 2011 
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APPENDIX 14 : Anti-dumping case against Vietnam export products 
since 1994 
Year Products From 
country 
Year Products From 
country 
1994 Rice Columbia 2007 Gas lighter Turkey 
1998 Glutamate EU  Fluorescent lamp India 
 Footwear EU  CD-R India  
2000 Gas lighter Poland 2008 Uncovered Innerspring US 
2001 Garlic Canada  Flat Yarn of Polyester India 
2002 Water proof 
Footwear & sole 
Canada  Siluriformes EU 
 Gas lighter EU  Leather footwear EU 
 Gas lighter Korea 2009 Waterproof Rubber 
Footwear 
Canada 
 Catfish US  Polyethylene Retail 
Carrier Bags 
US 
2003 Oxide zinc EU  Air-conditioner  Turkey  
 Shrimp US 2010 Air-conditioner Argentina 
2004 Metal ring EU  Steel Wire Garment 
Hangers 
US 
 Tyre Turkey 2011 Cold Rolled Coil Indonesia 
 Bicycle EU  Yarn Brazil 
 Steel type EU  Footwear Brazil 
 Stainless fastener EU  Certain Steel Pipe US 
 Fluorescent lamp EU 2012 Steel Wire Garment 
Hangers 
US 
 Surfboard Peru  Utility Scale Wind 
Towers 
US 
2005 Leather Footwear EU  Flat-rolled Stainless 
Steel  
Brazil 
 Fluorescent lamp Egypt  Motorcycles Brazil  
 Spokes Argentina    
2006 Driving belt Turkey    
 Fabric Footwear Peru    
Sources: Adapted from LE Thi Thuy Van & Tong (2009) and VCCI (2012) <URL: 
http://antidumping.vn/page/cases/anti-dumping/Viet-Nam><Accessed 1st June 2012>. 
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APPENDIX 15 Number of new registered non-state business and total 
number of business from 2006-2010  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total number of business  254.2 312.4 377.7 454.1 547 
Newly registered business  46.6 58.2 65.3 84.5 85 
Source: CIEM, 2010and Government Office, 2010 
 
 
APPENDIX 16 GDP growth after the WTO accession 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP Growth % 8.44 8.23 8.46 6.31 5.32 6.78 5.89 
Source: GSO, 2011 
 
 
APPENDIX 17 : FDI, Export and import value after the WTO accession 
(billion USD) 
 Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FDI Commitments 6.83 12 21.34 71.7 21.1 18.6 
Implemented FDI) 3.31 4.1 8.03 11.5 10 11 
Total export value 32.44 39.82 48.56 62.69 57.1 72.23 
% Increase   22.74 21.93 29.09 -8.92 26.52 
Total import value 36.76 44.89 62.77 80.71 69.95 84.84 
% Increase   22.12 39.82 28.60 -13.34 21.29 
Source: GSO, 2010; 2011 
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APPENDIX 18 : Aggregate institution indicators of Vietnam 
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APPENDIX 19 World position of several Vietnamese agricultural 
products 
Commodity World Export Position 2001 World Export Position 2011 
Rice 3rd (after Thailand and India) 2nd (after Thailand) 
Coffee 2nd (after Brazil); 1st for 
Robusta coffee 
2nd (after Brazil), 1st for 
Robusta with 18% of world 
export volume 
Pepper 9.1.1  1st since 2004 accounting for 
30% of the world pepper 
trading 
Cashew Nut 2nd (after India) 2nd (after India) 
Tea 7th 7th 
Rubber 9.1.2  4th (after Thailand, Indonesia 
and Malaysia) 
Source: Thuy Hai, 2011 
 
 
APPENDIX 20 : Vietnam’s commitments on tax cut of some major 
agricultural products 
 WTO Commitment 
No Items MFN tax Tax at 
accession 
Final tax Implementation 
time (years) 
1 Beef 20 20 14 5 
2 Pork 30 30 15 5 
3 Milk materials 20 20 18 2 
4 Finished Milk 30 30 25 2 
5 Processed meat 50 40 22 5 
6 Confectionary 39.3 34.4 25.3 3-5 
7 Beer 80 65 35 5 
8 Alcohol 65 65 45-50 5-6 
9 Cigarettes 100 150 135 3 
10 Cigars 100 150 100 5 
11 Castle feeds 10 10 7 2 
Sources: NCIEC, 2007 
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APPENDIX 21 % Growth of agricultural sector year by year from 2003-
2011 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total  4.5 4.1 3.2 4.1 3.6 6.9 2.8 4.7 4.9 
Cultivation 3.8 4.6 1.4 3.4 3.4 6.9 0.9 4.3 4.7 
Livestock 8.1 2.3 11.4 6.9 4.6 7.3 10.5 6.3 5.7 
Service 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.3 
Source: GSO, 2008; 2011 
 
 
APPENDIX 22 Export of the agriculture products of Vietnam over the 
years (million USD) 
Year (95-02) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Agriculture 1745.8 2159.6 2231.4 2274.3 2545.9 2563.3 2421.3 2396.6 
Forest 153.9 212.2 225.2 191.4 169.2 155.7 176 197.8 
Aqua 621.4 696.5 782 858 973.6 1478.5 1816.4 2021.7 
Total  2521.1 3068.3 3238.6 3323.7 3688.7 4197.5 4413.7 4616.1 
% change   21.7 5.6 2.6 11.0 13.8 5.2 4.6 
          
Year (03-10) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture 2672 3383.6 4467.4 5352.4 7032.8 9239.6 8352.8 
11799.6 
Forest 195.3 180.6 252.5 297.6 408.4 468.7 463.4 
Aqua 2199.6 2408.1 2732.5 3358 3763.4 4510.1 4255.3 5016.3 
Total  5066.9 5972.3 7452.4 9008 11204.6 14218.4 13071.5 16815.9 
% 
Change 
9
.77 
1
7.87 
2
4.78 
2
0.87 
2
4.38 
2
6.90 
-
8.07 
2
8.65 
Source: GSO 2012  
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APPENDIX 23 Total investment and its growth on extended agriculture 
products over the year 
Sources: GSO 2008; 2009; 2012 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 24 FDI in agricultural and aquatic products since WTO 
accession 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No. of project 16 23 29 12 
Registered capital 58.6 223.5 134.5 36.2 
Source: GSO 2012 
 
  
Year 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture, forestry and 
aquatic 
20933 22963 25715 30087 33907 39697 44309 51071 
% Change year by year 9.1.3  9.1.4  1.98 17.00 12.70 17.08 11.62 15.26 
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APPENDIX 25 Number of Banks from 1991 to 1999 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
SOCBs 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Urban Joint Stock 
Banks 
4 16 25 29 29 31 31 31 28 
Rural Joint Stock 
Banks 
0 6 16 16 19 20 20 20 20 
Joint Venture Banks 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 
Foreign Banks 0 5 8 9 18 22 24 25 26 
Source: Kovsted et al, 2005 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 26 : Number of banks by different types of ownership after 
WTO accession 
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Joint stock banks 35 35 36 37 
Joint venture banks 5 5 5 6 
Foreign bank branches 27 35 37 37 
100% foreign owned banks 0 0 5 5 
SOCBs 5 5 5 5 
Policy banks 2 2 2 2 
Source: Linh, 2011 
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APPENDIX 27 : Foreign banks’ stake in domestic banks in 2010 
Domestic Banks Foreign Banks Stake Note 
ACB Standard Chartered 
(SCB) 
11.47% Include 4.13% stake of 
SCB and 7.34% stake of 
its subsidiary, SC APR 
Sacombank ANZ 9.78%  
Eximbank Sumitomo Mitsui 15%  
Techcombank HSBC 20%  
SEABank Societe Generale 20%  
Southern Bank UOB 19.99%  
Orient Commercial Bank BNP Paribas 15%  
VIB Common Wealth 20%  
Habubank Deutsche Bank 10%  
Source: Linh, 2011. 
 
APPENDIX 28 : Market share of banking sector in Viet Nam 
Banking 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
State-owned Commercial 
Banks 
77 80.1 79.3 78.1 75.2 
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 11.3 9.2 10.1 11.2 13.2 
Joint Venture Banks 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 
Branches of Foreign Banks 9.2 8.8 8.1 7.8 8.2 
State-owned Commercial 
Banks 
76.7 79 79.9 78.6 76.9 
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 9.2 9.3 9.5 10.8 11.6 
Joint Venture Banks 1 1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Branches of Foreign Banks 11.3 9.5 8.8 8.9 9.5 
Source: MPI and UNDP, 2006. 
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APPENDIX 29 : Export Volume of Vietnamese Textile and Garment 
industry and of Vinatex in 1995-2010 
 
Source: VINATEX, 2010 
 
 
Effective Rate of Protection of the Textile and garment industry (%) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2015 2020 
Textile and garment 124,71 34,06 34,74 35,28 35,61 33,31 28,59 
Thread fibre 4,00 -4,97 -4,46 -4,06 -3,81 -3,10 -2,66 
Clothing 135,70 58,02 58,44 57,72 57,48 58,26 57,83 
Carpet weaving 56,00 25,02 25,22 25,38 25,47 19,81 20,32 
Embroidery (excluding Carpet) 62,33 17,44 17,69 17,90 18,05 16,03 16,31 
Source: Adapted from Nguyen & Dang, 2009 
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APPENDIX 30 Exports turnover of Vietnamese garment and textile into 
the US market between 2001 and 2010 (Unit: Million USD) 
US Market 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Exports 
Turnover  
49.3 952 2484 2720 2881 3396 4558 5425 
Growth (%) 0.99 193.2 206.9 10.95 10.48 17.8 34.22 19.02 
 
 
APPENDIX 31 : Equitisation progress of the Vinatex from 1998-2009 
Year Total Fully 
Equitised 
Partially 
Equitised 
Year Total Fully 
Equitised 
Partially 
Equitised 
1998 02 02 0 2004 15 08 07 
1999 04 01 03 2005 05 02 03 
2000 04 02 02 2006 19 12 07 
2001 03 01 02 2007 02 01 01 
2002 05 03 02 2008 01 01 0 
2003 18 14 04 2009 02 02 0 
 TOTAL 80 49 31 
Source: Vinatex, 2010 
